Key Issues in Rural Development: A University Graduate Course by Meassick, Mark A.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Master's Capstone Projects Center for International Education
1987
Key Issues in Rural Development: A University
Graduate Course
Mark A. Meassick
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cie_capstones
Part of the Education Commons
This Open Access Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Education at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Meassick, Mark A., "Key Issues in Rural Development: A University Graduate Course" (1987). Master's Capstone Projects. 126.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cie_capstones/126
KEY ISSUES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
A UNIVERSITY GRADUATE COURSE 
by Mark A. Meassick 
Master's Project 
to fulfill CIE requirements 
for M.Ed. degree 
December, 1987 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Abstract 1 
2. Proposal Outline 2 
3. Chapter 1 - Rural Development 
is not Urbane S 
4. Chapter 2 - Learning Style 
Learning Theory 12 
5. Chapter 3 - Putting Style into 
the Classroom 26 
6. Chapter 4 - Facilitating Style 33 
7. Chapter S - Creating a Course with Style 39 
8. Chapter 6 - Learning Modules 46 
9. Bibliography 47 
10. Lesson 1 - Establishing Balance S3 
11. Homework 1 - Formulating the Problem SS 
12. BRAC Case S6 
13. Lesson 2 - Identifying Development 
Problems i66 
14. Homework 2 - Observing Others 168 
lS. Oliver, "Human Nature" 169 
16. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation 193 
17. Vogeler, "Dialectics of Understanding 
the Third World" 214 
18. Shah, "The Story of Fire" 227 
19. Lesson 3 - Intervening and Motivating 
Who for What? 230 
20. Homework 3 - Affecting Others 
Effectively 231 
21. Hewes, "Political and Administrative 
Aspects of Rural Development" 232 
22. Heilbroner, "The GNP" 24S 
23. Lesson 4 - Differentiating Help 
and Hindrance 2S9 
24. Homework 4 - Designing a Rural 
Development Approach 261 
2S. Gurley, "Rural Development in China" 262 
26. Gudeman, "Implications for a Rural 
Development Strategy" 283 
27. Lesson S - Learning Style 289 
28. Homework S - Establishing Trust 290 
29. Hildebrand, "The Sondeo Approach" 291 
30. Marcotte, "Farming Systems Research" 301 
31. Lacroix, Integrated Rural Development 
in Latin America 310 
32. Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid 340 
33. Letham, "Identification and Design of 
Project Related Technical 
Assistance 3S3 
34. Lesson 6 - Building Trust 361 
35. Homework 6 - Managing Rural Development 362 
36. Heaver, "Bureaucratic Incentives" 363 
37. Lesson 7 - The Green Revolution Game 400 
38. Homework 7 - Managing for Solutions 401 
39. Lesson 8 - Managing Ambiguity 402 
40. Homework 8 - Oranizing Management 403 
41. BRAC, "Unraveling Networks of 
Corruption 404 
42. Dunn, "Nature of Social Learning" 415 
43. Korten, "Learning Process Approach" 418 
44. Johnston, "Organizing the Rural Poor" 425 
45. Shah, "Fatima the Spinner and the Tent" 462 
46. Lesson 9 - Empowering Yourself 464 
47. Case - "The Road to Hell" 465 
48. Homework 9 - Empowering Others 471 
49. Alfonso, "Empowering Rural Communities 472 
SO. Hall, Beyond Culture 483 
51. De Franco, "Interdependency in 
Nicaragua" 496 
52. Lesson 10 - Ending Gracefully 505 
53. Homework 10 - Analyzing your Case 506 
54. Evans, "Analyses of Case Histories 507 
55. Batten, "Obtaining, Selecting, 
and Editing Cases 510 
56. Thongyu, "Reflections of a Village 
Development Worker 517 
57. Oxfam manual for development workers 520 
58. FUNDEAC (Colombia) Case 534 
ABSTRACT 
A graduate course on rural development issues is presented 
that focusses primarily on the processes involved in development 
both at a personal and abstract level. A theoretical foundation 
for the course is outlined based on David Kolb's theory of 
experiential learning. This model is transcribed into learning 
environments necessary to focus participant awareness of issues 
surrounding their own learning style. The role of the facilitator 
who demands attention to learning style as well as content in 
rural development is defined, utilizing Malcolm Knowles' 
andragogical concepts. Finally the course curriculum is 
presented, followed by lesson plans and readings supplemental to 






Key Issues in Rural Development: 
A University Graduate Course 
The Center for International Education needs a course to 
address issues in rural development. Many center graduates return 
to the field and get involved in some aspect of rural 
development. Many incoming students have expressed a desire to 
take such a course. There is no course within the University that 
addresses rural development as a field. 
Rural development is a very broad field, grappling with 
issues that require knowledge in sociology, economics, 
anthropology and education. The artificial academic delineations 
of these disciplines often fail to reflect the complex reality, 
the interrelationships and the interdependence of issues that 
people in rural communities face in defining and solving their 
problems or in just living their lives. The central problem in 
developing a course to deal with this complexity is to integrate 
the process as part of the course content. This integration 
provides the opportunity to experience the ambiguous nature of 
rural development activities. 
A development worker living in a rural community must be 
able to fit the different bodies of knowledge together in a way 
that is apporpriate to address a specific issue. Different parts 
from different disciplines are needed for different problems. Is 
that ambiguous enough? Skills to confront ambiguity are the types 




How would a course curriculum on rural development for 
university graduate students be structured and what would the 
content include so that thinking- feeling- and action-oriented 
learning styles are interwoven to create a vibrant experiential 
setting in the classroom to learn different aspects of rural 
development? 
Implementing questions 
1. What is the rationale for a course in rural development 
and how does this rationale affect the course structure? 
la. What issue/topic/areas of rural development will provide 
a useful a framework for the curriculum? 
2. What are the factors that typify different learning 
styles that people use and why are they important for a 
course in rural development? 
3. What kind of classroom activities and case study usages 
will achieve the shifts in different learning styles within 
each participant? 
4. What is the role of the facilitator/teacher to create a 
situation that participants can learn in, learn from and 
learn through? 
S. What kind of curriculum design will fuel learning 
utilizing the different learning styles? 
6. What will each session include and how will each session 
be structured in view of the above considerations? 
Significance of Study 
This study is intended for three distinct audiences. 
Professors in the field of international education who have not 
been in the field for significant amounts of time to adequately 
experience the ~urrent ambiguities surrounding issues in rural 
development will be able to use the techniques in this course. 
Participants will be able to assess the merits of a course 
designed deliberately to shift their style of learning. Other 
curriculum development researchers may benefit from the approach 
outlined in this study. 
Review of the Literature 
Two primary sources will be used in this study. Case studies 
and analyses of rural development from different perspectives 
will provide the substance of the course. Resources on simulation 
and games, learning theory in the classroom, and curriculum 
design will serve to develop the rationale and structure for the 
course. Specific resources on economics, foreign aid, technology 
transfer, diffusion of innovation, management and non-formal 
education will provide course readings and substance for class 
discussions. 
Clarification and Delimitation of This Study 
Assumptions - The primary assumption of this study is that 
people learn best through praxis. As a result it is necessary to 
create experiences in the classroom that provide a basis for 
reflection. I also assume that techniques oriented toward praxis 
transfer skills and create opportunities for paradigm shifts 
within individuals. The study also assumes that reflection can be 
facilitated through writing about experiences. 
Methodology 
This study will primarily be a review of the literature. The 
final product, a course manual, may be tested later on, but that 
assessment is not a part of this study. 
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Chapter 1 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IS NOT URBANE 
A Working Definition of Rural Development 
There is no definitive strategy to promote rural 
development. Rural development describes a variety of unrefined 
methods and strategies to change some behavior or pattern in a 
group of people or in a community in some particular way to 
produce an outcome, usually called an improvement. Many observers 
of rural development agree that improvement is dependent upon 
many factors inherent in and external to the people affected. 
This systemic definition offers a new and exciting way to 
approach rural development that encorporates an appreciation for 
relativity. Thre is a relationship between various endogenous 
factors that affect development strategies, between different 
exogenous factors and between factors endogenous and exogenous to 
the community. Calling it "appropriate" relativity better 
illuminates the point. Like all terms prefixed with "appropriate" 
the key is to know where to use what when, or when to use what 
where. 
In other words it is crucial to look at the 
interrelationship betweeen the setting of an event (or a behavior 
or pattern), the event and intervening in the event. Looking at 
the interrelationships is only the passive part of the story. 
Being an effective, creative and positive innovator, instigator, 
catalyst, change agent, motivator, animateur or interventionist 
~, 
requires an act. When one is in such a role not to act is to act. 
Hence the need for proper tools for action, and the equipment and 
processes necessary for tool production. 
I still have not offered a precise definition of rural 
development. Every definition in the literature of rural 
development is suitable to the definer. Unfortunately, there are 
many people affected by rural development who are not yet in the 
literature. What do they think? For those people rural 
development is not rural it is "my" development or "my families" 
development or "my neighbors" development. "Rural" is the term 
used by outsiders to label a group of people who have a certain 
characteristic. It is not a label those groups frequently use to 
describe themselves. 
Rural development includes the myriad of needs of all people 
involved in rural development. It is not just the needs of the 
rural people themselves, their leaders, their neighbors, their 
families and friends. A definition of rural development must 
include the needs of outsiders who define events and phenomena in 
their own language, who give money as charity or for opportunity 
as they perceive it, who earn a living, who conscientize oth~r~, 
who work for social change, or who desire to gain a new 
experience. These needs all contribute to what rural development 
is. 
Rationale for a Course in Rural Development 
The Center for International Education and the University of 
Massachusetts have periodically conducted courses in rural 
development. There has been no such course during the past five 
years. Many students in the CIE program in particular have 
expressed a desire for such a course. Most international programs 
usually address some aspects of rural development, whether it is 
in planning educational programs, improving literacy, improving 
health or assessing employment opportunities. This makes a 
compelling case for the re-introduction of such a course at CIE. 
This course is designed to help outsiders question there 
assumptions about rural development, rural poverty and rural 
people. I assume that everyone who would take this course can no 
longer be considered a rural person. Each person may have a 
different understanding and appreciation of rural lifestyles but 
by pursuing graduate study they have removed themselves from the 
people of rural areas and now approach the problems in their 
lives differently. 
I want the course to equip participants with the skills to 
analyze different rural situations, with the knowledge to be able 
to ask informed questions for assessment and evaluation and with 
the self-awareness to persistently question the assumptions they 
bring to the rural setting. This last goal leads to an important 
assumption of the course. I am assuming that engaging in the 
self-analysis process is a skill that can be used as a training 
tool to promote rural development. An underlying strategy will be 
to create situations for self-analysis and to become aware of how 
this process occurs. 
Course Structure 
Getting people to question their assumptions initiates a 
process that has been described by others as transcendence or as 
paradigm shifts. An environment that allows the opportunity for 
self-reflection which may or may not promote these shifts 
requires careful planning and innovative techniques. The goal of 
this course is not to force paradigm shifts within individuals. 
This is not only very improbable in any setting, but also not a 
desirable primary goal in this course. 
While I want the opportunities for participants to change to 
be created in the course of the course, I also want them to 
experience other levels of learning. I, as the course designer, 
can only mark out a path to be explored; the followers of this 
path will perceive the landmarks in their own way. In this case 
the critical lesson is to learn that what one perceives as a 
landmark may merely be a stone and the real landmark may be the 
path itself. Praxis can create a diversification in an 
individual's interpretation of events. An important part of this 
course will be to create experiences that are "hands on," through 
reading, discussion or games that allow individuals to reflect on 
how they interpret events. 
Transfering information in such a way that people learn new 
viewpoints and alternative world views of others is also as 
important as questioning one's own assumptions. It could be 
argued that the international experience that many participants 
will bring to the course demonstrates that people have the 
ability to view the world from another perspective. I assume 
that, while the experience may have been an opportunity to learn 
new perspectives, participants may not be aware of how such 
changes may be induced or imparted to others. After all, inherent 
in rural development is some perceived need for people to change 
and adapt to new circumstances that rise in the course of 
history. One way to promote opportunities for these self-
questioning moments with useful information is to create a 
learning environment that encorporates thinking-, feeling- and 
action-oriented activities that push the participants to 
experience the issues of rural development, 
How can this learning environment be created? One method, 
justified in the next chapter, involves blending different 
learning techniques around each topic. The blend allows the 
learning style focus to shift at intervals so that participants 
have the chance to shift how they view and interpret a certain 
situation and material. These "shifts" by the facilitator will in 
some small way simulate shifts in perspectives that are necessary 
for development workers who must encorporate multiple 
perspectives and explore wide varieties of considerations when 
engaged in effective development activities. There is no 
justification for this idea; it is my intuition and part of the 
experiment of this course. 
An important implication that arises is how can a 
participant recognize when such a shift has occurred? I will 
assume that through a process of identifying a particular 
development problem and analysing it from a variety of 
perspectives presented throughout the course, participants will 
be able to discover changes in their perceptions. This will 
require tightly structured learning assignments that build into a 
final documentation of the development in each person's thought 
surrounding some issue in rural development. Each participant 
will produce an account of a rural development problem of special 
interest to them, applying new concepts and ideas as they are 
presented throughout the semester. Hopefully, the evolution of 
thought will be apparent in the document. 
Course Objectives 
1. To allow participants to analyze their attitudes, knowledge 
and experiences surrounding rural development and to assess and 
evaluate these as new material and ideas are presented and 
experienced. 
2. To broaden class participants' understanding of various roles 
played by practitioners, participants and other actresses in 
rural development. 
3. To provide a foundation for analytical skills for participants 
to act effectively as practitioners in sustainable rural 
development programs. 
4. To examine rural development from a multi-discilplinary 
perspective so that participants are aware of the economic, 
political, sociological, anthropological, and educational 
perspectives on rural development; and to discern the artificial 
convenience of these delineations. 
5. To evaluate a course design that promotes learning through the 
use of techniques that shift focus from thinking-oriented to 
feeling-oriented to action-oriented learning styles so that 
different learning opportunities are created within and between 
each participant. 
Primary Issues 
1. Perspectives - A brief historical outline of rural development 
approaches, and a case study to illuminate the interests of 
various groups involved in rural development activities and to 
provide a common reference point for the participants. 
2. Intervention, motivation, and justification - analysis of the 
need for rural development efforts and particular strategies to 
discover the implications it has on the people affected. 
3. Designs of rural development strategies - survey and analysis 
of previous strategies and generation of possible alternative 
strategies for sustainable development in the future. 
4. Management and administration of rural development - analysis 
of different management strategies and their implications for 
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design and participation. 
5. Empowerment, participation and liberation - analysis of how 
rural development activities affect and are affected by these 
ideas and by different definitions of these ideas. 
6. Development of guidelines for effective and sustainable rural 
development strategies - a look at evaluation criteria and 
influences in the decision-making process that inhibit and 
enhance effectiveness, including the generation of new ideas to 
improve the effectiveness of rural development programs. 
Secondary Issues to Provide Perspectives on Primary Issues 
1. The economic and political perspectives on rural development. 
2. The gender perspectives on rural development. 
3. The anthropological perspectives on development. 
4. The educational perspectives on rural development. 
5. The technological perspectives of rural development. 
A Final Word 
Each of these secondary issues will be considered in all of 
the primary issues under discussion. By presenting a wide variety 
of points to view on each topic I hope that the participants will 
develop the skills to integrate information from a variety of 
fields to address the rural development problem that they have 
identified and are exploring. 
i\ 
Chapter 2 
LEARNING STYLES LEARNING THEORY 
A Brief Perspective on Learning Theory 
Most of the literature addressing learning theory has at 
least three primary biases: it focuses on how children learn, 
with mere brief allusions to adult learning; it is highly 
specialized, usually directed to cognitive learning or motivation 
or the structural aspects of learning; and its experimental 
research is centered in Western cultural contexts. In spite of 
this skewness, learning theory has provided valuable, far-
reaching and extensive insight into how human beings learn 
things. The skewness however also presents problems in adapting 
the knowledge generated by learning theory to specific groups. 
The difficulty is not making reasonable generalizations based on 
research findings, but in translating this knowledge into useful 
tools for adult education. 
In the past there has been specific focus on adult learning 
needs. These have been present in the writings of William James, 
John Dewey, Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson and Kurt Lewin to name the 
most important. It was Erikson and Lewin whose writings placed 
prominant importance on how adults learn and what environments 
facilitate adult learning. Kolb has taken these ideas and 
formulated a theory of experiential learning that provides the 
skeleton for this course in rural development. 
Kalb's ideas are important because they focus primarily on 
how adults perceive and process information. This chapter will 
IL 
outline Kolb's theory of experiential learning alluding to why 
this approach is appropriate for a course in rural development. 
It will not elaborate on the development of the theory or discuss 
the contributions of the aforementioned scholars. It is important 
to demonstrate that this learning skeleton can support muscle for 
conceptualizing ideas and circulation for processing information 
about rural development in particular. 
Experiential Learning Theory 
"Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created 
through the transformation of experience."l There are six 
important characteristics of experiential learning: 
1. Learning is best conceived as a process, not in terms of 
outcomes. 
2. Learning is a continuous process grounded in experience. 
3. The process of learning requires the resolution of 
conflicts between dialectally opposed modes of adaptation 
to the world. 
4. Learning is an holistic process of adaptation to the 
world. 
5. Learning involves transactions between the person and the 
environment. 
6. Learning is the process of creating knowledge. 
Learning as a process rests on the assumption that "ideas 
are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but are formed 
and reformed through experience."(p.26) Defining learning in 
terms of outcomes becomes "a definition for nonlearning in the 
sense that the failure to modify ideas and habits as a result of 
experience is maladaptive."(p.26) The purpose of education 
should be to stimulate inquiry and skill in the process of 
1 Kolb, David A. Experiential Learning: Experience as The 
Source of Learning and Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. (1984), p. 38. No other footnotes will be 
recorded, all of the information in this chapter is excerpted 
from this work. 
knowledge getting, not to memorize a body of knowledge. This is 
also refered to by Freire as the "banking" concept of education. 
It is through the interaction of expectation and experience 
that learning occurs. Hegel said that "any experience that does 
not violate expectation is not worthy of the name experience." 
(p.28) "The fact that learning is a continuous process grounded 
in experience has important educational implications. Put simply, 
it implies that all learning is relearning. How easy and tempting 
it is in designing a course to think of the learner's mind as 
being as blank as the paper on which we scratch our outline. 
Everyone enters every learning situation with more or less 
articulate ideas about the topic at hand. Thus, one's job as an 
educator is not only to implant new ideas but also to dispose of 
or modify old ones."(p.28) It is critical that educators 
recognize that it is not enough to merely set people off in small 
groups to discuss issues or to lecture them. The educator must 
engage and direct the learner in an educational process that 
"begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, 
examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more 
refined ideas into the person's belief systems"(p.28) if the 
learning process to be facilitated. 
The resolution of conflict has been ref ered to by Freire as 
"praxis" and by Piaget as accommodation and assimilation. For 
Freire this conflict is resolved through dialogue. "Learning is 
by its very nature a tension- and conflict-filled process."(p.30) 
Effective learners need four different kinds of abilities: 
concrete experience abilities, where the learner can be involved 
IL<-
fully, openly and without bias in new experiences; reflective 
observation abilities, being able to reflect on and observe 
experiences from many perspectives; abstact conceptualization 
abilities, being able to create concepts that integrate their 
observations into logically sound theories; and active 
experimentation abilities, where learners are able to use 
theories to make decisions and solve problems.(p.30) Integrating 
these four abilities is difficult since they are polar opposites. 
"Learners must continually choose which set of learning abilities 
he or she will bring to bear in any specific learning situation." 
(p.30) 
~C°"""" "'P"'''°'"\ 
Testing implications Observations and 
of concepts in new reflections 
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concepts and generalizations 
Figure 2.1 The Lewinian Experiential Learning Model 
Learning is holistic in the sense that it "involves the 
integrated functioning of the total organism - thinking, feeling, 
perceiving, and behaving."(p.31) Most research about human 
behavior has been very specialized and to integrate it all into a 
holistic framework would be simplistic and impossible. "Yet if we 
are to understand human behavior, particularly in any practical 
way, we must in some way put together all the pieces that have 
been so carefully analyzed. In addition to knowing how we think 
and how we feel, we must also know when behavior is governed by 
thought and when by feeling. In addition to addressing the nature 
of specialized human functions, experiential learning theory is 
c IJ 
also concerned with how these functions are integrated by the 
person into a holistic adaptive posture toward the world."(p.32) 
"The transactional relationship between the person and the 
environment is symbolized in the dual meanings of the term 
'experience' - one subjective and personal, the other objective 
and environmental."(p.35) "The concept of transaction implies a 
fluid interpenetrating relationship between objective conditions 
and subjective experience, such that once they become related, 
both are essentially changed."(p.36) 
Learning must also be understood in terms of the nature and 
forms of human knowledge and processes that create knowledge. 
Epistimological considerations offer explanations for solving 
problems that are rooted in conflicting assumptions about the 
nature of knowledge and truth. "Experiential learning theory 
provides a perspective from which to approach these pracital 
problems, suggesting a typology of different knowledge systems 
that results from the way the dialectic modes of concrete 
experience and abstract conceptualization and the modes or active 
experimentation and reflective observation are characteristically 
resolved in different fields of inquiry."(p.37) 
These primary characteristics of experiential learning can 
be viewed as being parallel to characteristics of rural 
development. Over time experience in rural development has 
demonstrated that it is indeed a process and that there are no 
quick remedies. This process is continuous; there is no clear 
point at which a community becomes developed. Thirdly, effective 
rural development necessitates the resolution of conflicts 
I' to 
between many opposing factors; macroeconomic planning vs. 
microeconomic and social consequences; outside assistance vs. 
community self-reliance; urban-oriented interpretation of need 
vs. local rural knowledge; or, providing needed services vs. 
developing sustainable local institutional capabilities. 
In view of the many conflicts present it is important to 
employ a holistic approach that attempts to address the 
interrelatedness between conflicts and within conflicting 
approaches to rural development. Adaptation of approaches based 
on results must occur and change through time and space. There is 
much distinguishment between short-term performance of a strategy 
or idea, the medium-range learning that occurs in communities and 
agencies, and the long-term development of communites and people 
involved in rural development. These three perspectives create 
different types of knowledge, each restructuring priorities and 
understanding of the knowledge creator. This knowledge will form 
the basis of further action and hence determines the specific 
approach to be employed. 
If agents of rural development can begin to become conscious 
of their own assumptions and knowledge perspectives, they can 
better integrate information about rural development for 
themselves and help others to integrate information. One way that 
will promote this is an understanding of learning patterns and 
learning styles. 
Learning Styles 
Kolb delineates the four types of learning that depict the 
adult learning cycle. They were described earlier as concrete 
i7 
experience (CE), reflection and observation (RO), abstract 
conceptualization (AC), and active experimentation. These 
learning types symbolize a process and a style of learning. "This 
is not a four step process. Each of these stages involves some 
overlap, interaction and flexibility. A creative tension exists 
between Active Experimentation and Reflection and Observation 
that, if nurtured helps the learner to have a more enriching 
learning experience. This is equally true for Concrete Experience 
and Abstract Conceptualization."2 
Juxtaposed between these learning processes are styles that 
depict the way learning abilities manifest themselves. "Through 
socialization experiences in family, school and work, we come to 
resolve the conflicts between being active and reflective and 
between being immediate and analytical in characteristic ways, 
thus lending reliance on one of the four basic forms of knowing: 
divergence, assimilation, convergence, and accommodation." (Kolb, 
p.77) Each individual develops a learning style that incorporates 
these four styles, though some aspects are stronger or weaker 
than others. Each of these styles can be described as follows: 
The convergent learning style relies primarily on the 
dominant learning abilities of abstract conceptualization 
and active experimentation. The greatest strength of this 
approach lies in problem-solving, decision-making, the 
practical application of ideas and where there is a single 
correct answer or solution to a question or problem. 
Convergers are controlled in expressing their emotions and 
they prefer dealing with technical tasks and problems rather 
than social and interpersonal issues. 
The divergent learning style has the opposite learning 
2 Mullinex, Bonnie. "Rebuilding a Tree of Knowledge: Adult 
Learning in Theory, Fact and Practice," Comprehensive Examination 
Paper, University of Massachusetts-Amherst (May, 1987), p. 44. 
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strengths from convergence, emphasizing concrete experienc 
and reflective observation. The greatest strength of this 
orientation lies in imaginative ablitity and awareness o~ 
meaning and values, being able to view concrete situations 
from many perspectives. The emphasis is on adaptation by 
observation rather than action. Divergers are better in 
situations that call for alternative ideas and implications, 
are interested in people, and are imaginative and feeling-
oriented. 
In assimilation, the dominant learning abilities are 
abstract conceptualization and reflective observation. The 
greatest strength of this orientation lies in inductive 
reasoning and the ability to create theoretical models and 
in assimilating disparate observations into an integrative 
explanation. Assimilators, like convergers, focus more on 
ideas and abstract concepts rather than people. Ideas, 
however are judged less in this orientation by their 
practical value. It is more important that the theory be 
logically sound and precise. 
The accommodative learning style has the opposite strengths 
from assimilation, emphasizing concrete experience and 
active experimentation. The greatest strength of this 
orientation lies in doing things, in carrying out plans and 
tasks and getting involved in new experiences. The adaptive 
emphasis of this orientation is on opportunity seeking, risk 
taking and action. Accommodators are adept at adapting 
themselves to changing immediate circumstances. They tend to 
solve problems in an intuitive trial-and-error manner, 
relying heavily on other people for information rather than 
their own analytic ability. They are at ease with people, 
but are sometimes viewed as impatient and pushy. (Kolb, 
p.77-78) 
The figure below illustrates the relationship between the 
learning processes and the learning styles. 
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The diagram's third dimension will complete our discusssion 
of experiential learning theory. This dimension provides focus on 
the human development process. "Development on each dimension 
proceeds from a state of embeddedness, defensiveness, dependence 
and reaction to a state of self-actualization, independence, 
proaction and self-direction. This process is marked by 
increasing complexity and relativism in dealing with the world 
and one's experience and by higher-level integrations of the 
dialectic conflicts among the four primary learning modes." 
(p.140) Progress throught the stages of acquisition, 
specialization and integration will vary depending on learners' 
individual personality and cultural experience. "Even though the 
stages of the developmental growth process are depicted in the 
form of a simple three-layer cone, the actual process of growth 
in any single life history probably proceeds through successive 
oscillations from one stage to another. Thus, a person may move 
from stage two to stage three in several separate subphases of 
integrative advances, followed by consolidation or regression 
into specialization." (p.141) 
Acquisition is the stage of acquiring basic learning 
abilities and cognitive structures. "Development is marked by the 
gradual emergence of internalized structures that allow [one] to 
gain a sense of self that is separate and distinct from the 
surrounding environment." (p.142) It is developing the capacity 
to learn, not necessarily the actual learning of specific skills. 
Kolb focuses this stage mainly in childhood, though it may be 
interpreted differently, depending on cultural considerations. 
Specialization describes how "people shaped by cultural, 
educational, and organizational socialization forces develop 
increased competence in a specialized mode of adaptation that 
enables them to master the particular life tasks they encounter 
in their chosen career (in the broadest sense of the word) 
paths." (p.142) "Stability and change in life paths are seen as 
resulting from the interaction between internal personal dynamics 
and external social forces, emerging from which is the tendency 
for there to be a closer and closer match between self 
characteristics and environmental demands." (p.143) Most 
importantly of all for a classroom course is that "development in 
general tends to follow a path toward accentuation of personal 
characteristics and skills, in that development is a product of 
the interaction between choices and socialization experiences 
that match these choice dispositions for later experience." 
(p.143) 
The personal styles tend to gravitate toward specific kinds 
of experience while interpretations of experience, already pre-
selected (not as deliberately as the word), tend to reinforce 
that specific personal learning style. "The self in this stage is 
defined primarily in terms of content - things I can do, 
experiences I have had, goods and qualities I possess. The 
primary mode of relating to the world is interaction - I act on 
the world (build a bridge, raise the family) and the world acts 
on me (pays me money, fills me with bits of knowledge), but 
neither is fundementally changed by the other." (p.143) 
The specialization level accomplishments of security and 
achievement often place personal fulfillment needs in the 
background. "This drive for fulfillment is thwarted by the needs 
of [Western?] civilization for specialized role performance." 
(p.146) One's style serves to define and shape the flow of 
experience providing more direction and structure to one's 
development. The question becomes, how does one break this 
mutually reinforcing pattern of experience and style and choose 
other types of experiences and define them differently? 
"Integrative consciousness introduces purpose and focus to 
this random process." (p.144) "To achieve inte.grative 
consciousness, one must first free oneself from the domination of 
specialized interpretative consciousness." Jung called it the 
process of individuation. Actually saying what integrative 
consciousness is presents an impossibility; "integrative 
consciousness by its very nature cannot be described by any 
single interpretation.'' (p.158) Integrative consciousness has a 
transcendent quality of "climbing out of the specialized adaptive 
orientations of our worldly social roles." (p.158) 
Kolb describes integrative levels of predominantly 
affective, perceptual, symbolic and behavioral interpretations of 
experience: 
The integrative levels of affective complexity begin with 
the relativistic appreciation (in the fullest sense of the 
term) of value systems and conclude with an active value 
commitment in the context of that relativism. Integration in 
perceptual complexity begins with a similar relativistic 
appreciation of observational schemes and perspectives and 
concludes with intuition - the capacity for choosing 
meaningful perspectives and frameworks for interpreting 
experience. With integrative consciousness, symbolic 
complexity achieves first the ability to match creatively 
symbol systems and concrete objects and finally the capacity 
for finding and solving meaningful problems. Behavioral 
complexity at the integrative level begins withy the 
development of an experimental, hypothesis-testing approach 
to action that introduces new tentativeness and flexibility 
to goal-oriented behavior - tentativeness that is tempered 
by the active commitment to responsible action in a world 
that can never by fully known because it is continually 
being created. (p.159) 
The Skeleton for Supporting Rural Development 
Experiential learning theory as outlined above has many 
obvious· analogies with rural development theories. While it may 
be accused of having a cultural bias, gender bias, class bias or 
value bias, it does offer some explanation for learning that is 
much more holistic than other approaches. It can establish a 
foundation to allow participants in a course to build their own 
model of rural development and learning. By consciously 
developing and alluding to parallels between learning styles, 
human development and rural development issues and approaches, an 
interactive environment can be created that demands intergration 
of not only information but processes. Attempting some holistic 
approach to teaching may lead to more holistic learning. Analogy 
and metaphor are useful tools to illustrate complexity, to 
facilitate exploration at many levels and to maintain perspective 
of "the big picture." 
Many of the analogies are obvious. Different learning style 
biases could be construed as analogous to different approaches to 
rural development. Many development efforts have stemmed from a 
convergent learner bias, that there is a right answer. This could 
be interpreted as typifying the modernization model of 
development which views development in mostly technical terms. 
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The outlook purveyed by dependency theorists could be viewed as 
the creation of people having a more assimilative learning style. 
Dependency theorists place importance on the soundness of their 
theory and is less focussed on people's living standards or 
conditions (unless it adds to the preciseness of the theory). 
I am not hypothesizing that these analogies are true, but 
illustrating that these parallels imply that experiential 
learning theory can create a solid framework to address rural 
development issues and concerns. Why is this parallel important 
and how is it useful? Marshall McCluhan said that "the medium is 
the message." If an approach to teaching rural development issues 
can be found that mirrors the processes involved in rural 
development, then the opportunity for lasting learning is 
created. For instance, if participants are in a course that 
attempts to present information so that it caters to each of the 
four primary learning styles, they may gain insight in how to be 
more effective in their own work later on as facilitators and 
imporve their abilities to assess learning opportunities for 
others. They may not, but at least an opportunity has arisen that 
might otherwise have been missed. 
Determining how to best transfer the foundations of 
experiential learning theory, learning styles, human development 
and rural development into the classroom will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 
PUTTING STYLE INTO THE CLASSROOM 
The theory of experiential learning has created an overall 
framework of learning goals for this course. Linking performance, 
learning and development within the individual and within the 
content of rural development issues, questioning assumptions and 
integrating different learning styles becomes the skeleton of the 
course. Transferring these goals into achievable objectives will 
require consideration of learning style, growth and creativity of 
each participant. These process objectives will later be viewed 
in conjunction with the content objectives of the course. 
The Stylizing of the Classroom 
There are two factors Kolb outlines that inhibit the 
consideration of learning styles in the classroom; accentuation 
and specialization. "Feldman and Newcomb describe the 
accentuation process as it affects the college experience: 
Whatever the characteristics [learning styles] of 
an individual that selectively propel her toward 
particular educational settings-going to college, 
selecting a particular one, choosing an academic 
specialization, associating with a particular group of 
peers-these same characteristics are apt to be 
reinforced and extended by the experiences incurred in 
those settings. (Kolb, p.164) 
"Thus, if students with a particular learning style choose a 
field whose knowledge structure is one that prizes and nurtures 
their style of learning, then accentuation of that approach to 
learning is likely to occur." (Kolb, p.164) 
Specialization in learning style is a direct result of 
accentuation. Robert Altmeyer demonstrated the affect of the 
accentuation process and that it did indeed lead to specialized 
learning styles. In a study of engineering/science and fine-arts 
students "the surprising finding was that engineering/science 
students decreased in creative thinking and fine-arts students 
decreased in analytic reasoning over the college years." (Kolb 
p.166) So not only does accentuation lead to strengthening 
certain specialized learning styles, it also tends to weaken the 
other learning styles. 
There have been many new techniques employed in the 
classroom to improve management of the learning process. These 
include: "computer-aided instruction; experienced-based learning 
materials in math, science, and psychology; programmed 
instruction; games and simulations; and small group work." (Kolb, 
p.196) "The weakness of nearly all these techniques is the 
failure to recognize and explicitly provide for the differences 
in learning styles that are characteristic of both individuals 
and subject matters." (Kolb, p.196) The task of this course is to 
make explicit reference to learning style so that learners have 
the opportunity to make their own learning style more flexible 
and adaptable. 
"Any educational program, course design, or classroom 
session can be viewed as having degrees of orientation toward 
each of the four learning modes in the experiential learning 
model, labeled as affective, perceptual, symbolic, and 
behavioral, to connote the overall climate they create and the 
particular learning skill or mode they require. Thus an affective 
environment emphasizes the experiencing of concrete events; a 
symbolic environment emphasizes abstract conceptualization; a 
perceptual environment stresses observation and appreciation; a 
behavioral environment stresses action taking in situations with 
real consequences. Any particular learning experiencecan have 
some or all of these orientations to differing degrees at the 
same time." (Kolb, p.197) Unfortunately, these styles are rarely 
if ever made explicit in the classroom setting. 
There seem to be four cues that can serve to assess the 
environmental orientation of a course: 
1. The primary source or use of information; 
2. The rules guiding learner behavior; 
3. The facilitator's role; 
4. The provision for feedback. (Kolb, p.197) 
Each of the four learning envorinments in their absolute sense 
elicit a picture that can be described using these four cues as 
follows: 
Affective complex learning environments are ones in 
which (1) the emphasis is on experiencing what it is 
actually like to be a professional in the field under study. 
(2) Learners are engaged in activities that simulate or 
mirror what they might do as graduates, or they are 
encouraged toe reflect upon an experience to generate these 
insights and feelings about themselves. The information 
discussed and generated often comes from expressions of 
feelings, values, opinions by the learner. (3) The 
facilitator serves as a role model for the field or 
profession, relating to the learner on a personal basis and 
as a colleague. (4) There is accepted discussion and 
critique of how the course is proceeding, making events 
emergent rather than prescribed. 
Perceptually complex learning environments are ones in 
which (1) the primary goal is to understand something: to be 
able to identify relationships between concepts, to be able 
to define problems for investigation, to be able to collect 
relevant information, to be able to research a question. To 
do this (2) learners are encouraged to view the topic or 
subject matter from different perspectives (their own 
experience, expert opinion, literature) and in different 
ways (listen, observe, write, discuss, act out, think). If a 
task is being done or a problem is being solved, the 
emphasis is more on how it gets done, the process, than on 
the solution. Learners are left to conclude answer define 
criteria of success for themselves .and individual 
differences are allowed and used as a basis for further 
understanding. In this process, (3) the facilitator serves 
as a mirror or process consultant. He or she is non-
evaluative, answers questions with questions, suggests 
instead of critiquing and relates current issues to larger 
ones. (4) There is planned time spent looking back at 
previous steps, events or decisions in order to guide the 
learner in future activities. 
Symbolically complex learning environments are ones in 
which (1) the learner is involved in trying to solve a 
probelm for which there is usually a right or best solution. 
(2) The source of information, topic or problem being dealt 
with is abstract, in that it is removed from the present and 
presented via reading, data, pictures, lecture inputs, etc. 
In handling such information the learner is both guided and 
constrained by externally imposed rules of inference, such 
as symbols, computer technology, jargon, theorems, graphical 
keys, or protocols. (3) The facilitator is the accepted 
representative of the body of knowledge - judging and 
evaluating learner output, interpreting information that 
cannot be dealt with by the rules of inference, and 
enforcing methodology and the scientific rigor of the field 
of study. (4) Success is measured against the right or best 
solution, expert opinion, or other wise rigid criteria 
imposed by the teacher or accepted in the field of study. 
Behaviorally complex learning environments are those in 
which (1) the emphasis is upon actively applying knowledge 
or skills to a practical problem. The problem need not have 
a right or best answer, but it does have to be something the 
learner can relate to, value and feel some intrinsic 
satisfaction from having solved. (2) Completing the task is 
essential. Although there may be an externally imposed 
deadline or periodic checkpoints for which reports or other 
information are required, most of the learner's time is hers 
to manage. She is thus concerned with what effect her 
present behavior will have vis-a-vis the overall task to be 
done. The learner is always left to make decisions/choices 
about what to do next or how to proceed. (3) The teacher can 
be available as coach or advisor, but primarily at the 
learner's request or initiative. (4) Success is measured 
against a criteria associated with the task: how well 
something worked, feasibility, sellability, client 
acceptance, cost, aesthetic quality, etc. (Kolb, p.198) 
Of course every learning environment has some degree of each 
of these characteristics. While the language Kolb has used to 
describe the learning style environments, along with the 
experiential learning theory, seem to create a sense of 
artificiality, the ideas and concepts described by the words have 
some intuitive validity for me. Someone else may discount these 
descriptions on the basis of the lack of cultural considerations, 
gender considerations or value considerations. This is equally 
valid. However, it is extremely necessary to attempt to create 
some theoretical construct to practice learning management. 
Without some kind of evolving framework learners and facilitators 
do become entrapped in their own styles of learning. By taking 
this model and attempting to apply it to a classroom setting a 
dialectic between theory and practice, action and reflection will 
allow an opportunity to refine the model and to refine the 
experience. Without the model refinement is more remote. 
The obvious challenge to face is inventing a course design 
that allows all of these different environments to be experienced 
by the learner. The details of this design will be elaborated 
later. The application of learning styles adds an important 
dimension to the classroom setting. A dimension of learning 
process is created with learning content. A creative tension is 
developed between the learner and herself. This operates 
concommitantly with learner and facilitator and course content 
and learner. The class learning atmosphere is multi-dimensional. 
New possibilities are always being created. Knowledge can be 
created. Personal power can be developed and oppression can be 
reduced. Opportunities for human development may be revealed. 
Integration in the Classroom 
How to view learning styles in the classroom gives 
facilitators and participants insight in how to promote the 
learning process. These insights must be considered along with 
the other learning objectives of individual growth and 
creativity. Here "in making students more well-rounded, the aim 
is to develop the weaknesses in the students' learning style to 
stimulate growth and their ability to learn from a variety of 
learning perspectives. The aim is to make the student self-
renewing and self-directed; to focus on integrative development 
wherer the person is highly developed in each of the four 
learning modes: active, relfective, abstract and concrete. The 
student is taught to experience the tension and conflict among 
these orientations, for it is from the resolution of these 
tensions that creativity springs." (Kolb, p.203) 
How to achieve this aim in the classroom or in the 
university environment is unclear. Promoting integrative 
development and adaptive learning behavior will not result in 
radical changes or improvements in one course. The entire program 
needs to review its reward systems, selection and evaluation 
criteria. The program, not just the course needs to have a 
specific reference point. (Kolb, p.206) It may be that the 
reference point is that the goal of the program is the students' 
development as self-directed learners. Its focus becomes more 
concerned with learning capacities and abilities so that learners 
become more balanced in their learning style preferences. (Kolb, 
p.206) 
Revealing the Hidden Curriculum 
The major task of this chapter is to explicitly state the 
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underlying orientation of this course. There will be a conscious 
effort to focus on learning style adaptability. The hidden 
curriculum is implicit in what the facilitator does, and as Bloom 
says, "it is probably better learned and longer remembered than 
the explicit objectives of the manifest curriculum." (Bloom,1981, 
p.148) 
This aspect of teaching has been seriously neglected by 
professors at the Center for International Education. While 
professors have been respectful of students' abilities to learn, 
they have not provided education in how to expand learning 
capacity. This is often described by students as a "lack of 
direction." Most of the time professors tend to teach to their 
own style of learning. While they may be quite adaptive in their 
own learning style, their teaching is more often than not 
dominated by one style rather than accommodating to all styles. 
Again, this is not deliberate, but unconscious. It needs to 
become a critical area of consideration in course design and 
instructional approach. 
Considerations of facilitator roles in this course will 
follow in the next chapter. These issues can certainly be 




The Facilitating Function 
Building on our metaphor of the rural development course as 
a human body, this chapter will examine the facilitator as the 
heart of the course. The circulation of information, the supply 
of vital tools to the central nervous system, which symbolizes 
the participants is performed by the heart. It has a consistent, 
steady beat and the electric impulses that students feed back to 
monitor its pulse link it inextricably with the· nervous system, 
the participant group. It is divided into four chambers that deal 
with four different functions. One chamber takes in old, used 
information and sends it through another chamber to receive new 
life and to become revitalized. A third chamber takes in this 
newly rejuvenated flow of enriched information, leading to 
another chamber that pushes this new perspective out into the 
rest of the body. Nothing is unaffected. 
Notice that it is not the heart that actually rejuvenates 
the blood content. It merely acts as a receptacle to channel the 
flow of information, creating a division between new and old, 
discovered and undiscovered, from which the nervous system 
benefits. The heart is very unobtrusive, always beating and 
facilitating renewal. Yet if it goes into distress, if it skips a 
beat, or fibrilates, the entire organism becomes disoriented and 
dizzy. Listen to your heart beat. No really stop and try. The 
pulse is very subtle, very steady and very distinct from the 
blood itself. 
The Role of Instruction 
Bloom distinguishes between curriculum and instruction as 
two separate activities separated by a fundemental difference. 
Changes in instruction technique and method can usally be seen 
much more immediately than changes in curriculum.! "The major 
task facing an instructional specialist [is] the identification 
of those teaching-learning activities which are to be used. An 
additional task [is] the sequencing of these activities."2 These 
tasks can vary widely. 
The way a teacher approaches these tasks could be described 
as the teacher's style. Bloom explains that "group instruction 
produces errors in learning at each stage of a course - no matter 
how effective the teacher is [my emphasis]."3 Mastery learning 
strategies require three things: group instruction, that created 
by the teacher; feedback, providing participants with information 
and means to assess what they have learned; and individualized 
help, so that participants may understand concepts that they may 
have missed. Without any one of these components instruction will 
not reach its potential effectiveness, and the learner will 
experience frustration. Each participant has different needs and 
as a result will need different types and qualities of 
instruction to assist them in mastering material. 
1 Bloom, Benjamin S. All Our Children Learning: A Primer for 
Parents, Teachers, and Other Educators. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1981, p.121. 
2 Bloom, p. 122. 
3 Bloom, p.140. 
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Bloom outlines five variables to be considered when 
designing instructional approaches toward a strategy for mastery 
learning: 
1. Learner aptitude for a particular kind of learning 
or the learning style of the learner. 
2. The quality of instruction or the degree to which 
the presentation, explanation, and ordering of elements 
of the task to be learned approach optimum for a given 
learner. 
3. The learner's ability to understand instruction, 
that is his or her ability to understand the task to be 
learned and the procedures to be followed in the 
learning of the task in a group atmosphere. 
4. Perseverence, the time the learner is willing or can 
spend in learning a particular task. 
5. The time allowed for learning by the instructor, 
which will be too much time for some learners and too 
little time for others.4 
These variables merit analysis, and are especially critical 
in graduate study. Too often instructors ignore the learning 
styles of their students and assume that students are self-
directed because they are older or more mature. This approach 
assumes that the learning abilities of students are the same. 
Instructors abdicate responsibility for improving students' 
learning abilities. This is fallicious andragogy. It is important 
to respect students' learning capacity, but learning is a skill 
and a students' ability can be refined and expanded given proper 
attention. The role of instruction in this course will be to 
facilitate the improvemen~ of learners' learning skills, by using 
the content of rural development as a medium for learner 
experimentation. 
Principles of Teaching 
Knowles focus on andragogy has led to the application of 
4 Bloom, pp.156-65. 
teaching principles to specific conditions of learning that 
facilitate growth and development. These conditions are produced 
through the teaching-learning transaction. The link between 
learning conditions and teaching principles outlined below 
produces effective opportunities for growth and development: 
Conditions of 
Learning 
1. The learners feel 
a need to learn. 




mutual trust and 
respect, mutual 
helpfulness, freedom 
of expression and 
acceptance of 
differences. 
3. The learners 
perceive the goals of 
a learning experience 
to be their goals. 
aspirations and 
present level of 
performance. 
Principles of Teaching 
1. The teacher exposes the learners to 
new possibilities for self-fulfillment. 
2. The teacher helps the learners 
clarify their own aspirations for 
improved behavior. 
3. The teacher helps the learners 
diagnose the gap between their 
comfortable and conducive to interaction 
(preferably no person sitting behind 
another). 
4. The teacher helps the learners 
identify the life problems they 
experience because of their gaps in 
knowledge and skills. 
5. The teacher provides physical 
conditions that are6. The teacher 
accepts the learners as persons of worth 
and respects their feelings, ideas and 
experience. 
7. The teacher seeks to build 
relationships of mutual trust among the 
learners by encouraging cooperative 
activities and refraining from inducing 
competitiveness and judgemental 
attitudes. 
8. The teacher exposes his or her own 
feelings and contributes resources as a 
colearner in the spirit of mutual 
inquiry. 
9. The teacher involves the learners in 
a mutual process of formulating learning 
objectivesin which the needs of the 
learners of the institution, of the 
teacher, of the subject matter, and of 
the society are taken into account. 
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4. The learners 
accept a share of the 
responsibility for 
planning and 
operating a learning 
experience, and 
therefore have a 
feeling of commitment 
toward it. 
5. The learners 
participate actively 
in the learning 
process. 
6. The learning 
process is realted to 
and makes use of the 
experience of the 
learners. 
7. The learners have 
a sense of progress 
toward their goals. 
10. The teacher shares his or her 
thinking about options available in the 
designing of learning experiences and 
the selection of materials and methods, 
and involves the learners in deciding 
these options. 
11. The teacher helps the learners to 
organize themselves (project groups, 
learning-teaching teams, etc.) to share 
responsibility in the process of mutual 
inquiry. 
12. The teacher helps the learners 
exploit their own experiences as 
resources for learning through the use 
of such techniques as discussion, role 
playing, case method, etc. 
13. The teacher gears the presentation 
of his or her own resources to the 
levels of experience of particular 
learners. 
14. The teacher helps learners to apply 
new knowledge to their experience to 
make the knowledge more meaningful and 
integrated. 
15. The teacher involves the learners in 
developing mutually acceptable criteria 
and methods for measuring progress 
toward the learning objectives. 
16. The teacher helps the learners 
develop and apply procedures for self-
evaluation according to these 
criteria.(Knowles, p.57-8.) 
This course will try to incorporate all of these principles 
into the methods used. The facilitator role will necessitate a 
keen sensitivity to learning style. It is only with this 
sensitivity that the facilitator may even approach becoming 
effective to every learner in the classroom. Furthermore, it is 
only through demonstrating the usefulness of these techniques 
that the facilitator can urge others to adopt them. An essential 
part of this course will be to discuss the use of techniques that 
adhere to the above principles, using formative evaluation 
sessions conducted throughout the course. 
The next chapter will demonstrate how the concepts of 
experiential learning theory and this framework for the 




CREATING A COURSE WITH STYLE 
Designing a course is art. Just as the sculptor cuts and 
fits wood together to form shapes, so the course designer cuts 
and pastes readings and materials to form a coherent workable 
environment. Both have many tools at their disposal, but what 
makes the sculptor and the course designer an artist is knowing 
when to use the right tool for the right material or medium. 
Nails do not penetrate oak and boring instruction does not 
penetrate wandering minds. Another feature of the artist is 
perceiving a message in something that may not be readily 
apparent to someone else. Thus, a block of wood becomes an 
exquisite work of art that can be appreciated and felt by others. 
Designing This Course 
I have tried to take a large unmanageable body of knowledge, 
rural development, and remove the outer layers to create a 
sculptured course that will give participants a look at its 
essence. Only they will be able to judge whether this approach is 
significant. I have attempted to not only create a work of art in 
the design, but through experiencing the design I am trying to 
create a larger framework for learning. The course focus on 
learning style, learning ability and learning capacity will 
hopefully provide learners with the opportunity to integrate 
their learning style, improve their learning ability and come 
closer to their learning capacity. 
The processes in the classroom have been recast into actual 
course content. Ample time has been created throughout the course 
so that participants may reflect on their own approaches to 
learning. Each session pays careful attention to shift 
presentation styles to appeal to different types of learners. A 
lecture, small group discussion, large group debate and a 
formative evaluation session may be part of one class session. I 
have tried to consider techniques best suited to particular 
objectives (see Knowles, p.240 for synopsis). Often the 
evaluations of the course are linked to time for participants to 
evaluate their own behavior in class. This type of reflective 
activity provides fuel and substance for the course. Rural 
development issues create Qpportunities for experimenting with 
ideas and insights that participants generate. 
The Course Requirements 
The course will present some initial constraints that the 
participants must confront, just as they would deal with 
constraintts if they were to enter into a rural development 
situation. There will be four agreements that all participants 
must agree to if they want to stay in the course. They have not 
been created to be oppressive or demanding, but to create 
constraining circumstances that most people might face in a new 
rural development situation. The four agreements are: 
1. Agree to come to every class on time. 
2. Agree to complete all work assigned before 
class. 
3. Agree to stay at each session until it is 
over. 
4. Agree not to gossip about what is said in 
this class. 
The agreements also reflect my expectations as the 
facilitator. Without these minimum requirements from the 
participants the learning objectives set out for the course 
cannot be achieved. Some may seem obvious, but it is important to 
obtain specific agreement with each participant to ensure that we 
understand each other. These will not be negotiable. 
Everything else about the course will be negotiable. If 
participants have suggestions about improving the course in any 
way, such as increasing participation, these can be discussed and 
necessary changes can be made. The sessions have been planned to 
focus on processes of rural development. The specific content I 
have chosen can easily be altered to include other aspects that 
cater to specific learner interest. 
The course sessions are outlined as follows: 
Session 1 - Establishing Balance 
Session 2 - Identifying Development Problems 
Session 3 - Intervening and Motivating Who for What? 
Session 4 - Differentiating Help and Hindrance 
Session 5 - Learning Style 
Session 6 - Building Trust 
Session 7 - The Green Revolution Game 
Session 8 - Managing Ambuguity 
Session 9 - Empowering Yourself 
Session 10 - Ending Gracefully 
Session 7 will take a full Saturday to complete. It is a 
simulation of a rural development project with all the players 
involved in a typical model. It should provide a synthesizing 
experience for all of the previous material and bridge the ending 
sessions of the course that deal with liberation issues. The 
detailed objectives and activities of each session can be read in 
the next chapter, the course syllabus. 
To provide a thread to link these processes together each 
participant will be asked to develop and write a case on a rural 
development issue/topic/problem which is of special interest to 
them. The paper will initially be written in parts as they relate 
to each of the course sessions. The facilitator, myself, will 
provide feedback on each part. Then at the end participants will 
be expected to submit a final paper that identifies a 
problem/topic/issue and then anaylyzes it in view of the 
different processes of development that we discuss and experience 
at each session. The course sessions will cater directly to each 
of the four learning styles. The paper will focus primarily on 
conceptualizing and reflection. 
Accompanying each session will be a homework assignment. 
Each assignment will have reading and writing. The readings have 
been linked to the writing so that they provide a framework to 
develop the case study. The readings have been selected because 
of their particular content or perspective. There are articles 
dealing with economics, anthropology, sociology, education and 
development. 
Specific case studies have also been included to look at 
sectors as interrelated wholes, rather than entities that can be 
analyzed separately. While it is essential that each sector, be 
it agriculture, health, water, appropriate technology, business, 
or education be the focus of inquiry so that it may develop as a 
field, it is equally essential that the rural development worker 
view the application of these sectors in terms of their 
interrelatedness. Case studies help to present this viewpoint. 
The Course Materials 
There are four texts that are required for this rural 
expectations, hopes, fears and ignorance. The facilitator of this 
course must be genuinely concerned with the development of his or 
her learners because this is the kind of attitude that is needed 
from practioners active in rural development. 
Course Evaluation 
The standardized evaluation forms will be used to evaluate 
the course at semester's end. During the last session there will 
be time devoted to course and facilitator feedback. Time will 
also be spent for learners to evaluate their own progress and 
performance in the course, focussing on their flexibility and 
adaptability as learners. This is outlined in the last session. 
development course: 
1. Moris, Jon R. Managing Induced Rural Development. 
Bloomington, IN: International Development Institute, 
1981. 
This book provides a brilliant overview of rural 
development issues from the perspective of the 
practitioner. It looks at broad policy questions as 
well as specific management problems at the local 
level. It also includes a guide to the current 
literature that addresses rural development issues as 
well as theoretical questions about development. 
2. Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the 
Last First. Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1983. 
Specifically concerned with the role outsiders 
play in rural development, Chambers offers insight into 
how outsiders acquire and use knowledge. He discusses 
issues of empowerment and the research needs of rural 
development as a field. 
3. Hyden, Goran. Beyond Uiamaa in Tanzania: 
Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980. 
This is the predecessor of Hyden's new book, No 
Shortcuts to Progress, which is a more general 
treatment of rural development policy. This book 
presents one of the most comprehensive analyses written 
on the Ujamaa development strategy in Tanzania, one of 
the most important episodes in the rural development 
field. It provides an excellently detailed case that 
can be discussed throughout the course. 
4. Bureaucracy and the Poor. Ed. David C. Korten and 
Felipe B. Alfonso. Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1983. 
Presents many cases that are written from a management 
perspective. Korten has outlined a new development 
strategy that he entitles "People-Centered 
Development." These essays are written to include 
discussion of participation, empowerment and local 
institution building. 
Supplementing these primary texts are other readings drawn 
from the fields of anthropology, economics and politics. They 
encompass a wide variety of perspectives, from World Bank to 
Oxfam, from micro to macro. The readings are included in the next 
chapter after each session outline. 
I have spent great lengths of time arduously piecing the 
readings together so that each reinforces certain aspects of the 
other, and so that all of them relate to the development process 
under discussion at the next class. I have also been careful to 
provide adequate class time to discuss the readings. It is a 
common complaint that readings rarely are discussed in class and 
that this deficiency creates uncertainty in participants about 
the purpose and their interpetations of the readings. 
The Green Revolution Game will be played during session 7 on 
a Saturday. I have not played the game, but I have read reviews 
of it and Chambers recommends it in his book. I am awaiting a 
copy of it from England. When it arrives, I will ask various 
people to participate in the game next semester in order to 
assess it and modify it as necessary. 
If there is any more time than the ten sessions in the 
semester I hope to be able to show a film. I have not utilized 
other mediums of communication because quite frankly I have not 
researched this at all. I have considered showing The Mission to 
demonstrate how intervention strategies for development may not 
mean much in view of systemic problems and barriers. 
Course Instruction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, andragogical 
principles will guide the facilitator's behavior. The role model 
aspects of learning will be an important characteristic of the 
instructional style. The facilitator must be a flexible, adaptive 
learner and actively demonstrate this capacity. This means 
conceptualizing experiences and providing practical examples of 





Session 1 - Establishing Balance 
Session 2 - Identifying Development Problems 
Session 3 - Intervening and Motivating Who for 
Session 4 - Differentiating Help 
Session 5 - Learning Style 
Session 6 - Building Trust 
Session 7 - The Green Revolution 
Session 8 - Managing Ambiguity 
Session 9 - Empowering Yourself 





Homework 1 - Formulating the Development Problem 
Homework 2 - Observing Others 
Homework 3 - Affecting Others Effectively 
Homework 4 - Designing an Approach 
Homework 5 - Establishing Trust 
Homework 6 - Managing Rural Development 
Homework 7 - Managing for Solutions 
Homework 8 - Organizing Management 
Homework 9 - Empowering Others 
Homework 10- Analyzing Your Case 
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Histories. Ed. Donald D. Evans and Laurie Nogg Adler. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1979. 
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The participants will: 
1. Understand the structure of the course; 
2. Understand the agreements to take the course; 
3. Know what the presenter expects of the participants; 
4. Recognize what issues in rural development are important to 
them; 
5. Develop specific questions surrounding issues in rural 
development that they would like to address. 
Activities 
1. Introductions and list of addresses/telephone nos. (20 min) 
2. Outline of course content and syllabus . (15 min) 
a) Emphasize multidimensional aspect of course and 
interdisciplinary nature. 
b) Oppourtunities to reflect on their own learning styles 
will allow participants to become more flexible learners. 
3. Outline of my goals for the course (25 min) 
a) To create oportunities for participants to become more 
aware of their own learning style preferences. 
b) To facilitate participants to acquire skills to become 
effective development workers. 
c) To provide information to improve participant knowledge 
about the rural development field. 
d) To apply andragogical learning concepts rather than 
pedagogical ones. 
4. Course agreements (20 min) 
a) Discuss the nature of agreements and why they are 
essential. 
b) Discuss why they need to be explicitly agreed upon- that 
the course is designed assuming that these agreements have 
been kept. 
c) The agreements: 
1. The participant agrees to come to every class on 
time. 
2. The participant agrees to complete all work assigned 
before class time. 
3. The participant will stay in each class until it is 
over. 
4. The participant agrees not to gossip about this 
class. 
5. Course requirements (10 min) 
a) Case analyses 
b) Personal case development and analysis process. 
c) Free to stop class at any time to make observations about 
group process occuring in class. 
d) Please buy the books. 
e) Negotiations- everything in this course is negotiable 
except the agreements. 
6. Break (10 min) 
7. Organize triads (10 min) 
8. Brainstorming (20 min) 
a) Write down all the issues concerning rural development 
that you think are important and should be covered in this 
course. 
9. Question/problems development (20 min) 
question form that 
of this course. 
10. 
a) Each triad writes down ten problems in 
they would like answered by the end 
Process consultation (30 min) 
five minutes to free 
first session focussing 
a). In large group each person takes 
write their impresssions of this 
on: 
1. Impressions of first class group dynamic. 
2. Perception of facilitator. 
3. Perceptions of overall course. 
4. Perception of work in small group triads. 
11. Handout homework number 1 - Formulating the Development 
Problem. 
HOMEWORK 1 
FORMULATING THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM 
1. Read Ahmed BRAC ~ase. Note down issues he discusses that 
relate to the ones generated by your triad. 
2. Read Moris, chapters 1 and 2. 
3. Read Hyden, pp.1-36. 
4. Writing. 
1. Formulate a single question surrounding a specific 
topic/issue/problem of rural development .that you would 
like to explore during this course. 
2. In no more than one of a page explain why this 
issue/topic/problem is important to you. 
3. Utilizing the reading and the class discussions ask 
at least 20 questions that would guide your exploration 
of the problem/topic/issue that you identified. 
4. Please make a photocopy to hand in at the next class. 
A PROJECT TO HELP· PRACTITIONERS 
HELP THE RURAL POOR 
Case Study No. 2 
BR.t\C 
Building Hum9n Infrastructures 
to Serve the Rural Poor 
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Any development practitioner looking for fresh ideas and practical les-
sons concerning integrated, community-based programs for meeting the basic 
needs of poor rural families will find this report on the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) of considerable interest. 
This case study is the second in a series of critical examinations of 
unconventional family-cen~ered rural programs that form the core of empiri-
cal evidence for an international project on this subject being conducted by 
the International Council for Educational Development (ICED) in cooperation 
with a variety of developing countr~es and external assistance agencies. The 
purpose of the overall project is to develop and disseminate a body of per-
tinent information, illustrations, and operational guidelines drawn from ac-
tual experience that can be useful in a wide ra~ge of developing countries in 
connection with designing, implementing and evaluating multipurpose community-
based programs for improving the quality of family life among the rural poor. 
The reader will see that BRAC is a strictly home grown, locally staffed 
and managed program, born as an emergency relief measure in the turmoil of a 
great national struggle for independence. It has since evolved--and is still 
evolving--into a unique multifaceted rural development program whose experience 
to date offer a variety of positive lessons for others along with some equally 
important negative ones that the leaders of BRAC are quick to point out with-
out a trace of defensiveness. BRAC's managers have maintained from the outset 
an experimental attitude and flexibiJity of mind and a demonstrated readiness 
to convert past weaknesses into future strengths. Through this open-minded 
process of trial and error and learning-hy·-doing, the BRAC program has grown 
steadily in strength and in its dimensions and effectiveness. Even as this 
preface is written, further important changes born of experience are in pro-
cess of being introduced. 
The principal author of this report--Manzoor Ahmed, deputy director of 
the ICED project--has frequently expressed the great difficulty of capturing 
in written words the spirit and vitality of this living, growing multifaceted 
program. The relatively small scale of BRAC's activities, its freedom as a 
voluntary organization from the often irresistible rigidities and inertia of 
large public programs, and the uncoumon enthusiasm and dedication of its lead-
ership and workers have found expression in a continuous surge of fresh ideas 
and plans and in a dynamism to which no written report can do full justice. 
While it is undoubtedly true that these special assets and qualities can-
not readily be duplicated on a nationwide scale, this by no means rules out the 
possibility that various specific lessons from BRAC's experiences can be use-
fully applied to larger public programs and in quite different contexts. 
What this report presents--to borrow the language of the cinema--are some 
revealing snapshots of BRAG as of early 1977, with a series of selective flash-
backs to significant episodes in its earlier career. The report also undertakes 
to assess the significance of these past and current experiences, the 1mpacts 
that BRAC has had thus far on the lives of villagers and villages in the area 
it serves, and the new directions expected to emerge in subsequent months and 
years. The concluding section of the report attempts to place in perspective 
a number of lessons from BRAC's experience that would seem to be of particular 
interest and value to development practitioners elsewhere in Bangladesh and 
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in other developing countries. 
A brief explanation is in order about how the study was conducted. As 
in all field research studies, choices had to be made regarding the most sig-
nificant types of evidence to be collected and analyzed, the most appropriate 
and efficient methods for doing so, and the most effective uses of the limi-
ted time, manpower, and financial resources available. 
The investigators made extensive use of available quantitative data and 
documented information such as earlier project plans and proposals, service 
records, periodic reports, and the results of limited previous evaluation ef-
forts. These were supplemented by a sample household survey conducted in 10 
villages in the so-called Sulla Project area to collect basic reference data 
on the socioeconomic circumstances of families, the extent of their partici-
pation in BRAC activities, their knowledge of the program, and their own as-
sessments of what BRAC had done, or could do in the future, to improve their 
own lives. In addition the investigators visited all the project sites, joined 
the daily cycle of activities of some of the field workers, and spent many hours 
interrogating workers and project leaders in the field and at the headquarters. 
A special comment should be added regarding the relative roles of quan-
titative and non-quantitative evidence in an operationally-oriented study 
such as this. It is obviously important to collect and analyze whatever 
statistical evidence may be available on such matters as the inputs into 
the program, the services delivered,the costs and sources of support, and 
the measurable impacts of the program on various facets of family and com-
munity life. It must be recognized, however, that reliable quantitative 
evidence of this sort is frequently very difficult to come by, especially 
in home grown programs such as BRAC that never ran the gauntlet of prepar-
ing a proper plan and submitting a persuasive proposal to some external 
assistance agencies whose sophisticated program analysts insisted on base-
line surveys and built-in evaluation provisions as a condition for providing 
support. The plain fact is th<'t tbe entrepreneurs of such home grown pro-
grams, whose sophistication is of a more down-to-earth variety, are usually 
so anxious "to get on with the job" that they see little point in diverting 
scarce talent and energy into recording statistics that might some day warm 
the hearts of professional evaluators. 
In all events, even an ideal supply of quantitative data, if available, 
would still not provide answers to some of the most important questions on 
the minds of practitioners~questions that by their very nature defy quanti-
tative treatment. This applies, for example, to the important task involved 
in each ICED case study of identifying key internal or envirorunental factors 
that have either facilitated or inhibited the successful performance of a 
particular program, which can be extremely useful for planners of other pro-
grams to be aware of. These factors typically turn out to include such things 
as the calibre of leadership, the validity of the underlying assumptions of 
the program, the adequacy of the initial diagnosis and planning, the organ-
izational arrangements and relationships, the t00tivation of staff and recep-
tivity of the interested clients, the relevance and adequacy of the educational 
components, and not least of all the nature of the socioeconomic environment 
and general political climate. These kinds of factors obviously cannot be 
measured with a slide rule or computer, but they can nevertheless be identi-
fied and reasonably evaluated in a scientifically objective manner through 
the application of sensltive, informed, and systematic observation and judg-
ment. In short, to equate scientific method narrowly with quantitative 
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measurement, especially in the social sciences, is to rule out the possi-
bility of providing valuable fresh insights to practitioners and reasoned 
and responsible answers to some of their most urgent questions. 
Although full responsibility for the content, interpretations and 
findings of this report resides with the author and ICED, we wish to 
express our appreciation to all of our colleagues in Bangladesh who 
contributed so importantly to this study. In particular we are grate-
ful to Dr. Mohammed Ashraf Ali of the Institute of Education and Research 
at Dacca University for conducting the household sample survey and writing 
up sections of the preliminary draft report; to Saleh Chowdhury, a journ-
alist with professional training in social work, for helping in the sample 
survey and sharing his insights into rural life; to Dr. Mohammed Selim, 
Director of the Institute of Education and Research and more recently 
Educational Advisor to the Mir.istry of Education, for his sage advice, 
encouragement, and interest in the study; and to UNICEF officials in 
Dacca, particularly Carl Schoruneyer and Joseph Acar, for their help with 
both logistical support and substantive comments. 
Above all we express our appreciation to the Executive Director of 
BRAC, Mr. F. H. Abed, and his numerous co-workers both .in Dacca and in 
the field for their generosity with time and patience in meeting all re-
quests of the investigators and for their unstinting cooperation with 
the study. Overworked project managers who already have problems enough 
can be forgiven if they are wary of outside investigators who do not only 
impose on their time but may end up making gratuitous criticisms and re-
connnenda tions that create still further problems. It must be said of 
Mr. Abed and his colleagues that their reaction to ICED's proposed case 
study was quite different. They actively welcomed a searching indepen-
dent review of BRAC's activities, the shortcomings along with the vir-
tues, believing that they as well as others might profit from it. When 
asked to review and comment on a draft of the report and to set the author 
straight on any erroneous or offensive statements, they raised no objec-
tion to the fact that it candidly singled out apparent weaknesses along 
with the evident strengths of the program. Their reaction instead was 
to agree, and to point to actions they were already taking or planned to 
take to remedy these shortcomings. Perhaps this attitude toward honest 
criticism is a good part of the explanation of why BRAC has progressed 
so far so fast, notwithstanding formidable obstacles. 
October 1977 
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Philip H. Coombs 
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AND AN OVERVIEW 
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Connnittee (BRAC), an indigenous 
voluntary organization, functions in selected rural areas of Bangladesh. 
It attempts to bring a limited amount of external assistance and the 
idealistic impulses of a group of educated young people to bear on the 
problem of extreme poverty and deprivation among the rural people in 
Bangladesh. It has designed a program with a combination of activities 
that aims at: 
(a) improving the economic situation of the rural families by 
helping them adopt more productive farming practices and 
increase earning from nonagricultural sources, including 
income-supplement activities of women; 
(b) providing basic preventive and curative health care and 
family planning services at an affordable cost; 
(c) building local institutions and expanding the basic 
educational opportunities, so that the people can 
actively participate in their own affairs and the develop-
ment activities can become increasingly self-managed; 
(d) making an impact on the living condition of the poorest 
and the most disadvantaged rural families, who often 
fail to become the beneficiaries of rural services not 
specially geared to the needs of the poorest. 
The significance of the BRAC program and the reason for ICED's 
interest in examining it lie in the broadness of BRAC's vision that, 
nonetheless, focuses on the basic needs of the deprived rural fami-
lies and recognizes the value of an integrated approach to meeting 
these needs. 
Background and Setting 
The program began in 1972 in a cluster of villages in the 
Sulla, Derai, and Baniyachang thanas (sub-districts) of Sylhet dis-
trict in the aftermath of the war of liberation as a relief effort 
for those war victims whose homes, cattle, and boats for fishing 
and transportation had been destroyed and whose fields had lain 
fallow for a year. Being on the international boundary between 
Bangladesh and the Indian states of Meghalaya and Assam and having 
a 60 percent Hindu population, the project area of about 200 
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villages (120,000 people in 160 square miles of territory) suffered more 
than its share during the war. With the assistance of Oxfam of England 
and Canada, BRAC provided construction materials to rebuild the houses, 
timber to build boats, and other assistance to help the people resettle 
in the villages. BRAC soon discovered that the villagers, back from 
refugee camps to their homes, while no more dependent on charity for 
their daily ration of food, were in a state of destitution not very dif-
ferent from that in the refugee shelters. It was clear that sustained 
development efforts, not mere temporary relief measures, were needed to 
have any tangible impact on the living condition of the people in the 
area. 
The Sulla area is unique in some ways but similar in others to the 
rest of the Bangladesh countryside. Topographically the area falls in 
the depressed haor (semi-permanent lake) region, which means that most of 
the area is submerged for six to eight months in a year. The total cul-
tivable land in the project area is about 64,000 acres, of which 60,000 
acres are suitable for only one deep-water rice crop in the winter. For 
over six months in the year, the area takes on the appearance of a sea 
--a watery expanse extending to the horizon in all directions with little 
scattered islands sheltering people and animals in thick clusters of huts 
made of bamboo and corrugated iron sheets. 
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The topography of the area sets a limit to its agricultural prospects 
and increases its isolation from the urban centers and the rest of the 
country. On the other hand, fishing is an important occupation in the 
area. It is the primary means of livelihood for 20 percent of the 
families and a secondary occupation for most of the rest. 
The density of population in the area is close to 700 per square mile 
--less than one-half of the national average only because much of the land 
area is not habitable. With over a quarter of the families having no farm 
land, and about 20 percent possessing farms over one acre in area, most of 
the landholdings are below the one acre level. Even when farming and fish-
ing are combined, a practice that is followed by most of the families, the 
primitive technology and the low level of productivity in both activities 
assure at best a precarious living. Both farming and fishing are suscep-
tible to the vagaries of nature--the unpredictable late autumn floods and 
hailstorms occasionally wipe out the one rice crop (boro) primarily grown 
in the area; irregular floods also affect the fish harvests adversely. 
The ecological features of the area are somewhat forbidding as far as 
economic development is concerned--probably more so than the typical rural 
area of the rest of the country. However, in terms of the level of poverty, 
the dependence on primary production activities based on primitive technolo-
gies, the high rate of population growth, the low level of education, the 
inadequacy of government institutions and public services, and the basic 
cultural patterns and values, the area is not significantly different from 
other rural areas in the country and is subject to the same challenges, 
problems, and prospects of development as the rest of Bangladesh • 
.. ~ 
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Major Program Elements 
The 200-odd villages of the project area, chosen because of relief 
needs and geographical contiguity rather than administrative convenience, 
cover the whole of Sulla thana, three unions of Derai thana, and two 
unions of Baniachang thana. Spending a little over Tk 4 million (about 
US$207,000) in the course of three years to the end of 1975 (excluding 
the initial relief expenditures), BRAC appears to have served directly 
at least one-half of the area population with one or more of its program 
activities. BRAC has faced and attempted to solve with varying effective-
ness many problems that other rural programs, large or small, public or 
private, will have to face and resolve in the future. 
BRAC has apparently identified a cluster of basic needs of 
the rural people that are amenable to deliberate collec-
tive efforts, if they are supported by a sufficient input 
of technical and financial resources. It has fashioned 
a program to utilize these resources for a direct assault 
on the problem of satisfying the basic needs. 
BRAC has recruited for its staff a group of young men and 
women, most of whom are university graduates. While the 
knowledge, skills, and educational back~round of such 
people can be an asset to a development program, the high 
educational qualifications can also alienate them from the 
rural people, and their values a nd temperament may make 
them unsuitable for rural work. BRAC has attempted to 
capitalize on the idealistic impulses of the young, to in-
still in them the spirit and values of the organization, 
to give them the necessary understanding of the issues and 
intricacies of implementing a multipurpose rural develop-
ment project, and to develop their ability to relate to 
and communicate with the rural people. 
The field staff of BRAC is complemented by local young men 
and women from rural families who are recruited, trained, 
and utilized for various roles in the implementation of the 
program. 
The program has apparently managed to work with the village 
power structure; it has gained their tolerant acceptance if 
not actual support of a program which helps the underprivi-
leged in the village but eventually and potentially threat-
ens to upset the existing power structure. 
The program functions within the context of services and 
activities of the government departments concerned with 
rural areas, however inadequate these services may be. One 
of BRAC's tasks is to work out a compatible relationship 






both the local and national levels and to secure the 
cooperation of the government agencies whenever nec-
essary and possible. 
In order to increase farm productivity, create new 
employment, and improve the nutritional balance, the 
program has introduced some new farm practices, faci-
litated the supply of essential inputs, and helped in 
procuring and maintaining farming and irrigation equip-
ment. All of these, though on a limited basis, have 
apparently been done without using a large complement 
of specialized agricultural extension staff. 
The program in addition to providing health, family 
planning, and functional education services to women, 
has attempted to bring women into the mainstream of 
economic and development efforts by using local women 
personnel in some of the program activities, by offer-
ing special skill training to women, ~nd by encouraging 
the formation of women's cooperative economic enter-
prises. 
One component of the program is the attempt to encourage 
village youths to undertake collectively corrnnunity ser-
vice activities as well as cultural, sports, and recrea-
tional activities to enliven the overall corrnnunity at-
mosphere. Selected youths are also given training to 
help in the management of cooperatives. 
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The health and family planning component of the program 
is founded on the concept of a low-cost basic preventive 
and curative service delivered by community-based auxil-
liaries and backstopped by paramedics and qualified phy-
sicians and clinical services. A health insurance plan 
is a significant feature of this effort. 
BRAC has invested considerable effort and resources in 
an experiment to raise the effectiveness and efficiency 
of its adult education program. BRAC's early efforts 
were troubled by the typical problems of most well-
intentioned traditional literacy programs, such as dif-
ficulty in sustaining learner interest and motivation, 
teaching techniques that smack of infantile pedagogy, 
inappropriate content materials, and lack of followup 
materials. With the technical support of World Educa-
tion, Inc. of U.S.A. and World Literacy of Canada BRAC 
has developed methods and materials for a functional 
education program that promises to produce better re-
sults and to be more relevant to the total development 
efforts carried out by BRAC. 
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One of BRAC's main objectives is to build local institutions 
and organizations that will permit the development efforts to 
be carried out with the active involvement of the rural people 
and will lead the way to greater self-management of these ef-
forts by the local people. To this end, BRAC has put a heavy 
emphasis on building community centers and forming cooperative 
societies of different types. 
All of these elements of the BRAC program, as noted earlier, have by 
no means achieved a high level of effectiveness; the performance varies 
between communities in the project area. The important point is that all 
of these elements are seen as the necessary constituents of a program for 
improving the quality of life of rural families. 
Since the initial development phase of Sulla (called Sulla Project, 
Phase II) came to a conclusion at the end of 1975, BRAC has initiated a 
third phase of the Sulla Project, extended its development activities in 
rural locations in other districts, and reoriented and reorganized its pro-
gram activities in both Sulla and other locations on the basis of the ex-
periences acquired from the early Sulla efforts. The basic program objec-
tives of BRAC, however, have remained unchanged; the redirected program 
activities are designed to achieve the same basic goals more effectively. 
Goals of the Study 
The purpose of this case study is to carry out an analysis of various 
necessary operations and tasks that have been undertaken in designing, man-
aging, and implementing the program. In this process, evaluative judgement 
including assessment of various components of the program is made to the 
extent permitted by available information. 
Certain operations are connnon to all programs aiming at the improve-
ment of rural living conditions: diagnosing the local situation with 
respect to the development needs, potentialities, and obstacles; designing 
a strategy of actions and building an organizational structure; recruiting, 
training, and utilizing the staff; selecting learning contents and prepar-
ing and supplying learning materials; developing and applying appropriate 
learning methods; securing the involvement of the clientele and building 
or strengthening local participatory institutions; establishing working re-
lationships with the government agencies at the different levels and with 
the local power structures; and mobilizing resources of various types from 
local and external sources. All these are tasks that have to be tackled at 
a certain level of effectiveness by all programs of rural development. An 
analysis of BRAC experience, it is hoped, will shed light on the procedures, 
methods, techniques, and steps adopted as well as on the obstacles and the 
favorable circumstances encountered in carrying out the vital tasks of pro-
gram implementation in one case. The BRAC experience also provides an 
opportunity for examining not only the practical application and meaning of 
the concepts of integrated rural development, but also the participation and 
involvement of the clientele in self-sustaining and self-managed development 
programs~concepts that are emphasized by BRAC and other programs focusing 





The case study has attempted to match the implementation steps taken with 
the results achieved, not only in terms of the stated and predetermined goals, 
but also of the unanticipated byproducts and costs incurred in terms of rooney as 
well as human and material resources. The assessment of the results as far as 
possible is necessary for analyzing and understanding the process of implementa-
tion. The negative aspects of the program can be as instructive as the positive 
achievements as far as the case study is concerned. 
A further aim of this case study~in combination with similar other case 
studies undertaken by ICED--is to make a contribution to building an inductive-
empirical base for extracting useful lessons and formulating general principles, 
operational guidelines, and evaluative criteria for conceptualizing, designing, 
:implementing, managing, and evaluating other programs that will improve the sit-
uation of the rural poor. 
An Overview of BRAG 
By the end of 1976 BRAC grew to be a multifaceted development program of 
considerable size employing over 180 full-time staff members with an annual 
operating budget of about Tk 5 million. The BRAC activities, with general guid-
ance and support from the Dacca central office, spread to several rural locations 
with at least 300,000 potential beneficiaries in three districts. In addition, 
BRAC contributed to the national rural development effort by publishing a monthly 
rural newspaper that circulated throughout the country, by establishing a train-
ing program that provided training to rural development workers of other organ-
izations in the country, and by developing and producing functional education and 
health education materials that could be used by other programs. The total pro-
gram is organized as a number of sub-projects (though usually referred to as "pro-
jects" in BRAC parlance), each of which is briefly described below. 
The Sulla Project. 
Sulla is the oldest and best known of BRAC projects. It is in Sulla that 
BRAC began its relief activities and then initiated the rural development program 
that came to be called Sulla Project, Phase II. This phase of the Sulla Project 
began in November 1972 and lasted until December 1975 when Sulla Phase III was 
launched. 
The activities carried out during Phase II included construction of gono-
kendro (community center) in the project villages, a functional education pro-
gram, agricultural development, promotion of cooperative societies, fisheries 
development, vocational training for women, and a health care and family plan-
ning program. 
For the implementation of the above activities, a fairly elaborate field 
organization with full-time staff personnel was built up. The project area was 
divided into 11 sectors, each with an Area Manager and a field camp where 4 to 
5 field-level development workers, known as Field Motivators, resided and func-
tioned under the guidance of the Area Manager. The 11 field camps were super-
vised by 2 zonal program coordinators. A Field Coordinator had the overall 
responsibility for directing the project. The health care and family planning 
program was implemented by 30 paramedics, divided among the field camps and 
supervised by 4 medical doctors. 
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Phase III plans (January 1976 to December 1978) still emphasized 
health care and family planning as a major project component. Function-
al education was to be reoriented to stress its roles of "consciousness-
raising" and helping specific interest groups more directly in being or-
ganized for collective self-improvement activities. There was to be, on 
the whole, an emphasis on helping functional groups of landless laborers, 
women, young people, and fishermen in improving their situation through 
collective efforts instead of conducting separate sectoral activities. 
During the first year of the third phase, women Field Motivators 
and paramedics were recruited and trained for the first time, a step 
that was expected to be the beginning of a new trend. Otherwise the 
field organization remained essentially the same as during the second 
phase. 
Manikgang Project. 
This project located in the Manikganj thana, 40 miles west of Dacca, 
was initiated in April 1976 after BRAC became familiar with the area and 
its population by conducting a rural works project in the thana. The 
Manikganj project embodies the lessons of experience in Sulla and reflects 
the emerging program approach of BRAC. 
The health and family planning component remains a major sectoral 
activity in this project. All other development activities, however, are 
not planned to be sectorally separated but rather designed according to 
the specific preference and capacity of functional interest groups, such 
as landless laborers, women, youth, rural artisans, and managed mainly 
through the collective efforts of these groups rather than by BRAC's own 
personnel. Functional education is to be used as the main vehicle of or-
ganizing the functional groups and developing their capacity to engage in 
self-help activities. Rural youth, especially the educated ones uncertain 
about their vocation and purpose in life, are regarded as an important re-
source to be tapped for becoming "agents of change" and local organizers 
of the collective activities. BRAC plans include provisions for training, 
technical assistance, and limited financial assistance to the local youth 
organizations. 
Jamalpur Project. 
This project in 30 villages near Jamalpur town in Mymensingh district 
had its origin in an involvement of BRAC in conducting a functional educa-
tion program for destitute rural women who were participants in a UNICEF-
sponsored food-for-work project. At the conclusion of the UNICEF project, 
the rural women and the local instructors of functional education earlier 
trained by BRAC were eager to continue the education and development effort, 
if only they could receive some guidance and assistance. BRAC assisted the 
group of 15 women instructors/development workers in preparing an opera-
tional plan and found for them a source of financial assistance to implement 
the plan. Launched in early 1976, the plan included the following: func-
tional education centers and groups for women in each of the villages; a 
family planning program, including child health and maternal care; improve-
ment of preventive health measures and hygiene in the villages; joint sav-
ings and cooperative economic projects for women (including horticulture, 
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poultry raising, and use of fallow land); and formation of women's organiza-
tions for self-help efforts. This project for underprivileged rural women 
is directed and managed entirely by BRAC workers, who are all local women 
originally recruited as functional education instructors for the UNICEF pro-
ject. 
The Materials Development Unit. 
Dissatisfied with conventional adult literacy methods and materials, 
BRAC found the need for developing a more effective approach to functional 
education and creating relevant educational materials for this purpose. As 
a part of this effort to design a new functional education program (for 
which BRAC received technical assistance from World Education, Inc., a tech-
nical assistance agency based in New York), a materials development unit was 
established at BRAC headquarters in Dacca in 1974. The staff of the unit 
was intimately involved in developing the new educational methodology, iden-
tifying the relevant lesson content, preparing and field-testing the trial 
materials, and preparing the successive sets of functional education mater-
ials. The unit, with a full-time staff of four writers, evaluators, and 
illustrators, is engaged on a continuous basis in assessing and modifying 
the old materials and designing, field-testing, and producing new materials. 
Training and Resource Centre (TARC) . 
As BRAC began to build a sizeable field organization with full-time 
personnel and initiated a functional education program that required spe-
cial training for instructors and supervisory staff, the need arose for a 
systematic staff training arrangement. With the assistance of a consult-
ant provided by the Ford Foundation and banking on its own training needs 
for field personnel, BRAC developed a series of short training courses or 
"modules" on topics considered important in improving the skills and com-
petence of the staff. These topics include communication, organizational 
analysis and needs assessment, program planning, group dynamics, leader-
ship, "consciousness-raising," and functional education methodology. The 
training center--based partially in the Dacca office and partially in Savar, 
20 miles northwest of Dacca, where the facilities for the center, including 
residential accommodation, were under construction--employed six full-time 
trainers in late 1976. The center, besides meeting BRAC 1s own needs, also 
conducted training courses for rural development and functional education 
workers on commission from other voluntary organizations in Bangladesh. 
Gonokendro. 
Recognizing the scarcity of relevant reading materials for rural 
readers, BRAC began to publish in 1973 a monthly tabloid of 8 to 12 
printed pages with development-related information, articles, and news 
items. Although the journal was seen originally as a means of providing 
reading materials to neoliterates emerging from the functional education 
courses, it turned into a more general interest rural journal (without 
the gradation of vocabulary and careful selection of the texts required 
for neoliterates), especially after UNICEF offered to underwrite the cost 
of distributing 60,000 copies every month to rural primary school teachers. 
! _) 
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The Research and Evaluation Project. 
Soon after the beginning of its development phase, BRAC saw a need 
for a system of orderly collection and analysis of base-line information 
about the project area and population and of service data. It saw a 
need for a general assessment of the changes or lack of changes resulting 
from BRAC activities. Aided by a grant from the Ford Foundation, a small 
research and evaluation unit was set up which at the end of lG76 had five 
full-time research assistants and statisticians. The plans for research 
and evaluation included the following: base-line sample surveys of pro-
ject areas for selected socioeconomic indicators; assessment of the impact 
of specific sectoral activities, such as health and family planning; and 
an in-depth economic-anthropological study of selected villages, in order 
to evaluate the overall socioeconomic impact of the project activities on 
the village communities. Assistance of researchers from local research 
institutions were available for designing and conducting the surveys. The 
services of an anthropological researcher from the Marga Institute in Sri 
Lanka was available for designing the village studies and training the 
research workers for this purpose. 
Rural Works Program. 
The works program, by means of which rural agricultural laborers are 
paid wages in cash or in food grains during the "slack" farming season for 
work in useful community works projects, has become a regular annual BRAC 
activity. BRAC used the works program to build physical infrastructures 
to improve the agricultural potential of the Sulla and Manikganj project 
areas, to provide a means of sustenance to vulnerable groups in the pro-
ject area at a time of food shortage and unemployment, and to involve lo-
cal people in planning and implementing development schemes in their own 
localities. In Manikganj, the works program was the means for BRAC to 
get acquainted with the area and its population, to establish BRAC's own 
credibility and reputation among the local people, and to identify promis-
ing members of local youth groups and involve them in BRAC development 
activities. 
During the 1975-76 dry season 30 works projects, including embank-
ments, irrigation canals, drainage canals, roads, and fishery and irri-
gation ponds, were completed in Sulla and Manikganj. The projects pro-
vided 87,000 man-days of employment and cost a total of Tk 545,000. 
Various facets of these program components and how they relate to 
each other in shaping ·the total rural development thrust of BRAC are 
examined in the following sections of this report. 
CHAPTER 2 
FUNCTIONAL EDUCATION 
A Conventional Beginning 
Widespread illiteracy among the rural people was seen by the organizers 
of BRAC as a major contributing factor to rural underdevelopment and poverty. 
Spread of literacy was considered necessary for communicating new knowledge 
and ideas to the people and for creating among them an awareness of their 
situation and of ways of changing thjs situation. 
A strong literacy drive was therefore launched early in the project as 
a major element of its rural development strategy. With a goal of eliminating 
almost 90 percent illiteracy ir. the Sulla Project area within a period of three 
years, 255 literacy centers were opened in 220 villages in 1973, and 300 local 
men and women were trained and employed as teach~rs. 
It was a conventional literacy campaign, concentrating on the skills of 
reading and writing, with traditional pedagogic techniques in a classroom 
environment. Some efforts were made to include rural topics in the lessons. 
There was a great surge of enthusiasm initially and 5,000 villagers enrolled 
in the courses. 
But interest waned quickly and the dropout rate shot up. 
closed down because learnerd did not show up, ar..d others took 
twelve months to complete the six-month course because of high 
Only 5 percent of those enrolled completed the course. 
Some centers 
as long as 
absenteeism. 
A combination of factors contributed to the failure of this. educational 
effort. An unusually high level of flood in 1973 not only damaged many of 
the centers and made them unusable but also caused extra economic hardship to 
the people of the area. BRAC launched the campaign on the assumption that 
there was a high level of demand for literacy and all that was needed was to 
provide the opportunity to attend literacy classes. Very little attention was 
given to appropriate teaching techniques for adults, and the lessons were pre-
pared on the basis of preconce:fved notions of what was good for the learners. 
The most serious problem was that the learners soon discovered that the acqui-
sition of literacy skills required considerable effort and time; yet these 
skills and the reading lessons bore little relevance to the innnediate and 
burning problems of their life. Customers for the literacy courses, there-
fore, declined sharply. 
The Functional Approach 
Having reached the conclusion that mere teaching of alphabet and arith-
metic was not enough to hold the interest of the learners and of no direct 
benefit to the rural learners, BRAC began searching for a new approach. It 
was felt that new methodology and materials had to be developed that would be 
perceived as useful and relevant by the learners in their daily life. In this 
10 
FUNCTIONAL EDUCATION 
task BRAC enlisted the assistance of consultants from World Education, 
Inc. to develop, test, and implement on a pilot basis an adult functional 
literacy education program designEd (a) to maintain learners' interest 
and participation in the educational program, (b) to enable learners to 
read with understanding and write legibly simple texts likely tG be of 
use to them, and (c) to modify learners' attitudes and behavior toward 
family planning, nutrition, health and agricultural practices. 
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The main steps followed in implementing the new functional education 
program were assessment of learners' needs and interests, development of 
learning materials and methods, training supervisors and instructors, and 
implementation of a pilot phase in order to test and revise materials and 
methods. 
The assessment of learning needs was based on a canvassing of the 
villagers' views on their main concerns and problems about which they need-
ed new knowledge and information. This was supplemented by the BRAC field 
workers' knowledge and understanding of the general rural condition. A 
survey was carried out in 19 villages in the Sulla Project area to collect 
general information about village socioeconomic situations and to determine 
the villagers' perception of their learning needs. Consequently, several 
major content topics for the functional education program were identified: 
(a) soil and use of fertilizers, (b) high yielding rice cultivation, (c) 
animal husbandry and poultry, (d) fisheries and pisciculture, (e) coopera-
tives, (f) nutrition, (g) hygiene and public health, (h) family planning--
male orientation, (i) family planning--female orientation, (j) child care, 
and (k) cottage industries. 
In early 1974, a materials development unit, consisting of an educa-
tion and training adviser, one illustrator, three writers, and a typist, 
was set up in BRAC's head office in Dacca. The first round of materials 
--large charts with drawings, "generative words," and short suggestive sen-
tences--was the product of brainstorming among the materials development 
unit staff centering on the themes identified as the main concerns of the 
rural people. A consultant from World Education with experience in mater-
ials development for functional adult education programs served as a re-
source person for the unit. 
Methodology and Materials 
The preparation of materials was, of course, contingent upon a method-
ology for the use of the materials. The World Education consultants intro-
duced to the materials development unit and other senior BRAC personnel the 
functional education methods developed for World Education-assisted programs 
in Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and other countries. The main elements of 
this methodology were: 
(a) 
(b) 
identification of key concepts relating to the learner 
group's major problems and potential ways of dealing with 
these problems; 
preparation of lessons (pictures, words, sentences, reading 
and writing exercises, arithmetic exercises) centered on 
the selected key concepts; 
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(c) group discussion of the key concepts (aided by relevant 
pictures and drawings), encouragement of active par-
ticipation by group members, presentation of practical 
experiences, and comparison of conflicting ideas and al-
ternative action possibilities; 
(d) introduction to relevant words, sentences, and arithmetic 
exercises following the discussion as a means of recording 
and expressing ideas, increasing knowledge, and gaining ac-
cess to useful information; and 
(e) recognition of the instructor, not as a traditional teacher, 
but as a facilitator of group discussion and group learning. 
(Credit for farm production, for instance, may be a theme 
that would be the basis for an extended discussion of the 
learners' situation in relation to farm credit and would 
also supply the key words and sentences for one or more 
lessons. The identification of the main themes and the 
generative words derived from the themes is done through 
the needs assessment exercise mentioned above.) 
In conformity with this methodological approach, the BRAC staff 
developed a basic functional education course for the rural learners 
of Sulla comprising 80 lessons--56 of which were regarded as core 
materials for both male and female learners and 24 as variations de-
signed to fulfill the special needs of either the male or the female 
learners. Sets of posters with the illustrations, words, and sentences 
for the lessons bound in the form of a flip-chart were prepared for use 
with each learning group. The same lessons and exercise sheets were 
printed in handy book-size pages and bound in a looseleaf book for each 
learner. 
The materials were tested with 1,175 learners in 59 learning groups 
in Sulla when the first cycle of the functional education course was 
launched in May 1974. On the basis of a review of the first cycle exper-
ience, the materials unit decided to reduce the number of lessons in the 
six-month course (two or three sessions per week) from 80 to 70 and the 
number of differentiated lessons for men and women was reduced to 14 from 
the original 24. Many illustrations were revised to improve their capacity 
to communicate messages and generate group discussion. The written content 
of some of the lessons was also changed. 
The revision and modification of the lessons and adaptation of them 
to the needs of new learner groups in different geographical areas are a 
continuous responsibility of the materials unit. Its members spend much 
of their time in the field observing the actual use of the materials, test~ 
ing new materials, and gathering ideas for improving the lessons. A current 
round of revision of the materials (late 1976 and early 1977) is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
'. ~. 
FUNCTIONAL EDUCATION 13. 
Training Instructors and Supervisors 
Orientation and training were necessary for both supervisors and 
instructors in the program in order to familiarize them with appropri-
ate use of the materials and methods and, probably more importantly, 
to change their conventional perception of the role of the instructor 
in a learning group. The members of the materials unit and other BRAC 
personnel designated to become trainers of field personnel, together 
with the assistance of a World Education consultant, worked out the 
orientation and training content and method for the supervisors and 
the instructors. 
The Field Motivators, who have overall responsibility for initia-
ting and supervising all village level activities of BRAC, were also to 
be the supervisors of the functional education activities. The instruc-
tors for the learning groups were to e young men and women with some 
post-primary formal education background, chosen on a part-time basis 
from the same villages as of the learners. 
The first cycle of functional education courses, however, was 
launched in May 1974 without going through the supervisory training 
phase. The cycle began directly with the recruitment and training of 
61 instructors in the project area. The importance of a thorough under-
standing of the concept and process of functional education by all sup-
ervisory personnel of BRAC and the need for continuous support and guid-
ance to the instructors were soon realized, and training sessions for 
all BRAC personnel with supervisory responsibilities were arranged 
before the second cycle of courses. 
The World Education consultant who had earlier assisted in design-
ing the functional education program returned in September 1974 and 
organized a five-day training session in Dacca for 11 area managers, mem-
bers of the materials development unit, and other core personnel of BRAC 
who would subsequently have training and other responsibilities in the 
functional education program. Immediately following this session, a five-
day course for the Field Motivators was held at the Sulla Project site at 
Markuli. The training was conducted by the Area Managers and the World 
Education consultant attended as a resource person. 
In addition to the initial training of instructors, short workshops, 
follow-up meetings, and refresher courses were organized for the instruct-
ors by the Area Managers and Field Motivators, and they, in turn, attended 
review meetings organized by the training and materials development staff 
at the head office. 
The training sessions, passing through initial trials and errors, 
have evolved into a common pattern (known as the BRAC Functional Educa-
tion Training Module), though variations for specific groups are pos-
sible and even encouraged. The session normally lasts for five full days. 
The specific objectives of the training are: (a) to help participants 
shed their inhibitions in group situations and understand the dynamics 
of an effective group as well as the worth of individual members in the 
group, (b) to eliminate the traditional notions of "experts" and "teach-
ers" and to demonstrate that everyone in a group can enrich the group's 
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learning experience, (c) to familiarize the participants with the materials 
and methods of the course and their role as facilitators of group inter-
action, and (d) to let the participants engage in practice and dennnstra-
tion of the methods to be used later with the learners. 
The major activities of the training sessions include the following: 
identification and discussion of the participants' own expectations about 
the training session and its outcome; brainstorming about anticipated pro-
blems in functional education groups and the participants' own misgivings 
and doubts about the approach; discussion of the familiar methods of teach-
ing literacy and numeracy; simulation games and role-playing to sharpen un-
derstanding of the learners' and instructors' roles as well as the general 
rural situation; discussion of the specific steps in the functional educa-
tion lessons; demonstration lessons by the trainer and the participants who 
volunteer; discussion and demonstration of effective group procedures; and 
critical analysis of the participants' experience in the training session 
at various stages along the way and of the entire experience at the end. 
When feasible some of the demonstration lessons are conducted with actual 
illiterate learners. An instructor's guide that outlines the objectives 
and steps for each of the 70 functional education lessons has been pre-
pared in 1974. It serves as a useful training aid as well as a handy ref-
erence for instructors in the field. 
Readin~ Materials 
With the aim of providing relevant and informative reading materials 
to rural readers, BRAC began publishing the monthly journal, Gonokendro 
(The People's Forum) in April 1973. Written and edited by a full-time 
staff of two, the tabloid-size eight-page paper (later increased to 12 
pages) started with an initial print run of 2,000 copies. The circula-
tion shot up to 30,000 copies when UNICEF agreed to buy and distribute 
copies to 30,000 rural primary school teachers as a supplementary read-
ing material for themselves and their students. UNICEF later decided to 
distribute 60,000 copies to cover most rural primary schools in the country. 
Besides the primary school teachers, the general distribution in the rural 
areas was less than 1,000 copies in mid-1976, even though BRAC tried to pro-
mote subscription among the functional education participants. 
A content analysis of one volume of Gonokendro (12 issues from April 
1975 to March 1976) showed that the materials in the journal were on agri-
culture (rice, jute, horticulture, wheat, fishery, cattle, and poultry); 
health and nutrition; family planning; women's socioeconomic situation; 
cooperatives and the rural economy; primary education; and general informa-
tion (10 to 20 percent of the space). Each issue also contained some liter-
ary and entertainment pieces covering about 10 percent of the columns. The 
lead articles in the 12 issues were headed as follows: "Deep water rice," 
"Population Education in Bangladesh," "Main causes of malnutrition," "Cattle 
Wealth of Bangladesh," "Our fishery resources," "Preparation for winter farm-
ing," "Cultivating improved varieties in the Baro season," "Population growth 
has to stop," "Food for work," "Foreign market for jute has to be protected," 
"Ups and downs in jute farming." 
/ ( 
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Although the paper is well-written in an attractive racy language 
and is well edited and covers topics likely to be of interest and use 
to rural readers, it requires a level of language proficiency signifi-
cantly beyond the level of an average neoliterate. It is well suited 
to primary school teachers and others who have language skills expected 
at least of primary school completers. This is the group it serves now 
--not, by any means, an unimportant service. But it does not fill the 
alarming vacuum that now exists in neoliterate reading materials with 
systematically chosen texts of graded levels of complexity. 
The Results 
As noted earlier, with 35 male and 26 female instructors, the first 
cycle of courses was opened for 734 men and 441 women from over 50 vil-
lages in the Sulla Project area. Another 85 villagers joined the learn-
ing groups after the formal beginning, making a total enrollment of 1,260. 
The new participatory learning process and the emphasis on familiar pro-
blems of rural life aroused a high level of enthusiasm; regular attend-
ance and retention showed marked improvement in comparison to the earlier 
literacy efforts. A total of 520 learners (41 percent) completed all 80 
lessons, and another substantial number completed more than half of the 
course. A second cycle of courses was offered in June 1975 in 53 centers 
with 1,338 learners, of whom 616 or 46 percent, completed the lessons. 
What is the significance of these results? For one thing, a much 
larger number of rural people compared to that of the previous literacy 
efforts considered it worthwhile to devote the time and energy to com-
pleting the lessons. Moreover, the attention and effort given to pre-
paring the materials, developing the methodology, and training the 
instructors, as well as the participatory learning process employed in 
the program must have made a qualitative difference in the learning 
outcome that could not be indicated merely by the completion rate. 
The important question, however, is: What is the achievement of 
the participants in the educational program in terms of (a) literacy 
and numeracy skills, (b) new knowledge and information useful in improv-
ing rural living conditions, (c) critical awareness of the situation in 
which the participants find themselves, and (d) use of the newly acquired 
knowledge and awareness to change the situation? 
BRAC has not undertaken any systematic evaluation to provide a defin-
itive answer to this question. BRAC workers, however, through their 
continuous contact with the rural people in the project area, including 
the participants in the educational program, have formed their own views 
about the results of the educational efforts and have accordingly in-
fluenced the subsequent course of the educational program. ICED inves-
tigators, on the basis of extensive discussion with workers in the field 
and at headquarters and visits with the rural participants of the pro-
gram, have reached the following conclusions: 
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1. Most of those who finish the course do not achieve a level of skill 
sufficient to write an informative letter to a friend or a relative or to 
read a newspaper column. They also do not achieve a level of self-sufficiency 
in literacy skills that would permit them to improve their skill level on their 
own if reading materials for neoliterates were available. A small proportion, 
no more than a quarter (estimated generously) of those who complete the course, 
achieves a level sufficient to continue to improve their skills if they have 
relevant reading materials for neoliterates and the opportunity to use fre-
quently their skills in their daily life. In the absence of both, most of 
these people are likely to relapse into illiteracy. For a rural resident in 
a Sulla village, it would take extraordinary individual motivation and deter-
mination to continue to make use of his newly acquired literacy skills and to 
improve them. 
2. To the extent that the lessons cover information and knowledge use-
ful to improvement of rural living conditions and an understanding of the 
dynamics of the rural socioeconomic situation, and to the extent that the 
skills of the instructors and their supervisors are sufficiently put to use 
(these skills vary in the groups), there is a greater knowledge and under-
standing among the participants about various rural problems and their own 
situation than in a comparable group of nonparticipant rural residents. (To 
be any more precise about the level of knowledge and understanding of the 
learners would call for a somewhat elaborate evaluation effort beyond the 
scope of this study.) 
3. There is, however, no clear evidence that the knowledge and aware-
ness gained from the functional education program have been put to effective 
use. The level of participation in the various BRAC development activities, 
either as beneficiaries or as contributors of the functional education group 
members, is not significantly different from that of nonmembers. Nor does 
the "standard of living" of the group members as a group appear to be differ-
ent from that of the nonmembers. It is evident that the BRAC program organ-
izers, at least initially, have not viewed the participation in functional 
education as a precondition or an essential element of participation in other 
development activities. Nor has the functional education program led to such 
initiatives and self-help efforts among the participants as to cause them to 
be marked apart as the focus of special development efforts either by BRAC or 
other agencies. 
Implications of the Early Experience 
The functional education experience in Sulla reconfirms what has been 
found repeatedly in literacy efforts: that in a nonliterate environment and 
a primitive rural economy with most people engaged in subsistence activities, 
literacy is not a practical necessity, and it is extremely difficult to main-
tain 100tivation and interest in literacy efforts, even when these efforts form 
a part of a broader functional education program. In fact, in these programs 
the literacy components tend to dominate the program and distract attention 
from other important goals of the program, such as that of creating a 
critical awareness of the learners' situation and the dissemination of useful 
knowledge. 
The rural people are generally interested in literacy, as their initial 
response to any kind of literacy effort shows, because they see in it a vi-
sible and tangible objective to attain skills which the privileged ones possess 
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and also a promise of change in their own condition. A rude awakening 
soon follows when mastering the skills proves to be hard work and the 
promise of change turns out to be elusive. Interest wanes and the drop-
out rate mounts. A functional education program deemphasizing literacy 
and stressing the intangible "conscientization"l objective probably 
would not evoke the same kind of initial enthusiasm among the people; 
but if the program were well-conceived and well-managed, the interest 
in it would be likely to increase cumulatively and should be more en-
during than in a traditional literacy program. 
The Sulla experience also indicates that just initiating a number 
of development activities, including educational programs, in the same 
area and under the same organizational auspices will not lead spontan-
eously to an integrated development effort with the educational programs 
supporting and reinforcing the total development effort. The education-
al program has to be directly and deliberately geared to satisfying the 
needs of knowledge, skills, understanding, and group efforts for various 
development activities--especially if popular support and initiatives are 
called for in these development activities. An independent functional 
education program with a heavy emphasis on the mechanics of literacy does 
not satisfy these needs effectively. 
The implications of the Sulla experience have led the BRfaC leader-
ship to two somewhat conflicting responses: (a) a revision of the 
functional education materials laying a greater stress on the mechanics 
of literacy and arithmetic, and (b) a greater emphasis on the "con-
scientization" role not only in the educational effort but in the total 
development approach of BRAC. 
The primary aim of the revision of the materials, undertaken by 
the Materials Development Unit, seems to be improvement of the achieve-
ment level in literacy skills of those who complete the course. The 
number of lessons is to be raised from 70 to 100, apparently because a 
larger number of lessons is considered necessary for achieving a func-
tionally useful level of proficiency in reading and writing. Every 
eleventh lesson in the course is to be a review lesson focusing on the 
mechanics of literacy and arithmetic such as the vowel signs and the 
arithmetic functions. The sequence of the lessons is to be based on 
the level of complexity of the mechanics. Some modification of content 
in the light of experience and a more logical clustering of lessons by 
major themes are also to be done in the course of the revision. Changes 
of the "generative words" and specific content items are also intended 
to make the materials usable widely in different parts of the country. 
Expansion of BRAC activities in various locations and the increasing 
interest by voluntary organizations as well as government agencies in 
1Raising the level of consciousness about one's own condition 
through a dialogical process--a concept advocated and popularized by 
the Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire. 
20. BRAC 
in terms of methodology, content, field personnel, and the organization and 
management of BRAC field activities are yet to be fully worked out, although 
the general trends and directions are evident from project plans. 
Reconciling Literacy and Functionality 
On the whole, the BRAC program managers appear to be minimizing and un-
derrating the divergent rationale and philosophies of (a) the approach under-
lying a functional education course with a predetermined lesson sequence 
that imposes a literacy bias and criterion of learning achievement on all 
rural learners and an all-purpose readymade educational package to be used 
by various organizations in various situations; and (b) a truly functional 
program that is shaped and controlled by each learning group's priorities 
and perception of the crucial problems and is characterized by a "conscien-
tization" effort that directly leads to actions for changing the existing 
situation. The latter approach would call for: 
(a) Instructors or learning group facilitators who are not just 
tutors of literacy skills but are individuals with a high 
level of sophistication and a highly developed critical aware-
ness about the dynamics of the rural situation who can help 
organize not just the educational activity but also the action 
programs that accompany or follow the educational efforts. The 
instructor has to become also the field worker for the develop-
ment activities to be launched collectively by the learning 
group. 
(b) Generation of learning materials by the learning groups them-
selves, based on the specific situations they face and the 
action programs they choose to undertake. A central materials 
development unit can prepare resource materials and prototypes 
to be drawn upon by the groups and can provide guidance and 
techniques to the groups and the instructors for creating at 
least a significant proportion of their own learning materials. 
The instructor/field worker has to have training in improvising 
relevant learning materials and in assisting the learning groups 
to create their own learning tools and content--another task for 
the materials development unit. 
(c) Planning, implementing, and managing the BRAC activities at all 
levels, particularly at the field level, in a way that recog-
nizes the central importance of "conscientization" of the parti-
cipants and shuns the temptation to impose solutions or manipulate 
compliance of participants in the name of efficiency or any other 
pretext. 
(d) Adequate provisions for acquiring functionally useful levels of 
literacy skills and supplying relevant reading materials for those 
who are interested. While literacy should not dominate the func-
tional education program and should not be a major criterion for 
judging the performance of the program or of the learners, literacy 
need not be relegated into an inconsequential position in the pro-
gram. Just as the literate "do-gooders" should not impose liter-
acy on others at the slightest pretext, neither should they withhold 
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the rural people, and only by allowing everyone a crack at it 
(or more than one crack) is it possible to know who has the 
motivation and the determination. As the momentum of develop-
ment quickens, the customers for literacy will grow too. It 
is, however, evident that those who survive a basic cycle 
need further assistance in bringing their skills up to f unc-
tionally usable levels. They also need relevant reading mater-
ials and help in availing themselves of opportunities to use 
their new skills. Improving the general learning environment 
and expanding the scope of literacy use can be an element in 
the various development activities undertaken in the village. 
(e) Pragmatic strategies and tactics to overcome the inevitable ob-
stacles put up by the local power structure that has a vested 
interest in maintaining the status guo or seizing control of 
the development activities. While resistance may arise to an 
educational program seen as a pure literacy effort, an authen-
tic "conscientization" effort is bound to face much more vehement 
and sinister opposition. In each situation the BRAC workers and 
the local participants have to make a realistic assessment of 
the several obstacles, issues, and activities that give rise to 
possible confrontation. They must be ready to take advantage of 
all progressive elements and forces in the locality as well as 
in the national political scene. BRAC is obliged to weigh care-
fully against potential outcome of its effort the possible dan-
gers of exposing the deprived rural residents to even greater 
deprivation and even oppression by initiating an educational 
effort. Its assessment should be shared fully with the parti-
cipant groups. 
The degree of effectiveness BRAC will achieve in its functional edu-
cation efforts will depend on how successfully BRAC tackles these questions. 
Insofar as functional education is intimately linked with the whole develop-
ment approach of BRAC, the realization of the overall development objectives 
of BRAC also will depend heavily on how well these issues are handled. 




The health problems in the Sulla Project area are similar to those 
found throughout rural Bangladesh. Caused by the absence of basic hygiene 
and sanitation provisions and frequently complicated by malnutrition, pre-
ventable and communicable diseases abound. Adequate information about the 
prevalence and incidence of diseases in the area is not available. The 
service statistics of BRAC and the observations of its health workers indi-
cate that diarrhea and gastro-intestinal diseases, internal parasites, and 
respiratory infections account for about 60 percent of the total morbidity 
in the area. Infection of the skin and of ears, eyes, and throat amounts 
to another 15 percent of the diseases. If common cold and general bodily 
aches and pains, described as rheumatism, are added to the above list, it 
would cover over 80 percent of the diseases for which the people of Sulla 
sought treatment from BRAC paramedics (see Table 3.1). 
Undernutrition and malnutrition are particularly noticeable prior to 
the harvesting of the boro, the only rice crop in much of the area. Speci-
fic nutritional deficiencies in the form of night blindness and stomatitis 
are frequent. Tuberculosis is prevalent, although its intensity is not 
known. Incidence of malaria has gone down recently and smallpox, a scourge 
in the past, seems to have been eliminated as a result of an internationally 
assisted goverrmevt eradication campaign against malaria and smallpox. 
Mortality rate for the area, on the basis of a 1975 sample survey, is 
estimated to be around 15 per 1,000 population with a heavy concentration 
among infants, children under five, and pregnant mothers. The survey has 
shown that two-thirds of all deaths in the project area occurred among 
children up to the age of 4 years. The rate was 186 per 1,000 for infants 
(from birth to age 1). It fell sharply to 23 per 1,000 for children (1-4 
years). From age-groups 15-19 to 45-49 the death rate was more or less 
constant around 1 per 1,000, and it rose gradually for older people over 
50.l The population growth rate for the area is estimated by BRAC at 2.5 
percent. Both the crude birth rate and the crude death rate in the project 
area, according to the sample survey, is slightly lower than the national 
rate (40 and 15 respectively compared to 47 and 17). 2 
lBRAC, Base-line Survey of Sulla (October-November 1975), Dacca, 1976. 
2However, the infant mortality rate was found to be higher than in 
another thana with good demographic records. Matlab Demographic studies 
(May 1967-April 1968) indicated an infant mortality rate of 125 compared 
to 186 in Sulla in 1975. (BRAC, Base-line Survey of Sulla (October-November 
1975), Dacca, 1976 9 pp. 4-5.) 
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Table 3.1 
Incidence of Diseases Treated by Paramedics in Sulla 
July-September 1976 
23. 
Disease Symptoms Number of Cases Percentage 
Diarrhea 982 10.4 
Dysentery (chronic and acute) 1 727 18.2 
Worms 1 043 11.0 
Hyper acidity 285 3.0 
Common cold 992 10.5 
Acute bronchitis 423 4.4 
Pneumonia 263 2.8 
Ear, eye, throat condition 630 6.6 
Skin infection 763 8.0 
Rheumatism 787 8.3 
Others 1 590 16.8 
TOTAL 9 485 100.0 
Source: BRAC Service Records. 
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Services Other Than BRAC 
The stipulated pattern for government personnel for health care in 
a thana is one health administrator (physician), a medical officer and 
other staff for a 25-bed hospital, two or three health inspectors, and a 
family welfare worker for vaccination and preventive care per 5,000 
people. The family planning staff is supposed to include a thana Family 
Planning Officer, a number of Lady Family Planning Visitors for maternal 
and child health care as well as some clinical services such as IUD in-
sertion, and three family planning workers per union (one male and two 
female). In 1976, the government personnel and facilities in the area did 
not conform to this standard. In the project area, encompassing one thana 
and parts of two other thanas, there were two physicians serving as Thana 
Health Administrators and 15 other health workers for two thanas. The 
family planning personnel included, besides the two thana officers, 14 
field workers. The thana health center existed only in one thana, Derai. 
It had offices for the health officials, a dispensary and outdoor clinic 
(open about two hours a day, six days a week), a 25-bed indoor treatment 
facility, and a seldom used operation theatre. 
The government health personnel are known to remain confined to the 
thana center waiting for the people to come to them and providing such 
curative services as inadequate and irregular supplies of medicine permit. 
Frequent complaints about the absence of the doctor, the nonavailability 
of medicine, and the considerable distance that most of the thana resi-
dents have to cover to come to the center discourage effective use of the 
center. Visits to villages by the health workers are made mainly for vac-
cination drives against smallpox and cholera. The family planning program, 
which has recently undergone a major reorganization at the national level 
and the impact of which is still to be felt in all the rural areas, has 
remained ineffective in both motivational work and in recruiting acceptors. 
The private practitioners of western medicine in the area include 11 
doctors (2 regular medical graduates, 3 LMFs, and 6 national doctors). 1 
All of these doctors are located in four bazars (trading centers) in the 
area. A number of "village doctors" (compounders or pharmacist's assis-
tants, and practitioners of indigenous medicine) are also mostly located 
in the bazars. All health workers, government and private, are men. 
BRAC Health Care and Family Planning Approach 
True to its character as a relief program in its initial phase, the 
early BRAC activities in the health area consisted of fielding four medi-
cal teams in 1972 to provide daily outpatient services in four camps. When 
1r.MF (Licentiate of the Medical Faculty) doctors, licensed by the 
State to practise medicine, have four years' training after 10 years of 
general schooling, compared to five years' training after 12 years of 
schooling for MBBS. The LMF program was discontinued under pressure 
from the medical establishment to "raise the standards of the medical 
profession." 
National doctors are trained in a private medical school, not recog-
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a cholera epidemic became a real threat and beyond the capabilities of 
the small medical'teams to handle, the doctors also trained a group of 
villagers in the techniques of taking care of cholera and severe diar-
rhea cases. In addition a child feeding program was undertaken with 
UNICEF assistance. Up to 15,000 children of poor families in the area 
were given a ration of corn-soya milk as a supplement to their diet to 
avert the dangers of serious malnutrition. 
As the BRAC activities began to evolve into a development program 
from a relief operation, the need arose for converting the ad hoc medi-
cal relief effort into a program of medical care, public healt-;:- and 
family planning that would become an integral part of the total rural 
development effort of BRAC. 
The disease pattern in the villages, encompassing a preponderance 
of collmlunicable and preventable diseases, and thehealth manpower situa-
tion in the rural areas dictated a solution that had been found effective 
in a number of other developing countries. It was to raise a cadre of 
paraprofessional health workers from the rural residents themselves (para-
iredics) to treat the common diseases and conduct preventive and health 
education activities. It was decided that the cormnon clinical facilities 
and technical medical personnel would provide backup support to both the 
health care services and the family planning services. The main objec-
tives of the health care and family planning program, as these were seen 
at the time of initiating this program in mid-1973, were: 
a. to train a cadre of paramedics. to treat 18-20 connnon illnesses, 
b. to make available inoculation and vaccination against the common 
preventable diseases, 
c. to motivate and educate villagers to take preventive sanitation 
and public health measures, and 
d. to form a cadre of female family planning workers to serve as 
distributors of contraceptives and recruiters of acceptors 
with the paramedics' guidance and supervision. 
Organization of the Services 
The paramedic is in a central position in the delivery of health 
care in BRAC. Each paramedic, responsible for 4,000 to 5,000 people 
in five to eight villages, visits the villages once a week or as nearly 
so as possible, treats the specified common health problems, discusses 
and provides advice on sanitation and hygiene measures, and looks after 
the health problems of mothers and children brought to his attention by 
the family planning organizer in the village. 
The health and family planning activities are organizationally 
linked with other BRAC activities through the camp, the base unit for 
all activities in a cluster of villages. The paramedics are also based 
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in the camps (one or two for each camp), where they conduct a daily clinic 
for an hour in addition to the village rounds and maintain liaison with 
other BRAC personnel and activities. The Area Manager, head of the camp, 
and the Field Motivators, who initiate and guide the village activities, 
also have general supervisory responsibilities for the health and family 
planning activities in the villages. Existing groups for functional 
education, cooperatives, and women's activities are used in most motiva-
tional and educational work relating to preventive health measures, sani-
tation, nutrition, and family planning. In this effort, the Area Managers 
and the Field Motivators work as a team with the paramedics. Educating 
the public about the health insurance scheme (see below) and mobilizing 
support in its favor again require a team effort by all BRAC field person-
nel. 
Technical supervision of the paramedics is the responsibility of the 
three physicians based in three health centers in the project area (a 
ratio of one physician to 40,000 people--the present overall ratio in rural 
Bangladesh). The physicians provide initial and refresher training to the 
paramedics, look after the patients referred to them.by paramedics and the 
family planning organizers, and supervise the paramedics' work by frequent 
field visits. The main task of the physicians is to provide technical sup-
port and supervision to the paramedics and to take care of the referral 
cases. They do not deal with patients directly except in exceptional emer-
gencies. The centers where the doctors are based are modest facilities 
where simple surgical procedures, common pathological tests, and such family 
planning services as IUD insertion, tubal ligation, and vasectomy can be per-
formed. 
The village level family planning functions (i.e., making direct con-
tacts with child-bearing age women, informing them of the contraceptive 
alternatives, distributing supplies, maintaining records of acceptors, ad-
vising about side effects, recruiting candidates for terminal methods, and 
so forth) are the responsibility of the Lady Family Planning Organizer 
(LFPO) . She serves a village (about 100 families) and is a native of the 
village. She makes referrals to paramedics and the physicians as necessary. 
She looks, however, to the Field Motivators and the Area Manager for guid-
ance and active help in educational and motivational work, specially in 
dealing with existing community groups or when special community assemblies 
are arranged for this purpose. 
The health care and family planning components of the second phase of 
the Sulla Project (1973-76) have functioned on the basis of the organiza-
tional structure described above. This structure aims at bringing the basic 
health care and family planning services to the people's doorstep, meeting 
the most urgent need, hitherto unmet, of simple domiciliary care, utilizing 
the available health manpower efficiently, emphasizing preventive measures 
and basic health care in place of expensive hospitals and sophisticated cur-
ative services, and integrating health care and family planning with other 
aspects of rural development. 
Experience in the Sulla area with this organizational approach, how-
ever, has pointed out some practical problems and has led BRAC to explore 
-~ 
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certain modifications of this approach in the third phase of the Sulla 
and in new projects in other locations.I 
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First, it was found that there was a preponderance of adult males 
being treated by the paramedics, even though disease pattern and speci-
fic mortality rates indicated that child-bearing women and children under 
five were most in need of medical services. For example, the age and sex 
distribution of patients treated by paramedics in the Markuli area during 
a one-month period (from August 10 to September 10, 1974) was as follows: 
No. of Percentage of No. of Percentage of 
Age Male Male Female Female 
in Years Patients Patients Patients Patients 
0-5 111 13.5 96 11.6 
6-15 109 13.3 50 6.1 
Over 15 
_]12_ 38.8 139 16.9 
TOTAL 539 65.6 285 34.6 
Women were apparently reluctant to come themselves or bring their 
children to paramedics, who were young men and mostly unmarried. The 
treatment of pediatric and obstetric-gynecological problems requires a 
personal rapport with the mother that is not easy for young men to esta-
blish in a Bengali village. 
Second, despite the weekly village visit of the paramedics, the 
degree of contact between the paramedics and the villagers and the ac-
cessibility to medical service were found to be insufficient. A 
villager of ten had to wait up to a period of one week or travel some 
distance to one of the camp clinics before he could get help on any 
urgent medical problem. 
Finally, the paramedics were found to be spending most of their 
time in the village providing curative services and very little time 
teaching preventive care and health education. Moreover, the once-a-
week visit to the village for a few hours did not create a rapport and 
mutual trust between the paramedics and the villagers that is essential 
for the acceptance of new ideas and information. 
The changes initiated in organization and staffing to overcome the 
problems encountered in Sulla were three-fold: (a) formation of a cadre 
of auxiliary women health workers who under the supervision of paramedics 
would establish a continuous presence of the ~ealth program in each vil-
lage--each being based in her own village and each serving no more than 
100 families on a narrower and more specific range of health problems 
than those treated by paramedcis (see below the discussion about person-
nel); (b) employment of women paramedics and a significant increase in 
their numbers (see the chapter on women's programs); and (c) emphasis on 
1BRAC, The BRAC Health Care, Preventive Medicine and Family Plan-
ning Program, Dacca, n.d. 
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public health education, preventive measures, and nutrition education through 
a systematic corranunity-centered effort, particularly through women's groups 
such as mothers' clubs (see the chapter on women's programs). 
In addition, it was seen as an important objective to develop the organ-
izational structure and the service delivery system in a manner that would 
make the health program increasingly self-sufficient in financial and manage-
ment terms. The health insurance scheme designed to achieve this goal is dis-
cussed below in the section on financing. 
Health Personnel 
Categories and Functions 
Three categories of personnel form the health and family planning staff 
of BRAC. They are (a) the newly introduced (in 1976) village-based women aux-
iliaries, known variously as the Peoples' Healer (Shasthya shevika) or locally 
as the Daktarnee (the lady doctor) and the older category of Lady Family Plan-
ning Organizers (LFPO), (b) the paramedics, and (c) the qualified physicians. 
Women auxiliaries are seen by BRAC as the most effective means of reaching 
rural families; consequently, BRAC has no current plan to use men as village 
health auxiliaries. 
As noted above, the village-based auxiliary or the peoples' healer is 
the response to the need for maintaining a continuous contact of the health 
program with each village and for ensuring greater accessibility of the ser-
vices to the village people. Her tasks, therefore, are three-fold: (a) pro-
viding specific treatments for selected cormnon and uncomplicated disease 
symptoms such as diarrhea, dysentery, scabies, headache and fever, and in-
testinal worms (the list may vary somewhat depending on the village needs); 
(b) providing specific advice and information to mothers about nutrition, 
child care, vaccination, and family planning; and (c) distributing oral con-
traceptives. This list is not intended to be rigid or restrictive. The 
healer may be given more limited responsibilities (for example, when an LFPO 
is functioning in the same village) or additional tasks depending on the 
ability to learn and performance of the healer and the need of the village. 
The additional tasks that the healer may take over are vaccination and inocu-
lation and midwifery. 
The functions of the LFPO have been mentioned already. With the healers 
placed in each village, the role of the LFPO needs reassessment. The logical 
solution would appear to be.to combine the LFPO and healer functions and to 
retrain the interested and competent LFPOs for the healer's job. BRAC, how-
ever, is not certain about the proper course to follow. Apparently, women of 
relatively high level of education and social status are interested in beco~ 
ing healers, whereas the LFPO's position is seen somehow related to the tasks 
of traditional birth attendants or dais, ranked relatively low in the social 
status hierarchy. Having two separate groups of village level workers for the 
health and family planning services offers the advantage of aligning the sup-
port of some influential village women for the health activities, but it has 
the disadvantage of affecting adversely the social esteem and credibility of 
the LFPO and of separating the interrelated health and family planning activi-
ties. The solution ultimately accepted will depend on trials, underway 
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currently (1976) in selected villages, with different patterns: newly 
recruited healers performing both health care and family planning tasks, 
LFPOs converted into healers carrying out their old and new functions, 
and division of duties between LFPOs and healers in the same villages. 
The responsibilities of paramedics have been discussed in the pre-
vious section. With the posting of healers in each village, the para-
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medic continues with his usual weekly village visit, but now visits homes 
identified by the healer as having health problems and follows up previously 
treated cases. He devotes more time to health education and preventive 
care by attending meetings of village groups, such as mothers' clubs, 
functional educational groups, and primary schools. With a potential 
decrease in the paramedic's work load, and in view of the seriousness 
of another problem in the villages, the idea of training paramedics for 
treating and preventing common diseases of cattle and fowl is being ex-
amined in BRAC. It is not known whether the treatment of cattle and 
people by the same person will be found acceptable by the people. Pre-
sumably, the cattle will have no objection to this arrangement! 
The functions of the physicians--anyone with MBBS, LMF, and National 
Certificate, and all three types are represented in BRAC staff--have been 
described above. As a BRAC document states, 
The classic role of the physician as that of a 
healer is being redefined in BRAC. We view him 
first and foremost as a teacher, then a planner 
and lastly one directly involved in curing.l 
With an increasingly important role of the village-based healer as the 
front line worker of the health and family planning program, her train-
ing and ultimate technical backstopping and supervision of her perform-
ance are the responsibility of the physician posted in the health center 
serving a particular area. 
Recruitment and Training 
The criteria for recruitment as a people's healer are that (a) she 
is a female member of the community, preferably over twenty years of age, 
(b) she is acceptable to the community, and (c) she is enthusiastic about 
her new responsibilities and willing to move freely about the village. 
She may be illiterate if she meets the other criteria. 
The training of the healer is carried out in one of the villages and 
conducted by physicians or paramedics supervised by physicians. The main 
methodology is demonstration and practice of the tasks--identifying the 
disease symptoms, mixing and applying medicine, communicating with clients, 
handling money, and so forth~repeating these as many times as necessary to 
ensure mastery of the tasks. For the benefit of illiterate healers, the 
drugs are premixed with individual dosages separated or marked and each drug 
color-coded for easy identification. The initial training of healers lasts 
up to four weeks in two to three hours of daily sessions. Refresher ses-
sions are held as needed. 
lBRAC, The BRAC Health Care •.. Ibid., p. 12. 
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Since LFPOs do not handle medicine, a less rigorous training method 
has been followed in their case. The one week training for them includes 
discussion and deroonstration about the need for family planning, the rela-
tionship of family planning to nutrition and child care, means of contact-
ing child-bearing couples, and the recording of data. The training is 
conducted by the paramedics and the Field Motivators. 
To qualify as a paramedic in the BRAC health program, the candidate 
must (1) have at least matriculation certificate (10 years of formal edu-
cation), but relaxable in the case of female candidates; (2) be well moti-
vated and willing to travel from village to village; and (3) be acceptable 
to the village communities to be served by him. Until mid-1976 all para-
medics in BRAC were men; since then a group of 15 women have been placed 
in training to become paramedics. 
The training of paramedics is conducted by the BRAC physicians and 
is held in the project area, except for one week's special training at 
the Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca on diarrheal treatment methods 
developed at the laboratory. It is a fairly rigid well-structured train-
ing course that lasts for six roonths and includes two months of classroom 
sessions on theoretical aspects and four months of supervised practice. 
A training manual for the paramedics has been prepared that lists 
the distinguishing symptoms, danger signs to be watched, and specific 
treatments for the following common diseases: 
1. Diarrhea 
2. Dysentery (acute, bacillary) 
3. Dysentery (chronic, amoebic) 
4. Enteric fever (typhoid) 
5. Conunon cold and influenza 
6. Pneumonia 











18. Stomach ulcer 
19. Malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies 
(including night blindness and stomatitis) 
20. Women's conditions (including pregnancy 
and post delivery problems) 
In addition, the procedure and dosages for inununizations (DPT, tetanus 
toxoid, smallpox, BCG and TABC) are described in the manual. 
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The training also emphasizes the basic philosophy and mottoes of 
the program, the supervisory and management responsibilities of para-
medics, conununication with village people, and the importance of preven-
tion. 
The quality that is given the highest importance in the recruit-
ment of a physician is his enthusiasm for the BRAC program and its 
objectives and his willingness to learn from his own experience. There 
is no formal training program in BRAC for a physician. His profession-
al training does not prepare him for the role he is expected to play as 
a teacher, planner, and provider of technical backstopping in a compre-
hensive rural health care system. However, for the professional and 
intellectual rejuvenation of the physician and as a kind of special 
incentive, there is provision for short study tours in other developing 
countries to observe the rural health problems or innovative projects 
and for attending short advanced public health education and manage-
ment courses. 
Services Provided 
In the Sulla Project area in 1975 curative and preventive services 
were provided by 31 paramedics. As noted earlier, they provided treat-
ment for the common ailments and referred complicated cases (about 5 
percent of the patients) to the physicians. 
The number of cases treated by the paramedics and physicians in 
1975 was about 50,000, mostly among the members of the insurance scheme 
(see below). With 13,500 members in the insurance scheme in 1975, and 
each member requiring treatment on an average of three times a year, the 
number of noninsured patients was very small. 
Although anyone in the project area could take advantage of the cur-
ative service by paying the cost of medicine (an average of 2.50 taka) and 
a modest service fee of Tk 0.50 per consultation, even these charges were 
apparently high for many families. The insurance scheme was intended to 
overcome this problem by distributing the cost burden evenly in the popula-
tion. However, as mentioned earlier, the reluctance of women to be treated 
by male paramedics and the inadequate provision of service in the absence 
of a village-based health worker prevented the spread of the insurance 
scheme. Therefore, on a regular basis, the benefits of the curative ser-
vices were enjoyed mostly by a small proportion (about 12 percent) of the 
area population. As a part of the plan to expand the benefits, the vil-
lage-based people's healer scheme was initiated in 1976, and training of 
female paramedics was begun. At the end of the year, 30 people's healers 
(Shasthya shevika) were working in 30 villages, mostly with insured groups, 
and 15 female paramedics were in training. 
One specific preventive measure widely available was primary small-
pox vaccination for all children. DPT and BCG injections for children as 
well as tetanus toxoid for pregnant mothers were to be ma.de selectively 
available in 1976 and were planned to be made generally available subse-
quently. 
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Besides general advice by paramedics on prevention and hygiene during 
contacts with the villagers, group efforts on health education were carried 
out through mothers' clubs as well as functional education groups, primary 
schools, and cooperative society meetings. The most systematic of these ef-
forts were the mothers' clubs, 73 of which were started under BRAC auspices 
and were functioning in the project area in 1976. The ioothers' clubs acti-
vities are described in the chapter on women's programs. 
Family planning services were offered through 87 Lady Family Planning 
Organizers in the project area in 1976. The services included contact with 
eligible couples and explanation of the methods, means, and importance of 
family planning; distribution of oral pills, condoms, and EMKO foam; fol-
lowup of side effects; and referral to clinics for insertion of IUD or ter-
minal methods. 
The family planning program started in January 1974 and reached a peak 
of 2,105 acceptors in May 1975. Since then, the number of acceptors seems 
to have reached a plateau and has remained around 2,000 in 1976. In December 
1975, 1,892 women were on pills, 38 had IUDs inserted, and 40 men had under-
gone vasectomy.l Tubectomy was not made available until 1976 because, as the 
BRAC leadership put it, the husbands in male-dominated societies avoided the 
much simpler procedure of vasectomy and prevailed upon their wives to undergo 
tubal ligation. The plan was to have a sufficient number of vasectomy clients 
first and then to offer both vasectomy and tubal ligation. As it turned out, 
the campaign for vasectomy did not have a great success, and the denial of 
tubal ligation probably imposed more hardship on women willing to take a ter-
minal measure than the pain they were spared. Tubectomy, therefore, began to 
be available in 1976. 
The services of LFPOs were available in 1976 to 87 villages, or less 
than half of the 200 villages in the project area. The current acceptance 
ratio, if computed on the basis of the total eligible couples in villages 
actually served (estimated to be about 10,000) rather than of the eligible 
couples in the whole project area (about 20,000) is approximately 20 per-
cent--compared to a national estimate of about 5 percent.2 
While 20 percent acceptance rate is relatively high, what precisely this 
means in terms of impact on population growth rate was not clear. Some bench-
mark data for 1975 were collected by BRAC, but no comparative demographic data 
for a later check were available. In any event, the program was not extensive 
enough or had not been in existence long enough to provide any definitive con-
clusion regarding its impact. The rate of continuation among contraceptive 
acceptors after 12 monthly cycles of pill distribution was reported to be 62.6 
percent after 12 monthly cycles and 54.9 percent after 18 cycles of dis-
tribution. 3 Physical side effects of pills were reported to 
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 24-25. Service statistics 
for December 1976 showed 2,082 continuing pill acceptors, and a total of 74 
IUD acceptors and 59 vasectomies in Sulla by December 31, 1976. 
2According to the BRAC oral pill follow-up survey of February-March, 
1976, the estimate of acceptance rate is 21.1 percent of the eligible married 
women in the villages covered by family planning services. 
3BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context of 
Integrated Rural Development, Dacca, March 1977, Table 13. 
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be the single most important reason for discontinuation. (See Tables 
3.2 and 3.3.) 
Financing the Health Program 
A primary health care service designed to meet the basic health 
care needs of the people on a permanent basis cannot remain dependent 
forever on philanthropic support of voluntary organizations. It is 
BRAC's belief that its low-cost health delivery approach will make it 
possible to have a self-sufficient community health service financed 
by the conununity's own resources with some supplementation from the 
national government or other outside sources. 
The group health insurance scheme is designed to mobilize commun-
ity resources for the health program and to keep the cost burden for 
the rural families at an acceptable level. The main features of the 
scheme, as it operated in Sulla till 1976, are as follows: 
a. A group consisting of at least 75 percent of the population 
of a village with a minimum of 175 people can enter the 
scheme. 
b. The annual premium of 4 kilograms of paddy (unhusked rice) 
per person is payable in advance (collected after the 
main harvest). 
c. The insured families must accept and cooperate in BRAC's 
preventive health program (particularly, inoculation and 
vaccination). 
d. BRAC provides weekly paramedical curative health service 
to the group, including referrals to doctors when neces-
sary, without further cost. 
(With the introduction of shasthya shevikas, curative care is 
available on a continuous basis in each village. The preventive 
measures such as vaccination and mother and child care through the 
mothers' clubs are, in principle, available to all project area 
people, irrespective of participation in the insurance scheme.) 
The insurance scheme was launched in May 1975 and a drive was 
organized by the paramedics and the Field Motivators to enroll mem-
bers and form village committees for the collection of the annual 
in-kind premium. BRAC estimates are that throughout the project 
40 to 50 percent of the families were prepared to join the scheme, 
but only 10 percent of the villages could muster 75 percent cover-
age to qualify for group insurance. By early 1976, only 37 groups 
covering 13,500 people had joined the scheme.l 
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 22. 
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Table 3. 2 
Stated Primary Reasons for Discontinuation 
of Contraceptive Use 
Reasons Number 
Physical side-effects 247 
Desire for another child 156 
Accidental pregnancy 130 
Not needed for unspecified reasons 91 
Other reasons 36 
Husband's objection 37 
Fear of method 28 
Forgetfulness 27 












Source: BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context 
of Integrated Rural Development, Table 15. 
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Table 3.3 










Lack of appetite, dyspepsia 
Fatigue 
Difficulty in breast feeding 
Bleeding between periods 
Weight gain or loss 










































Source: BRAC, Oral Pill Follow-up Survey: Family Planning in the Context 




At a time of relatively low paddy rice (late 1976) the annual per 
person premium of 4 kilograms of paddy valued at Tk 6.00 covered 
roughly SO percent of the drug costs on the basis of 3.3 consultations 
per person per year at an average drug cost of Tk 3.SO per consultation. 
The trends in cost of production and the international prices suggest 
that rice prices will stabilize at a higher level of around Tk 100.00 
per maund (40 kgs.). The current premium rate of 4 kgs. would therefore 
cover about 80 percent of the drug costs--if the drug costs also remain 
stable. 
Recurring costs other than for medicine are estimated to be no more 
than two-thirds of the drug costs on the basis of the cost structure pro-
posed by BRAC for the third phase of the Sulla Project. Following broad-
.1.Y. the BRAC cost projections for the Sulla Project, the following per 
capita annual recurring costs are derived: 
Medicine 
Other supplies (contraceptives, clinical 
supplies, vaccinations, etc.) 
Personnel 
Doctor (Tk lSOO per month/30,000 people) 0.60 
Paramedics (Tk 7SO per rnonth/4,000 
people) 2. SO 
Shasthya Shevika/LFPO 
(Tk lSO p.m./1,000 people) 1.80 
Travel (20% of doctor & paramedic salaries) 









BRAC leaders believe that it would be feasible gradually and suf-
ficiently to increase the insurance premium during Phase III (1976-78) 
to cover all of the medicine and supply costs. The personnel costs have 
to be met from other sources. BRAC's proposal for Phase III states that 
the salaries of paramedics and the shas th ya shevikas will be "required · 
to be borne by the Village Development Committee who will receive grants 
from the Cooperative Society. The cost of administration and doctors' 
salaries will require funding from outside sources. 111 Whether the Vil-
lage Development Cotmnittee can pay the salaries of the health worker will, 
of course, depend on how successful, economically and otherwise, the coop-
erative societies are. 
Recordkeeping and Evaluation 
A reluctance to devote any substantial effort to maintaining more 
than the most rudimentary service data and other project statistics is 
clearly detectable in BRAG. As stated in a project document, "Paper is 
1 Ibid., p. 10. 
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not only expensive, it creates an army of clerks when we want an army 
of health workers." 
The paramedic maintains a notebook in which he enters the date 
and the village visited every working day and records the patient's 
name, age, sex, symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, and money collected 
for medicine. These records are reviewed llXJnthly by the physician. 
37. 
The LFPO used to maintain two notebooks, one for listing the tar-
get couples and the other for acceptor information. These have been 
replaced by a card to be maintained by the LFPO for each married woman 
between 15 and 45. The cards are used to record name and age of hus-
band' and wife, number and ages of children, type of contraception ac-
cepted, period when used, and reason (if any) for discontinuation. 
The cards are used for referral service in the clinic. 
The shevika is required only to record the number of patients 
seen and whether they are adults or children. 
If the data recorded by the paramedics and LFPOs were consoli-
dated and analyzed, they would provide the basic quantitative indica-
tion of curative medical services provided and the acceptance and 
retention rates for family planning. These, however, would not pro-
vide any accurate indication of the impact of the health efforts in 
terms of morbidity, mortality, and overall health situation of the 
population; nor would there be an indication of the effects on birth 
rate and population growth rate or of the differential characteris-
tics of acceptors, dropouts, and non-acceptors in the family planning 
program. 
Recording of births, deaths, morbidity, nutrition status, and 
socioecono1'1ic characteristics of patients and family planning patients 
on a continuing basis is regarded by BRAC as "a very expensive and 
time consuming process"l and not an appropriate task for the health 
workers. The necessary evaluative data about the health and family 
planning activities as well as other aspects of the BRAC project are 
planned to be collected by a sample survey of the population every 
three to four years. Such a sample survey of 1600 households was 
conducted for the first time in Sulla in late 1975. A follow-up sur-
vey of oral pill acceptors was undertaken in February-March 1976. 
Both of these, being the first surveys, provided useful benchmark 
data (but no comparative data for assessing the impact of the pro-
gram). 
Outlook for the Future 
Whether the BRAC health and family planning program will survive 
and grow as a viable approach to meeting the health and family plan-
ning needs of the rural people in Bangladesh and whether it will in-
fluence significantly the national programs will depend, first, on 
the results of the efforts under way to extend the accessibility and 
1 The BRAC Health Care .... op. cit., p. 15 
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coverage of the services to the total project area population and, second, 
on how successfully a management structure evolves that is compatible with 
local management of the program (without the guiding hand of BRAC) and 
with the overall organization and management of development and local 
government in the area. 
Greater Access. 
As noted already, access to and coverage of the services are affected 
by cultural factors (the women's reluctance to face men paramedics), physi-
cal factors (once-a-week presence of the paramedic for a few hours), and 
the nature of the service (dominance of an "outpatient" type curative ser-
vice and the lack of dialogue, social interaction, and a seeking of advice 
and reassurance that is possible only with the presence of a health worker 
in a village). Attempts to remove these barriers to quantitative and 
qualitative improvement of the program are being made by the introduction of 
the village-based auxiliaries (healers) and the recruitment of new female 
paramedics. The outcome of these recent moves in both quantitative and qua-
litative terms are yet to be seen. 
Visible Impact. 
The extension and intensification of service coverage should begin to 
be reflected in the health and demographic status of the area population in 
the near future. BRAC apparently has not paid sufficient attention to as-
sessing the impact of its services on such indicators as the rates of mor-
bidity, mortality, and births. It appears to be particularly modest 
about its effect on the high mortality rate. One of its reports states: 
"A fall in death rate may be noted but is not anticipated. Food produc-
tion, flooding, and social stability will probably have greater effects 
on mortality rates than the heal th care or preventive medicine program. " 1 
Obviously, a high mortality rate is not the main problem; it is but 
an indicator of the health status of the population. An improvement in 
the general health status should reduce mortality rate, especially when 
certain segments of the population are found to be particularly vulnerable 
and are contributing disproportionately to the total mortality rate. A 
concentrated attack on the health hazards of infants, children under five, 
and mothers who fall victims to communicable diseases and preventable but 
fatal infections such as tetanus is quite feasible and compatible with 
BRAC's health care approach and is likely to curtail both the specific and 
overall rate of mortality significantly. 
Improving Records. 
BRAC's reluctance to have the health workers spend much time on col-
lecting and recording statistics is understandable. On the other hand, 
the fairly intensive coverage of rural families envisaged by its service 
delivery approach (having a ratio of no more than 150 families to one 
village-based auxiliary) should permit the maintenance of a set of selec-
ted data about the health situation in the area without imposing too 
1The BRAC Health Care ... , p. 16. 
HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 39. 
heavy a tax on the worker's time. The information recorded may include 
births, deaths, incidence of selected disease symptoms, children's nu-
tritional status (using a simple QUAC stick or other appropriate measure-
ment), contraceptive acceptance, and continuation of contraceptive use. 
The periodic sampling of the population still would be useful for assess-
ment of the impact of overall BRAC efforts and may be supplementary to 
the regular recording of information. The advantages of consolidation of 
the selected data--say, on a monthly basis for each paramedic's area and 
on a quarterly basis for the project area--are many: (a) it would pro-
vide a ready check on the health situation of the area; (b) it would 
help determine appropriate emphasis on specific therapies, preventive 
measures, and educational actions for each locality at a particular 
time; (c) it would encourage the workers to maintain systematic con-
. tact with their clients and remain fully informed about the health situa-
tion in the area; and (d) it could be a tool for creating an awareness in 
the communities about their health and population situation and about the 
results or lack of results of their collective efforts. 
Coopting Indigenous Medicine. 
BRAC has taken an initiative to coopt the. practitioners of the 
various forms of nonallopathic medicine (ayuverdic, unani, and homeo-
pathic) into the comprehensive health care system for a rural area. 
The advantages of this move are seen to be three-fold: 
First, the potential power of these practitioners of medicine to 
resist the spread of the BRAC approach and to create misgivings about 
it among the rural population will be neutralized. Second, to the ex-
tent the therapies and health measures of the indigenous and non-allo-
pathic medicinal practices are relatively effective, cheap, and compa-
tible with popular beliefs, these practices may be included with bene-
ficial results in the repertoire of treatments of the paramedics and 
the shasthya shevikas. Finally, these practitioners of medicine--being 
a group of people living in the rural areas and catering in their own 
way to the health needs of the rural population could be put to good 
use as paramedics within the primary health care system and could be 
prevented from being the purveyors of poor medical service at a high 
cost to the patients. 
The success of this move will depend on whether a commonly agreed 
list of therapies and health measures can be prepared, whether the local 
"doctors" can be brought into a specially designed paramedic training 
program, and whether these "doctors" perceive the move to be in their 
long-range interest. Identifying elements of nonallopathic medicine 
that can be incorporated into the curative and preventive practices of 
the basic health care system of the country calls for a substantial re-
search and investigation effort. The prospect of government assistance 
and collaboration of other agencies in the country concerned about rural 
health could be explored by BRAC. 
Improving Family Planning. 
As for family planning, the tasks before BRAC are to extend the 
coverage of the services to all the project area villages (instead of 
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less than half the villages as in 1976) and to push the curve of the acceptor 
rate upward beyond the plateau that the curve seems to have reached. An opti-
mal acceptor rate among the couples of childbearing age at the present stage 
is about one-third of the total (leaving out those who are already pregnant 
and those in a state of postpartum amenorrhea).l However, identifying and 
reaching the appropriate clients in this group and maintaining their acceptor 
status would require a more precise and differentiated approach than a general 
"shot-gun" approach to the provision of family planning service, which ac-
tually may do more harm than good by interfering with the natural fertility 
reducing effects of the biological factors. 
The potential of traditional and nonwestern methods of restricting births 
appears to have been ignored in BRAC family planning efforts. There has been 
almost an exclusive reliance on just one birth control technology--the pill 
(other than the terminal measures of vasectomy or tubectomy). While this 
dependence on one method may have been justified and may have to continue--
given the fact that this is culturally an alien technology and produces, at 
least for some, adverse physiological side effects--the other indigenous and 
"non-technological" methods such as rhythm, abstinence·, late marriage, breast-
f eeding (in order to extend lactational amenorrhea), azl (coitus interruptus) 
warrant a fair trial. The offering of wise and appropriate counsel to poten-
tial candidates about methods other than the standard prescription of pills 
would require a personal, well-motivated, non-stereotyped approach. 
Another issue that has to be resolved is the overlap between the functions 
of the Lady Family Planning Organizer and the shas th ya shevik.a. The logic 
and rationale behind the integrated health care approach of BRAC calls for a 
merger of these two positions in the village. If indeed there is a social stig-
ma attached to those in family planning services, there is all the more reason 
to combine the positions of the LFPO and the shevika in order to assure a great-
er social acceptance for those in family planning services. Such a move, of 
course, should be accompanied by an educational effort to remove the roots of 
the prejudice. The trial under way with different combinations of roles and 
functions of the village-based worker will probably suggest the best course of 
action in this respect. 
Organizational Issues. 
A number of organizational and management issues has to be tackled during 
the third phase of the Sulla Project (and in the course of initiating BRAC-spon-
sored health programs in other locations). How can the health care system con-
tinue to function when the BRAC umbrella and resources are removed? What kind 
of organizational structure will ensure that the needs of the people will be 
Lrbe period of temporary sterility after a live birth. This period is 
estimated to be 17 months in Bangladesh for a woman who breastfeeds her child. 
Use of contraceptive pills ends the state of amenorrhea and increases the 
probability of conception if the woman is negligent about taking the pills 
regularly or if she drops out. See Lincoln C. Chen,~ al, Recent Fertility 
Trends in Bangladesh: Speculation on the Role of Biological Factors and Socio-
economic Change, Dacca, The Ford Foundation, December 1976. 
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adequately served, that the necessary resources will be available, that 
the workers will be paid, and that they will perform their duties? How 
can the group insurance scheme be kept alive and prevent the paramedics 
and the shevikas from being individual private entrepreneurs? How can 
the beneficiary population participate in the management of the program 
and keep it compatible with their overall development needs and priori-
ties? 
The approach that is favored by BRAC and expected to be worked out 
in detail and gradually implemented over the next two or three years is 
the transfer of the management responsibilities to a representative body 
at the thana level with subsidiary bodies at the union (a unit of 10-20 
villages) level. The COII'ailittees at the thana and the union levels, formed 
with a representation of the different categories of workers in the pro-
gram and the beneficiary population (and with the representation of BRAC 
management at the initial stage), will be made responsible for making 
appropriate arrangements and taking the necessary steps for: 
collecting the group insurance premium 
seeking and receiving supplementary resources needed for 
operating the program 
organizing training and supervision of the workers and 
maintaining the standard of their performance 
paying the workers 
procuring, storing, and distributing the supplies 
maintaining appropriate liaison with other development 
activities and agencies within the area and outside 
Supplementation of the locally generated resources of the program 
may come from the Thana Development Committee or a central federation of 
the village cooperative societies that is expected to emerge from the 
BRAC development efforts in the area. Another possible source is a gov-
ernment subvention to the program for performing functions of the nation-
al health and family planning services. The extent of supplementation 
available from the Thana Development Conunittee, or, for that matter, the 
mobilization of local resources possible through a general acceptance of 
the health program and widespread enrollment in the group insurance scheme, 
will depend on the overall development achievement of the total range of 
BRAC project activities in the area and the climate of hope and confidence 
created by these activities. 
It is BRAC's expectation that the thana and union committees for 
health will be affiliated or partially overlap with representative bodies 
(~·..&·• the Thana Development Committee) which will emerge in order to 
oversee, manage, and keep alive the overall development program for the 
area initiated by BRAC. 
It is evident that if the BRAC health and family planning program 
develops along the line envisaged and becomes capable of offering compre-
hensive health care service to the area population, an acconuoodation has 
I 0 I 
42. BRAC 
to be reached with the government health and family planning activities in 
the area. There are three possible alternatives. The government could 
provide financial assistance to the program, ensure that the entire area 
population is served, and see that specific government health and family 
planning objectives are fulfilled. In this case, the government person-
nel and facilities from the area could either be withdrawn or turned over 
to the management of the local program. This alternative should not be 
seen as the abdication of government responsibility for health care and 
the transfer of government ftmctions to a private organization. If the 
BRAC goals are fulfilled and local representative organizations emerge to 
take over the management of health and other development services, the 
health care program would become the program of the local communities 
(rather than of BRAC). The government public health service would provide 
technical and financial support to locally managed programs instead of run-
ning the local program itself. Ideally, this is the direction in which all 
government development agencies should move if fostering self-reliant com-
munities and mobilizing local resources are considered important goals. A 
second possibility is the continuation of the status guo whereby both the 
government health service and the BRAG project would attempt to serve inade-
quately the health needs of the local population without consolidating their 
efforts and resources and without the emergence of local organizations assum-
ing greater management responsibilities for the local program. Under this 
alternative, BRAC would play a useful role in filling at least a part of the 
gap in local health care as long as the government service remains weak and 
out-of-reach of most of the rural people. Obviously, the full potential of 
a cormnunity-based primary health care system with appropriate back.stopping 
from the national government and support from other extra-community sources 
will not be realized under this option. The least desirable alternative is 
that two rival structures of facilities, personnel, and services would at-
tempt to expand themselves without any effort to cooperate and complement 
each other wasting national resources, creating confusion and distrust among 
the people, and leaving the basic health needs of the people badly served. 
CHAPTER 4 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the Sulla Project area, almost all of the cultivable land (60,000 
acres out of a total of 64,000 acres) is one crop rice land suitable for 
boro rice farmed during the dry season (November-April) after the flood 
water recedes. The farm land remains inundated the rest of the year. 
An ICED sample survey revealed the predominance of agriculture in the 
economic life of the area. Over 53 percent of the households relied for 
their livelihood exclusively on farming their own land; about 20 percent 
of the landless families depended on farm lahor as the main source of in-
corre. For over 10 percent of the households fishing was the primary source 
of family earnings. The same survey also showed that the pressure on the 
limited farm land was high: 54 percent of the families had farms less than 
one acre in size; 17 percent had farms of between 1 and 3 acres; and only 
3 percent of the families had over 3 acres of farm land. Twenty-six percent 
of the families owned no farm land. According to BRAC's independent esti-
mates, landless and near landless families would constitute at least one-
third of the households in the project area. 
The agricultural needs of the area, defined by the ecological limita-
tions, are as follows: (a) to make the best use of the limited cultivable 
land during the short farming season by increasing the productivity of rice 
on land with sufficient moisture and producing on thE rest of the land 
other crops requiring less moisture in order to increase total agricultural 
income and to improve the nutritional balance, (b) to make a special effort 
to help farmers with small landholdings use high yielding seeds and fertili-
zers, and (c) to help the landless and the near landless make intensive use 
of plots attached to the homestead to meet at least partially their basic 
food and nutrition needs and also to help them make collective use of com-
munal or state land whenever available. 
The government assistance for agricultural development, in principle, 
consists of agricultural extension service, provisions for agricultural in-
puts, and support of farmers' cooperatives. The extension field staff in 
the thana is headed by the Thana Agricultural Officer, TAO (usually with a 
university degree in agriculture). The TAO supervises the Union Agricul-
tural Assistants, each of whom is responsible for rendering technical ad-
vice to farmers in about 20 villages with up to 10 thousand farmers. The 
inputs supplied by the government at subsidized price include low-lift 
pumps, fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds. It is the government policy 
under its Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) to encourage the 
formation of primary cooperative societies of farmers at the village level 
and a central federation of cooperatives at the thana level which then 
can be the main channel for providing credit, inputs, and extension ad-




In practice, the government infrastructure for agricultural develop-
ment has not functioned at any reasonable degree of effectiveness for var-
ious reasons. The principal reasons include: inadequate training, super-
vision, technical backstopping, and incentives fer the extension staff; 
limited supply of inputs and credit insufficient to meet the total needs; 
village social structure and land tenure that allows the benefit of coop-
eratives and government inputs to be enjoyed by relatively larger land-
owners; and inefficiency of the overall administrative structure that causes 
frequent breakdown in the logistics of supply, supervision, and maintenance 
of services. The net result is that the government agricultural services 
reach too few with too little too ineffectively. The IRDP with its goal of 
creating village level cooperatives with broad-based membership appears to 
offer some prospect for invigorating the agricultural services and increas-
ing the efficiency of the scarce inputs. Other national level efforts are 
underway to improve the extension service and the supply of inputs, but the 
results of these efforts are yet to be felt in the project area. BRAC in 
its third phase program in Sulla is attempting to supplement and support the 
IRDP efforts in the project area to expand the structure of cooperatives and 
increase its effectiveness. (see discussion in ch. 7.) 
The main features of BRAC agricultural activities in Sulla during the 
second phase were agricultural support blocks, camp demonstration plots, in-
troduction of new vegetable crops, support to landless groups, and assistance 
in flood protection and irrigation. 
Components of the Agricultural Program 
Agricultural Support Blocks 
The agricultural support blocks were intended to enable BRAC to concen-
trate its limited resources and personnel on a limited area of land and a 
small number of farmers to produce a demonstration effect in respect of im-
proved practices in rice cultivation. During each planting season 20-30 
agricultural support blocks, each with an average of 50 acres of land, were 
organized by BRAC workers in the eleven camp areas for cultivation of high 
yielding varieties of boro rice with equipment and inputs within the means of 
local farmers. Five to six hundred farmers in the support blocks received the 
following types of support: 
Block farmers were brought together into regular meetings early 
before the onset of the agricultural season and during the sea-
son in order to plan and implement the agricultural plan for each 
block. 
Farmers were assisted in planning the input needs, arranging finances, 
and procurement. Most farmers were able to arrange the supplies with 
their own resources. 
Farmers were advised about preparing compost pits and the use of 
organic fertilizer. 
Some of the farmers received credit from BRAC for fertilizer and 
seeds. 
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High yielding rice seeds were supplied by BRAC at cost. New 
short-duration high yielding varieties were introduced by 
BRAC, particularly for land vulnerable to early flooding. 
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The responsibility for the extension work with the support block 
farmers lay primarily with the Field Motivators who were supervised by 
the Area Manager for each camp. Information about the increase in 
yield resulting from the block support activities was not collected by 
BRAC. BRAC, however, claimed that "support block farmers in most cases 
were able to show substantial improvement in yield. 11 1 Th~ farmers them-
selves perceived the activities to be sufficiently beneficial to continue 
their participation in the blocks during successive years. 
Camp Demonstration Plots 
Each of the eleven BRAC camps in the Sulla Project area set up its 
own demonstration plots, and the BRAC personnel residing in the camps 
contributed the labor to grow various crops in these plots. An average 
of two acres was leased from local farmers for rice or wheat demonstra-
tion, and an additional half acre was used for different varieties of 
vegetables and legumes. The plots were the means for practical farming 
experience for the BRAC workers, demonstration of methods and results, 
and a way of establishing credibility for BRAC extension service. As 
reported in a BRAC report: 
... [At first] the sight of university graduates ploughing 
and transplanting brought laughter and sarcasm from villagers. 
The seriousness and persistence of BRAC workers soon changed 
their attitude to one of respect. When the plants stood out 
as sor.ie of the best that they had seen grown in the area, the 
cultivators started asking for advice and requesting BRAC work-
ers to visit their fields.2 
New Vegetables 
Prior to BRAG activities in the project area, vegetable growing was 
almost unknown in the area, and vegetables were regarded as an inferior 
type of food. BRAC launched a vegetable growing campaign in order to 
make better use of land unsuitable for rice and to supply the nutrition-
al needs of the population. In cooperation with the Mennonite Central 
Committee (an American voluntary organization active in improving the 
productivity of small farmers in Bangladesh), vegetable seeds were im-
ported and distributed each year to 10,000 families and primary and 
secondary schools in the project area. Vegetables new in the area such 
as carrots, broccoli, and Chinese cabbage were grown successfully along-
side those already grown in the area such as tomatoes, cauliflower, and 
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 12. 
2BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, pp. 12-13. 
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radishes. Up to 800 acres of land were put under vegetable cultivation in 
the area per year. 
Seeds were given free the first year, but in subsequent years they were 
sold. Instructions on seedbed preparation, transplantation, and care of plants 
were provided by BRAG field motivators, and growers' plots were repeatedly vi-
sited by them at the initial stage. Horticulture exhibitions were organized in 
each camp, and prizes were given to the best growers. Although seeds were not 
distributed free after the first year, no problem was encountered in selling 
the seeds. 
BRAG also encouraged the growing of fruit trees in the area. After the 
unusually high floods of 1974 when all the papaya trees in the area were des-
troyed, BRAG transported thousands of papaya saplings, as well as seedlings 
and saplings of coconut, banana, mango, and guava, and distributed them at 
cost to villagers. 
Support to Groups of Landless 
BRAG organized groups of landless laborers for cultivation of fallow land 
leased from local landlords or of state-owned land. Only about 600 acres of 
such land was available for lease, and all together 300 landless farm laborers 
in groups of 25 on an average benefited from this effort. The land available 
for this purpose was not readily cultivable; it required leveling and clear-
ing, and the supply of water had to be arranged and water chc.nnels laid out. 
BRAG workers advised the groups on preparing the land and making a farm plan 
for optimal use of the land, supplied credit for purchasing the ne~essary in-
puts, and provided the services of low-·lift irrigation pumps and power tillers, 
the cost of which was recovered after the harvest. The program increased the 
income of the beneficiary families substantially, but the size of the program 
was limited by the high pressure on cultivable land in the area. 
Assistance for Irrigation and Flood Protection 
Agriculture in the project area suffers from too much water during most 
of the year and too little of it in relatively higher land during the dry 
season. BRAG procured 19 low-lift diesel pumps of 2-cusec capacity to irri-
gate boro land without sufficient residual flood water. The pumps were 
leased to groups of farmers in the support blocks and among the landless 
groups. 
BRAG charged a rental of Tk 225 per acre for the pumps and took care of 
the fuel, maintenance, and operation of the pumps. The average area irrigated 
by each pump was 52 acres. This compares favorably with the average of about 
20 acres in the government (Agricultural Development Corporation) program for 
extensive use of low-lift pumps to increase cropping intensity. The govern-
ment in its program subsidized the cost of pump use, charging about Tk 1,000 
as rent for each pump for a season (irrespective of acreage covered) with 
fuel and operation costs paid by the farmers. BRAG, on the other hand, reali-
zing over Tk 10,000 for each pump per season, more than covered the capital 
and operating costs of the pumps. This was possible because BRAG saw to it 
that a sufficient amount of land was included in the irrigation plan of the 
group renting the pump and that a breakdown would not occur ruining the crop 
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and the farmers' investment in time and money. Besides ensuring the supplv 
of fuel, spare parts, and proper operation of the pumps through its ow~ 
well-trained operators, BRAC also had a small maintenance shop for the over-
haul and repair of the pumps and other equipment such as 10 power tillers 
and two outboard motors for the small boats used by the staff during the 
floods. (The power tillers were rented to farmers without draught animals 
and the groups of landless farmers.) 
Building flood protection embankments, as well as drainage and irri-
gation channels, were undertaken during the dry season of 1974-75 and 1975-
76 as a "food-for-work" program under which workers received their wages in 
wheat supplied for this purpose by Oxfam of Canada and ll.K. Additional pro-
tection embankments and water channels were also excavated during the same 
years by voluntary efforts of the local people organized hy BRAC workers. 
It is reported by BRAC that: 
During the early floods of April 1974, when the neighbouring 
areas suffered total destruction of their crop, the BRAC area 
only suffered a 40 percent crop loss due to the successful effort 
of the BRAC workers in mobilizing and activising entire villages 
for building dams and embankments day and night to fight the 
rising water.l 
The Third Phase Plans 
The third phase plans for Sulla (implementation of ~hich began in 
1976) call for continuation of the agricultural worK begun earlier and 
propose some new elements: a rice seed multiplication project, new 
initiatives in animal husbandry, and increased emphasis on supporting 
agricultural opportunities for groups of landless and women from poor 
families. 
With the spread of high yielding rice varieties, the supply of good 
quality seeds becomes a critical bottleneck. Government seed farms cur-
rently meet only a fraction of the total demand of the country, and it is 
difficult for farmers to arrange procurement from the limited government 
supply without direct BRAC intervention. The small farmers themselves 
find it difficult to put aside seed grains and to control the quality of 
seed production without some assistance. The BRAC project is intended 
to train and support some model farmers to undertake seed multiplication 
on a commercial basis. Best quality first generation seeds are to be 
procured by BRAC and supplied to the farmers who will be provided a price 
guarantee and whose fields will be supervised by a qualified agronomist 
to ensure quality control. BRAC will arrange proper storage of the seeds 
in specially constructed ferro-concrete bins in the humid climatic condi-
tion of the area. It is expected that the production, storage, and sale 
of high quality rice seeds will eventually be taken over by the central 
body of the local cooperatives or the Thana Development Committee and 
will become a source of income for the central body. 
Preparation of land in the Sulla area, as in the rest of the coun-
try, is almost entirely dependent on cattle drau2ht power. Feeding the 
cattle is a serious problem during the six months of flooding when the 
cattle remain confined to the pens. During the dry winter months the 
situation improves, but as more fallow land comes under cultivation the 
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 14. 
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the competition between grazing and farming land becomes more intense. The 
paucity of veterinary care is another problem that means wastage from ill 
health and premature death of cattle. BRAC plans to introduce high yielding 
fodder crops such as Guinea grass and alfalfa, begin extension work on local-
ly suitable silage methods, and start a basic veterinary service by training 
the paramedic in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of the conunon cat-
tle diseases (as well as the diseases of poultry and ducks). 
A special effort is to be made during the third phase to form coopera-
tive groups of landless farm laborers and destitute women and to make use of 
all available land on lease either from the state or from local landowners. 
BRAC will support these groups initially until the first harvest, while the 
land is levelled, irrigation facilities built and the first crop planted. It 
will also make credits available on the basis of production plans of the 
groups by arrangement with a commercial bank. In addition, BRAC workers will 
provide continuous extension support to these groups. 
Fishery Development 
BRAC estimates that 20 percent of the households in the Sulla Project 
area depends on fishery as a major source of income. 
The natural water bodies of the area are owned mostly by the state, 
and the fishing rights in these waters for a specified period are leased to 
cooperatives of local fishermen. Since collective fishing requires high cap-
ital inputs in nets, boats, and royalty payments to the government as well as 
in storing, transporting, and marketing the highly perishable commodity, the 
cooperatives are financed and controlled largely by nonfishermen moneylenders 
who provide credits at usurious rates and serve as middlemen for marketing. 
As a result fishermen as a class are one of the most exploited and poorest 
groups in the area. 
BRAC supported a number of fishermen's cooperative societies by provid-
ing them boats and nylon twines for fishing nets. Altogether 15 medium-sized 
fishing boats and 10,000 pounds of twine were distributed. But, by BRAC's 
own admission, this had only "peripheral impact." It is estimated that an av-
erage cooperative society of 150 members requires a working capital of Tk 100,000 
to 120,000 to fish in a water area leased for two years. The fishermen can 
reap the full benefit of their labor and extricate themselves from the vicious 
cycle of exploitation, if they can procure this capital on reasonable terms 
and arrange for marketing their catch without depending on the moneylenders 
and the middlemen employed by the moneylenders. 
In the third phase of Sulla, BRAC proposes to meet the full credit re-
quirements of a number of societies under financial arrangements with connner-
cial banks similar to those planned for landless groups. BRAC also plans to 
assist in organizing a fishermen's cooperative marketing society and training 
a number of fishermen for marketing activities. 
In order to help youth and women's groups in the fishermen's communities, 
BRAC also organized, during the second phase, the digging of six large ponds un-
der the "food-for-work" program which were used for pond-fishery. The ponds 
were stocked with quick-growing Nilotica fingerlings imported by UNICEF from 
Thailand. A number of the youth group members were sent to Jamalpur for train-




While the impact of the fishery program during the second phase of the 
Sulla Project was, by BRAC's own account, marginal in improving the well-
being of the fishermen, the achievements of the agricultural program were 
also not very clear. Once again the reason for the lack of a clear picture 
of the results is BRAC's reluctance or inability to devote the necessary 
effort (and workers' time) to a collection of elementary benchmark data and 
a collection and recording of information about the services provided and 
the results achieved. Basic information about the initial condition of the 
farmers in the support blocks and the changes in their condition brought 
about by BRAC services could have been collected without substantial expense 
of time and money, and it would have identified and made clear the benefits 
derived from the effort. 
What is now known is that the total beneficiaries of the two main and 
intensive ef forts--the support blocks and group farming by landless laborers 
--were relatively small in number. In any one season a maximum of 600 farm-
ers and 300 landless laborers were involved in the two activities out of a 
total of over 15,000 heads of farmers' and landless laborers' families in 
the area. About 40 Field Motivators sper:t most of their time during the 
farming season with the farmers' and laborers' groups (a ratio of one motiva-
tor to 25 farmers). This is a relatively high extension worker-to-farmer 
ratio by any standard with its consequent cost implications. 
To the extent that credit, supply of inputs, and logistics (and not just 
the knowledge gap) were the impediments to increased agricultural productivity 
in the area, the support blocks and the camp demonstration plots were unlikely 
to have much spillover effect on other farmers in the area. Obviously, the 
scarcity of rentable land, subsistence support when the land is prepared and 
planted, and credit for inputs were the main obstacles for the landless labor-
ers' groups. Supply and logistics apparently were also major problems for the 
support block farmers as is clearly indicated by the BRAC emphasis on procure-
ment of seeds and fertilizers and the operation and maintenance of power pumps 
and tillers. 
Under these circumstances, the approach to serving the total farming pop-
ulation and to improving the overall agricultural situation would be to estab-
lish and strengthen the institutions that serve the supply and logistical 
needs, such as the cooperatives, the government distribution mechanism of seed~ 
and fertilizers, and the supply and maintenance of the irrigation pumps and 
tillers (again the responsibility of the government Agricultural Development 
Corporation). BRAC put great stress on the formation of cooperatives--thts be-
ing the central institutional strategy of the BRAC development approach (see 
the chapter on institutional structures). However, the support block opera-
tion does not appear to have been linked directly with the formation and 
strengthening of the cooperatives or, for that matter, with other BRAC compo-
nents, such as functional education and the health program. All of these run 
parallel to each other with only incidental overlap of clienteles rather than 
in a strategic concentration of multifaceted program efforts on the same com-
munities. Nor were there attempts to work with the Agricultural Development 
Corporation for better utilization of irrigation pumps and tillers in the 
area or for improved distribution of seeds and fertilizers. Of course, in 
this case the willingness to cooperate and work together must be mutual, 
and the government agencies often are not overly eager to admit that they 
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need the help of a private organization. On the problem of seeds, BRAC has its 
own project for the third phase. 
The agricultural extension work of BRAC carried out by the Field Motiva-
tors appears to be based on standard technical prescriptions and generally ac-
cepted notions about the improvement of rice and vegetable cultivation rather 
than on specific technical analysis and recommendations derivative of such 
analysis. The Field Motivators had neither special training in agriculture, nor 
the technical advice and services of an agronomist or a soil tester. On the 
other hand, .if the obstacles to agricultural improvement were more institutional 
than technological, specialized technical knowledge of the field workers and 
the backstopping of an agronomist would be less important. The problem would be 
to use effectively already known and applicable techniques. However, the ser-
vices of an agronomist would be required in the third phase for the seed multi-
plication project. It should be possible to utilize him in a broader role of 
providing technical support to the extension team. 
In view of the high pressure on land and the large number of very small 
landholders depending on farming for their livelihood, it would be very impor-
tant to explore the question of optimal economic use·of the small farms and 
the limits and possibilities of changes in cropping pattern and cropping inten-
sity. This is also an important question for the landless groups who manage to 
lease some land. 
BRAC made a special effort to improve the lot of the landless laborers by 
organizing group farming projects, and it plans to continue this effort during 
the third phase with both the landless laborers and destitute women. As noted 
already, these efforts are handicapped by the limitation of land available for 
renting out and by the financial and technical support needed to put the groups 
to work on land which is often of marginal quality. Despite all the efforts, 
the return realized by each individual member of the group may be too small to 
make an appreciable difference in his standard of living--partly because of 
BRAC's understar.dable desire of not leaving out any of the landless families 
in a village project. It therefore becomes important to look for a broader 
range of income earning opportunities for the landless families, such as a 
combination of rural public works, nonfarm activities, farm laborers' work, 
horticultural and animal husbandry activities around the home, group farming 
projects, and group economic projects in agricultural processing. Ideally, 
the planning, managing, and participation in the group farming projects should 
be organized within the framework of a broader approach to improving the earn-
ing and employment opportunities of the poorest rural families. The institu-
tional vehicles of functional education groups, cooperatives, and membership 
in health insurance schemes can be used then to reinforce the economic improve-
ment efforts, to give a sense of cohesion and purpose to the participants, and 
to facilitate a larger role of the participants in the management of these 
efforts. 
There are indications that BRAC is attempting to apply the lessons of the 
experiences in Sulla in its new projects, particularly in Manikganj. The Manik-
ganj Project put a heavy emphasis on the institutional structure in the villages 
--organizing youth's and women's organizations and cooperative societies, and 
planning and implementing various development activities, including agricultural 
activities, through the groups in an integrated manner. We return to this ques-




The third phase efforts in fishery development--to the extent that 
capital funds are available and participation is made broad-based--should 
have a greater impact on the condition of the fishermen than the second 
phase activities. 
No attention has been paid so far to the long range fishery pros-
pects, nor to th~: possibilities of technological improvements in raising 
both yield and employment in fishery activities in the area. This would 
probably require a regional approach extending beyond the project area, 
also resources and expertise difficult to muster without government sup-
port. In any case government support would be needed for any long-range 
fishery development in the area, because the government is the owner of 
the fishing grounds and the ultimate authority for imposing and enforcing 
regulations in such matters as fishing seasons, selective catching, terms 
of fishing rights. These questions deserve attention as they affect the 
welfare of a sizeable proportion of the population in the project area. 
CHAPTER 5 
PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN 
Activities that have been designed by BRAC to contribute to the improvement 
of social and economic status of women fall into two categories: 
(a) integrating women into the general development activities 
of the project, and 
(b) special activities in response to special needs of women. 
The general program activities which serve women clientele or have sub-
stantial involvement of women in one form or another are functional education, 
agricultural and horticultural extension, family planning, and health care. 
Activities which respond to special women's needs include mother and child-
care clubs, skill training for women, women's cooperatives, women staff develop-
ment, and the women's project in Jamalpur. 
Serving Women Through General Programs 
Functional Education 
Women have participated in a major way in the functional education program. 
In the Sulla Project, of over 1,100 completers in the first two cyclces of 
courses in 1975 and 1976, about 400 were women. One-half of the centers were for 
women and the number of women instructors was of the same proportion. 
The project in Jamalpur with functional education as the key element serves 
exclusively the low-income rural women in a cluster of 29 villages. This project, 
as noted earlier, originated from a project to help destitute women in the same 
area. 
The content of the functional education lessons also attempts to reflect 
women's needs and interests. While 70 percent of the content are of general 
interest, 30 percent are differentiated for men and women. The special lessons 
for women cover such topics as women's contribution to agricultural production; 
food processing and preservation; nutritious cooking; savings habits; survey of 
the community birth, pregnancy, and family planning status; family planning 
methods; cooperation among women; nutrition surveys; breast feeding; and fire 
hazards in the kitchen. Some of the general lessons which are designed for 
both men and women also include topics of special significance in improving the 
condition of women; for example, equal rights for men and women, cooperatives 
for women, nutrition topics, family planning methods, survey of family planning 
and nutrition status in the canmunity, pregnant mothers' health, plight of wida:,..rs, 
evils of early marriage, and child care. 
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AgriculturaJ and Horticultural Extension 
Women have a traditional role in Bangladesh in the horticultural acti-
vities around the home. BRAC extension service in horticulture, therefore, 
serves both men and worocn. As noted in chapter 4, about 10,000 families in 
the Sulla Project area benefited each year by the distribution of vegetable 
seeds and by technical advice, and up to 800 acres of land were put under 
vegetable cultivation, including such newly introduced items as carrots, 
broccoli, Chinese cabbage, as well as the more traditional vegetables. BRAC 
also provided seedlings of fruit plants such as coconuts, bananas, mangoes, 
guavas, and papayas, which were planted and reared to a large extent by the 
women. 
In the Jamalpur Project one of the major activities is to encourage 
and assist women in undertaking vegetable, fruit, and other crop cultiva-
tion collectively as well as individuz.lly. This young project, only in 
its first year of operation in 1976, has yet to yield substantial results 
in the horticultural area. Future plans for Jamalpur as well as other 
areas include efforts to design extension services for economically viable 
collective or individual projects on grain processing, poultry and duck 
raising, and animal husbandry. Another area to be examined is those tech-
nologies that will reduce the drudgery and increase the productivity of 
routine chores around the home: grain processing and storage, food prepa-
ration, water collection, household cleaning and sanitation, and so forth. 
Health Care and Family Planning 
Women constitute a specially vulnerable group in regard to health. 
The BRAC health care program, important for the whole population, meets 
a special need for women. Bringing health care directly to the rural 
homes through the paramedics also facilitates women's participation in 
the program. Special measures to improve the health care provisions for 
women through staff development and village women's assemblies are men-
tioned below. 
The family planning program in BRAC, following nearly universal 
practice, uses a female-oriented approach: persuasion of women to 
take contraceptive measures. BRAC also encourages male vasectomy be-
cause of the simplicity of the procedure and the relatively smaller 
medical risks involved. Furthermore, it shows that the responsibility 
for family planning lies in a direct personal sense as much with the 
male as with the female population. The BRAC clinics in the Sulla Pro-
ject also perform tubal ligation operations. However, these terminal 
measures are resorted to by only a small number even when 
family planning practices are widespread. Without underestimating the 
importance of educating men about family plar-ning, it can be said that 
the success of the family planning program of BRAC depends very much on 
how effectively the female population is reached with the message and 
the services of family planning. 
The use of female workers in the family planning program and the 
related program of mother and child care education are discussed below . 
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Mother and Child Care Clubs 
Widespread health and nutrition problems of pregnant and lactating 
mothers and children observed in the Sulla Project area led to a special 
effort to reach this group. The paramedics in their respective villages 
organized "mothers' clubs" or a monthly discussion group of the pregnant 
and lactating mothers in the village. This group meets in the village 
gonokendra or a suitable home, where health problems and preventive and 
curative measures for mothers and children are discussed under the para-
medic's guidance and certain services are provided. The services include 
blood pressure check, iron and vitamin supplement for pregnant mothers, 
weighing the children and recording their weight on "Road to Health" cards. 
In the Sulla Project area 73 mothers' clubs were functioning in mid-
1976, with attendance in each ranging from 10 to 20 mothers plus their 
children. About 15 other clubs have been organized in the Jarnalpur Project 
area. 
A series of posters and a discussion guide keyed to the posters have 
been produced by the BRAG materials development unit in order to provide 
some structure and guidelines for the mothers' club meetings. Another pur-
pose of the materials and the discussion guide is to enable field workers, 
such as functional education instructors without paramedic training, to 
conduct mothers' club discussion groups. 
The multicolor wall poster set prepared for the mothers' clubs contains 
15 posters on nutrition, care for pregnant and lactating mothers, child care, 
family planning, common diseases, and vaccination and inoculation. Each of 
the wall posters is used as the main visual aid for conducting one discussion 
session. The discussion guide, compiled in the form of a mimeograph booklet, 
explains the basic principles to be observed in effective group discussion, 
the objectives of each session, the main message or information to be conveyed 
to the group, the leading questions arising from the wall poster designed for 
the particular session, and other questions to maintain the momentum of the 
discussion, with possible follow-up actions to be engaged in by the group and 
the discussion leader. 
The mothers' club as a device for organizing mother and child health 
care is a recent BRAC activity that begar-. in the Sulla Project area only 
in the latter part of 1975 and even more recently in the Jamalpur area, where 
the discussion groups are led by the women field workers (experienced func-
tional education instructors who are serving as multipurpose motivators/or-
ganizers and supervisors of functional education). 
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the clubs. Discussion 
with the field workers in Jamalpur revealed a number of problems. Although 
a sizeable group gathers on the appointed day, there is often a lack of 
continuity because the same person does not come on a regular basis. There 
appears to exist a superstitious belief that weighing a child attracts the 
evil eye and causes harm to the child's health. Some of the field workers 
decided to counteract this belief by taking their own little children to 
the village discussion meetings and weighing them in front of the village 
mothers. It is also often found that some members of the group want to 
discuss problems and topics other than mother and child care. The meetings 
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are also frequently attended by a few women who are not pregnant or lacta-
ting mothers. They come sometimes as chaperons of the young mothers (es-
pecially if a male paramedic is the discussion leader) or just as curiosity 
seekers. 
In the light of the experience with the mothers' clubs the BRAC 
discussion leaders have accumulated some ideas for the future development 
of this activity including the following: 
(1) converting the mothers' club into a more general forum for 
village women concerned with health and nutrition and re-
(2) 
naming it the women's assembly (Mohila Shobha) 
broadening both its membership and scope and using 
vehicle for discussion, education and planning for 
development activities that are of interest to the 
emerge out of the functional education program. 
it as the 
general 
group or 
It is interesting that both of these possibilities involve broaden-
ing the role and function of the women's forum and a departure from a 
rigidly structured and imposed discussion session. The participants, it 
appears, are interested in setting their oFn agenda, pace, and ground 
rules. It is also noteworthy that BRAC field workers on their own have 
detected and recognized these tendencies. However, how these needs would 
be handled and what steps would be taken to prepare the discussion lead-
ers to meet this demand, to provide the learning materials, and to link 
up the assemblies with other economic and educational activities were 
still to be worked out. 
Vocational Training and Cooperatives 
In its effort to help destitute women (without a male breadwinner 
in the family) earn a living and enable other women to supplement the 
family income, BRAC began a vocational training program in Sulla. The 
original ambitious plan envisaged four vocational training centers for 
women in the project area teaching many types of productive skills.How-
ever it was possible to open only one sewing center in Derai, and the 
plan for a weaving center had to be abandored because of problems faced 
in procuring cotton yarn that had even made many professional weavers 
unemployed. 
In the sewing center 89 women in three batches received training 
for three months in tailoring. UNICEF donated sewing machines and cloth 
which were used to train the women in making children's clothing. The 
training, however, did not lead to the establishment of economic enter-
prises that provided employment and income to the trainees. Apparently, 
the local demand for commercial tailoring was being met by the existing 
tailors in the bazars, and none of the trainees could afford to invest 
in a sewing machine for meeting only the family clothing needs. 
BRAC learned from the experience that the problem of unemployment 
and absence of earning opportunities in a poor rural area could not be 
solved by a skill training effort alone. It decided that "the training 
of women in skills which require assistance of male members in such mat-




etc., would not be the right approach for ensuring their economic independence." 1 
BRAC's emphasis, therefore, shifted from skill training to proirotion of collec-
tive economic projects by women compatible with the local market demands. The 
women were brought together through functional education groups and the forma-
tion of women's cooperatives. 
In the Sulla area, some 30 women's cooperatives had made an embryonic 
beginning by mid-1976 and were engaged in collective projects in agriculture 
(growing of rice, potatoes, legumes, and vegetables), making fishing nets, 
and pond fishery. BRAC Field Motivators helped in the initial formation of 
the groups, advised the groups about the principles and practices of coopera-
tives, encouraged them to accumulate capital by regular (though small) saving. 
and provided them with small credits with which tc launch their projects. 
In the newly initiated Jamalpur Project, by October 1976, there were 29 
women's cooperative societies with a total membership of 353, mostly destitute 
women or members of the poorest families. Their savings in less than six months 
had approached Tk 1,000. With the assistance of the women field workers of 
BRAC and the promise of small loans from BRAC, the group had already launched 
or were planning projects in block-printing of cloth, weaving, silkworm rais-
ing, oil pressing, running grocery shops, bamboo crafts, poultry, pond fishery, 
and farming. 
A comparable approach is proposed in the plans for the Manikganj Project: 
BRAC's functional education classes will be the initial media 
to bring women together. These classes will stimulate women to 
think creatively about their environment and to develop their de-
cis ion-rnaking pawers. The learners from these functional education 
classes will become the potential core membership of women's socie-
ties .... Those members interested in savings and loans will set 
rice saving targets, and with the amount saved credit unions or rice 
banks will be established. Loans will then be given to finance srnall-
scale, village-based economic activities •... The choice of activities 
by the women will depend in part on local availability of raw materials 
and marketing facilities. Certain activities will generate cash in-
comes for the women; others will add to the nutritive value of their 
families' diets.2 
Women Staff Development 
Very often in rural development programs, even when special needs and 
problems of women are addressed, the responsibility for carrying out the 
development activities is in the hands of men, and the women become passive 
beneficiaries of the project activities and services. 
In BRAC, women workers had been employEd as functional education in-
structors and Lady Family Planning Organizers. However, the Field Motivators 
1BRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 19. 
2BRAC, Manikganj Project, p. 15. 
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and the paramedics--the personnel responsible for organizing and initiating 
the functional education and family planning activities in the villages, 
supervising and guiding the instructors and the LFPOs, and providing back-
stopping to these frontline workers often by direct contact with the rural 
residents--were all male. As noted elsewhere, the effectiveness and expan-
sion of the health program suffered because all the paramedics were men 
with whom the village women hesitated to communicate freely. 
In 1976, BRAC initiated a number of steps to remedy this situation and 
to establish a parity of esteem and responsibilities between men and women 
among the BRAC personnel. 
As noted in the chapter on health and family planning, all or nearly 
all frontline health and family planning workers--the village-based auxi-
liaries or the shasthya shevikas (with or without the duties of the family 
planning organizer)--would be women from the respective villages. This 
was more than adding another tier of workers in the hierarchy; it signified 
a change of approach in the delivery of health service that made the vil-
lage-based shevika the key link in the chain that connected the health pro-
gram and the rural people. 
The third phase of the Sulla Project (beginning in 1976) included the 
provision for training and recruiting 15 female paramedics. The training 
of these paramedics, besides the subjects contained in the regular paramedic 
syllabus, would include midwifery, mother and child care, and certain women's 
diseases. The female paramedics were also to be trained in IUD insertion and 
tubal ligation in order to reduce further the dependence on qualified doctors. 
With the goals of training women program personnel, transfer-
ring to women the direction of women-related activities, and exploring new 
program ideas for improving the social status and economic condition of rural 
women, BRAC decided to open one camp in the Sulla Project area to be directed 
and staffed entirely by women. It was felt that in an all-female environment 
some of the housing problems and social obstacles in recruiting female full-
time staff might be overcom~. The women's camp in Anandapur, with a direct 
responsibility for programs in a cluster of 10 villages and indirect responsi-
bility for support of BRAC activities affecting women in the whole project 
area, opened in March 1976 with a female Area Manager and three Field Moti-
vators (two local and one outsider). Nine other women joined the camp as 
trainees who would serve as BRAC personnel in Sulla or in other locations. 
The women in BRAC who conceived the idea of the camp (and one of whom serves 
as the Area Manager) describe the role of the camp as follows: 
These staff [in the camp] carry out the female segment of 
BRAC's ongoing activities: functional education, public 
health, family planning, cooperatives. They will also experi-
ment with and demonstrate potential economic activities for 
women: poultry and duck farming, food processing, intensified 
horticulture, manufacturing of utility items, etc. Eventually 
it is hoped they might design extension services and appropri-
ate technologies to improve women's grain processing, fuel 
processing, water collection, etc. 
Anandapur Camp will serve also as a training centre for pro-
spective female leadership from other areas. Each camp's staff 
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members [there are eleven other all-male camps in the Sulla 
Project area] are being encouraged to locate a core of moti-
vated and interested women from their camp areas to facilitate 
some of the development activities ~ow being facilitated by 
male staff. Anandapur camp will serve both as an experimen-
tal laboratory (in which various ideas for women's develop-
ment activities can be tested and evaluated) and as a training 
centre (for local female leadership) .1 
The Jamalpur Project 
BRAC 
In the Jamalpur Project of BRAC, which evolved from an ad hoc functional 
education component in a UNICEF-sponsored "food-for-work" schemefor destitute 
women into a special women's project of BRAC, the women functional education 
teachers took the initiative and assumed responsi.bility for planning, manag-
ing, and implementing the whole project. When the UNICEF-assisted project 
came to an end in November 1975, the 15 women instructors decided to continue 
the functional education courses and to expand the scope of their activities 
to village-based women's development work in the villages of the functional 
education participants. The women teachE:rs, with the assistance of BRAC head-
quarters staff, prepared the project plans for poor rural women in 28 villages 
of the Jamalpur subdivision. The objectives of the project, as formulated by 
the women after investigating the needs and priorities of the potential parti-
cipants in the villages, were as follows: 
1. to make village women conscious of the root causes of their problems 
and to help them seek solutions; 
2. to control population growth through family planning rnovitaion and 
delivery of services; 
3. to encourage joint savings and cooperative economic activities by 
village women; 
4. to educate village women in hygiene and nutrition; 
5. to encourage horticulture and poultry raising by women; 
6. to encourage village women to utilize fallow land surrounding their 
respective villages; 
7. to intitiate women's organizations in the villages; and 
8. to educate village women. 
The 15 women set up their headquarters and a dormitory facility (for those 
not resident of the town) in a rented house in Jamalpur town and launched the 
lKhushi Kabir, et al., Rural Women in Bangladesh: Exploding Some Myths, 
Dacca, The Ford Foundation, May 1976, Appendix A, p. 5. 
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project in January 1976. Most of them came from the general area. Ten of 
them were marriQd and were in the age-range of 19 to 25 years (except one 
who was 45). Their formal educational achievement varied from eighth grade 
to twelfth grade. They came to BRAC as candidates for the instructor's po-
sition in UNICEF-assisted functional education without any previous develop-
ment work background and were chosen from a total pool of 60 applicants on 
the basis of an interview by the BRAC functional education coordinator. After 
their selection, the women went through a five-day training course for func-
tional education instructors. This training, the experience of conducting 
thE: functional education courses with the destitute women, and two short eval-
uation and planning workshops (organized for them by BRAC to help evaluate thi 
results of their work with the destitute women and to consider the issues in 
planning the future Jamalpur Project) were the women's main training and pro-
fessional development exposure before they embarked on the new project. 
By November 1976 the 14 women and one team leader were working in pairs 
five days a week in the 28 villages (with a population of 36,000 and 6,400 
families). In 15 functional education centers, close to 200 women attended 
courses three days a week. As mentioned earlier, 29 women's savings groups 
were engaged in or planning group economic projects. 
In 32 mothers' clubs, women discussed once a week (average attendance 
of 10-15) health, nutrition, hygiene, sanitation, and child care problems 
and actions. Over 550 acceptors of family planning measures were recruited 
(including 170 tubal ligation and 29 vasectomy cases). Each Saturday the 
women instructors/field workers met to report and discuss the previous week's 
activities and to plan for and discuss the next week's activities. The 
teachers formed their own savings society and opened a joint bank account. 
The teachers together with selected village women received training with 
BRAC headquarters assistance in public health and nutrition, duck and poul-
try raising, composting, and horticulture. (For instance, two rural women 
from Jamalpur were sent to Sylhet, 200 miles away, for a six-week training 
course in duck farming conducted by a church organization. On their return, 
these women started demonstration duck farms and were ready to advise others 
interested in raising ducks.) In the course of a few months the team of 
functional education teachers were maturing into a team of development work-
ers. 
Concluding Points 
The relatively new and exploratory activities related to the improve-
ment of economic condition and social status of women and making women part-
ners in the overall rural development efforts already succeeded in indicating 
the potentialities of these activities and in demonstrating the promise of 
specific program approaches.l 
It is evident, in thE: first place, that rural women, even those with-
out formal education and experience in roles outside the family environment, 
can serve effectively as frontline workers in such roles as those of Shas-
thya shevikas,Family Planning Organizers, and functional education 
lsee Khushi Kabir,~ al., Rural Women in Bangladesh .... ,££· cit. 
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instructors (who, of course, must have some fonnal education). 
Second, women with some educational achievement and an interest in assum-
ing a role outside home--irrespective of whether they are from a rural or a 
semiurban background--may be motivated and trained to take up supervisory, lea-
dership, and field operation responsibilities involving extensive travel, public 
contact, and personal initiatives (as in the position of paramedics and the 
Field Motivator). 
Third, relatively inexperienced women with appropriate motivation, inter-
est, and training, are able to plan, design, manage, and implement a develop-
ment program designed to benefit rural women. 
Finally, social constraints and inhibitions can be overcome if female 
workers live and work in teams. Village women also respond to female field 
workers and are willing to travel from their homes to attend meetings, form 
cooperatives, and participate in collective activities. 
Despite the promising leads given by the BRAC efforts, many of the most 
apparent economic and social problems of the women participants in the various 
projects are by no means about to be solved. 
The capacity to save money among the members of the cooperative groups is 
very small, and it cannot begin to provide the necessary capital even for modest 
economic ventures. For the limited number of groups with economic propositions 
in Sulla and Jamalpur, BRAC has given the seed money. But with a larger number 
of groups in the two areas and particularly if the approach is expected to ex-
pand to other areas, the demand for capital funds and the problem of managing 
and monitoring the use of these funds will be beyond the capacity of BRAC as 
well as that of other agencies, including the government. 
Identifying and designing viable economic projects ensuring a reasonable 
return to each member of a group have been found to be extremely difficult. 
The experience to date in BRAC s~ggests that for maintenance of motivation and 
effort, it is crucial that an individual's return is sufficient to make at 
least a small impact on his economic position. It is not enough for a group 
project's total return to be relatively large, if the total when divided among 
members becomes insignificant. 
Even if projects are theoretically sound, they need management and super-
vision that is not always within the competence of BRAC field workers. Anything 
beyond extremely simple and primitive production or processing activities often 
requires complementary inputs and support beyond the means of the project. 
These are difficult to organize. 
Besides these obvious difficulties, the fundamental problem lies in the 
subsistence character of the rural economy with its extremely limited effective 
demand for commercial products and services. This situation severely limits the 
opportunities for families without access to agricultural land. A general im-
provement in the economic situation, spurred by higher agricultural production 
and better distribution of income, will generate the demands for nonsubsistence 
goods and servjces and create a trore conducive environment for the poor women's 
economic ventures. Improvement of the women's situation beyond a certain point 
and beyond small numbers included in special "hot-house" projects is inextri-
cably connected with overall rural development with equitable distribution. 
0 
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It bears reemphasizing, however, that a lot more can be done to 
involve women prominently in health, family planning, education, and 
other social development efforts for rural families. This involvement 
will not only enhance the social status and self-esteem of women, but 
also help make the development activities more effective. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF 
A difficult problem in all rural development programs is the recruit-
ment of field workers and supervisory people who not only are well-motivated, 
dedicated, and willing to give up the attractions of the city, but are also 
perceptive about rural problems, sensitive about pride and values of the rural 
people, and above all, willing to learn from their experience. A difference 
is usually noted in· spirit and motivation between the personnel in the govern-
ment agencies and those in nongovernment voluntary agencies--often because of 
the close-knit interpersonal relationships in a small organization, the in-
fluence of ideologically motivated leadership in voluntary programs, and the 
fact that voluntary organizations tend to attract idealists. However, volun-
tary organizations have their own share of personnel problems in finding the 
right people for the right tasks, helping the workers develop the necessary 
skills and competence, and maintaining their motivation and confidence in the 
face of frustration and failures. Any program past the stage of a small shoe-
string operation and employing paid workers needs to be concerned about the 
questions of recruitment, staff development, and efficiency of performance. 
Another issue is to what extent and in what way government field agents can 
sustain the kind of motivation and enthusiasm that many workers in voluntary 
programs apparently have. 
BRAC Personnel 
In July 1976, BRAC's personnel roll included 157 full-time members, ex-
cluding part-time workers in the villages such as the Lady Family Planning 
Organizers, and voluntary workers such as the functional education instructors, 
and youth program leaders. By the end of the year, the total number of full-
time personnel rose to about 200 with the addition of 30 newly recruited shas-
thya shevikas and 14 trainee female paramedics. 
Of the regular personnel, about 10 may be regarded as constituting the 
directing staff of BRAC, including the Executive Director, the coordinators of 
different administrative functions, the Program Administrators for Sulla and 
Manikganj, and the Medical Officers. The support staff including the training 
and materials personnel, staff writers, clerical workers, drivers and mechan-
ics, custodial staff, and office helpers numbered about 50. The number of para-
medics including the trainee women recruits was 45. The main workhorse for 
BRAC's field activities with direct and multiple responsibilities for identify-
ing and assessing opportunities and needs for field activities and initiating, 
guiding, and supporting them, is the Field Motivator, 49 of whom were in em-
ployment in mid-1976. Directly above the Field Motivators, with immediate re-
sponsibility for guiding and assisting the Field Motivators, W8re 19 Program 
Supervisors (also known as Area Managers). 
The Field Motivator is the basic rank to which new multipurpose field 
workers are recruited, and at this level the BRAC personnel receive their 
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orientation and experience in the rural development approach of BRAC. Al-
though lateral entry at the higher management levels has been necessary 
initially and still continues to some degree in the headquarters, a career 
ladder appears to be emerging as more workers are promoted to higher levels 
in the hierarchy from the rank of the Field Motivators. Recruitment and 
training of specialized BRAC workers in health and education has been dis-
cussed in other chapters. This chctpter will deal mainly with the Field 
Motivators--the backbone of the BRAC personnel structure. 
Recruitment Criteria and Procedure 
There was initially a heavy emphasis on high formal education quali-
fication in the recruitment of BRAC personnel; this emphasis still persists 
although its application appears to be somewbat less rigid now. At the 
beginning of the Sulla Project, when BRAC had to recruit both the field le-
vel workers and the supervisory personnel (at that time there had been no 
opportunity to appoint supervisors by promotion), the bas1.c requirements for 
Field Motivators were college graduation (two to three years of college ed-
ucation after the higher secondary stage), and the candidates for super-
visory positions such as Area Managers (also called Program Supervisors) 
were required to have a master's degree. The emphasis was on the level of 
college qualifications rather than on a specific disciplinary background 
because a master's or bachelor's degree in any subject was acceptable as 
the requisite qualification. 
The argument for the high value attached to formal education degrees 
(irrespective of the subject of study) as put forth by BRAC was that a high 
level of formal education was likely to be associated with an adequate level 
of intellectual competence, leadership qualities, and an ability to analyze 
and learn from new experiences. The possible alienation of the educated 
youth from the rural environment and the difficulties in establishing a 
bond of empathy and rapport between the rural people and the urban-educated 
youth were apparently not a great concern to BRAC. The feeling was that 
with its very low level of urbanization, Bangladesh was essentially a "rural" 
country and even the university-educated young people were not completely 
severed from their rural roots. The most important reason for insisting on 
high educational credentials probably was that with the prevailing high le-
vel of unemployment am:>ng the college educated there was an ample supply of 
these candidates for BRAC jobs. 
As it turned out, the university degree was not actually the determin-
ing factor in recruitment. In selecting the personnel from the large pool 
of available candidates, all with university degrees, BRAC management used 
other criteria. Assessment of the candidate's suitability for the Field Mo-
tivator's job, determined through personal interview and personal reconunend-
ations about an individual's qualities and aptitudes, was really the decisive 
factor. It was all quite subjective--contingent largely on the notion of 
the qualities and competence considered necessary for the field worker's 
job by the person conducting the interview or making the recommendation. 
It is difficult to make a judgment on the formal qualifications and 
the selection procedure followed, because there is really no benchmark 
for comparison. The Executive Director of BRAC considered t!1e process 
as "hit or miss" and found the attrition rate among workers as relatively 
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high. He pointed out that, out of hundreds of job applicants who submit 
their applications whenever new recruitment is announced, ten might be 
selected. Out of the ten, t"1o would not turn up, t"1o would leave during 
the first D.10 months, two would be asked to resign as incompetent within 
the first few months, b.10 would continue as "plodders" in their level of 
performance and motivation, and two would turn out to be effective, well-
motivated, and enthusiastic. Most of the workers would stay on if they 
survived the first six months. 
In order to improve on the "hit or miss" results described above, a 
new selection procedure was introduced in 1976. This procedure consists 
essentially of a two-day group interaction session of the applicants re-
tained on a "short list" after preliminary screening of the written appli-
cations. The group session, called the "selection course" requires the 
applicants to engage in a series of exercises selected from BRAC training 
modules (see below) involving communication, planning, and analytical skills. 
The exercises offer the opportunity to BRAC management to observe and assess 
the applicant's personality, perception of rural development problems, lea-
dership qualities, analytical ability, and planning capability. The appli-
cant also has the opportunity to get a taste of what might be required of 
him as a BRAC worker and whether the job suits his own expectations and 
temperament. The procedure is applied in selecting new male and female 
Field Motivators. This procedure makes the selection process more system-
atic and permits at least an attempt to relate a potential recruit's compe-
tence, aptitude, and personality traits to the tasks required to be per-
formed by the Field Motivator. The process, however, is yet to undergo 
sufficient trial to warrant any definitive judgment. 
Staff Training 
The training and orientation of the Field Motivators and other non-
specialized BRAC personnel have been dependent on a combination of brief 
orientation sessions and the initiation of the workers into the methods 
and approaches of BRAC through practical experience. 
The new recruits go through an initial orientation course for about 
a week in which the new personnel become familiar with the BRAC develop-
ment approach, an overview of the program activities, specific responsi-
bilities and assignments of field workers, and the work procedures · and 
the administrative routines. After they are dispatched to the field, the 
apprenticeship continues at least for a three-month period when the new 
recruits are accompanied and guided by their senior colleagues. After 
this apprenticeship period, the new Field Motivators are given independent 
assignments and increasingly greater responsibilities. The Program Super-
visors (previously known as Area Managers), each one of whom supervises no 
more than four or five Field Motivators, are always at hand to assist and 
advise the latter. Moreover, the full-time field workers of BRAC (Program 
Supervisor, Field Motivators, and paramedics) usually reside in a communal 
style in camps. This leads to a close association with almost daily 
comparison of notes and ideas, both formally at the Program Supervisor's 
initiative as well as informally. 
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Problems and progress in field activities and plans for the subsequent 
months are taken up at monthly meetings at the project level (e.g., in Sulla, 
Manikganj, and Jamalpur), attended by all Program Supervisors and selected 
Field Motivators in turn. These meetings serve as a learning experience for 
the Motivators and they provide training and scpervisory guidelines for the 
Supervisors. 
In addition, special training opportunities are organized on specific 
topics. For instance, before the introduction of the second cycle of the 
functional education course and after the revision of the course content and 
methodology at the end of the first cycle, all field staff in the Sulla Pro-
ject went through a five-day training session on the implementation of the 
functional education program. The Sulla Project staff attended special train-
ing sessions on cooperative principles and practices organized in Camilla in 
cooperation with the Cooperative College and the Academy for Rural Develop-
ment. A month-long staff development workshop was conducted in the Sulla Pro-
ject in July-August 1976, in which BRAC headquarters personnel, training 
staff, and field staff deliberated on seven selected topics--reorientation 
of functional education instructors, functional education methodology, BRAC 
approach to development, "consciousness raising" among the rural people, 
human relations, leadership and communication, and the third phase strategy 
for the Sulla Project. Similarly, a week-long evaluation and planning work-
shop was organized for the functional education teachers in the Jamalpur 
Project before they launched the special women's project there. 
A small training team under a Chief Trainer was put together in BRAC 
headquarters early in 1974 and given the responsibility for arranging the 
special training and orientation sessions for the BRAC field personnel and 
for developing a portfolio of training materials and methods on specific 
topics called training modules. BRAC received assistance from a training 
expert provided by the Ford Foundation in the preparation of the training 
modules. The modules are resource materials on a specific subject that can 
be drawn upon in organizing a training session on the subject. These can be 
modified, adapted, and combined for specific groups, depending on their needs 
and the available training time. In fact, for each group of trainees, a 
special training program that may vary from a day to a month is worked out 
by adapting and combining the modules. 
The training modules developed so far are the following: 
1. Communications. There are three modules in the communications 
area--(a) teachi_ng of methods for dissemination of ideas in a 
way that creates a sense of participation from all parties con-
cerned; (b) organizational analysis and needs assessment to un-
derstand exactly what the organization desires from its workers, 
what the workers expect of the organization, and what they to-
gether expect their accomplishments to be; and (c) program plan-
ning where all members are involved in the process of establish-
ing the goals and objectives of the program leading to plans and 
objectives to which all parties are committed. 
2. Group dynamics. Establishing a sense of team effort through 
genuine interaction, teaching how to work together for common 
goals, and reaching consensus. 
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3. Leadership. Helping trainees to be self-confident and identifying 
and helping develop qualities and skills needed to achieve leader-
ship status that is freely accepted by the people concerned. 
4. Consciousness raising. Helping trainees develop analytical skills 
to understand why certain conditions and situations exist in the 
rural areas and to formulate and assess alternative approaches to 
solving specific rural problems. 
S. Functional education. Training instructors in methodologies develop-
ed specifically for use with BRAC functional education material. 1 
Training and Resource Center (TARC) 
With the establishment in mid-1976 of a Training and Resource Center con-
sisting of six full-time staff members, the staff training program has become a 
systematic and regular activity and has developed into a service that is avail-
able to other organizations and groups interested in rural development and the 
BRAC program approach. The establishment of TARC does not mark any basic change 
in training content and methodology, but it permits orderly planning and manage-
ment of the training activities and provides some assurance that the necessary 
staff and resources are devoted to training. An important motivation for set-
ting up the center was also the growing demand by many voluntary organizations 
in the country for training assistance from BRAC for their own workers. Another 
reason was a new emphasis in BRAC's own program strategy on rural youth "self-
starter" groups and youth leaders who might be trained and supported to initiate 
rural self-help projects without building a heavy staff and organization struc-
ture maintained by BRAC (see the chapter on institutional structures). 
In 1976, about one-half of TARC staff time and training activities was 
spent in providing services to other voluntary organizations. 111ey were charged 
fees roughly on the basis of actual costs for the services provided. 111e rest of 
TARC activities were devoted to training BRAC's own staff and rural youths iden-
tified as potential leaders of "self-starter" groups. A program timetable of TARC 
for one month (December 1976) ir.dicates the typical scope and nature of TARC acti-
vities (see Table 6.1). 
111e Training and Resource Center was located in Dacca in 1976 in a rented 
building adjacent to the BRAC headquarters. It is planned, however, that the 
center will be set up in a rural location with residential accommodation and run 
like an ashram where trainees and trainers together form a connnunity, meeting 
their basic needs through necessary manual labor and creating an environment for 
a total living-learning experience. 2 It is also planned that the training staff 
will alternate between training work at the center and regular field assignments 
in BRAC projects. 
Six acres of land have been purchased at a cost of Tk 400,000 in Savar, 20 
miles west of Dacca, for the site of the training center. 111e dormitory, staff 
lBRAC, Training and Support Programme for Rural Development, n.d., pp. 2-3. 
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Source: Training and Resource Centre, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, 
Dacca. 
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residences, meeting rooms and other facilities are expected to cost a similar 
amount. The annual recurring expenses for running the center is estimated to 
be about Tk 350,000--a part of which will be recovered from fees for services 
provided to other organizations. 
Maintaining Motivation and Morale 
Persistence in rural development work and efforts to improve the condition 
of the poorest in a political climate and socioeconomic environment not parti-
cularly conducive to rapid social change takes a high level of stoic fortitude 
and a certain philosophical disposition. Successes when achieved are small and 
slow to come, and frsutrations and failures are frequent. A consistently high 
level of enthusiasm among rural development workers is unrealistic to expect. A 
high degree of "achievement motivation" gratified by quick and visible accom-
plishments is probably not as helpful to a rural development worker as it might 
be in McClelland's entrepreneurial world.l Morale and enthusiasm among the BRAC 
workers, therefore, have their natural "ups and downs," as the Executive Direc-
tor put it. It is also likely that a number of the BRAC workers would prefer to 
have remained in the city with a desk-bound job in a government or commercial of-
f ice and have come to BRAC only as a second choice. 
On the whole, however, the level of enthusiasm and dedication among the work-
ers is regarded as high by the BRAC leadership--an assessment confirmed by ICED 
researchers' impressions from visits to project sites and discussions at field 
camps. This is attributed to a number of factors by the Executive Director of 
BRAC: 
1. Friendly interpersonal relationship among the workers is emphasized 
and the leadership pays attention to and helps resolve any inter-
personal problems among workers. 
2. There is a high level of flexibility in administration and manage-
ment of program activities. Workers have a great deal of freedom 
about taking initiatives and making decisions and usually would 
receive backing from the leadership in their decisions and judgment. 
3. There is an informality in relationship between the workers and the 
program management. The Executive Director and other program lea-
ders are freely accessible to all workers. 
4. The communal environment of camp living generates an organizational 
spirit and helps to protect the workers from the sense of isolation 
and frustration a conscientious rural development worker may feel. 
Concluding Comments 
It is not clear what the dividends have been in terms of performance and 
motivation because of the emphasis on formal education credentials in the re-
cruitment of Field Motivators and higher level personnel. A variation seems 
to persist among personnel in performance and commitment to program goals as 
indicated by the "hit or miss" character of the results obtained from the re-
1 David W. McClelland and David G. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement: 
Accelerating Economic Development through Psychological Training (New York: 
The Free Press, 1971). 
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cruitment process. The new recruitment approach thrcugh group interaction 
exercises is an interesting innovation and represents an attempt to make 
the selection of personnel more rational and less intuitive. However, if 
this approach proves to be more satisfactory, it would only indicate the 
importance of assessing personal traits and qualitiEs of individuals rather 
than placing a premium on university degrees. 
Apparently little weight is given to the local background of the work-
ers--the project staff being drawn from all over the country. The educa-
tional requirements, in a sense, restrict the possibility of local youths 
being employed as Field Motivators, because very few university-educated 
young men can be found living in their own villages. There are both ad-
.vantages and risks in giving a preference to the local candidates in re-
cruitment. The local youths are likely to be acquainted with and sensitive 
to local social and cultural characteristics and capable of identifying 
with the aspirations and values of the people in the area. On the other 
hand, in a social structure marked by inequity, the most likely candidates 
for a development worker are apt to be members of the local "gentry," or 
similar privileged groups, and they may not be effective in serving and 
safeguarding the interests of the local poor. A Field Motivator from 
another district, even if he comes from a class background similar to that 
of the local workers,will probably not be inclined as much to identify 
himself with or to be sympathetic to the local power structure. General-
izations, of course, are inappropriate because the determining factor is 
each individual's own attitudes and level of awareness of the rural socio-
economic condition. 
In the light of recent shifts of emphasis in BRAC program strategy 
towards stronger local organizations and less reliance on a large BRAC 
staff for local project management, the pros and cons of recruiting lo-
cal field workers need to be reexamined. There may be significant advan-
tages and far-reaching consequences of recruiting and training local Field 
Motivators who may, after a stint with BRAC, pursue a career in politics 
and local government and carry over the BRAC experience and outlook to 
their new vocations. Such workers would not become professional BRAC 
field workers, and their life's ambition and the rewards and incentives 
would not be tied to the career ladder held out by BRAC. Obviously, it 
is not necessary or appropriate to apply the principle of local recruit-
ment rigidly, even if it is found to be generally desirable. 
The establishment of a training center and setting up courses ready 
to be offered on request may have led to a process of growing formaliza-
tion of training and an abstraction of training from the essence of pro-
gram activities. Formal training sessions on specific topics and skills 
as well as for general orientation can be extremely valuable. However, 
the practical insight into the intricacies of rural life, the perception 
of the problems of the rural poor, the approaches to dealing with them, 
and the skills and understanding necessary for effective human relations 
are developed through practical experience and are very much affected by 
the program objectives and rationale. The training modules will never 
replace the learning experiences of the field worker during his initial 






responsibilities; but the training sessions and the 
invaluable as complements and stimulants to further 
tary and catalytic role of a training center needs 
continues to provide its services to BRAC and other 
BRAC 
refresher workshops can be 
learning. This complemen-
to be recognized as TARC 
organizations. 
If indeed it is desirable in voluntary organizations to have field workers 
whose life's ambition does not lie in climbing the career ladder in a rural 
development program and if the skills as a rural development worker cannot be 
abstracted from the substance of the program to be put into the content of a 
training course, then approaches followed for staff development and utilization 
in large public programs and small voluntary agencies must be somewhat divergent. 
Centralized planning and decisiorunaking, larger bureaucracies, standardized per-
sonnel management and administrative procedures, whjle understandable in large 
public programs, do not readily lend themselves to the improvisation, individual-
ization, and destandardization possible in recruitment, training, interpersonal 
relationship, and administrative procedures in small voluntary programs. The 
public programs also would have these advantages to the extent that the nature 
of the public programs change in the direction of greater decentralization, lo-




Creation of appropriate institutional infrastructures is both a pre--
condition for effective rural development programs and an objective of 
such programs. The organizational and staff structure of a program and the 
concomitant mobilization of the beneficiary population into participatory 
institutions make it possible to carry out thE. program activities. This 
process of participation at the same time can help the beneficiary popula-
tions develop their own capabilities to control and manage the development 
activities in a locality--growing increasingly less dependent either on 
outside voluntary organizations or a centralized government bureaucracy. 
BRAC's approach to rural development attaches a high value to the 
growth of local participatory institutions and self-sustaining and self-
managed rural development. However, in the short span of time since the 
inception of the BRAC development program, there has been an evolution of 
concepts and strategies about creating and strengthening institutional 
structures for rural development. Definitive solutions to the problems 
of institutional structures have not been found by BRAC and probably should 
not be expected; nevertheless, the BRAC experience with these problems and 
its continuing efforts to deal with them are instructive. 
BRAC Organization and Staff Structure 
In 1976, the BRAC organization was physically spread out in Dacca, 
where the central offices were located, and in three project locations--
Sulla, Manikganj, and Jamalpur. 
The central offices consisted of the Executive Director's office, 
the administration and accounts departments, the materials development 
unit, the Gonokendro editorial office, the research and evaluation unit, 
and the Training and Resource Center (until the Savar site for the cen-
ter is fully developed) . 
The field organization was most elaborate in Sulla where BRAC was 
born and where the project had been in operation the longest. The Sulla 
Project area was divided into 11 sectors under 2 zones. Each sector was 
headed by an Area Manager (also known as a Program Supervisor) who had 
an average of 4 Field Motivators and 3 paramedics working under him. The 
Area Managers reported to the two Program Coordinators in charge of the 
two zones, and they in turn were supervised by the Field Coordinator for 
the Sulla Project. There were also three Medical Officers in the project 
area in charge of three cl~nics and responsible for providing technical 
support to the health workers in the area. In mid-1976 there were 42 
Field Motivators and 31 paramedics in the Sulla Project area (in addition 
14 women paramedics were under training). There were also 30 newly ap-
pointed shasthya shevikas functioning as full-time village health 
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auxiliaries in 30 villages; shevikas were to be ultimately appointed in each 
village in order to intensify the coverage of and improve the access to the 
health services in the area. There were also about 90 part-time Lady Family 
Planning Organizers and an unspecified number of volunteer and unpaid func-
tional educational instructors and youth workers in the project area. 
In the Manikganj Project in late 1976, there were 7 Program Supervisors 
under the direction of the Program Administrator. Ultimately, in each of the 
8 unions (with a total population of about 100,000) to be covered by the BRAC 
project, a team of 2 Program Supervisors was planned to be posted. No Field 
Motivators were proposed to be appointed in Manikganj. The health care acti-
vities were not yet operational in Manikganj. The plan, however, was to post 
a single paramedic in each union and 3 to 4 village-based auxiliaries in each 
village~a smaller ratio of paramedics to population than in Sulla and a great-
er reliance on the shevikas for basic health and family planning services. 
(Meanwhile, BRAC supported financially a local voluntary family planning organ-
ization based in Manikganj that provided clinical services and performed tubec-
tornies and vasectomies.) 
In Jamalpur's special women's project covering 28 villages and a total 
population of 36,000, there were 14 women functional education instructors/ 
field workers under the supervision of a Program Supervisor. Functional ed-
ucation groups, mothers' clubs, women's cooperatives, and group economic ac-
tivities were to be organized, and nonclinical family planning services were 
to be provided by these women with the assistance of local volunteers. Basic 
health care was not included in the initial phase of the Jamalpur Project. 
The field organizations in Manikganj and Jamalpur, both of which were in-
itiated in 1976, show a distinct shift from the pattern in Sulla. The signi-
ficance of this shift is discussed later in this chapter. 
The organizational structure described above was not meant to carry out 
the rural development program of BRAC by itself. The effectiveness of this 
structure depended on how well it could help create and support various or-
ganizations and institutions of the local people as the instruments for im-
plementing the multifaceted development program of BRAC. We turn now to 
these organizations. 
Cooperatives and Other Local Organizations 
Cooperative societies of rural groups with homogeneous economic and develop-
ment interests are seen by BRAC as essential for collective self-help efforts as 
well as efficient provisions for support services and inputs. A major task of 
all BRAC field workers is the promotion of cooperatives~educating rural resi-
dents about the importance and ways of coope:ra tion, encouraging them to save and 
to undertake cooperative projects, and assisting them to form and manage cooper-
ative societies. 
BRAC was interested in forming new societies as well as rejuvenating exist-
ing farmers' and fishermen's cooperatives in the Sulla Project area. Many of the 
old societies had become ineffective, having fallen into the hands of powerful 
groups in the village such as the larger landowners and m:ineylenders. Input 
allocations, credit facilities, and other benefits of cooperative societies 
available from the government were monopolized by members of the managing group 
to the detriment of general members' interest. Furtherm:)re, corruption and mis-
' I 
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management at the top were a conunon feature of the cooperatives. 
One of the first tasks before BRAC was to rid the cooperatives of their 
unsavory image. It was necessary to restore the confidence of the general 
members in cooperative societies and eliminate the prevalent corruption and 
bad management. BRAC emphasized the importance of cooperative spirits, sav-
ings habits, collective responsibility, and cooperative projects, rather than 
achievement of legal status as a registered society under government regula-
tion, although this was not discouraged. All Field Motivators were trained 
in cooperative accounting practices, and books of accounts of the societies 
were updated and regularly maintained. BRAC arranged with government coop-
erative inspectors for audit and regular inspection of the societies' state 
of affairs. The societies were encouraged to hold regular weekly meetings, 
and the members were encouraged to attend these meetings. BRAC field work-
ers attended many of these meetings. New management connnittees were elected 
for many societies in a democratic mannEr. A training session was arranged 
for 154 chairmen and secretaries of the cooperatives by the joint efforts 
of the BRAC staff and the extension officers of the cooperative department. 
About 120 primary cooperative societies were active in the Sulla Pro-
ject area in 1976. About 80 of these were farmers' cooperatives, approxi-
mately 30 were fishermen's cooperatives, and the rest were societies formed 
by women's groups and landless laborers. The combined savings of these so-
cieties had exceeded Tk 200,000 by early 1976. Following the national pat-
tern under the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) of the government, 
the Sulla Thana Central Cooperative Association (STCCA) was formed in early 
1974. The role of the central association is to serve as a channel for 
credit funds and inputs available from the government for the primary so-
ciety's members, to provide common services to the small primary societies 
they are unable to arrange by themselves, and to maintain liaison with gov-
ernment departments on matters of common interest to the rural cooperative 
members. 
Interference by a prominent member of the ruling political party, who 
was interested in controlling the government patronage offered through the 
central association and was opposed to the prominent role of BRAC in the 
local cooperative movement, gave the STCCA an inauspicious start. The 
situation improved, however, after the change of government in August 1975. 
The government appointed a Project Officer under the IRDP whose job was to 
provide teclmical assistance and management advice to STCCA. The STCCA 
and through it the primary societies received the exclusive fertilizer 
dealership for the thana, and a credit fund of Tk 500,000 for lending to 
members of the primary societies was made available by the government. A 
central association was also formed in 1976 in Derai thana, part of which 
is included in the BRAC project area. 
Deviating somewhat from the IRDP national pattern, the Sulla central 
association decided to decentralize its activities by forming another tier 
of association in each of the four unions in Sulla thana with all the pri-
mary societies in the union as its members. There was an enthusiastic re-
sponse to this idea from primary societies, and land and money were donated 
by the local people for erecting the STCCA office. 
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In the Jamalpur Project some 29 women's groups were engaged in collec-
tive economic projects. (See ·discussion in the chapter on women's programs.) 
In Manikganj, during the first year of its operation in 1976, 27 groups of 
women and landless laborers with a total membership of over 400 were being 
assisted by BRAC field workers in group economic activities, including hand-
husking and marketing of rice, farming, weaving, and pottery. These groups 
in Jamalpur and Manikganj were at a pre-cooperative stage in the legal sense 
and were entirely dependent for credits and inputs on BRAC, not being eligi-
ble for support from the government sources. In addition to the above, in 
November 1976, there were 19 other groups in Manikganj with 339 members 
which had made more progress towards becoming full-fledged cooperative soci-
eties with elected managing conunittees, regular membership meetings, and 
weekly thrift savings. Among these groups were 10 women's cooperatives with 
158 members, 6 landless farmers' groups with 138 members, 2 weavers' societies 
with 24 members, and 1 potters' society with 19 members. 
As the description of the Jamalpur and Manikganj efforts in the develop-
ment of cooperatives (and collective economic enterprises) indicates, there 
is a deliberate emphasis in these projects to concentrate on helping the 
underprivileged groups organize collective self-help efforts through coopera-
tives--in contrast to the general cooperative development effort in the 
country by such agencies as the IRDP and the cooperative department, both of 
which have concentrated on cooperatives of landowning farmers. 
The cooperatives and pre-cooperative groups were seen as the institu-
tional means for economic improvement. For the purpose of mobilizing people's 
initiative and motivation, creating a conducive environment for self-help 
efforts, and raising the level of awareness about the roots of rural problerrs 
and ways of dealing with them, BRAC introduced two kinds of institutions--the 
Gonokendro (people's center) and the functional education groups. 
The Gonokendro, a modest building established in each village as a center 
of village community life and a physical base for various development efforts, 
was given a high priority in the second phase of the Sulla Project. Construc-
tion of 175 Gonokendro buildings were planned through joint contributions of 
BRAC and the individual village communities. BRAC was to supply the building 
materials and the villagers were to provide the land, labor, and the furniture. 
Actually 129 buildings were constructed by the end of 1974--mostly modest 
bamboo and timber structures. 
While the accomplishments in physical construction of the buildings were 
relatively good, the experie.nce of Gonokendro was an eye-opener for BRAC. In 
many instances, it was found difficult to overcome the rivalry of opposing 
factions, patronized and supported by influential families in the village. 
Many of the village committees formed for directing the Gonokendro did not 
have the support and confidence of the whole village. In at least one-third 
of the villages, it was not even possible to agree on a site for the center. 
Apparently, the Gonokendro as a focal point for village organization and 
activities was BRAC's own concept of how the villagers could be organized and 
mobilized for development efforts. This concept ignored the reality of 
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conflicts of interests among the village residents and the fact that the 
village community was not really one entity. The Gonokendro, an attrac-
tive idea on the face of it, did not live up to BRAC's expectations. BRAC 
concluded: "Despite the fact that this programme accounted for a substan-
tial part of BRAC effort the achievement of the programme was not commen-
surate with the effort. 11 1 While building a community center ir. the village 
was not ruled out if the village desired it and was willing to contribute 
to its building and upkeep, it was not included as a project item in the 
third phase of Sulla or in other BRAC projects. 
The role of the functional education groups in helping self-help efforts 
and in supporting the total rural development efforts has been discussed else-
where in this report. 
The group health insurance scheme and the mothers' clubs also have been 
described in other chapters of the report. The insurance scheme is intended 
to mobilize local financial support for the health care and family planning 
services, distribute the cost burden of health care evenly among the popula-
tion and keep it within acceptable limits, and eventually be a mechanism for 
substantial participation of the local people in the management of the health 
program. The mothers' clubs are designed to facilitate health and nutrition 
education and to serve as a forum for collective and individual actions for 
the improvement of mothers' and children's health. 
Important questions about the institutional and organizaticnal arrange-
ments of a rural development program are to what extent these arrangements 
facilitate community participation in its various dimensions and promote 
better integration of the program activities among themselves and with other 
rural development efforts. 
Community Participation 
Two main aspects of community participation are the distribution of 
the benefits of the development program among the various segments of the 
community population and the degree of active involvement of the benefi-
ciary population in managing and carrying out the development activities. 
Since BRAC has been in operation for some length of time only in the 
Sulla Project area, ICED attempted to determine to what extent the benefits 
of BRAC activities reached the poorer and the more underprivileged groups. 
A random sample of 240 households from 11 villages where BRAC had been 
active were asked about the. nwnber of instances they had benefited from 
various BRAC activities since the inception of these activities in the re-
spective villages. The responses were classified according to the level of 
education and landholdings of the heads of the household. (See Tables 7.1, 
7.2, and 7.3.) It was found, somewhat unexpectedly, that the overall 
lBRAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 7. 
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Table 7 .l 
Distribution of Benefits Related to the Level of 
Education of the Head of the Household 
Total 
Level Respondents Frequency of Mention of Benefits 
of Heads of Agric. Family 
BRAC 















56 34 28 29 
46 28 32 33 
so 31 30 31 
10 6 7 7 
26 38 210 37 320 36 
18 25 172 30 268 30 
20 29 149 26 249 28 
7 9 36 6 60 7 
TOTAL 240 100 162 100 97 100 71 100 567 100 897 100 
*see first footnote of Table 7.2. 
SOURCE: ICED Field Data 
Table 7.2 
Distribution of Benefits Related to Land °'1nership 
Size Total Respondents Freguenst of Mention of Benefits 
of Heads of Agric. Family 
Landholdings Households Health COOE· Planning: Other* 
# % # % # % # % # % 
No land 62 26 33 20 8 8 21 30 111 20 
Less than 
l Acre 130 54 10 6 6 6 10 14 44 8 
1 to 3 
Acres 40 17 52 32 40 41 7 10 164 29 
3+ Acres 
and above 8** 3 67 41 43 44 33 46 248 43 








*Other activities include fisheries cooperatives, youth groups, women's groups, 
functional education, providing power tiller and water pump, supply of seeds , 
useful literature and advice. 
**Many of the larger land-owners' families are joint families with several 
nuclear units within the joint family structure, which partially explains high 
frequency of mention of benefits from the various BRAC activities. 
Source: ICED Field Data. 
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Contribution to BRAC Project Activities by Level of Education 
and Land Ownership of Head of Household 
Freg,uency of Mention of Contribution 
77. 
Level Participation Voluntary Paid Donation: 
of in Planning and Service Services Cash or in 
Education Management Kind 
Illiterate 4 16 2 1 
Less than Complete 
Primary Education 4 15 1 
Primary Education 
but less than 
Complete Secondary 
Education 7 17 1 3 
Secondary 
Education 
and above 6 3 1 1 
Land 01N11ership 
No land 1 13 1 
Less than 1 Acre 2 1 
l+ Acre to 3 Acres 5 15 2 
3+ Acres and above 16 21 3 
N=240. 
Source: ICED Field Data. 
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benefits as well as the specific benefits from the health activities, co-
operatives, and the family planning efforts (as the respondents perceived 
the benefits) were distributed more or less evenly among the groups with 
different educational levels. Groups with higher levels of education were 
not enjoying a disproportionate share of the benefits. 
The findings were quite different when the benefits were related to 
the landholding pattern. Households with no land or less than an acre of 
land revealed themselves to be recipients of benefits much less frequently 
than their share in the sample population and those with three acres or 
more land mentioned instances of benefits totally out of line with their 
proportion in the sample. The totally landless households fared somewhat 
better than those with less than an acre of land, apparently because of 
some special efforts to help landless laborers and destitute women, though 
even in this case the frequency of mention of benefits was less than pro-
portionate to their number. The most "discriminated" group was also the 
largest group of households--those with less than one acre of land. The 
pattern of benefits according to landholdings for specific sectors was not 
the same for all sectors. (Table 7.2) The distribution of health care 
benefits was similar to the skewed pattern of overall benefits. In agri-
cultural cooperatives it was more skewed in favor of the larger landowners 
than the overall pattern. The distribution of benefits was somewhat more 
favorable for the two poorer groups in regard to family planning. 
The specific quantitative dimensions as shc:Mn in the table may not 
reflect a high level of precision, because the investigators in the sample 
survey relied on the verbal responses tc their questions and were not able 
to apply any independent verification to the responses.l The investigators 
believe, however, that the main findings of the survey regarding the direc-
tion of bias in the distribution of benefits are valid. 
The absence of a relationship between educational distribution and 
the distribution of BRAC benefits and the positive relationship between 
landholding and benefits apparently mean that ownership of land is a more 
important determinant of economic status and social influence than educa-
tional achievements and that distribution of education does not have a high 
correlation with the distribution of land ownership. These cross-relation-
ships, however, need further investigation, especially for the purpose of 
assessing the role of education in rural development and determining educa-
tional policies. 
The heads of the same sample of households were asked about their 
contribution to BRAC activities by means of participating in program plan-
ning and management, providing voluntary services, providing services for 
lThe landholding pattern, for example, indicated by the survey is some-
what at variance with the findings of a BRAC survey in 1975 of 2300 households, 
which shows that 34 percent of the households are totally landless, 18 percent 
have one acre or less land, and 25 percent possess between 1 and 5 acres. The 
discrepancy, however, does not alter the basic characteristics of the ownership 
pattern. 
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payment, and offering cash or in-kind donation. The responses were pre-
dominantly negative for all educational groups and land ownership groups. 
(See Table 7.3) This apparently was not because they were unwilling to 
contribute. In response to queries, 90 percent of the sample household 
heads expressed the willingness to commit labor and time to support BRAC 
activities and 8 percent said they would contribute cash and materials to 
help BRAC. The lack of contribution, at least in part, was due to the 
organizational structure of the BRAC program that did not create conditions 
for mobilizing local contribution. 
The overall picture that emerges regarding community participation is 
that the benefits of BRAC activities in Sulla were enjoyed disproportionately 
by the relatively better-off families with larger landholdings and that the 
institutional structure of BRAC did not exploit to the full extent the 
latent potentials of engaging the beneficiary population in planning and 
managing the program activities and of mobilizing the community resources. 
On the question of the integrated approach, the Sulla experience points 
to a number of problems that defy easy solutions. Having decided to address 
various urgent rural problems in the areas of health, family planning, farm-
ing, fisheries, the landless, women's situation, and education, and lacking 
the human and material resources to provide a reasonably comprehensive cover-
age of the entire project area population, BRAC scattered its sectoral activi-
ties among certain villages and certain population groups, making none the 
true beneficiary of an integrated approach. As we have seen in the discussion 
of the major sectoral activities, any overlap of participation among different 
activities was coincidental rather than central to the program approach fol-
lowed in Sulla. There was no central organizational mechanism that mobilized 
groups of population to assess their own development needs and priorities and 
to launch a multifaceted self-help program. The functional education groups 
might have been the institutional means for homogeneous interest groups to be 
organized for improving their own condition. But functional education in 
Sulla, as we have noted earlier, was not linked directly to development action, 
and the instructors and the BRAC field workers did not view functional educa-
tion as the prelude to collective and organized action. The sectoral activi-
ties together constituted an integrated approach in an abstract sense from the 
point of view of BRAC as an organization, since these appeared to complement 
each other, but they remained somewhat compartmentalized for the beneficiary 
population. 
The links of BRAC activities with nonBRAC development efforts--mostly of 
the government agencies--were tenuous. As noted in th~: chapters on the major 
sectoral activities, the differences in program approach and objectives, the 
inadequacies of resources and personnel in national programs, and sometimes 
the inclination to compete rather than to cooperate on both sides stood in the 
way. The lack of resources for comprehensive service coverage either by BRAC 
or by the government agencies left room for a tacit territorial anC'. jurisdic-
tional division of labor. 
Cooperation between BRAC and other agencies had been most pronounced in 
respect of the agricultural cooperatives and the formation of the thana central 
associations. After initial political problems the central associations, 
formed with BRAC encouragement and support, received the standard financial 
and technical support and the government allocation of agricultural inputs 
. ;,fO 
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available to all IRDP sponsored central associations. There was apparently 
a sufficient commonality of objectives and approach between IRDP and BRAC 
in this respect. 
The problems of the institutional structure and organization in the 
Sulla Project were apparently recognized by the BRAC leadership. In attempts 
to deal with these problems, new program strategies and institutional approach-
es emerged, as the plans for the third phase of Sulla and the new Manikganj 
project were prepared. 
New Organizational Approach in Sulla 
The main organizational goal for the third phase (1976-1978) of the Sulla 
Project as stated in the project proposal is as follows: 
to organise and develop appropriate village and local level 
institutions, in order to effectively involve the masses of rural 
population in mobilising the communities' resources for their own 
development and to provide services to those whose needs are 
presently being ignored.l 
The major features of the third phase plans, from an organization and in-
stitutional point of view, are the following: 
1. The third phase puts special emphasis on organizing disadvantaged 
rural groups with homogeneous development interests, such as landless labor-
ers, small farmers, destitute women, fishermen, artisans, and the youth. The 
functional education courses are to be organized for such homogeneous groups 
and are to be used for planning and implementing group projects rather than 
only for literacy teaching and "consciousness raising" in an abstract sense. 
Another device to be used for spurring group action is the village work-
shop. These workshops, conducted by BRAC staff and local youth qroup members, 
are to be a series of "conscientization" sessicns with all the members in a 
village community. In these sessions, a critical aEalysis of the village 
socioeconomic structures and problems is to be made and action plans formu-
lated for social and economic change. 
As a result of the village workshops and the functional education program, 
village organizations such as youth groups, women's associations, and coopera-
tive societies of different types are expected to emerge, and a village devel-
opment conunittee with the representation of these organizations is likely to 
be formed. The village developrrent cor.1!11i.ttee is to plan and guide the broader 
community-wide development services in such areas as those of health, sanita-
tion, family planning, and education. BRAC staff and the yot·.th groups are to 
monitor the progress of the action programs of the village organizations and 
the village development conmittee and provide critical support. 
2. The BRAC field staff that was operational during the second phase is 
to be maintained during the following three years or even slightly increased 
with the addition of women Field Motivators. However, the main energy and 
time of the field workers are to be devoted to "ins ti tution-building"--forrna-
tion of homogeneous action groups of women, youths, landless laborers, fisher-
men, and so on, and supporting the plans and activities of these groups rather 
~RAC, Sulla Project Report on Phase II, p. 1. 
1t.i- I 
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than just organizing and carrying out sectoral activities initiated by BRAC 
its elf. 
3. The sectoral activities are to be used not only to provide needed 
services but also to enhance the formation of organizations and institutions 
that can help make the sectoral activities more self-sustaining and self-
managed. Tilis is to be achieved by drawing up sectoral plans and objectives 
with the involvement of the homogeneous interest groups and channeling the 
services through the groups. 
4. The central association of cooperatives at the thana level is planned 
to be more broad-based to include all cooperative groups rather than only agri-
cultural cooperatives. The capacity of the central association is to be devel-
oped to service and support the various primary groups and to coordinate and 
guide development efforts that affect the different village level societies. 
5. Tile BRAC organizational structure is expected to withdraw gradually 
at the end of the third phase leaving probably only a skeleton staff for 
technical support to the central association. The roles and functions that 
BRAC is performing are to be taken over by the central association or a 
similar central body and the village development committees. 
At the time of collecting materials for this report in late 1976, some 
progress had been made in moving towards this new institutional approach. 
The formats and procedures of conducting the village workshops had been pre-
pared, BRAC field staff had been briefed about the workshops, and a small 
number of the first round workshops had been conducted. The reorientation 
of the functional education courses was under way, but the full implications 
and the operational consequences of the new role of functional education were 
yet to be fully worked out. It was apparent that no systematic planning and 
thinking had yet gone into broadening the central association and building 
its strengths for ultimately taking over many of the BRAC organizational roles. 
Local Self-Sustaining Institutions in Manikganj 
The new BRAC project in Manikganj initiated in mid-1976 may be regarded 
as a testing ground for the lessons learned from the Sulla Project. From the 
very beginning, the emphasis in Manikganj was on keeping BRAC's own staff at 
a minimum level, forming local organizations of homogeneous groups for collec-
tive development action, and using youth groups as a catalyzing force for 
local activities. 
The initial preparation for the Manikganj Project was done through a food-
for-work program (FFWP) designed to attack three physical constraints to agri-
cultural development in the area--early monsoon flooding, drainage, and irri-
gation in the dry season. Members of the local youth organizations partici-
pated in the FFWP by working with BRAC pErsonnel to establish contact with the 
people, select FFWP sites, motivate the people living adjacent to the sites to 
give additional voluntary labor to the scheme, supervise the work, organize the 
transportation of wheat to the sites, and make payment to the laborers. The 
food-for-work program carried out between November 1975 and April 1976 not 
only improved the physical infrastructure for agriculture and provided food 
and cash to the vulnerable groups at a time of food scarcity, but also helped 
identify promising youths and youth groups for future BRAC work, invclved lo-
cal people in planning and implementation of development schemes, helped BRAC 
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to be acquainted with the local development problems and prospects, and 
enhanced BRAC's credibility with the local people. 
BRAC is of the view that throughout rural Bangladesh there are hun-
dreds of rural youth groups, educated but unemployed,who can act as cata-
lytic agents for various development oriented organizations and programs.l 
From the youth group identified in each village in Manikganj, two to 
three are to be selected to undergo functional education instructor train-
ing, and then the group is to open a functional education center in its own 
community. As mentioned in the chapter on functional education, the func-
tional education program is to be used as the main initial thrust for or-
ganizing groups for planning and carrying out self-help activities in 
Manikganj. As the groups begin to express the need for other programs, 
other youths are to be trained as paramedics, family planning workers, and 
motivators to assist in cooperative formation and other developmental acti-
vities .2 
The strategy of supporting local youth groups is also being tried in 
Shaturia, the thana adjacent to Manikganj. A dozen members of local youth 
groups spent several months in Sulla acquiring practical experience of the 
BRAC development approach. On their return to Shaturia the youth trainees 
formed an alliance of 13 local youth grol-,ps and planned development activi-
ties in the areas of public health, family planning, functional education, 
fisheries, agriculture, and formation of ccoperative groups. They were 
assisted by a BRAC staff member and received a limited financial support 
from BRAC. The Shaturia experience prompted BRAC to explore the prospects 
of a spcial program of training youth leaders of "self-starter" development 
programs and supporting such programs with small financial grants and tech-
nical advice. 
The sectoral activities in health, family planning, and extension ser-
vices for agriculture and fisheries in Manikganj are to be channeled and 
carried out through the local groups emerging from the efforts of the youth 
workers and the functional education program. As in the third phase of 
Sulla, ultimately the responsibilities for coordinating and supporting the 
development services are to be taken over by a thana level association of 
the primary groups. 
Concluding Comments 
In BRAC's efforts to create a viable institutional structure for its 
rural development program, a change of approach is readily discernible. 
Originally the pattern was characterized by a large paid field staff, BRAC-
initiated and managed sectoral activities not fully integrated with each 
lBRAC, Manikganj Project, p. 9-10. 
2rbid., p. 10. 
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other, a low level of community participation in planning and managing acti-
vities, and insufficient positive discrimination in the program in favor of 
the poorest people. This had changed to a pattern marked by a small number 
of full-time and paid field staff, reliance on members of local youth groups 
for field work, emphasis on building organizations of disadvantaged groups 
with homogeneous development. interests, and a more prominent role given to 
functional education and village workshops in forming primary action groups 
and in planning and carrying out the combination of sectoral activities 
through the local organizations. 
The new approach began to be reflected in BRAC activities and project 
proposals in 1976 and is still in the process of )eing shaped and elaborated. 
It is certainly compatible with BRAC's basic goals of promoting self-sustain-
ing rural development, creating and strengthening local institutions, and 
helping improve the living condition of the rrost deprived and the poorest. It 
is too early to tell how this approach will fare in reality and h<:M effectively 
BRAC will be able to put it into practice. 
Two critical questions in relation to the growth of the local institutions 
are how the local power structure will be dealt with and h<:M the local institu-
tional structure can be made strong enough to permit the "withdrawal" of BRAC. 
What will be the response to BRAC's organizational efforts of the incest-
uous alliance of the larger landowners, moneylenders, and influential fami-
lies whose po,..ier, influence, and privileges are certain to be threatened? Dur-
ing the second phase of the Sulla Project BRAC had infringed on the vested in-
terests of the local power structure only marginally; there was no concerted 
and broad-range effort to organize the various deprived groups and to utilize 
the idealism and the receptivity to change of the youth in this effort. In 
many instances the benefits of BRAC activities were enjoyed as much or more 
by the better-off families as the poorer families. 
It might be noted here that a somewhat dramatic brush with the local power 
structure came early in BRAC's life in a project in Rowrnari in the northern 
district of Rangpur. This ended in a BRAC retreat and eventual abandonment of 
the project. 
In the wake of the 1974 floods and famine, a famine relief project was 
launched in Rowmari with Oxfam-UK aid. BRAC also decided to initiate a multi-
purpose rural development program in the area, capitalizing on its association 
with the local people and on its familiarity with the local situation. However, 
soon after the relief operation began, BRAC faced a boycott and ostracism from 
the carpenters who refused to build the BRAC office building, the local bank 
manager who refused to release funds from the BRAC account, the bullock cart 
drivers who refused to transport BRAC supplies, and the firewood merchants who 
refused to sell their firewood to BRAC. A BRAC worker was assaulted in the 
night and was accused by village leaders of rape, even though he was not in the 
locality at the time of the alleged "incident." It turned out that all this 
activity was orchestrated by an influential local man who was chairman of the 
board of the IRDP-sponsored Thana Central Cooperative Association, a wealthy 
landowner, a jute exporter, and a former. member of the parliament from the 
locality. He and his allies were apparently afraid of losing control of the 
1411-
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local TCCA and other local institutions and also the system of patronage, 
influence-peddling, and corruption that went with this control. 
With the intervention of government officials from the district, the 
relief operation was salvaged and BRAC brought it to a successful conclusion. 
It had fed 8,000 to 13,000 children for up to four months, averting malnu-
trition and many probable deaths. BRAC and its financial sponsor Oxfam-UK 
decided, however, to pull out from the development program in Rowmari when 
it became obvious that BRAC and the local TCCA were unable to work together.l 
In order to have a better insight into the mechanism of social change 
in the village in the face of numerous obstacles, BRAC is supporting with 
a grant from the Ford Foundation an anthropological study of two villages 
in the two project areas of Sulla and Manikganj. Two research assistants 
have been hired to apply the "participant observation" techniques in the two 
selected villages. An anthropologist from the Marga Institute in Sri Lanka 
has been appointed as a consultant for preparing the research design, train-
ing the researchers in methodology, and supervising the·study. The study is 
expected to provide useful policy guidance from a disciplined observation of 
the interplay of the "system" of values, resources, and social and economic 
relationships in a village. Preliminary results of the study are expected in 
late 1977. 2 
The reaction of the local power structure is only one element in the 
process of nurturing and strengthening local organizations of deprived grours 
and building an institutional structure for self-sustaining development. Ano-
ther important element is the intention and attitudes of the national govern-
ment in regard to the local government structure and thE degree of decentrali-
zation and sharing of authority considered necessary or desirable. The BRAC 
efforts might be seen by the govenunent as a useful trial with important les-
sons for the national rural development program. In this case a favorable 
climate of suprort and cooperation from the government agencies, particularly 
the local and district officials, can reinforce and accelerate the process 
initiated by BRAC. Alternately, the BRAC activities may be viewed as well-
intentioned efforts of a voluntary organization that the government would 
tolerate as long as no laws are violated. In such an atmosphere, BRAC and the 
local organizations would be up against the added obstacle of noncooperation 
and foot-dragging of government agencies and their local agents. BRAC's exper-
ience and lessons would also have that much less impact on the government rural 
programs and the national rural developmc,nt policies and strategies. 
In fact, while at the field level the interaction between the BRAC acti-
vities and the government rural services have not generally been close if only 
because the thin spread of the government activities leave plenty of room for 
vo1untary agencies to function, at the national level there appears to be a 
lsee BRAC, Report on Rowmari Thana Childfeeding and Nutrition Programme, 
Dacca, n.d. 
Also Cole Patrick Dodge and Paul D. Wiebe, "Famine Relief and Development 
in Rural Bangladesh," Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, May 29, 1976, 
pp. 809-817. 
2aRAC, Newsletter, vol. 1, No. 3, May-June 1976, pp. 6-7. 
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general awareness and appreciation of BRAC's useful work and bona fides 
among government leaders and officials involved in rural develor:rnent. A 
member of the BRAC governing body is a member of the Council of Advisers 
to the President (i.e., a member of the President's Cabinet equivalent to 
a Minister) and there are other well-wishers of BRAC in influential offi-
cial pcsitions. There is increasing interest from relevant government 
agencies in BRAC's functional education and health care efforts. For 
instance, the Integrated Rural Development Program in launching a project 
for women's cooperatives has called upon BRAC's assistance for developing 
the educational components and training the field workers. The Division 
of Population Control and Family Planning has often cited the Sulla Pro-
ject of BRAC as an example where a family planning effort integrated with 
a broader rural development program has demonstrated encouraging results. 
However, a sense of goodwill towards BRAC and appreciation of its efforts 
among individual government leaders do not necessarily translate into the 
adoption of appropriate lessons from the BRAC experience in government 
programs, which would often call for basic reorientation of objectives and 
policies in government programs rather than the transplantaticn of certain 
methods and techniques. 
CHAPTER 8 
COSTS AND FINANCES 
The Pattern of Costs 
Available information about the budgets of the various components of 
BRAC indicate the magnitude of the different project activities, the break-
down of the total costs into major cost categories, and the relative pro-
portions of the cost categories compared to the total or to each other. The 
cost data are based on the proposed budgets for each of the major projects 
for the planned duration of the project, which varied from one year to three 
years. Actual expenditure data were not available as these projects were 
yet to come to a conclusion at the time of collecting the cost data (except-
ing the Functional Education Development project for which the data in 
Table 8.1 represents actual costs). However, major deviations from the 
budget in the total expenditures or in the relative proportions among cost 
categories were not expected. (Unfortunately, the breakdown of budget 
according to the categories in Table 8.1 for Sulla Phase II--the one major 
project that came to a conclusion at the end of 1975--was not available. 
This would have permitted a comparison of the pattern of expenditure be-
tween the early Sulla ph.ase and the later projects.) All of the projects 
included in Table 8.1, except Functional Education Development, had their 
beginning in 1976 and they presumably reflect the changes in program approach 
following the early Sulla experience. 
Among the six projects included in Table 8.1, the first three (Sulla 
Phase III, Jamalpur and Manikganj) are more representative of the normal and 
major activities of BRAC. Among the last three, the Training and Resource 
Centre is unusual because it has a large capital component (training facili-
ties, dormitories, etc.) because of the nature of the project. The last two 
projects--Research and Evaluation and Functional Education Development--in-
clude provisions for foreign consultancy that consume a very large chunk of 
the total budget in each case and distorts the relative shares of the differ-
ent cost categories. 
Table 8.1 shows that in all of the projects the staff cost is a major 
item if not the largest item in the total budget. The field staff ar,d head 
office overhead (which is essentially the head office staff salaries and the 
staff support and logistics costs) together accounted for 49 to 72 percent of 
total recurring costs in the different projects. The capital costs (land, 
building, transportation, equipment, and furniture) are relatively low or even 
nil in all the projects except the Training Centre project. In the two major 
projects--Sulla Phase III and Manikganj, they are 5 percent and 15 percent 
respectively. The lower figure in Sulla is explained by the fact that it in-
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The large difference in materials and supplies costs between Majikganj 
and Sulla Phase III is largely because of the plan to provide an intensive 
health and family planning coverage in Sulla and to build a base stock of 
supplies prior to BRAC withdrawal from the area at the end of Phase III. 
In both cases, the costs under this category would have been higher without 
the provision for recovery of drug costs from the patients. (Total drug 
costs are to be recovered in Sulla and 50 percent in Manikganj through in-
surance charges and ser:vice fees.) Without these provisions the costs would 
have gone up to Tk 1.6 million and Tk 250,000 respectively in Sulla and 
Manikganj. 
The category "other costs" includes two major items--staff travel and 
staff training. Staff travel is generally calculated to be about 20 percent 
of salaries for all personnel with supervisory roles. Training and retrain-
ing constitute a substantial expenditure item for all field level personnel. 
In the case of Sulla Phase III this category includes the costs for function-
al education and village workshops, whereas functional education costs at 
least partially fall under "grants to local organizations" that are expected 
to carry out this activity in Manikganj. The large expenditure under this 
category for Training Centre obtains because the maintenance of trainees 
while resident in the Centre is a substantial cost item. 
The loan fund for cooperatives and other group economic enterprises is 
smaller for Sulla than for Manikganj because it is expected thct commercial 
banks w~ll be found interested in extending credit to groups in Sulla under 
BRAC guarantee. The amount provided in the budget represents the write-off 
cost for bad debts (up to 20 percent of the total loans). In Manikganj, the 
loans are to be provided from BRAC's own funds. 
Grants to local organizations of youth, women, and landless represent a 
new program aliproach that emphasizes the important role of local organizations 
and local self-management of group activities. The grants are to be provided 
as seed money for projects to be planned and implemented by the local organiza-
tion. This approach, according to the budget figures, seems to be more vigor-
ously pursued in Manikganj. 
Major Program Items 
Table 8.2 shows the major program items in the budgets for the three main 
sub-projects of BRAC--Sulla Phase II (concluded in 1975) , Sulla Phase III and 
Manikganj (both begun in 1976). Health care and family planning clearly consti-
tutes the most important component in all three sub-projects judged by budget 
expenditures. The budget for this component has gone up from under 21 percent 
of the total in Sulla Phase II to about 36 percent in Sulla Phase III. It is 
comparably high in Manikganj with 29 percent of the total allocation. 
A comparison of the budgets of Sulla Phase II and the two other sub-project 
budgets indicates a trend tcward a diffusion of the demarcations of sectoral 
activities and more emphasis on organizations and groups of the beneficiary 
populations rather than separate sectoral activities. This trend is more marked 
in Manikganj than in Sulla Phase III, probably because it was more difficult 
for Sulla Phase III to depart radically from Phase II patterns than for Manik-
Ganj, a new sur-project. 
;c.r1 
COSTS AND FINANCES 
Table 8.2 
Major Items of Expenditure for 
Three BRAC Sub-Projects 
Sulla Phase II (Actual Nov. '72-Dec. '75) 
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Institutional Development (Functional Education, 
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Health and Family Planning 
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Veterinary Service, Staff Support) 
Field Organization (General Staff Salaries and 
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Field Organization (Salaries, except Health and 
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Source: BRAC Project Documents. 
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Functional education and other training ar,d educational activities (in-
cluding village workshops in Sulla) remain a central element in the two re-
cent sub-projects. It is not a separate line item in Manikganj budget because 
much of the educational activities, as noted above, are to be carried out by 
local organizations with BRAC staff support; hence the costs are included un-
der organizational grants and general field organization costs. 
The field organization costs in Manikganj are relatively larger than the 
others because all staff costs in Manikganj (except health workers) are in-
cluded under this item, whereas some of the staff costs in Sulla Phase III are 
shown under separate program costs. Manikganj actually has, on the whole, a 
smaller paid staff relative to the size of the sub-project. 
Overall Size of Operation 
Overall size of the BRAC operation is indicated by the total annual non-
capi tal expenditure during the financial year 1975-76. The total came to 
approximately 4.9 million Taka with t:r.e following breakdown: 




Shaturia Youth Project 
Gonokendro (monthly publication) 
Materials Development Unit 
Research and Evaluation 
Mothers' Club Development 
Training Program 
Total 
The capital assets of BRAC in early 1976 were valued 
1.8 million Taka, divided equally between fixed assets in 
(on the project sites and land purchased for the training 
BRAC head office and the BRAC printing plant) and movable 
tal assets in 1976 included the following: 
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l 836 000 
The above figures do not include approximately 400,000 taka spent toward 
site preparation and construction of the training center and the printing 
press building in 1976. BRAC also received shipment of the printing plant 
equipment worth US$117,000 in 1976 which was still to be installed. 
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Dependence on External Sources 
BRAC--of which the staff, management and leadership are wholly indi-
genous--is totally dependent on external support for both the operational 
expenses of all of the project activities and for building up the capital 
assets. The organization, as we have noted, originated as an instrument for 
distributing relief supplies provided by private relief organizations from 
abroad; but as its role changed into that of a rural development agency--
with sympathetic backing and encouragement of the donors who originally 
supplied the relief materials--BRAC remained dependent on the outside donors 
for carrying out the new development-oriented activities. 
BRAC has succeeded in attracting the support and assistance of a large 
number of external assistance agencies of different types which include 
secular philanthropy, religious charity, foundations, international agencies, 
and government aid agencies. The most consistent and the largest donors have 
been the different branches of Oxfam in U.K., USA, and Canada. The religious 
charities include Novib of Holland and Bread for the World of Germany. Inter 
Pares of Canada, a secular philanthropy, has also provided funds. The Cana-
dian International Development Agency (CIDA) has given support towards estab-
lishing the printing press. United Nations Children's Fund has financed the 
publication of the ironthly Gonokendro. The Ford Foundation has given a grant 
for carrying out a research and evaluation project. 
Overall Cost Feasibility 
The cost of the second phase of Sulla, as we have noted, was about Tk 4 
million over three years; or about Tk 11 per capita per year for the 120,000 
people in the project area. The budgets of Sulla Phase III and the Manikganj 
project are of the same order of magnitude (Tk 6 million and Tk 4 million 
respectively over ~~ree years with 100,000 people in the BRAC project area of 
Manikganj thana) . 
The absolute per capita amount of money spent in the projects, given 
their scope and objectives, is obviously small. It may be argued that the 
project activities do not directly benefit the total population of the res-
pective areas and, therefore, the denominator in the calculation of per 
capita cost should not be the total population of the area. On the other 
hand, the same argument is applicable to most rural development prograrr£ in-
cludi.ng the government ones. By way of comparison, it may be noted that per 
capita government expenditure for the whole country in 1975-76 for health and 
family planning was Tk 10.l Since then, the government budget, particularly 
for family planning, has been boosted substantially by external assistance. 
The proposed population control and family planning bucget of the government 
for a two-year plan covering 1978-79 and 1979-80 announced in September 1977 
1 However, most of this amount was spent for curative services and medical 
facilities in the urban areas. See Oscar Gish, "The Development of Health 
Services in Bangladesh," Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex, February 1976. 
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is Tk 3,040 million or about Tk 20 per capita per year. BRAC activities 
cannot be seen as supplanting government agencies and services, but BRAC 
has attempted to fill critical gaps in rural services and institutional 
development at costs that appear to compare favorably with the costs of 
government programs. 
It has been noted in chapter 7 that the organizational approach en-
visaged for primary health care including family planning, if implemented 
successfully, will permit the health care program to be self-financed to 
the extent of two-thirds of the cost at the community level. The remain-
ing one-third (about Tk 6) needed from extra-community sources is well 
within the range of the growing per capita health and family planning 
expenditure of the government, if the government funds are redirected to-
wards the provision of primary health care in the rural areas. 
Mobilization of financial, material, and human resources from the 
communities for community programs is a principle to which BRAC has been 
attaching increasing importance and which it has been attempting to ap~ly 
with vigor in the newer projects as the discussion of the institutional 
structures in chapter 7 shows. It is, however, not BRAC's premise that 
rural people living in absolute poverty can lift themselves up from their 
condition by their own bootstraps without substantial assistance from out-
side the rural community. 
Future Outlook 
What is the future resource outlook for BRAC? Is BRAC to be perrnan-
enly dependent on external sources of support for carrying out its develop-
ment activities? 
It has been noted that in the Sulla II health care program BRAC has 
recovered about half of the cost of drugs--the major cost component of 
health care--through the insurance scheme. The goal for the third phase 
of Sulla is to recover the total drug cost by improving the coverage and 
operation of the insurance scheme. The Manikganj project has a similar 
eventual objective. 
As the third phase plans of the Sulla Project indicate, it is BRAC's 
expectation in each project area to develop the local institutional struc-
tures to a level that will enable BRAC to withdraw its own personnel from 
the project, letting the local institutions manage the development and 
service activities with their own resources and such government and out-
side subsidies as they can attract on their own. The problems and prospects 
of realizing this outcome are discussed in other parts of this paper. 
Another important step taken by BRAC is to build an accumulation of 
capital assets that will provide a core of permanent financial support. To 
this end a relatively large printing press is being set up at a total cost 
of approximately US$170,000 (site, plant and machinery), which will serve 
BRAC's own printing and publishing needs and is expected to generate an an-
nual net earning of Tk 1 million for BRAC. This site will also house BRAC's 
head offices, effecting substantial savings in costly rentals. 
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With the establishment of the new Training and Resource Centre f acili-
ties outside Dacca, including residential accorrnnodation for trainees, the 
center is expected to devote at least one-half of the training activities to 
serving other organizations in Bangladesh and to exact appropriate fees for 
these services. 
If these expectations are fulfilled, it will mean that BRAC will be able 
to maintain from its own resources its organizational existence, support a 
core of permanent professional staff, and carry on essential follow-up of 
its earlier projects. This will be no small achievement. However, it also 
means that for undertaking new development projects or extending the scope 
of present activities geographically, BRAC will have to depend on external 
sources of support. 
This situation does not necessarily portend a bleak future for BRAC. If 
philanthropic assistance from the industrial countries to the poor nations 
continues at least at the present level and if BRAC continues to prove it-
self to be a relatively effective voluntary agency capable of making good use 
of resources entrusted to it, it should not have any great difficulty in at-
tracting sufficient financial support. 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS 
The purpose of our review and analysis of the BRAC rural development 
activities is to draw appropriate conclusions and lessons about the impor-
tant questions that inevitably arise in the course of designing and imple-
menting programs to serve the rural poor. As a rural development program 
focusing on the disadvantaged groups in the rural population, BRAC's own 
efforts to tackle the problems of planning and managing a multifaceted pro-
gram are expected both to clarify the nature of the issues relating to 
these programs and to indicate the approaches to resolving the issues. 
The questions that prompted this case study and others in the ICED 
series, we might recall, are the following: 
How can the individual and fragmented activities be integrated into 
a concerted development process aimed at improving the life of 
rural families? 
How can the usual "top-down" approach of rural programs be re-
versed and how can the rural people and communities effectively 
participate in the programs? 
How can the educational processes be effectively used to improve 
the performance of the development programs and to enhance inte-
gration and community participation? 
How can the development programs extend their reach and benefits 
to the poor and the underprivileged segments of rural communities? 
How can voluntary organizations best utilize their unique advan-
tages and become the precursors and demonstrators of new approach-
es for larger public programs? 
In attempting to arrive at answers to these questions, one cannot help 
asking what difference the BRAC efforts have made to the life of the people 
in the project area. As the preceding secticns of this report must have in-
dicated, this straightforward question does not have a simple answer because 
the BRAC undertaking is complex, its goals are diverse in scope and quality, 
it has been in existence for a relatively short time, and the one-to-three-
year time-scale of the financial donors supporting specific project activities 
does not provide an adequate basis for judging the impact of the program. One 
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may, however, appropriately point to the factual evidences relating to BRAC 
performance in the Sulla Project area where BRAC has functioned the longest 
and where, at the time of this writing, one develoµnent phase has been con-
cluded and another phase is well underway. The important indicators of BRAC 
performance during the three years of the second phase in Sulla are noted 
below. 
At the cost of a major share of the total financial resources and over 
one-half of the manpower in the project area, the health and family planning 
program achieved the participation of approximately 15,000 residents (out of 
a total of over 120,000) in the health insurance scheme and reached a level 
of about 2,000 (out of an estimated potential number of 20,000) married wo-
men of child-bearing age as acceptors of a family planning method. The tang-
ible impact of this service coverage after three years of operation in terms 
of health and family planning status of the population appears to be marginal. 
Although pre-project benchmark data were not available for comparison, statis-
tical evidences of mortality and morbidity for mid-1975 and derrographic infor-
mation for early 1976 do not suggest a significant improvement when these in-
dicators are compared with national statistics. Obvicusly, the health care 
program has not had the opportunity by 1976 to provide a sufficiently wide-
spread, sustained, and intensive service to make a dent on the health situa-
tion. Similarly, the cumulative acceptor figure in the family planning pro-
gram is not large enough or does not represent a retention pattern of suffi-
cient duration (most being acceptors for less than a year) to mark an impact 
on the demographic situation. 
About 2,600 project area residents participated in the functional educa-
tion program and about one-half of this number is reported to have completed 
the lessons. We arE not sure, however, what the completion of the course 
means in terms of new skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Most of the complet-
ers do not appear to have acquired a usable level of reading and writing skills, 
nor is there evidence (as far as the implementation of the program in Sulla 
Phase II is concerned) that any systematic effort was made to help the learners 
make the connection between the lessons and individual and collective self-
help projects. Methodology and content of the functional education program 
was a distinct improvement over the traditional adult literacy efforts, but 
during Phase II of Sulla an effective approach was yet to be developed of mak-
ing functional education truly functional, that is of its having a significant 
bearing on the current circumstances and future life prospects of the partici-
pants. 
The agricultural promotion activities benefited less than 1,000 households, 
including 600 farmers in the "support blocks" and 300 landless laborers, al-
though the extent of improvement in the economic status of these households 
was not clear from available information. Another 10,000 families were report-
ed to have benefited from the distribution of vegetable seeds and fruit plants 
and saplings. 
The effort to help improve the status of women through conventional skill 
training did not succeed and was abandoned in favor of more systematically or-
ganized collective economic and self-help projects through cooperatives and 
joint savings. It was possible to organize only a small number of such group 




formation of more traditional farrrers' cooperatives and assisted in improving 
the performance of the existing ones. BRAC's efforts created a finn base for 
the extension of the government's Integrated Rural Developrrent Program (center-
ed on a two-tier structure of primary cooperatives and a central association 
of the primary societies) to the project area. The cooperatives facilitated 
the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs for the members; however, 
the total number of beneficiaries was small and thf: cooperative structure was 
yet to take a firm root, expand its coverage, and become the main instrument 
for agricultural and rural transfonnation that it was intended to be. 
It should be noted along with this catalog of achievements and nonachieve-
ments that the total time-span of the second phase of Sulla was about three 
years (and considerably less for some of the cc.mponent activities), the total 
financial resources committed were less than Tk 4 million, and the involved 
BRAC staff comprised less than 100 young people--most without any professional 
expertise or high level training. 
The most enduring achievement of the Sulla project so far is to be found, 
not in the quantitative record of performance of the sectoral activities, but 
rather in the fact that it brought to the surface various problems of develop-
ment programs intended to help the rural poor, established a base of institu-
tional structures and experienced personnel, and pointed the direction to be 
taken in reshaping and reorienting the program during the third phase of Sulla 
and in other new projects. The questions raised above can be fruitfully ex-
plored if we look at the BRAC experience in this light--as a continuous striv-
ing towards the development of a viable integrated approach for helping the 
needy and disadvantaged to help themselves through collective efforts. 
The Integrated Development Approach 
BRAC recognized the need and significance of an integrated approach and 
in pursuing this approach put differe~t rural development components together 
in the Sulla Project. However, the resources and manpower committed to the 
project did not permit a sufficient participation of the people in the project 
area needing the various services offered by the project. The program manage-
ment also did not provide for the mutual linkages and reinforcement of the 
different program activities essential for an integrated approach. The result 
was a series of parallel sectoral activities with only incidental overlap to 
the beneficiaries. 
The program approach taken was an identification of certain general needs 
of the population and an attempt to meet them with a number of sectoral acti-
vities devised by the prevalent conventional wisdom about what constituted a 
rural development program. The needs that were identified (such as basic health 
care, agricultural development, functional educatio~, cooperatives and so on) 
were genuine enough in a general sense, and a certain number of the project 
population undoubtedly benefited from the services provided; but, as we have 
seen, the program after three years of operation of its developmental phase has 
not brought about a major improvement in the quality of life of a significant 
proportion of the population--least of all, in the life of the poorest groups. 
Evidently the project activities needed to be tailored specifically to the 
needs of specific groups (especially if the purpose was to help the economic-
ally weaker and the disadvantaged sections of the community) but also made 
flexible enough in different combinations of components for a variety of groups. 
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Apparently the assumpticn behind the sectoral activities undertaken was 
that the individual participant, in assimilating their separate benefits 
would somehow effect an integration of them in terms of his own plan for 
managing his resources and improving his socioeconomic situation. This 
assumption was probably valid for those who were economically and socially 
in a relatively advantageous po~ition. The sectoral approach (in contrast 
to the "people approach") inevitably gravitated towards a norm of opera-
tional goals and patterns that benefited the easily reachable and the rel-
atively better-off at the cost of the disadvantaged. 
In operational terms, a shift of emphasis from separate sectoral acti-
vities to an integrated "people" approach means that different relatively 
homogenous socioeconomic groups have to be identified and organizational 
structures developed accordingly. This is the logical approach when the 
goal is to help the disadvantaged groups rather than to offer a series of 
services for the benefit of the gen€ral public. This is the approach to-
wards which BRAC appears to have moved for the third phase of the Sulla 
Project and for other new projects. 
Integrated rural development (in contrast to the parallel functioning 
of sectoral activities in the same geographical location or the coordina-
tion of different sectoral activities through various administrative 
devices) requires a focus on the participant population--their circum-
stances, their own perception of their critical needs, and their preference 
and values. The implication of this premise for national rural development 
efforts is that, instead of attempting to reach the rural population with 
vertical sectoral programs, a means must be found to form local organiza-
tions of homogeneous interest groups and make them serve as the instrument 
for integrating and managing the sectoral activities of the beneficiary 
population. A strong local government structure, adequately representa-
tive of the total rural population, can become a mechanism for coordination 
among the network of local organizations and institutions and for mediation 
between the local groups and the higher tiers of government agencies at the 
regional and national levels. 
Since health care and family planning have been implemented in BRAC vir-
tually as one sub-program, a question of particular interest is how this 
integration has affected the performance of both health care and family plan-
ning activities. One may also ask what the consequences might be for health 
care and family planning performance under a more effective overall integra-
tion of the different components of BRAC. 
We have to admit that a definitive and totally unequivocal conclusion in 
this regard cannot be drawn from the BRAC experience. BRAC obtained certain 
results by organizing the health care and family planning services in a par-
ticular way, important features of which were the following: (a) the medical 
and clinical backup of the family planning services was provided by the health 
care staff and facilities; (b) at the field level, special family planning 
workers were used for contact with clients and distribution of contraceptives 
but they were under the direct and close supervision of th~ paramedics who 
also played an important motivational role regarding family planning; and 
(c) the local people perceived the two activities as related--BRAC's medical 
services being the most well-known and widespread of all BRAC activities--
and knew that for any medical problem arising from the acceptance of family 
planning, they could get help from BRAC medical service. 
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We do not know what the results would be if a family planning program were 
not backed by the health service, not identified with a multifaceted rural de-
velopment program, and only had community-based field agents with supervision 
and backstopping provided by the family planning organization itself. The gov-
ernment family planning program is run along this line (though, in principle, 
maternity and child health care is regarded as a part of the family planning 
program), and its performance so far compares less than favorably with the BRAC 
program. But because of its many management and logistical problems, the govern-
ment program, at least at the present time, is not a good example of a "single-
purpose" family planning program and does not provide a good basis for comparison. 
While a "proof" cannot be offered on the basis of BRAC experience in favor 
of or against a combined health and family planning program or a more integrated 
approach, a number of pertinent factors must be taken into account in consider-
ing the issue. First, given the evidence regarding prenatal deaths of women and 
high postnatal infant and children's mortality, a high rate of births per child-
bearing age women,and a large family size are themselves serious health problems 
as far as the mothers and children are concerned. Second, it imposes an unafford-
able and unnecessary economic burden on poor countries to duplicate the technical 
and professional support manpower and support facilities for both family planning 
and primary health care. Third, the problem of establishing credibility and in-
spiring confidence about the family planning program is more easily overcome when 
it is offered in conjunction with activities that meet the perceived needs about 
health problems. 
The basic question, however, is not one of the technical efficiency of the 
single-purpose approach (on which ground alone the case for it is argued), but 
of values regarding all development efforts--whether the concern is about meet-
ing certain sectoral quantitative targets or improving the welfare of people. 
The question needs to be posed in this stark form to get at the heart of the 
integration issue, and it needs to be underscored that reduction of population 
growth and gaining acceptance of the norm of a small family size are not ends 
in themselves. (It is, by no means, certain that even on technical efficiency 
grounds the single-purpose approach is superior.) 
In a similar vein, it may be argued that health and family planning efforts 
will be better accepted, will have a more sustained impact, and will achieve 
goals in line with the preference and the value system of the beneficiary popu-
lation if implementation of these efforts is made a component of the collective 
and organized self-help activities that improve the socioeconomic situation of 
homogeneous rural interest groups. In other words, the health care and family 
planning program is likely to be more effective if the rural communities them-
selves can take charge of planning and managing the delivery end of the services, 
.!!:!_ the context Qf tackling othe!_ survival and development problems, with appro-
priate technical assistance and resource support from the higher tiers of govern-
ment and other external sources. 
Connnunity Participation 
Despite the intentions and efforts behind the functional education program 
and the formation of cooperatives, community participation was not a strong 
feature of the early phase of BRAC. The sectoral approach it adopted and the 
heavy reliance on its own relatively large field organization for management 
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and implementation of the sectoral activities undermined the principles of 
community participation. 
Couanunity participation has many dimensions whjch, in the context of 
a program to help the disadvantaged sections of the rural community, might 
well include the following: (a) organizing services in the couanunity on a 
connnunity basis and making the services widely and easily accessible; (b) 
contribution by the cotr111unity to the operation and maintenance of the ser-
vices; (c) participation of the community in planning and management of the 
services within the community; (d) community input in overall strategies, 
policies, and work plan of the development program transcending individual 
communities; and (e) overcoming factionalism and interest conflicts in the 
community to achieve broad-based participation, particularly of the disad-
vantaged groups. 
Participation of the beneficiary population in a development program 
along these dimensions is essentially a problem of building local organi-
zations and institutional structures in such a way that participation is 
a significant and meaningful contribution rather than a token gesture. 
This in turn raises the problems of rationale for forming viable local 
organizations, the best approcr to l'OC>bilizing people for collective ac-
tion and creating a "consciousness" about collective or class identity 
and class interests, and the best means for building the necessary corrr 
petence and capacity for collective action. 
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In rural societies characterized by peasant farming and large segments 
of landless and other disadvantaged groups, creation of participatory in-
stitutions and promotion of the participatory process require basic changes 
in the overall configuration of the intergroup social and economic relation-
ships. For instance, the participatory institutions must overcome the en-
trenched factionalism in village communities that are nurtured by powerful 
and influential families and groups; break the semi-feudal patron-client 
bondage; and give the disadvantaged groups the self-confidence, hope, and 
courage that will convince them of their collective strength. 
There is need for a clear conceptualization of the participatory pro-
cess and its goals in a given rural context. A strategy for identifying 
and forming the homogmeous interest groups must be determined, activities 
must be devised and implemented that are within group capacity but also 
strike at the root of their subjugation and deprivation. The educational 
process becomes a central element in this strategy. 
Ensuring participation in all its dimensions, as the evolution of the 
Sulla Project and the plans for other new projects indicate, calls for a 
lessening of emphasis on the sectoral approach and building an organizational 
structure that, instead of managing the program for the beneficiary population, 
permits the growth of the locr.l groups towards greater self-reliance and auto-
nomy. As we have noted earlier, the sectoral approach and an organizational 
nx>del that inhibits popular control of the development program tend to go 
hand-in-hand; conversely, effective integration and meaningful participation 
are like two sides of the same coin. 
Finally, the efforts to proroote participation can succeed only with 
unambigious connnitment on the part of thE development agency, whether a 
voluntary organization or a government department, to serve the interests 
100. BRAC 
of the disadvantaged groups--the landless farm workers, women from poor families, 
young people, small farmers, and rural artisans struggling to eke out a living 
from traditional occupations. 
Education 
BRAG's program approach is distinguished by the systematic use of varied 
educational approaches in support of its objectives. Three major categories 
of educational activities in BRAG are: (a) programs for the beneficiary pop-
ulation with the aim of raising their levels of awareness and understanding 
and making them better participants in the development activities, such as 
functional education and village workshops; (b) devices that develop the spe-
cial skills and competence of specialized program workers, such as paramedics, 
village health auxiliaries, family planning workers, cooperative accountants, 
instructors for poultry raising, functional education teachers, and so on; and 
(c) training for general BRAC field workers and potential youth group organizers. 
Given the overall goals of supporting self-sustaining development and help-
ing the rural poor, it was no surprise that the conventional literacy program 
launched by BRAC did not serve its purpose. The program was quickly abandoned 
and a new functional education approach was introduced. The new program was 
marked by substantial innovation in methodology, content material, and relevance 
to the learner's life. Apparently, even this, a series of prestructured lessons 
taught through a relatively standardized pedagogical approach to a group formed 
without any specific rationale, was not adequately functional as far as the life 
of most of the learners was concerned. BRAC recognized that the functional edu-
cation learning groups had to be formed with people who had common socioeconomic 
interests and that the educational program must be linked more directly and in-
timately with collective development action. This is the direction that had been 
taken by the functional education activities in the newer BRAC projects. "Con-
sciousness raising" and engaging in collective self-help action had gained pre-
cedence over the traditional goals of acquiring literacy and numeracy skills, 
although these were not seen as alternatives. Village workshops introduced in 
Sulla could be described as a form of relatively unstructured functional educa-
tion without the literacy and numeracy content and reflected a concern about 
making the educational program an active instrument for promoting development 
action. 
The evolution of the functional education program in BRAC suggests that 
the lessons and the methodology of the functional education course cannot be 
inserted into any situation and expected to promote development, unless the 
particular situation permits the formation of relatively homogeneous interest 
groups and unless the atmosphere exists for using the educational program to 
plan and initiate collective self-help activities. 
In the training of health workers and other field-level specialized per-
sonnel, BRAG evolved a low-cost but effective formula by shunning the trap-
pings of such conventional training programs as classroom lectures, theoretical 
studies, highly structured syllabuses, full-time professional trainers, and 
special training facilities. It relied on supervised apprenticeship in real-
life work situations followed by adequate technical support when the apprentices 
took independent responsibilities. BRAC also demonstrated that with continuous 
technical backup, people of both sexes, varied socioeconomic background, and 
little or no formal education could be entrusted with specialized development 
functions. Even with the "informal" training approach, a large variety of com-
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petence and skills (such as those of paramedics, shevikas, and LFPOs) could 
be differentiated and developed as demanded by the circumstances. 
It might be noted that paramedics, with their short informal training, 
would probably not be recognized as "paraprofessionals" by government stan-
dards, although even they could not be afforded at the base of the service 
delivery system--hence anothE:r layer of auxiliaries, the shevikas. This 
raises questions about the manpower policies and training requirements of 
government programs that raise public costs and make services out of the 
reach of the rural people. An alternative model of manpower development 
and utilization deserves serious consideration and trial, one that relies 
on practical apprenticeship and relatively intensive technical supervision 
as the basic approach for all field level workers of development services. 
For the improverrent of skills and r.ompetence of general field level 
workers BRAC has moved from an informal on-the-job learning approach to 
a more systematic training program. This appears to be in part the result 
of the accumulated BRAC experience in the field that has led to the identi-
fication of certain skills and knowledge that need to be developed by all 
field workers and for whic~ a training process may be devised. The empha-
sis on a special training program also reflects a shift in the program 
approach away from a large BRAC field organization to a greater reliance 
on the leaders of local organizations. The local group leaders are not 
full-time BRAC workers and, unlike BRAC's own full-time field agents, are 
not under the continuous supervision and guidance of BRAC personnel. 
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It is evident that the rural development approach of BRAC requires the 
field workers--whether full~time members of BRAC staff or members of local 
organizations--to acquire basic skills and understand the communication 
process, group dynamics, survey and analysis of the local socioeconomic 
situation, planning group projects, following through the implementation 
steps of a plan and assessing results, and the use of the functional edu-
cation approach for initiating and organizing collective self-help efforts. 
Programs that are relatively large in size or are expanding to new geo-
graphical areas and programs that are concerned with developing local leader-
ship and agents of change cannot entirely rely on an informal apprenticeship 
approach. A more systematic and somewhat institutionalized training process 
becomes inevitable. Any application of the BRAC program strategies in gov-
ernment programs is hardly possible without a well-organized training program 
for workers. 
What needs to be watched is that the training program, with special 
physical facilities and a full-time staff, does not become an artificially 
contrived and sterile process removed from the realities that the field 
workers would face in the villages. As for the skills and understanding 
required to be developed by field workers, institutionalized training can-
not be seen as a full substitute for learning from practical apprentice-
ship and experience. The training program can at best complement such 
learning or prepare the new field workers to benefit more fully from on-
the-job experience. The training programs, therefore, are likely to be 
effective only under certain conditions: if the :inherent limitations of the 
structured training courses are recognized, a balance is maintained between 
institutionalized training and the practical apprenticeship approach, and a 
recurrent approach is followed through short intermittent courses permitting 
i 
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the field workers to come back periodically to the training center and the 
trainers to rotate between field work and training. In such a scheme, the 
training interlude can be the occasion to analyze the collective experience 
of the field workers, to examine the applicability of general principles in 
specific situations, and to devise new solutions for specific problems. 
If the training program for general field workers--as opposed to specific 
training for technical skills such as maintaining the books of the cooperative 
society or artificial insemination of cattle--is seen as an integral and inter-
acting element of a development program, it would be difficult to offer "pre-
packaged" courses for the workers of different organizations with varying ob-
jectives and philosophic rationale. There are, of course, certain technical 
contents in training "modules" on communication or group dynamics that may be 
helpful for all rural development workers. However, as in the case of func-
tional education, the effectiveness of the training of field workers is bound 
to be minimized when training as a recurrent process is not linked directly 
with the development actions in which the field workers are engaged. 
Reaching the Poorest 
Poverty, whether defined in terms of a minimum per capita income or access 
to a set of basic goods and services, is pervasive in rural Bangladesh. One-
half to three-quarters of the rural population, depending on the estimate of in-
come or consumption level considered necessary to rise above the poverty line, 
live in poverty. But among the poor, some are poorer than others. The hardest 
hit groups, living virtually on the fringe of physical survival, are the fami-
lies of the landless farm laborers, the destitute women without able-bodied 
males in the family, and members of certain traditional artisan castes (such 
as potters, weavers, cobblers) for whom the economic base of the occupation has 
eroded because of problems of market, raw materials, and competition from industry. 
Despite the avowed concern for the poorest, in the early phase of Sulla 
there seems to have been insufficient attention to the differentiation of the 
relative levels of poverty among the total population; the varying socio-
economic circumstances of such groups as the landless laborers, the destitute 
women, and the unemployed artisans; and the need for different program strate-
gies for improving their situation. In the later phase of Sulla and in the new 
project activities of BRAC, there is a much greater awareness of the relative 
levels of deprivation among the poor and the need for a sharper focus on the 
most deprived groups as reflected in the emphasis on mobilizing functional in-
terest groups for collective self-help activities. 
Available evidence, as we have noted earlier, shows that the general develop-
ment services of BRAC--health care, family planning and functional education--as 
sectoral activities (and not integrated with the, collective self-help projects of 
homogeneous interest r.roups) have benefited the relatively better-off sections of 
the rural population more than the poorest. The agricultural support activities 
and the promotion of farmers' cooperatives, for inherent reasons, have also helped 
the less poor among the rural population. 
Given the fact that cultivable land, the most important productive resource 
in the rural areas, is owned and controlled by a relatively small minority that 
also enjoys the social, economic, and political power derived from this control, 
it is inevitable that the benefits of any general developmert program will be 





centrate the program efforts on the specific needs of the poorest. A general 
development program for improving agricultural production and providing essen-
tial social services can benefit the total rural community only if a large 
section of the community is not left out of the control and utilization of the 
productive resources of the community. This apparertly has been recognized by 
BRAC, and its project activities have shifted towards more selective activities 
focusing on the rrcst disadvantaged and deprived groups of the rural population. 
The selective focus on the poorest groups has its inherent limitations as 
long as this happens in the context of existing production and power relation-
ships in the rural community. It will take hard work and imaginative approaches 
to make the poorest groups participants and beneficiaries of the social services 
such as health care, family planning and education. But with the scarce produc-
tive resources (land being controlled by a section of the community and econo-
mic opportunities in general being limited), it is difficult to visualize more 
than marginal improvement in the economic situation of the most deprived groups. 
Insignificant progress on the economic front, in turn, is likely to undermine 
the efforts to widen participation in the social services. This is the funda-
mental reality that BRAC efforts bring to the surface and has to be faced by 
all rural development agencies and the national policymakers. 
Special Role of Voluntary Organizations 
Small-scale development programs managed by voluntary organizations have 
well recognized advantages of flexibility and freedom from bureaucracy that 
large public programs normally do not enjoy. Voluntary organizations are also 
able to select the scope of their activities, the geographical locations for 
the programs, and their participants to a much greater extent than public pro-
grams. Voluntary agencies also tend to attract idealistic and well-motivated 
people as paid and unpaid workers in their development activities. All of 
these favorable factors make it possible for voluntary programs to vary pro-
gram approaches for specific locations and clienteles within the same project, 
modify initial plans in the light of experience, and take quick policy deci-
sions when necessary. The evolution of BRAC's program approach from relatively 
conventional sectoral activities to a development approach concentrating on the 
promotion of local self-help groups on thE basis of the early Sulla experience 
is a demonstration of the special strength of the voluntary programs. This 
change came about without the fanfare of formal evaluation studies or review 
missions of international experts--not that systematic evaluation of projects 
is unnecessary. 
The unique characteristics of the small-scale nongovernment programs make 
them good instruments for testing and developing innovative ideas and approaches 
that may be difficult to try within the constraints of public programs. Many 
program ideas already applied in the various sub-projects of the multifaceted 
BRAC program suggest themselves as good candidates for testing for their poten-
tial adoption or adaptation into government programs on a large scale. Of 
course, apart from their inevitable bureaucratic tendencies, the government 
programs do not enjoy the flexibility of the voluntary organizations; there-
fore, straight transplantation of certain elements of the voluntary program 
into the government program is almost never advisable. 
A practical way of transferring lessons learned in voluntary programs 
to government programs would be for the government and the voluntary organ-
ization to embark on a kind of "joint venture" in the shape of pilot 
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projects in one or more specific locations. 
Once the viability of an approach is derronstrated in small-scale programs 
and some basic criteria of viability and feasibility (such as compatibility of 
objectives between the private program and a nationzl program) for a large-
scale expansion appear likely to be met, a pilot phase can be initiated on 
the basis of close collaboration between the government and the voluntary 
organization in a limited area {preferably in a standard territorial unit 
of administration, such as a tharca). The objective of such a venture would 
be two-fold: first, to test and develop the specific adaptations and modi-
fications of the approach of the small program inevitably needed for a 
national and public program; and secon~, to work out the operational steps 
for moving beyond the pilot phase and to use the pilot phase for training and 
orientation of the government functionaries in anticipation of further expan-
sion of the approach. The government, obviously, has to be enthusiastically 
cormnitted to giving the pilot project a fair trial and to following it up ap-
propriately. The voluntary organizatior, on its part, should be appreciative 
of the problems of nationa] programs and large bureaucracies and be willing to 
be flexible without sacrificing the essence of its own approach. 
Besides being the testing grounc for innovative techniques in integrated 
rural development, an equally significant potential role of voluntary organi-
zations is that of an institutional mechanism complementary to the local gov-
ernment structure. The government rural development approach in Bangladesh, 
represented by the Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP), visualizes a 
strong thana-level development guidance and coordination body composed of 
elected representatives and government personnel as the means for decentral-
izing development responsibilities. As we have noted, it is also BRAC's ex-
pectation that a thana-level apex organization representing various primary 
cooperatives and organizations in the villages will eventually take over the 
support and coordination of local development projects and services, permit-
ting BRAC to dismantle its own field organjzation. Whether this institutional 
design for rural development will be effectively established and whether it 
will serve the interests of all the rural people including the poorest in-
stead of being captured by the powerful minority will depend on the success 
of the efforts to mobilize and organize the local interest groups of the 
deprived and the disadvantaged. 
If BRAC, through its projects for "conscientizing" and generating homo-
geneous interest groups of the poor for collective self-help activities, can 
demonstrate a feasible approach for organizing the poor into constituent pri-
mary interest groups (and, to a degree, a countervailing political force) for 
the local government and local development coordination body, it will be a 
far-reaching contribution to building an effective rural development strategy. 
The mobilization of the poor for self-help also opens up the possibility of 
conflicts between the organized poor and others who would want to retain their 
control over the local institutions. The rights and interests of the poor ma-
jority cannot be safeguarded without facing this possibility. 
LESSON 2 
IDENTIFYING DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS 
Learning Objectives 
The participants will: 
1. Understand more thoroughly issues surrounding rural 
development through discussion of the BRAC case study. 
2. Have better understanding of the history of rural development. 
3. Recognize some important issures of problem identification in 
specific situations. 
Activities 
1. Discussion of BRAC case. (30 min) 
a) What were the most important issues discussed in the 
case? 
b) How did the perspective of the author affect the kind of 
information presented in the case? 
c) Are there other factors and considerations ommitted in 
the case presentation? 
2. Discussion of writing assignments. (30 min) 
a) What was the most difficult/easiest part of the 
assignment? 
b) How did you feel when you were doing the assignment? 
c) How would you improve the assignment if at all? 
3. Lecturette-history of rural development since WWII. (20 min) 
a) Context of development before WWII. 
b) Trends in development of theories and their ramifications 
to rural development. 
c) Current trends in rural development. 
4. Break (10 min) 
5. Simulation in problem identification. (1 hour) 
a) Outsider from class will enter and inform class that they 
have been chosen by an outside agency to receive funding for 
a project to benefit their community. S/he would like for 
them to submit a preliminary proposal on what they will do 
with the $100 dollars, the objectives they will achieve, 
exactly how the money will be spent, and how they will 
evaluate their success. The deadline for budget allocations 
for projects of this agency is in one hour so he will return 
to receive the proposal then. The rules overning the funds 
are that they may only be used to benefit their community as 
a whole, that they cannot divide the funds among themselves 
and that they must account for how the funds will be spent. 
I' i ~~ 
6. Process consultation (20 min) 
a) discussion on simualtion and issues that arose. 
7. Handout Homework number 2 - Observing Others. (10 min) 
Materials required 
1. Water and cups. 
2. $100 dollars cash. 




1. Oliver, Education and Community, pp.83-123. 
2. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, pp. 1-37. 
3. Vogeler, Dialectics of Third World Development, pp.3-25. 
4. Moris, chapter 3, pp.31-46. 
5. ·Shah, "The Story of Fire." 
2. Write: 
In at least two pages describe what you might do to increase 
the learning capacity of the people involved in your rural 
development problem/issue/topic. 
Guiding questions you might wish to consider: 
1. How would the aspects of human nature outlined by 
Oliver affect your actions? 
2. What factors would Rogers deem essential in 
determining your strategy? 
3. Revise your writing from homework number 1 if you need to. 
Make any ammendments to your problem, This is the last 
opportunity you will have to change your mind. After this the 
commitment has been made and you must see the development process 
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The Potentialities of Human Nature 
In this book we are attempting to present a way of looking at 
the human species which will emphasize criteria for judging quality 
of life and the evolutionary limitations placed on man in his quest 
for a positive life. The most basic source of these limitations is in 
man's nature itself. In a very direct way man's potentialities are lim-
ited by the physical equipment that has evolved with him over the 
millions of years life has been transforming itself on this planet. In a 
more obvious way this equipment includes prehensile forelimbs, bi-
pedalism, and a highly differentiated central nervous system which is 
capable of complex information storage and problem-solving. In a 
somewhat less obvious way, man is a species with a large number of 
social capacities and tendencies, some of which he shares with his 
primate neighbors: temporal biological rhythms, the capacity and 
need for physical and emotional attachments, the tendency to create 
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terms of ingroup-amity-outgroup-enmity, and the need to legitimate 
social patterns with cultural rules overtly expressed in cognitive state-
ments and symbolic gesture and celebration. 
To move directly from statements about human nature-tend-
encies, capacities, instincts, or the like-to supporting evidence, illus-
trations, or social implications short circuits a number of significant 
and clarifying analytic categories. We think that man's nature-both 
its limits and flexibilities-is expressed in any setting through four 
channels or subsystems: environment, culture, social structure, and 
personality (see figure 4.1). 
These channels suggest a limited set of structured potentials 
through which the full range of human possibilities can be described. 
It assumes, for example, that male-female dyads, nuclear or restricted 
families, full or extended families, bands or villages are natural hu-
man social forms each of which has special limiting characteristics. It 
is possible to imagine social forms in which males and females relate 
promiscuously, or adults and young people relate only casually and 
randomly, or adolescent females direct and control all others. It hap-
pens, however, that these structures rarely occur. 
We assume that the same kinds of limited possibilities occur for 
personality, culture, and environment. Regarding personality, for 
example, Fromm says: 
Freud's clinical descriptions of the oral-receptive, oral-exploitative, and anal 
character seem to us essentially correct and confirmed by experiences in the 
analysis of individuals, as well as analytical research into the character structure 
of groups. (Fromm and Maccoby 1970, p. 13) 
Freud's classification refers, of course, to only one complex dimen-
sion of human personality. 
Below we shall suggest subsets within these channels. Concep-
tually it is important to understand that the channels are present and 
limiting because of the underlying characteristics of the species. If we 
hypothesize, for example, with Wallace (1970), that age and sex arc 
related to social hierarchy, we would expect to find this fact repre-
sented in social structures (families, communities); in culture (beliefs 
about who is in authority); in personality (some types would be pre-
disposed in voice, gesture, and manner to express dominant behavior; 
some types would be predisposed to express submissive behavior); as 
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to understand, as the above example suggests, that the channels 
through which human tendencies are expressed are interrelated-not 
independent. Social structures must take account of variations in 
personality; culture tends to reinforce social structure; human tech-
nology demands certain types of social structures, and so on. High 
quality of life presumably occurs only when the channels are related 
in complex ways, for example, when there are sufficiently varied 
social forms (including diverse and reciprocal social roles) to include 
the full range of human personality types; when the culture is loose 
enough to accommodate this diversity but defined enough to give 
direction and meaning to people's lives; when technology has created 
sufficient economic wherewithal to meet minimal human needs, but 
not impose overwhelming amounts of alienating machinery (e.g., fac-
tories, office buildings) on human lives. These distinctions are, of 
course, commonly made by social systems analysts. (See, for exam-
ple, Parsons 1971.) Parsons attempts to link subsystems through 
which human behavior is channeled with functional requirements of 
human societies. His classic set of analytic relationships is sum-
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Source: Adapted from Talcott Parsons, The System of Modem Societies (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 19 71 ) : pp. 6, 1 I. 
intrinsic relationship between specific functional requirements of a 
society-economics (adaptation), politics (decision making), ideology 
(belief and values)-and the societal subsystems discussed here. That 
is, we do not see human adaptation, for example, as intrinsically 
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linked or parallel with only the economic system (what we would 
call environment and technology). 
Environment and Technology 
A basic limiting factor in human society is the level of support 
offered by the environment and the extent to which environment has 
or can be adapted by technology for human survival and comfort. 
What man needs for survival is, of course, problematical, but there 
are obvious necessities: food, air, water, shelter, and usually external 
energy in the form of domestic animals, wind and water power, fossil 
fuels, etc. Beyond these environmental or material requirements, 
what man calls poverty is somewhat relative to what his neighbor 
has. It is clear, for example, that the early Eskimos lived on the mar-
gin of successful adaptation. Minor changes in environmental pres-
sures or technology might lead to extinction or to a serious depletion 
of the population. (Their loving abandonment of old people is 
legendary.) It is difficult to argue, however, that the Eskimo had a 
lower quality of life than, for example, Banfield's Italian peasant 
who probably had less environmental pressure (Banfield 1958). The 
peasant of Montegrano lives in a marginal environment. 
If all the measures that have been suggested here [for improving the standard of 
living] were pursued actively and effectively, there would be no dramatic im-
provement in the economic position of the village .... Under the best of circum-
stances, it will be a very long time before the people of Montegrano have enough 
to eat. (p. 166) 
But at least as important as the stark environmental pressures are the 
relative standards of the "good life" which the peasant has in his 
head. 
By the standards of the larger society, the peasant's work, food, and clothing all 
symbolize his degradation. It is on this account, as much as for biological 
reasons, that he finds them unsatisfying and even hateful. Italians attach great 
importance to being mannerly (civile); the peasant feels that he is the very oppo-
site: association with earth and animals, he thinks, has made him dirty and ani-
mal-like .... 
La miseria, it seems safe to conclude, arises as much or more from social as 
from biological deprivations. (p. 65) 
Technology is currently seen as the destiny and salvation of 
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man's ills, on the one hand, and the undermining of more primitive 
conditions for a decent and humane life on the other. There is little 
doubt that man has the capacity to create destructive, ugly, and de-
meaning technology, just as he has the capacity to create destructive 
culture or sadistic personality. Moving from intuitive quality-of-life 
judgments regarding environment and technology to systematic or 
persuasive criteria, however, is difficult. The Goodmans (1960, p. 
171) deal with this issue: 
SOME ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
MORAL SELECTION OF MACHINES 
I. Utility (functionalist beauty) 
2. Transparency of operation 
A. Repairability by the average well-educated person (freedom) 
B. Constructivist beauty 
3. Relative independence of machine from non-ubiquitous power 
4. Proportion between total effort and utility {neo-functionalist beauty) 
Mumford makes a similar search for standards by which to 
judge not only the quality but the limits of technology. He sees the 
positive limits in terms of what he calls "dynamic equilibrium." 
Dynamic equilibrium, not infinite progress, is the mark of the opening age: bal-
ance, not rapid one-sided advance: conservation, not reckless pillage. The parallel 
between neolithic and neotechnic times holds even here: for the main advances 
which were consolidated in neolithic times remained stable, with minor varia-
tions within the pattern, for between 2500 and 3500 years. Once we have gener-
ally reached a new technical plateau we may remain on that level with very 
minor ups and downs for thousands of years. What are the implications of this 
approaching equilibrium? 
First: equilibrium in the environment. This means first the restoration of 
the balance between man and nature. The conservation and restoration of soils, 
the re-growth wherever this is expedient and possible, of the forest cover to pro-
vide shelter for wild life and to maintain man's primitive background as a source 
of recreation, whose importance increases in proportion to the refinement of his 
cultural heritage .... 
Second, equilibrium in industry and agriculture .... 
This state of balance and equilibrium-regional, industrial, agricultural, 
communal-will work a further change within the domain of the machine itself: 
a change of tempo .... It is not the absolute speed assumed by any part of the 
machine system that indicates efficiency: what is important is the relative speed 
of the various parts with a view to the ends to be accomplished: namely, the 
maintenance and development of human life. (1963, pp. 431-32) 
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Both the quality and quantity of man's control over his natural 
environment are complex and debatable issues. What seems clear, 
however, is that modem societies often use technology and create 
environments with little or no regard for the reqi.tirements of man's 
underlying nature, aside from what seems comfortable or convenient 
in the most superficial way. One might entertain with some cer-
tainty, for example, the principle (as the Goodmans suggest) that 
technology which obscures or denies man's biological self is poten-
tially dangerous and destructive. Seeing food only in its frozen or 
canned state obscures our absolute dependence on the sun for food; 
having waste products carted away in trucks or flushed down toilets 
and drains obscures the fact that we are intrinsically involved in a 
critical life-sustaining ecological chain. This latter iilusion Slater calls 
the Toilet Assumption. 
Prior to the widespread use of the flush toilet all of humanity was daily con-
fronted with the immediate reality of human waste and iu disposal. They knew 
where it was and how it got there. Nothing miraculously vanished. Excrement 
was conspicuously present in the outhouse or chamber pot, and the slops that 
went out the window went visibly and noticeably into the street •.•• 
Our ideas about institutionalizing the aged, psychotic, retarded, and infirm 
are based on a pattern of thought that we might call the Toilet Assumption-the 
notion that unwanted matter, unwanted difficulties, unwanted complexities and 
obstacles will disappear if they are removed from our immediate field of vision. 
(1970, p. 15) 
It is our position that there are environments and technology 
which are more and less consistent with underlying human require-
ments in much more profound ways than the superficial principles of 
comfort and convenience. The convenience of the garbage disposal 
and the flush toilet, for example, might well be weighed against the 
alienation caused by man living with the illusion that he has no waste 
products at all. 
More important than simple statements we make about the 
material environment alone is the differential power of control over 
environment and technology various groups within the society exer-
cise and for whose benefit that power and control are used. This, of 
course, is the thrust of Marxist thinking. The life one can imagine is a 
function of the material surroundings within which one finds oneself. 
Marx imagined beyond his immediate surroundings into a projective 
90 Dimensions of Quality of Life 
history, a history which had less to do with the tyranny of technol-
ogy and the human systems which manage them and more to do with 
who had the power to control and benefit from the blessings of tech-
nology. 
More recent analysts of postindustrial society seriously chal-
lenge the assumption that science and technology are value free-that 
it is only how humans use them that gives them normative signifi-
cance. It is important to distinguish here between simplistic material-
ism-the idea that man is simply a conditioned product of his mate-
rial surroundings-and the Faustian idea that man can be seduced 
into styles of life which emphasize materialism, consumerism, greed, 
and alienation from his natural sense of human sociality, coopera-
tion, and relatedness to other forms of life and the broad conditions 
that sustain them. Man's vulnerability to seduction by technological 
and political power is perhaps the most serious threat to a decent 
quality of life in the contemporary world. From an evolutionary 
point of view, the problem is that man has never developed inhibi-
tory mechanisms which move him to control or limit the size and 
complexity of his social and natural settings so they will be con-
sistent with the scale of his hunter-gatherer past, the past within 
which much of his adaptive constitution was forged. Control of per-
sonal or private property, for example, is minimal for the huntcr-
gatherer, for there is little to control; there is little surplus wealth. 
Likewise, abusive and arbitrary use of political power is limited by 
the fact that humans live in small units; all know one another inti-
mately; all share a sense of protective concern for all members of the 
band. 
The problem of technology, then, is really grounded in man's 
paradoxical evolutionary development. He has the technical capaci-
ties-as well as an inclination to use them-to destroy the material 
and social conditions within which he can feel comfortable or, at 
least, adequate. Faced with increasing material wealth and social 
power made possible by the control of complex technology, he tends 
to create highly stratified societies, for which his hunter-gatherer 
past ilJ-equipped him. For, as Lenski notes, "if any single feature 
of the life of hunting and gathering societies has impressed itself 
upon observers, it is the relative equality of the members" (1966, p. 
102). 
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Culture 
With the exception of our concern for environment and tech-
nology, our distinctions between culture, social structure, and per-
sonality are much like those developed by Spiro. Spiro sees social 
systems (what we would call social structure) as "configurations of 
reciprocal roles which are shared by members of a group in virtue of 
their inheritance from a prior generation" ( 1972, p. 588). He states 
that there are three bases for such social systems or structures: ge-
netic inheritance (as in the case of social insects); roles acquired 
through social learning (as in the case of some mammals, including 
primates); and roles inherited not through social learning, but which 
are symbolically prescribed. This latter potential is almost exclusive 
to man. 
I would now argue ... that culture consists, among other things, of the norms 
which govern social relationships; that these norms are to be distinguished ana-
lytically from that system of social relationships which may be termed the social 
system of a society; and that both are to be distinguished from personality, by 
which I understand the motivational system (including internalized norms) that 
characterize individuals. (p. 589) 
Very generally, culture would be defined as implicit or explicit 
rules which channel behavior. In their most obvious form, they ap-
pear as prescriptions or proscriptions. They are, however, surrounded 
by belief systems or ideology which rationalize and set the rules in 
broader context-value statements, facts, generalizations, law, sys-
tematic social theory, philosophy, symbols, myths, history, folktales, 
as well as methods for validating and knowing. 
If we construe culture as largely language or concept-bound, 
then human limits on culture are set by the way man uses language, 
symbols, and concepts. There is evidence that he has a universal 
grammar (Chomsky 1968). His nervous system is wired in a particu-
lar way which limits and determines his logical potential. 
He tends toward a dichotomized construction of reality (George 
Kelly 1955), and perhaps even toward specific dichotomies such as 
good-bad, strong-weak, active-passive. He tends toward metaphor and 
analogy which links his experience with the natural phenomena 
around him O ung 1968; Levi-Strauss 1963 ). His thinking tends to 
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function on a continuum from fluid imagery to sensory messages to 
very directed purposeful instrumental thinking Qung). 
The language characteristics seen as "human" vary considerably 
among individuals. There is, for example, a wide range of ability to 
think along the concrete-abstract dimension, or to create imagery in 
symbolic terms (e.g., poetry). Piaget ( 1955) has discovered a develop-
mental sequence through which humans ordinarily pass in their abil-
ity to symbolize and "think about thinking." There are degrees to 
which individual humans internalize culture or rule-systems. For 
example, attitudes may be formed and shift because (1) one wishes 
to comply with a message source (presumably an authority), (2) one 
identifies with the message source, or (3) one has genuinely internal-
ized the meaning and force of the message. Kohlberg and J\faycr 
(1972) make a similar set of distinctions in their study of the way 
humans handle moral dilemma stories verbally or conceptually. 
Moral judgments may have a "preconventional basis" (the rightness 
of a position is justified on the basis of force, fear of punishment, 
etc.); a "conventional basis" (the rightness is justified on the basis of 
group consensus, opinion, or specific rules which maintain order 
1 
within the group); or a "postconventional basis" (the rightness is jus-
tified on the basis of an abstract principle of justice such as utilitar-
ianism). The extent to which culture is conscious or unconscious is, 
of course, a central concern of depth psychologists. Conflicts be-
tween culture and personal drives arc presumably often handled by 
unconscious coping and defense mechanisms such as denial, repres-
sion, overcompensation, and the like. 
Universal ideological dimensions of culture have been schema-
tized by Florence Kluckhohn ( 1961 ), and are shown in table 4.2. 
Human cultures can also be described in terms of more abstract qual-
ities: for example, comprehensiveness (extent to which potential or 
real social behavior patterns are covered by rules, values, or ideol-
ogy); level of specificity (how detailed and delineated are the rules); 
and level of integration (extent to which rules in various behavioral 
domains such as work, love, religion, and play, are interrelated). 
Judgments about the quality of life which various societies 
encourage, allow, or prevent are often difficult if not impossible to 
make within the framework of culture as a single dimension of a soci-
ety. In general, such judgments apply to sociocultural or culture-and-
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1. Culture which seriously inhibits the normal functioning of 
basic human drives is destructive (e.g., rules preventing normal het-
erosexual relations until ten years after puberty' rules which prevent 
outgroup aggression). 
2. Culture which greatly enhances the value of behavior which is 
difficult for large numbers of people to learn or perform is destruc-
tive (e.g., the rule that all humans should have control over reading 
and writing complex and abstract language; rules which press for 
transcendent levels of human consciousness). 
3. Culture which legitimizes human exploitation is destructive 
(e.g., rules which allow or require some humans to live in poverty 
while others live in luxury). 
Social Structure 
A third analytic component or behavioral channel in a social 
system we would call social structure. Social structures can be con-
strued in individual terms as roles or learned behavior patterns which 
occur predictably and regularly through time regardless of what indi-
vidual plays them. Structure can be thought of more generally as sets 
of interrelated or reciprocal roles which together constitute institu-
tions. The family might be seen as an institution in which various age 
and kinship roles are filled; a factory might be seen as an institution 
in which various authority-power and instrumental work roles are 
filled. 
A continuing source of ambiguity is the extent to which we see 
institutions as universal, that is, occurring across different societies 
versus the extent to which we see them as the invention of a specific 
society or type of society. Families, villages, and cities are often seen 
as universals; schools, factories, and offices are often seen as society 
-or culture-specific. We make the distinction between general social 
forms and specific institutions. We maintain that social forms are uni-
versal types of collective behavior which man will generally create 
under certain specified circumstances. \Ve would suggest the follow-
ing, for example, as universal social forms: 
Intense dyads (lovers, marriage partners, friends, parent-child) 
Nuclear families 
Sodalities (work groups, friendship groups) 
"Bands," neighborhoods, villages 
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Universal social forms which human societies create can be de 
scribed along a number of dimensions, for example, complexit) 
basis of cohesion or integration, degree of integration or cohesion 
the looseness or tightness of behavior patterns, or the harshness o 
leniency of sanctions used to enforce prescribed patterns. In general 
more complex social forms use a greater variety of methods of int{ 
gration or cohesion. We would consider the following mechanisms a 
representing man's more important integrative capacities: 
Biosocial bonding (heterosexual bonding, cooperative worl 
bonding, nurturance-dependency bonding) 
Dominance hierarchies 
Division of labor 
Cultural codes or formal political structures legitimizing and ra 
tionalizing dominance hierarchies 
Negotiated contracts 
The concept of tight versus loose social structures seems to u 
especially important because of its relationship to more primitiv, 
societies characterized by tribal or band relationships and more mod 
em societies characterized by corporate organizations. It is not nece~ 
sarily the case that communal or tribal relationships are loose o 
tight, but rather that they can be, while corporate organizations al 
ways tend toward highly bureaucratic structured relationships. 
Looseness or tightness of social structures may be characterize• 
as: (1) the extent to which roles or role relationships within a socia 
system are clear and explicit; (2) the extent to which roles are close!· 
related to or locked into a set of reciprocal relationships; (3) the ex 
tent to which there are limited categories of people who can pla' 
roles (e.g., is the biological father the only person who can play 
child's father-role, or can the role easily be played by uncles, olde 
siblings, etc.); (4) the extent to which there is behavioral variation o 
flexibility within a role; (5) the extent to which there are harsh o 
lenient sanctions (and forgiveness) for deviation from role expect2 
tions. 
The general issue of tight and loose social structures was exam 
ined in an essay by Embree (1969, pp. 3-15) in which he compare• 
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Japanese and Thai village life. The essay sparked considerable contro-
versy because of the seeming contradiction between social structure 
as a categorical characteristic of a social system and the implication 
that "tight" equalled "more" and "loose" equalled "less." If social 
systems have, by definition, social structures, you cannot have more 
or less of a social structure-you simply have different types of struc-
tures. 
Putting this somewhat academic argument aside, we would 
maintain that the tight-loose distinction makes a good deal of sense, 
as suggested by our defining characteristics given above. Piker ( 1969, 
pp. 61-76), for example, states that role demands for Thai villagers 
are loose for a number of reasons: 
1. Civil servants are given much paid leave ijob truancy is legiti-
mated); 
2. It is difficult to offend someone beyond forgiveness; 
3. There are few stable expectations about lifestyles others are 
to maintain over the long run (except for ritualized politeness in 
face-to-face settings); 
J 4. There is relatively open social mobility. 
Piker then concludes: 
... these findings suggest two conclusions with respect to the correspondence 
between personality and the social system in rural Thai society: if such corre-
spondence does in fact obtain, it consists largely, first, of the adequacy of the 
sum total of institutions for the expression of those diverse personality traits 
that are widespread in the population and, second, of the accessibility of these 
institutions to the bearers of diverse personality traits. (p. 74) 
Phillips made a related comment on Thai personality: 
... cooperative, mutually expectable interaction as we know it in the West does 
not "simply take place" in Bang Chan. Rather, there is always the intervening 
factor of whether individuals want it to take place .... It is the individual that is 
primary, not the social relationship. The assumption is: "If he did not do it, he 
must have had his own good reason." (1965, p. 60) 
Both writers seem to suggest considerably looser role demands on the 
individual personality than in highly organized modem societies. 
Schooling in modem societies, for example, makes uniform demands 
on very diverse personalities, especially for younger children. 
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While the social structure of societies or groups can be described 
along such dimensions as degree of integration, basis of integration, 
or looseness or tightness of structure, statuses or roles themselves can 
be described along another set of meaningful dimensions first devel-
oped by Parsons. 
[Parsons J uses a set of 5 "pattern variables" to distinguish the aspects of any 
social relationship. According to Parsons, each time we act, and in each role in 
which we act, we are, in effect, emphasizing one or another of the 5 basic divi· 
sions. If a role is specific, our relationship is limited to one particular narrow)) 
defined exchange; if it is diffuse, our involvement will extend over a wide variet) 
of problems or relationships. We stress either affectivity (that is, feeling, emo 
tion, and gTatification), or affective neutrality, which mearu we place more em 
phasis on instrumental or moral considerations. We manifest particularism whe1 
we give special consideration to people because of their relationship to us 
whereas if we evidence universalism, we treat more or less alike all who com' 
before us in a given status-position. If my treatment of you is mainly on th· 
basis of what you are in yourself, in contrast to what you do or have done, 
stress quality over performance (ascribed status vs. achieved status). When m· 
concern is mainly to advance the goals of the group, I display a coUectivit) 
orientation, whereas if I am most concerned to advance my own interest 
through our relationship, I stress self-on"entation. Descnbed in these terms, th 
relations of husband and wife, and indeed all nuclear family relations, tend to b 
diffuse, affective, and particularistic, and reflect stress on quality and collecth 
ity-orientation. The relationship between a clerk and a customer would be at th 
opposite pole on each dimension. (Inkeles 1964, p. 74) 
As Inkeles suggests, Parsons' pattern variables are obviously derive 
from an intuitive sense that so-called primary groups (groups wit 
sustained face-to-face relationships) are somehow fundamentally di 
ferent from secondary groups. 
With this level of analytic differentiation, we might speculat 
about what characteristics of social structure tend toward high< 
quality of life and which tend to diminish the quality of life in h1 
man societies. One might ask the following questions: 
1. To what ex tent is the availability of primordial social forn 
such as the nuclear family, the extended family, sodalities, and smc 
communities or neighborhoods a prerequisite for emotional healt 
security, and adequate societal integration? 
2. To what extent can humans function with reasonable equa 
j 
.) 
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imity or without great stress in social forms which require competing 
types of social integration, for example, in neighborhoods integrated 
by sexual, kinship, and sentiment bonding and at the same time in 
corporate organizations (stores, offices, factories, schools) where 
integration is maintained through cultural codes, centralized control 
of sanctions, and negotiated contracts? 
3. To what extent can humans function with equanimity or 
without great stress in a variety of social forms which are either high-
ly integrated (as a religious commune) or highly fragmented (as sub-
urban life in modem society)? 
4. To what extent are societies or social forms characterized as 
having tight or loose or moderate social structures conducive to high 
or low human stress? 
5. To what extent does role diffuseness or specificity or the 
looS(ness or tightness of roles lead to higher or lower stress? 
6. To what extent do institutions having social forms which mix 
primary and secondary characteristics (e.g., schools and small family 
businesses) generate greater or lesser stress compared with institutions 
which have pure forms (e.g., family, or large corporate business)? 
Personality 
Personality refers to underlying motivational structures or overt 
behavior patterns which characterize individual humans. The forces 
which shape personality and affect individual behavior are multiple: 
human constitution (via inheritance, imprinting, or early biosocial 
learning); socialization (learned orientations toward basic human 
functions such as work, love and attachment, play, dream and fan-
tasy); the interaction between constitution and socialization, espe-
cially during critical developmental periods in the human career; and 
finally the press of sociocultural systems (institutions, roles, etc.) 
within which the individual always functions. 
A central tension in any human society is the fact that cultur-
ally defined or general rules, ideology, and roles must be channeled 
through diverse human beings. Wallace has described this tension by 
suggesting that there are two ways of looking at culture and society: 
one as the "replication of uniformity," and another as "the organiza-
tion of diversity_" From the point of view of the "replication of uni-
formity": 
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the society may be regarded as culturally homogeneous and the individuals will 
be expected to share a uniform nuclear character. If a near-perfect correspon-
dence between culture and individual nuclear character is assumed, the structural 
relation between the two becomes nonproblematical, and the interest of proces-
sual research lies rather in the mechanisms of socialization by which each gener-
ation becomes, culturally and characterologically, a replica of iu predecessors. 
(1970, pp. 22-23) 
From the point of view of "the organization of diversity": 
Culture ... becomes not so much a superorganic entity, but policy, tacitly and 
gradually concocted by groups of people for the furtherance of their interests, 
and contract, established by practice, between and among individuals to organize 
their strivings into mutually facilitating equivalence structures. (p. 24) 
We are here focusing on human diversity as the central problem 
of personality, that is, we need to categorize the major sources of 
variation through which different aspects of human nature are chan-
neled. We would suggest two significant categories of variation: ( 1) 
the salience and complexity with which different levels (in the 
Freudian sense) of personality are expressed; and (2) the differences 
in common human characteristics such as age, sex, temperament, tal-
ent, etc. Regarding the first type of variation one can imagine that 
human personality is constructed as a set of layers: 
Cultural values and rules, which rationalize role behavior 
t 
Learned social roles through which underlying personality 
type is expressed 
t 
Patterned constitutional tendencies interacting with envi-
ronment (e.g., oral or anal personalities) 
t 
Universal human strivings (e.g., love, work, meaning) 
t 
Undifferentiated libidinal energy 
Given this model, one can imagine basic human strivings as more or 
less crudely or directly expressed, or as more or less refined by social 
ized roles or cultural values. 
One can speculate that there are archetypal social callings which. 
when matched with archetypal personality types, require less role 
behavior and are a more direct expression of underlying impulses 
.__J 
"'\ 
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The clown or buffoon, the reflective teacher, the priest or shaman, 
the doctor or healer-all may be an expression of such role 
archetypes. When the bland unquestioning personality type, for 
example, takes on the work of reflective teacher, we would guess 
that the behavior is much more an expression of a highly socialized 
role than the underlying need to probe the meaning of his social or 
natural world. 
Personalities vary in their degree of socialization potential; some 
are relatively easily socialized; some are socialized with great diffi-
culty. Relating the concept of socialization potential to quality of 
life, one might argue that a higher quality of life is possible in a soci-
ety in which humans who socialize with great difficulty can select 
themselves into roles which are reasonably consistent with their 
underlying constitutional tendencies; or conversely, a society in 
which those humans who socialize easily are not required to crea-
tively fashion innovative roles. If normal human variation yields 
more clowns, buffoons, or comedians, for example, than can be 
accommodated in a society (especially where there is the technology 
of mass media), and comedians are then forced to become bank 
clerks or shoe salesmen (more exacting and highly socialized roles), 
presumably there is considerable human stress. Or conversely, if soci-
ety demands a great many questioning, interesting, and charismatic 
teachers who cannot be found, their places must be filled by over-
socialized bank clerks. 
The second category of human variation includes such charac-
teristics as age, sex, temperament, talents, etc. We might suggest the 
following as examples. 
1. Energy level 
As Robert White states: 
When one assists at the birth of a litter of puppies it is impossible not to see 
differences among the new arrivals with respect to activity and vigor. The moth-
er dog notices the differences and may even callously push aside a puppy that 
does not meet her minimum standards of responsiveness ..... It is hard ... to 
think of high vitality and zest as traits that could be wholly learned if they were 
not built into the organism in the first place. Some babies do not display these 
qualities and develop in a consistently quieter and less colorful way. ( 1966, pp. 
236-37) 
2. Sensory-conceptual modes of relating to the environment 
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evidence that different humans relate to the environment througl 
emphasis on different sensory processes. Three strong candidates fo, 
"relational modes" are kinesthetic-motor, sensory, and conceptual 
verbal. These terms might be defined by considering very talentec 
people who express themselves through each mode. Professiona 
athletes and dancers have a dominant kinesthetic-motor way of relat 
ing. Painters and film-makers have extraordinary sensory sensibilities 
Scientists and academics relate in a more conceptual-verbal mode 
Obviously any individual is a mix of these (and other) modes of relat 
ing, all of which are, to a considerable extent, subject to learning. 
3. Interpersonal tendencies 
It is possible to make a case for extroversion-introversion as 
dominant dimension along which individuals relate to one another 
4. Physique and temperament 
William Sheldon has probably done the most systematic stud' 
on the relationship between physique or body type and tempera 
ment. White summarizes Sheldon's work as follows: 
Sheldon reached the conclusion ... that temperament could be described as ha\ 
ing three main components. The first, which he called visaratonia, was represente< 
by a cluster of traits such as relaxation, love of comfort, amiability, and a need fo 
affection and approval of others. The second component, named somatotonia, wa 
characterized by vigorous assertiveness, a love of action, and a dominating bu 
somewhat insensitive attitude toward other people. The third component, cerebra 
tonia, had as its chief traits a tense vigilance, sensitiveness, a tendency for action t< 
be inhibited, and a certain ineptitude in social situations. All three components ar 
present in everyone, but in different relative strengths .... 
Sheldon seemed to give his components of temperament a more clear!· 
constitutional cast when he developed a systematic scheme for the measuremen 
of physique, and related visceratonia to a soft rounded physique, somatotonia t• 
a solid muscular one, and cerebrotonia to a slender, lightly built frame. {196E 
pp. 231-32) 
5. Male-femaleness 
While there is considerable controversy over the extent to whicl 
personality differences between sexes and the masculinity-femininit~ 
dimension within each sex is biologically or socioculturally based 
substantial differences seem universal. Males, for example, seem mor 
object- and task-oriented, more aggressive, and have more focuse( 
sexual interests. Females appear more people-oriented, have strange 
interpersonal needs, seem less openly aggressive, and have more dil 
fusely expressed sexuality. 
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6. The human career cycle 
While it is obvious that infants, children, and old people have 
specific, constitutionally-based developmental resources and needs, 
there is little systematic information on differences among other 
adults at different points in the human career. Erikson (1964) has 
suggested that developmental crises occur throughout life, and that 
each crisis requires a new integration with previous develop men ta! 
problems. We would speculate that the orientation of American soci-
ety (and of modern societies more generally) is toward construing all 
adult humans as equal and interchangeable-hence we become some-
what insensitive to age differences in our public discourse. There is, 
of course, a tremendous cosmetic industry which attempts to make 
plausible the illusion that everyone is the same age-through wigs, 
hair coloring, face lifting, cosmetics, and the like. 
We would argue that the essential criterion for quality of life for 
personality is the extent to which an authentic self can be con-
structed and expressed (at whatever age). The primary problem for 
the realization of such authentic personalities is the tendency of cul-
ture to construct a range of worthy types of people which is more 
limited than the normal range of differences which commonly occur 
_j within the species. Social roles, moreover, tend to be ordered on a 
..L hierarchy of privilege or prestige such that some individuals are con-
stantly tempted to "not be themselves" in order to gain prestige or 
avoid discrimination (e.g., the friendly generous teacher who is told 
to be tough with rowdy students). In this sense the potential for 
authentic personalities within a society is very much dependent on 
the range of roles within the social structure, the privileges associated 
with these roles, and the definition of these roles by the culture. 
Interaction Among Personality, Culture, and Social Structure 
Disciplinarians in the various social sciences constantly war over 
the relative importance of various subsystems of human society. 
Psychologists tend to stress the significance of individual learning, 
especially early childhood experience. Anthropologists stress the im· 
pact of common culture, often assuming a level of cultural uniform-
ity that defies common-sense experience. Sociologists and social 
anthropologists stress the importance of institutions and roles, con-
struing the significance of personality simply as a constellation of 
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internalized others; or they assume that different personality types 
cancel each other out, and thus account for no great impact on a 
society. 
This kind of analytic fragmentation leads toward several kinds 
of social mischief. First, it leads individual social scientists or 
"schools" of social science to grossly oversell the level of reliability 
with which any particular analytic orientation or theory can make a 
useful contribution to theories of social amelioration. Behavioristic 
psychology (Skinner) and more recently developmental psychology 
(Kohlberg) are examples. 
Second, disciplinary blinders often prevent social scientists from 
developing more complex theories which would square better with 
the realities of common-sense human experience. A case in point 
where disciplinary blinders have been somewhat removed is Fromm's 
theory of social character. Fromm (1970) suggests that there are rela-
tionships between personal constitution, early socialization experi-
ence, and sociocultural press. The socialization requirements which 
would allow an individual to achieve authentic love and productive 
work, for example, may be very different for the tender-minded, sen-
sitive person than for the aggressive, task-oriented person. And more 
importantly, sociocultural constraints in the larger society may pre-
vent one or the other type from achieving an authentic self because 
of the press it makes on the primary group environment. Social strat-
ification which places different values on people at different levels of 
society (on their work, their lifestyles, their values, their speech, etc.) 
may in fact be a way of sorting out people according to their consti-
tutional abilities to adapt to the dominant cultural values and struc-
tural constraints in the society. It may then be more realistic to talk 
about modal adaptations to a given sociocultural system than to talk 
about modal personalities. 
Conclusion 
We have taken the general position that human nature is chan-
nelled through four societal subsystems-environment and technol-
ogy, culture, social structure, and personality-and that each com-
ponent or subsystem has natural limits and tendencies which bear on 
the quality of life in society. Describing or developing these compo-
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limits placed on man by the direction of his own evolution. Regard-
ing technology, for example, man can respect or ignore his own evo-
lutionary connectedness with his natural environment, but if he 
ignores it, there is a cost in quality of life. Regarding culture, man 
has the capacity to create, understand, and maintain certain limited 
kinds of rules, and quality of life is improved if the rules are con-
sistent with such basic needs as personal security and support. (The 
cultural rule in this society that all worthy people must have gainful 
employment, for example, is probably destructive of quality of life.) 
Regarding social structure, man has the capacity to create certain 
limited types of social forms which provide stable social roles. When 
certain primordial forms are destroyed, such as the extended family 
or neighborhood, he becomes anxious and insecure. In terms of per-
sonality, broad natural diversity requires a breadth and looseness of 
culture and social form. 
Our central point is that the concept of channels suggests that 
under certain conditions human behavior and institutions f1ow in 
some directions more easily than others. The irony of the human 
condition is that despite his reflective nature, man often creates de-
structive environments, cultures, social structures, and personalities, 
and thus directs his nature away from its more obvious channels. 
And it is for this reason we find the concept of quality of life an 
issue at all. 
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The Functional Requirements 
of Human Society 
We have attempted to derive criteria for quality of life by look-
ing at underlying qualities of human nature directly or by looking at 
characteristics of channels through which human nature is expressed 
in society, such as environment-technology, personality, social struc-
ture, and culture. Another way of deriving quality-of-life criteria is 
by looking at the functional require men ts of man or society or man-
in-society. Maslow, for example, has developed what he calls a hier-
archy of human needs (see figure 5.1 ). 
The functionalists in sociology and anthropology have at-
tempted to develop a similar list of requirements for society. (One 
thinks especially of Parsons and Malinowski.) i\fore recently Aberle 
et al. ( 1950, pp. 100-11) developed a statement of what they call the 



























Esteem by others 
Love and belongingness 
Safety and security 
Physiological 
(Air, water, food, shdter, sleep, sex) 
The external environment 
Preconditions for need satisfaction 
Freedom, justice, orderliness 
Challenge (stimulation) 
*Growth needs are all of equal importance (not hierarchical) 
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Source: Frank G. Goble, The Third Force (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970): p. 50. 
Copyright 1970 by Thomas Jefferson Research Center. 
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I. Provision for adequate relationship to the environment and for sexual recruit-
ment . ... providing for basic physiological needs of enough adult members to 
insure reproduction and to man the essential status positions. (p. l 04) 
2. Role differentiation and role assignment .... the systematic and stable divi-
sion of activities. (p. I 05) 
3. Communication. No society, however simple, can exist without shared, 
learned symbolic modes of communication, because without them it cannot 
maintain the common-value structure or the protective sanctions which hold 
back the war of each against all. (p. 106) 
4. Shared cognitive orientations. In any society the members must share a body 
of cognitive orientations which (a) make possible adaptation to and manipula-
tion of the situation; (b) make stable, meaningful and predictable the social 
situations in which they are engaged; and (c) account for those significant as-
pects of the situation over which they do not have adequate predication and 
control. (p. 107) 
5. A shared. articulate set of goals. 
6. The normative regulation of means. That these means must be stated clearly 
for the sake of order and the effective functioning of the society follows from 
(a) the nature of other functional prerequisites and (b) the anomie that must 
result from the lack of recognized legitimized means. First, role differentia-
tion specifies who is to act, while the common articulated set of goals defines i~:1 what is to be done. The normative regulation of means tells how those goals 
may be won. Second, the absence of normative regulation of means invites 
apathy or the war of each against all. (p. I 08) 
7. The regulation of affective expression. 
8. Socialization . ... socialization includes both the development of new adult 
members from infants and the induction of an individual of any age into any 
role of the society or its subsystems where new learning is required. (p. l 09) 
9. The effective control of disruptive forms of behavior. 
Whether one focuses on the indi\'idual or the society, we think 
it is extremely useful to stress the fact that man is a multifunctional 
animal. From this point of view a central element in judging the qual-
ity of life in society is the adequacy and authenticity with which the 
various essential human functions are performed as well as the extent 
to which they are carried on in some reasonably balanced and in te-
grated relationship to each other. 
Specifically, our list of functions includes the following: 
1. Attachment, love, bonding; 
2. Adaptation, work, coping; 
- -
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3. Renewal, play, sleep, relaxation, fantasy, dreaming; 
4. Planning, deciding, conflict resolution; 
5. Celebration or acting out of universal events in the human 
condition, story telling, drama, sports, dance; 
6. Creation of myth and meaning: placing man in relationship 
to past and future events or human and cosmic events. 
We are not concerned here with an elegant scheme or a carefully 
developed rationale to justify our particular functional categories-
any such selection and categorization of "basic human functions" is 
somewhat arbitrary. We are concerned that one look at the require-
ments of society as a whole, as several interrelated functions. As 
O'Dea states: 
. .. functional theory sees society as an ongoing equilibrium of social institutions 
which pattern human activity in terms of shared norms, held to be legitimate 
and binding by the human participants themselves. This complex of institutions, 
which as a whole constitute the social system, is such that each part (each insti-
tutionalized element) is interdependent with all the other parts and that changes 
in any part affect the others, and the condition of the system as a whole. ( 1966, 
p. 2) 
This "unity-equilibrium" viewpoint in functional theory bears 
directly on the problem of inventing or maintaining constructive cul-
ture. It assumes that there is a limited fund of human energy to be 
expended; energy not spent in the fulfillment of one function will 
presumably be expended on another. The critical point, however, is 
that functional theory assumes that a set of problems are continu-
ously present and must be solved or at least handled simultaneously, 
and that when some problems are not adequately resolved, energy 
will be diverted to the unsolved problems. If inadequate resolutions 
persist, compensatory mechanisms come into play, comparable on 
the societal level to adjustive or defensive mechanisms hypothesized 
by psychoanalytic theory for individual personality. And like Freud-
ian defense mechanisms, societal compensatory mechanisms do not 
really solve problems; they simply expend human energy, often in a 
dysfunctional way, so that one has the illusion of successful coping. 
At a personal level, for example, the anal-compulsive individual may 
reduce anxiety by constantly washing his hands, but the underlying 
problem (for example, guilt over unconscious strivings toward sex or 
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autonomy) is never touched. Likewise, at the societal level if there is 
no adequate meaning system or symbolic ritual to explain or work 
through inevitable conditions of human pain (e.g., personal loss of a 
friend, climatic catastrophes, sickness and death), unrelieved emo-
tional pain or anxiety may be suppressed by compulsive work. The 
work will drain off energy, but the nagging concern over the meaning 
of the human suffering will continue in a potentially destnictive way. 
For as work itself loses meaning, it may take the threat of survival 
itself (through fabricated fears of internal subversion or external con· 
quest) to keep the system going. From this point of view war may be 
construed as a compensatory mechanism integrating work, celebra-
tion, myth-making, and the rechanneling of sexual energy through 
aggression, which temporarily staves off the more profound long-
term problem of a meaningful life in a less crisis-ridden society. But 
like washing one's hands, war "solves" the problem of a meaningful 
life for relatively brief periods of time (unless, of course, it is institu-
tionalized). 
In a sense the distinction between functional solutions and 
dysfunctional compensatory mechanisms is arbitrary. Functional 
solutions apply to constructive cultural elements or social institu-
" tions which allow humans to cope without inordinate stress; dysfunc-
'·"1 tional compensatory mechanisms apply to cultural elements which 
make it possible for humans to live under unnecessarily high stress. 
In general we assume as a practical matter that it is possible to distin-
guish whether the quality of life is enhanced or diminished by alter-
native functional institutions. Below we attempt to suggest various 
analytic distinctions as a way of clarifying this assumption. 
Criteria for Successful Functional Solutions 
1. Attachment, love, bond1.ng 
The quality of human attachments is, of course, a very large 
subject in religion, philosophy, psychology, etc. While we might dis-
cuss human attachments within the framework of a multitude of 
theories, we shall simply suggest Fromm's analysis as one insightful 
way to think about human relating. Fromm ( 1970) distinguishes 
among the following kinds of interpersonal relatedness: 
I. Symbr.otic relatedness: In the symbiotic relatedness the person is related to 
others but loses or never attains his independence; he avoids the danger of 
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aloneness by becoming part of another person, either by being "swallowed" 
by that person or by "swallowing" him. The former is the root of what is 
clinically described as masochism. Masochism is the attempt to get rid of one's 
individual self, to escape from freedom, and to look for security by attaching 
oneself to another person .... The impulse to swallow others is the active 
form of symbiotic relatedness and is sadism. It is the attempt to dominate 
others, and is rooted in and compensates for deep-and often unconscious-
feelings of impotence and powerlessness. (pp. 7 3-7 4) 
2. "Withdrawal-destructiveness: The feeling of individual powerlessness can be 
overcome by withdrawal from others who are experienced as threats .... Its 
emotional equivalent is the feeling of indifference toward others, often 
accompanied by a compensatory feeling of self-inflation. Withdrawal and in-
difference can, but need not, be conscious .... in our culture they are mostly 
covered by a superficial kind of interest and sociability .... Destructiveness is 
the perversion of the drive to live; it is the energy of unlived life transformed 
into energy for the destruction of life. (p. 74) 
3. Narcissism: In this form of relatedness (or unrelatedness) only that which re-
fers to one's ego, i.e., body, sensations, feelings, thoughts, is experienced as 
fully real, hence important. The reality outside, while perceived, has no 
weight, no importance, because one is not related to it .... the world outside 
is perceived without depth or intensity. (p. 75) 
4. Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to oneself. It implies 
responsibility, care, respect, and knowledge, and the wish for the other person 
to grow and develop. It is the expression of intimacy between two human 
beings under the condition of preservation of each other's integrity. {p. 76) 
Although it is clear that of Fromm's four types of relatedness, 
love is the "good" one, the successful one, it should be understood 
that an individual is not a caricature of one form of relatedness, but 
rather there are blends of the various components within the person-
ality. Our own guess is that within limits humans might bond nor-
mally by any of the mechanisms listed. 
2. Adaptation, work, coping 
To describe work in terms of quality of life is a more frag-
mented task than to describe human attachment. A variety of cri-
teria, however, come to mind. 
a. Adequacy for meeting the burden of survival and the basic 
economic needs of a society. It should be understood that adequacy 
is construed more in absolute than in relative terms. From our point 
of view it means meeting the basic biological needs of the society as 
well as biosocial functional needs (e.g., celebration, play). There is, 
of course, a delicate line between an absolute definition of adequacy 
and a relative definition. Many of the activities of civilization, such as 
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building pyramids, museums, universities, etc. allow humans to do 
productive meaningful work. Whether or not the absence of these 
institutions would make a society's work functionally inadequate, 
however, is highly doubtful. We would describe a society that is re-
quired to practice infanticide, or to abandon old people, or where 
there is highly competitive intraspecific behavior in obtaining food 
and shelter, as inadequate in absolute terms. Societies with high 
death rates from starvation, malnutrition, and exposure are at the 
extreme of negative adaptation. 
b. Efficiency, or the relationship between energy expended and 
the production of goods and services the society presumably needs. 
A low-energy-high-production economy would be considered effi-
cient. {One might make distinctions between expenditure of human 
energy versus the expenditure of mechanical energy or the energy of 
domestic animals, and suggest that conserving human energy is more 
efficient.) The distinction between adequacy and efficiency is ob-
vious: one might have an affluent economy which is either efficient 
or wasteful. 
c. Authenticity, or the extent to which one can justify a specific 
~-: kind of work or adaptation as genuinely related to the needs of hu-
,_ man survival. While one can make delicate distinctions in the gray 
area between the necessities and the luxuries of a society, it is less 
difficult to make the case at the extremes. In American society, for 
example, farming is probably more authentic work than is embalm-
ing; preparing food is probably more authentic than making tele-
vision commercials. 
d. Nondestructive or nonexploitative work. Work can be de-
structive ecologically, that is, destructive to the natural environment 
required for the long-term survival of the species and the planet. 
Work can also be destructive in human terms, either physically 
(breathing coal dust in a mine), or emotionally {doing monotonous 
work on an assembly line). Work might be healthy for the individuals 
participating in it, but destructive for other people {building high-rise 
"projects" in the ghettos or building barracks to house soldiers train-
ing for war). 
Another criterion applied to the quality of work might be the 
extent to which work done by one group is productive at the ex-
pense of other groups or individuals. An extreme example would be 
poor Haitians selling blood to help affluent Americans regain their 
health. 
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e. Fair distn"bution of meaningful work, or the extent to which 
monotonous, physically dangerous, or repetitive work is carried out 
by one group of people, while others do more meaningful work. 
f. Meritocratic dependency. Some members of a society are 
more competent to carry out certain tasks than others. In general, 
however, elites emerge which combine the resources of political lead-
ership, intellectual creativity, and inclination to act on the world. It 
is relatively easy for a society to build stable socioeconomic strata in 
which groups on the lower end of the scale depend for direction and 
the definition of work on those on the upper end of the scale. Our 
hypothesis is that stratified meritocratic societies generate depen-
dency, poverty, and survival anxiety in the lower strata as well as 
insensitivity, sadism, and guilt in the upper strata. 
g. Flexibility to meet changing conditions, or the extent to 
which adaptive institutions can change as human needs or natural 
conditions change: for example, to what extent can a modem society 
deal with the need to reduce energy use? 
Before we proceed to our four other functions, it should be 
stated that the first two {often referred to as love and work) have the 
most fundamental place in any scheme of human needs or societal 
functions. The problem of healthy human attachments, while it can 
be construed as a separate functional issue, permeates all other func-
tions. One cannot talk about work or play or celebration without 
some sense that they are affected by the various qualities of human 
relatedness. We would argue, moreover, along with Fromm, that 
while man has no specific set of instincts which guide his work and 
personal relationships, his common biological equipment and bio-
social history (e.g., long period of dependency) create a limited set of 
alternative modes of relating to people and to the world. Thus, while 
man is not an instinctual animal with a universal set of behavior pat-
terns, he is also not a plastic animal. His behavior tends to fall into 
major slots and can be understood {though poorly predicted and 
changed with difficulty) in these terms. The significance of this point 
is its relationship to criteria for the quality of life. We assume that 
there are a limited number of models through which man comes to 
relate himself to people or to work; and that some modes or qualities 
are healthier than others. 
Fromm ( 19 70), in his theoretical formulation of this issue, for 
example, describes a number of streams into which love or work 
orientations flow. According to Fromm there are behavioral com-
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plexes which develop as individual members of a society cope with 
the problem of establishing stable modes of human attachment (so-
cialization) and work (assimilation). These complexes he calls "social 
character" and are defined as the "relatively permanent form in 
which human energy is structuralized in the process of assimilation 
and socialization" (p. 11). A gross distinction is made between pro-
ductive and nonproductive characters, loving and nonloving charac-
ters. More specific distinctions are then made among various char-
.. acter types or orientations in which qualities of love and work come 
together. Those orientations which have the greatest pathological 
potential consist of: 
Receptive orientation: feels the source of all good (affection, 
love, knowledge, material goods) can only be acquired by 
having it given-in exchange for being "good," or "ill," or 
"in need." 
Exploitative orientation: does not produce anything for him-
self; it must be obtained by taking it from other people, 
either by force or cunning. 
""' Hoarding orientation: has little faith in anything new he might 
'\ get from the outside world; security is based on hoarding 
and saving. 
Marketing orientation: has little faith that he can produce any-
thing of value; but he can "sell himself" as in a monetary 
transaction. 
The productive or healthy orientation is difficult for Fromm to de-
scribe. In general, it is a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness 
in which the person feels himself to be an actor, an agent in which he 
can exercise power in a constructive way. Nor is the power used ex-
ploitatively. "The productive person gives birth to his own faculties 
and gives life to persons and to things" (1970, p. 72). 
While the nonproductive orientations tend toward pathological 
or neurotic forms of attachment and work, this is not necessarily so. 
We see these various character orientations as common channels or 
archetypal modes of relating to one's material and personal surround-
ings. As Fromm further states (although this is somewhat contradic-
tory to his major premise regarding pathological relating}: 
There is no person whose orientation is entirely productive, and no one who is 
completely lacking in productiveness. But the respective weight of the produc-
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tive and nonproductive orientations in each person's character structure varies 
and determines the quality of the nonproductive orientations. In the foregoing 
description of the nonproductive orientations it was assumed that they were 
dominant in a character structure. We must now supplement the earlier descrip-
tion by considering the qualities of the nonproductive orientations in a character 
structure in which the productive orientation is dominant. Here the nonproduc· 
tive orientations do not have the negative meaning they have when they are 
dominant but have a different and constructive quality. In fact, the nonproduc-
tive orientations, as they have been described, may be considered as distortions 
of orientations which in themselves are a normal and necessary part of living. 
Every human being, in order to survive, must be able to accept things from oth-
ers, to take things, to save and to exchange. He must also be able to accept au-
thority, to guide others, to be alone, and to assert himself. Only if his way of 
acquiring things and relating himself to others is essentially nonproductive does 
the ability to accept, to take, to save, or to exchange turn into the craving to 
receive, to exploit, to hoard, or to market as the dominant ways of acquisition. 
The nonproductive forms of social relatedness in a predominantly productive 
person-loyalty, authority, fairness, assertiveness-turn into submission, domina-
tion, withdrawal, destructiveness in a predominantly nonproductive person. Any 
of the nonproductive orientations has, therefore, a positive and a negative as-
pect, according to the degree of productiveness in the total character structure. 
The following list of the positive and negative aspects of various orientations 
may serve as an illustration for this principle. (1970, pp. 78-80) 
Fromm then suggests negative and positive characteristics of 
personality which might be associated with three of his major charac-
ter orientations. 
Exploitative Orientation (Taking) 
Positive aspect 
active 
able to take initiative 











































































The most interesting aspect of Fromm's theory from the qual-
ity-of-life perspective is its affirmation of the fact of human diversity 
at a very basic level of personality. One must take this fact into ac-
count in looking at the interface between personality, culture, and 
social structure. That is to say, there must be available respected and 
worthy roles supported by positive cultural rules and values which 
allow the full range of social character to express itself in the society. 
While no one is so naive as to suggest that all statuses in any society 
are likely to end up equally valued-all human societies tend toward 
dominance and leadership hierarchies and humans seem anxious 
without them-one can argue ( 1) that all statuses should be seen as 
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having essential worth, and (2) that no one will be forced to occupy 
statuses and play roles which substantially violate their authentic 
sense of self. From this point of view the marketing orientation 
might be viewed as either sick or well. A healthy marketing orienta-
tion would allow a temperamentally outgoing gregarious individual 
to spend time "making himself liked" because that is his own authen-
tic way of relating to people. The person with a pathological market-
ing orientation-perhaps under the stress of competition and job 
success-might lose any sense of authentic self in the process of sell-
ing himself. 
3. Renewal, play, sleep, relaxation, fantasy, dreaming 
The human organism is biologically constructed so that it must 
pass through cycles of physical stress and emotional anxiety on the 
one hand and relaxation, renewal, and sleep on the other. Although 
in Western societies we see the work-rest cycle in terms of a means-
ends relationship, with a little reflection it becomes somewhat diffi-
cult to distinguish the means from the end. One can imagine work as 
a nagging distraction from play-fantasy-sleep; or one can imagine rest 
as the necessary pause that refreshes so that one can get back to 
work. Few would question the fact that play and human renewal are 
necessary functions of society; controversy arises over its purposes 
and relative place among other functions. Some possible criteria are: 
a. Authenticity. Modes of renewal must relate to the develop-
mental needs of individuals: babies, children, adolescents, adults, and 
old people have different renewal modes and needs. Contrived or 
managed renewal, such as Esalen type experiences, may be more 
work than play, and in this sense nonauthentic. Highly controlled 
sports like basketball or football, involving adolescent boys, may be 
experienced more as work than renewal, and therefore may provide 
less play-fantasy-dreaming than classroom activities. 
b. Fantasy-participation balance. Renewal carried out totally by 
active physical or social play or totally by fantasy-dreaming would 
seem inadequate. The working person in a modem society whose 
only source of renewal is silently sharing television fantasies, as well 
as inventing fantasies of his own through his autistic processes, is 
probably missing something. 
c. Diversity. Renewal should be diverse enough to meet the 
needs of different kinds of people (e.g., verbal play, physical play, 
artistic activity). 
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4. Planning, deciding, conflict resolution 
To some extent society is the spontaneous playing out of com-
plex behavior patterns, some of which are fully learned and some of 
which are improvised. Many activities are not spontaneous, but are 
carefully directed and managed. Human management requires plan-
ning and decision making, and one can search for quality-of-life cri-
teria which apply to decision making. 
a. Requirement that decisions be just. A criterion for justice 
might be some reasonable balance between utilitarianism (greatest 
good for the greatest number) and respect for the dignity and worth 
of the individual. 
b. Consensuality. A second criterion might be the extent to 
which members of a society feel they have some say in how decisions 
are made, what decisions are made, and how they are implemented. 
c. Legitimation. This is the acceptance by members of the soci-
ety that decisions are binding on them without force or coercion. 
d. Efficiency. This is the relationship between the amount of 
energy spent making decisions and the quality of the decisions (in 
such terms as utilitarianism or justice). 
"\.\ 
-l 
5. Celebration or acting out of universal events in the human 
condition, story telling, drama, sports, dance 
Celebration is similar to renewal, but its purpose is more inte-
grative, that is, directed toward personal expression and binding of 
groups, tribes, or societies to provide security against individual 
frailty by dealing successfully with anxieties and limitations. The 
celebration of birth, harvest, death (rebirth), marriage, or community 
is on the whole positive, although man has invented pathological 
celebrations to serve short-run goals (e.g., witch trials and burnings, 
mass meetings in Nazi Germany). Quality-of-life criteria for human 
celebration are similar to those for human renewal. 
a. Authenticity. Are there genuinely shared joys, anxieties, and 
hardships? Is there genuine fellowship? 
b. Transcendence of man's anthropocentric bias. There are uni-
versal elements in the human condition and universal elements in 
nature which bind man-in-society to the planet. Transcendent cele-
brations recognize not only human life but life more generally; the 
biological unity of many forms of life and nonlife; man's evolu-
tionary past, bound to other forms of life in a common history (e.g., 
man has salt in his veins because he rose from the sea). 
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c. Diversity. Can the diversity of humans in a society (old-
young, weak-strong, men-women, conceptual-sensuous-kinesthetic, 
etc.) find authentic meaning in a common celebration? 
6. Creation of myth and meaning: placing man in relationship 
to past and future events or human and cosmic events 
As O'Dea says, "Culture is the creation by man of a world of 
adjustment and meaning, in the context of which human life can be 
significantly lived" (1966, p. 3). Both because it is instrumentally 
useful (symbols and concepts are tools) and because man has a drive 
for a sense of purpose, societies create constellations and systems of 
meaning which surround their lives. The loss of meaning leads to 
suicide. 
While secular thinkers are prone to separate empirical knowl-
edge from religion, both spheres are included in our term ''belief 
system." We would argue that modem religion has become trivialized 
precisely because it is separated from the common concerns and 
everyday facts of life encompassed by instrumental (useful) "true" 
knowledge. 
Functionalists such as O'Dea state explicitly that the purpose of 
religion is to deal with man's need to transcend common human ex-
perience. The need for transcendence, according to O'Dea, is rooted 
in man's frailty-his sense of uncertainty, powerlessness, and scarcity, 
and the consequent frustration at not being able to control these 
conditions. Our own view is that man's drive for meaning is rooted in 
the nature of the organism itself-man inherently has the capacity 
and the need to create and communicate meaning. Most forms of life 
exist in conditions of uncertainty, powerlessness, and scarcity, but 
few if any have a meaning system in the human sense. Man is driven 
not only to ask the ultimate "why" of the human condition, but also to 
ask the why of day-to-day events-why did his friend let him 
down? why did he injure himself or become ill? Man's life is enclosed 
within a web of meaning. From our point of view it is somewhat 
misguided to separate out the more ultimate questions as sacred and 
call the day-to-day questions secular, especially since the domains of 
reality shift about within these two categories. (The nation-state or 
the Communist Party may replace the Roman Catholic Church as a 
sacred domain.) 
O'Dea argues that a major social and cultural development of 
the last several centuries has been the secularization of culture. 
120 
Dimensions of Quality of Life 
We have seen that in primitive and traditional societies religion is a pervasive 
matter, and that religious beliefs and rites play an important part in the activities of 
various kinds of groups, from the family to occupational groups. We have seen that 
in such societies religion tends to provide the over-all point of view-the idea-
tional system or complex of thought-ways-in whose context human experience 
in general is understood. (p. 81) 
On the other hand, in modem societies this world view has become 
fragmented and emptied of strong emotional response, in short, secu-
larized. 
Secularization may be said to consist fundamentally of two related transforma-
tions in human thinking. There is first the "desacralization" of the attitude 
toward persons and things-the withdrawal of the kind of emotional involvement 
which is to be found in the religious response, in the response to the sacred. 
Secondly, there is the rationalization of thought-the withholding of emotional 
participation in thinking about the world. Rationalization implies both a cogni-
tive attitude relatively free of emotion, and the use of logic rather than an emo-
tional symbolism to organize thought. (p. 81) 
,., One could describe a sacred meaning system for contemporary 
-" man, including a sacred attitude toward such ideas as technology and 
purposeful progress, and such artifacts as automobiles and electrical 
appliances. Moreover, it is doubtful that medieval monks and priests 
behaved with stronger feelings about their day-to-day religious beliefs 
than do their modem counterparts (e.g., psychiatrists, physicians, 
engineers, and television celebrities). 
Our point is that man has probably changed as a species very 
little over the past centuries. What we call sacred today seems archaic 
only because we need sufficient historical distance to understand 
what has contemporary spiritual significance. We are embedded in 
sacred meanings in contemporary times precisely because man needs 
that level or intensity of experience. 
Given these general remarks we would suggest the following as 
quality-of-life criteria for a human meaning system. 
a. Authenticity. To what extent docs our world view authenti-
cally describe the human condition on the planet? One might look, 
for example, at the contrast between Social Darwinism and Quaker-
ism in terms of the problem of human aggression. Social Darwinism 
sees man as an aggressive, competitive, predatory animal and cele-
brates the fittest who survive. Quakerism sees man as a friendly, 
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cooperative animal and celebrates his ability to solve problems of 
human conflict through peaceful negotiation. At least superficially, 
both would seem inadequate. 
b. Range of abstraction. To what extent do beliefs deal with hu-
man meaning at various levels of abstraction and concreteness so all 
members of a society can share in the meaning? One might take as an 
example of this issue the problem of man coming to terms with the 
origin of life and the origin of his own species. The most authentic 
meaning system currently available is derived from theories of bio-
logical evolution and organic chemistry, both of which are abstract 
and complex. So most humans live with an archaic belief system 
(Genesis, or a similar myth), because no religio-scientific thinker has 
bothered to translate organic chemistry or evolution into sufficiently 
simple and concrete symbols or meanings so that common people 
can share in the more authentic system. 
c. Comprehensiveness. To what extent are there domains of hu-
man life which are avoided or omitted from a meaning system? For 
contemporary man in modern societies the meaning of death, for 
example, is quite obscure. Given our dominant orientation toward 
technology and science it is somewhat disconcerting that we have so 
little to say about human death. It is interesting that technology-
science does have an elaborate meaning system for human healrh and 
illness, including countless artifacts and symbols. Perhaps we assume 
that keeping people healthy will, in the long run, make them im-
mortal. 
d. Level of integration. It is probably safe to assume that a 
meaning system which can relate various domains of human action, 
at least in some loose way, is going to be more adequate than one 
which deals with the human career as a set of fragments. Puritanism, 
for example, suggests relationships among human attachment, work, 
and celebration. Modem Freudian meaning systems, including the 
Frommian analysis in this paper, attempt to relate love and 
work. 
One can generate quality-of-life criteria by looking separately at 
individual functional requirements (as we have), by looking at rela-
tionships among various functional requirements, and finally by con-
sideration of the requirements as a whole. In the last category, one 
might say that any society or subsociety with a relatively balanced 
expression of basic human functions might have a higher quality of 
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life than one which has focused most of its energies on one or two 
functions. One might consider the decision-making executive, the 
playboy, or the compulsive worker as exhibiting pathological life-
styles on a prim a facia basis. One can also look at the whole set of 
functional requirements in terms of the extent to which various func-
tions are integrated within common activities. Slaughtering an animal 
might, for example, be seen as a religious act {as celebration imbued 
with meaning), as an act of human sharing (bonding), and as adapta-
tion or work. Our suspicion is that highly integrated societies tend to 
be oppressive because their structures must be so tight and con-
trolled; that poorly integrated or fragmented societies tend toward 
insecurity and stress because any single function seems in itself mar-
ginally significant and therefore dispcnsible. 
Analytic Systems and the Integrity of Human Community 
However one looks at human community or society, we assume 
that quality of life is derived in some final sense by intuitive, albeit 
careful, sustained reflective thinking. In the last analysis, man's 
°" capacity for human society is a product of a long and poorly under-_ _;, 
stood evolutionary process, while man's conception of his own con-
dition is based on one small evolutionary product, the human mind. 
In the words of Hallowell: 
Society, culture, and personality may, of course, be conceptually differentiated 
for specialized types of analysis and study. On the other hand, it is being more 
clearly recognized than heretofore that society, culture, and personality cannot 
be postulated as completely independent variables. Man as an organic species, 
evolved from a primate ancestry, constitutes our basic frame of reference, and 
we find ourselves confronted, as observers, with the complexities of the human 
situation that have resulted from this process. Here I wish to consider man as the 
dynamic center of characteristic modes and processes of adjustment that are cen-
tral to a human existence, in order to emphasize the integral reality of society, 
culture, and personality structure as human phenomena. It is this integral reality 
that constitutes the human situation as our unique subject matter. Our abstrac-
tions and constructs, which may be ordered in different ways and for different 
purposes and which may vary in their heuristic value, are derived from observa-
tions of the same integral order of phenomena. ( 1953, p. 600) 
It is to this "integral reality" we must always return for the valida-
tion of whatever judgments we make about the sanity, stress, and 
quality of life in human societies. 
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Conclusion 
We have presented two schema by which one might describe hu-
man communities. It is our hope that through such analyses one 
might systematically generate a more complex and holistic set of cri-
teria by which to judge quality of life. One might look, for example, 
at the interaction between channels and functions as suggested by 

















Looking across line one of this matrix, one can ask: 
1. Within what social forms or institutions is work carried out? 
in families? sodalities? corporate organizations? 
2. What is the culture (rules, ideology) of work within these in 
stitu tions? 
3. What types of personalities are best adapted or least well 
adapted for the kinds of work carried on in the society? How is hu-
man diversity handled within work settings? Are workers of different 
types and statuses segregated (as in a modem corporation)? Do they 
work and relate together (as in a kibbutz)? 
4. What are the environmental conditions within which work is 
carried out (e.g., household industry, factories)? 
One might also look at relationships within and among channels 
or functions. Regarding channels, for example, one might ask to 
what extent the various channels mutually support and reinforce or 
contradict one another. A society which carries on human inter· 
action in relatively intimate social forms (e.g., household industry) 
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yet whose culture stresses impersonalness or distance might well 
create dissonance and stress. A society, like our own, which func-
tions within three major social forms-intimate dyads, nuclear fami-
lies, and impersonal corporate work settings-presumably must create 
somewhat contradictory sets of cultural rules. The central myth of 
the intimate dyad, for example, is that fulfillment comes from find-
ing the perfect love; fulfillment in the corporate setting comes from 
work success. 
One might look at the extent to which a society is functionally 
integrated; that is, the extent to which several functions are carried 
on in common settings, or the ex tent to which several functions arc 
at least culturally (ideologically) related. Puritanism, for example, 
developed a meaning system which related work (successful work 
was considered evidence of grace), celebration (church-related activi-
ties), and decision making (elders in the church were seen as wise 
decision makers). In the Bruderhof described by Zablocki (1971) vir-
tually all human functions are tied together around a common mean-
ing system, a common culture in an isolated and in ti mate setting. 
~Modem societies are comparatively highly fragmented. Celebrations, 
~for example, are carried on quite independently and focus on a wide 
variety of human meanings: football games celebrate violence, manli-
ness, competition, and discipline; rock concerts celebrate hedonistic 
release; quiz shows and shopping malls celebrate material success and 
consumerism; school ceremonials celebrate the value of difficult and 
often meaningless work. 
While we feel that our analytic schema of channels and func-
tions have considerable heuristic value in generating hypotheses 
about quality of life, we have a continuing concern about the rela-
tionship between quality of life and the potentials, constraints, and 
contradictions in the human condition based on the evolutionary 
nature of the species. The most focused statement of this concern 
might be the extent to which any human society incorporates in its 
functions and channels some expression of the human potential 
along the primal-modem continuum. (See tables 5.1 and 5.2 for a 
summary comparison.) 
From an evolutionary point of view, we have assumed that 
man's more primal capacities and characteristics continue to make 
substantial demands on individuals and societies which, if ignored, 
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Table 5.2 
Modern-Primitive Aspects of Human Functions 
Work 
Pn.mitive Modern 
Visible relationship between work and requirements for survival 
Nonuniformity of products; personal relationships between peo-
ple and products 
Less fragmentation of work roles 
Visible relationship between division of labor and efficiency; 
various parts of a task are visible to all 
Tasks tend to be associated with the personalities of people, ra-
ther than being seen as abstract jobs 
Contribution of various members of society cannot he reduced 
to common denominator-money 
Work performed with simple tools owned or controlled by 
worker 
Attachment 
Primary bonds are at band or extended kinship level rather than 
in nuclear family or to produce corporate work 
Long-term bonds, often for life 
Tendency toward more diffuse bonds; less intensive, more exten-
sive 
Age, sex, and kinship relationships tend to permeate relation-
ships rather than job roles or specialized interests 
Spontaneous social relating; fantasy, gossip, small talk 
No sharp line between reality, fantasy, and dreaming 
Renewal 
Celebration 
General participation, often with specialized parts based on age, 
sex, and kinship relationships 
Often linked to natural cycles: human life cycle, daily or sea-
sonal cycles 
Accompanied by music, dance, bodily movement 
Related to religious or magical meaning 
Embedded in tradition; tendency toward repetitiveness 
Creation of meaning 
Embedded in natural environment 
Slowly evolving 
Nonrelativistic; words and symbols intrinsically linked with the 
reality they describe 
Meaning in the environment to be discovered and used by man 
Relationship between tasks performed and requirements for sur-
vival often remains opaque 
Products of work are uniform and replaceable 
Highly developed division of labor and work roles 
Relationship between individual task and other tasks required to 
complete a whole task is often opaque 
Jobs have abstract requirements separated from the personalities 
of individual workers 
Value or contribution of individual members of society can be 
reduced to a common denominator and expressed quanti-
tatively through money 
Work performed with complex expensive tools owned by imper-
sonal corporate groups 
Primary bonds are within transitory nuclear family or in job 
roles 
Geographic mobility leads to short-term bonds 
Tendency toward small number of intense relationships 
Tendency toward relationships based on common interest, com-
mon jobs 
Age, sex, and kinship minimized as bases for relationships 
Organized play; continuing concern with self-improvement or 
performing recreation 
Fantasy and dreaming demarcated and labeled 
Participation by professional performers based on special talent, 
competence, and training; large group of nonperformers 
act as audience and share experience vicariously 
Often not linked to natural cycles; performances based on utili-
tarian criteria such as size of audience and availability of 
talent 
Performers active; audience passive 
Tendency to celebrate quality of performance rather than reli-
gious or magical significance of the celebration 
Innovation and novelty valued 
Because performances are novel and follow a literate script, they 
must be highly managed and practiced 
Impersonal relationship between performers and audience 
Tendency toward description of man-made environment 
Rapidly changing 
Relativistic; words and symbols seen as abstractions to be manip-
ulated and played with 
Meaning only partly in the environment; meaning partly related 
to man's sensing equipment and nervous sy!tem 
Decision making and conflict resolution 
Authority based on tradition, often linked with age and sex Authority based on meritocratic requirements of instrumental 
Strong press for consensus of small face-to-face groups accomplishment 
Sanctioning of emotional outbursts and personal conflict and Acceptance of authoritarian hierarchy based on impersonal con-
violence tracu 
Strong sanctions against personal emotional outbursts; support 
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challenge for creating positive culture in modern society is inventing 
social institutions in which primal and modern elements of human 
evolution are allowed expression in nondestructive or noncompeti-
tive ways; or in which the modem and primal are integrated within a 
common setting. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Elements of Diffusion 
To get the bad customs of a country changed and new ones, though 
belter, introduced, it is necessary first to remove the prejudices of the 
people, enlighten their ignorance, and convince them that their interests 
will be promoted by the proposed changes; and this is not the work of a 
day. 
Benjamin Franklin (1781) 
There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubt/ ul of success, nor 
more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new order of 
things . ... Whenever his enemies have occasion to attack the innovator 
they do so with the passion of partisans, while the others defend him 
sluggishly so that the innovator and his party alike are vulnerable. 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
The Prince(l513) 
ONE REASON WHY THERE JS so MUCH INTEREST in the diffusion 
of innovations is because getting a new idea adopted, even when it has 
obvious advantages, is often very difficult. There is a wide gap in 
many fields, between what is known and what is actually put into use. 
Many innovations require a lengthy period, often of some years, from 
the time when they become available to the time when they are widely 
adopted. Therefore, a common problem for many individuals and or-
ganizations is how to speed up the rate of diffusion of an innovation. 
The following case illustration provides insight into some common 
difficulties facing programs of diffusion. 
Water Boiling in a Peruvian Village: 
A Diffusion Campaign that Failed* 
The public health service in Peru attempts to introduce innovations to 
villagers to improve their health and lengthen their lives. This change agency 
•This case illustration is adapted from Well in ( 1955, pp. 71-103), and is used by per-
mission. 
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enjoys a reputation for efficiency throughout Latin America. It encourages 
people to install latrines, to burn garbage daily, to control house flies, to 
report cases of infectious diseases, and to boil drinking water. These innova-
tions involve major changes in thinking and behavior for Peruvian villagers, 
who do not understand how sanitation is related to illness. 
Water boiling is an important health practice for villagers and urban 
poor in Peru. Unless they boil their drinking water, patients who are cured of 
infectious diseases in village medical clinics often return within a month to be 
treated again for the same disease. 
A two-year water-boiling campaign conducted in Los Molinos, a peasant 
village of 200 families in the coastal region of Peru, persuaded only eleven 
housewives to boil water. From the viewpoint of the public health agency, 
the local health worker, Nelida, had a simple task: to persuade the house-
wives of Los Molinas to add water boiling to their pattern of daily behavior. 
Even with the aid of a medical doctor, who gave public talks on water boil-
ing, and fifteen village housewives who were already boiling water before the 
campaign, Nelida's diffusion program failed. To understand why, we need 
to take a closer look at the culture, the local environment, and the in-
dividuals in Los Molinos. 
THE VrLLAGE OF Los MoLINOS. Most residents of Los Molinos are 
~ peasants who work as field hands on local plantations. Water is carried by 
-,:. can, pail, gourd, or cask. Children are the usual water carriers; it is not con-
sidered appropriate for adult men to carry water, and they seldom do. The 
three sources of water in Los Molinos include a seasonal irrigation ditch 
close to the village, a spring more than a mile away from the village, and a 
public well whose water the villagers dislike. All three are subject to pollu-
tion at all times and show contamination whenever tested. Of the three 
sources, the irrigation ditch is most commonly used. It is closer to most 
homes, it has the advantage of being running water rather than stagnant, and 
the villagers like its taste. 
Although it is not feasible for the village to install a sanitary water 
system, the incidence of typhoid and other water-borne diseases could be 
reduced by boiling the water before consumption. During her two-year 
residence in Los Molinos, Nelida made several visits to every home in the 
village but devoted especially intensive efforts to twenty-one families. She 
visited each of these selected families between fifteen and twenty-five times; 
eleven of these families now boil their water regularly. 
What kinds of persons do these numbers represent? We describe three 
village housewives-one who boils water to obey custom, one who was per-
suaded to boil water by the health worker, and one of the many who rejected 
the innovation-in order to add further insight into the process of diffusion. 
Mrs. A: Custom-Oriented Adopter. Mrs. A is about forty and suffers 
from sinus infection. The Los Molinos villagers call her a ''sickly one.'' Each 
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has no understanding of germ theory, as explained by Nelida; her motivation 
for water boiling is a complex local custom of "hot" and "cold" distinc-
tions. The basic principle of this belief system is that all foods, liquids, 
medicines, and other objects are inherently hot or cold, quite apart from 
their actual temperature. In essence hot-cold distinctions serve as a series of 
avoidances and approaches in such behavior as pregnancy, child rearing, 
and the health-illness system. 
Boiled water and illness are closely linked in the folkways of Los 
Molinas; by custom, only the ill use cooked, or "hot" water. Once an in-
dividual becomes ill, it is unthinkable for him to eat pork (very cold) or to 
drink brandy (very hot). Extremes of hot and cold must be avoided by the 
sick; therefore, raw water, which is perceived to be very cold, must be boiled 
to overcome the extreme temperature. 
Villagers learn from childhood to dislike boiled water. Most can tolerate 
cooked water only if flavoring, such as sugar, cinnamon, lemon, or herbs, is 
added. Mrs. A likes a dash of cinnamon in her drinking water. The village 
belief system involves no notion of bacteriological contamination of water. 
By tradition, boiling is aimed at eliminating the innate "cold" quality of un-
boiled water, not the harmful bacteria. Mrs. A drinks boiled water in obe-
dience to local custom, because she is ill. 
Mrs. B: Persuaded Adopter. The B family came to Los Molinas a 
generation ago, but they are still strongly oriented toward their birthplace 
high in the Andes Mountains. Mrs. B worries about lowland diseases that she 
feels infest the village. It is partly because of this anxiety that the change 
agent, Nelida, was able to convince Mrs. B to boil water. 
Nelida is a friendly authority to Mrs. B (rather than a' 'dirt inspector," as 
she is seen by most other housewives), who imparts knowledge and brings 
protection. Mrs. B not only boils water but also has installed a latrine and 
has sent her youngest child to the health center for a check-up. 
Mrs.Bis marked as an outsider in the community by her highland hairdo 
and stumbling Spanish. She will never achieve more than marginal social ac-
ceptance in the village. Because the community is not an important reference 
group to her, Mrs. B deviates from village norms on health innovations. 
With nothing to lose socially, Mrs. B gains in personal security by heeding 
Nelida's advice. Mrs. B's practice of boiling water has no effect on her 
marginal status. She is grateful to Nelida for teaching her how to neutralize 
the danger of contaminated water, a lowland peril as she perceives it. 
Mrs. C: Rejector. This housewife represents the majority of Los 
Molinos families who are not persuaded by the efforts of the change agent 
during the two-year health campaign. In spite of Nelida's repeated explana-
tions, Mrs. C does not understand germ theory. How, she argues, can 
microbes survive in water that would drown people? Are they fish? If germs 
are so small that they cannot be seen or felt, how can they hurt a grown per-
son? There are enough real threats in the world to worry about-poverty and 
.. I;_, 
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hunger-without bothering about tiny animals one cannot see, hear, touch, 
or smell. Mrs. C's allegiance to traditional customs is at odds with the boiling 
of water. A firm believer in the hot-cold superstition, she feels that only the 
sick must drink boiled water. 
UNDERSTANDING WHY THE DIFFUSION OF WATER 8oJLING FAILED. 
This intensive two-year campaign by a public health worker in a Peruvian 
village of 200 families, aimed at persuading housewives to boil drinking 
water, was largely unsuccessful. Nelida was able to encourage only about 5 
percent of the population, eleven families, to adopt the innovation. In con-
trast, change agents in other Peruvian villages were able to convince 15 to 20 
percent of the housewives. Reasons for the relative failure of the diffusion 
campaign in Los Molinos can be traced partly to the cultural beliefs of the 
villagers. Local tradition links hot foods with illness. Boiling water makes it 
less "cold," and hence, appropriate only for the sick. But if a person is not 
ill, he is prohibited by village norms from drinking boiled water. Only the in-
dividuals who are least integrated into local networks risk defying commu-
nity norms on water boiling. An important factor affecting the adoption rate 
of any innovation is its compatibility with the values, beliefs, and past ex-
periences of the social system. Nelida and her superiors in the public health 
agency should have understood the hot-cold belief system, as it is found 
throughout Peru (and, in fact, in most nations of Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia). 
Nelida's failure demonstrates the importance of interpersonal networks 
in the adoption and rejection of an innovation. Socially an outsider, Mrs. B 
was marginal to the Los Molinos community, although she had lived there 
for years. Nelida was a more important referent for Mrs. B than were her 
neighbors, who shunned her. Anxious to secure social acceptance from the 
higher-status Nelida, Mrs. B adopted water boiling, not because she under-
stood the correct health reasons, but because she wanted to obtain Nelida's 
approval. Thus we see that the diffusion of innovations is often a social proc-
ess, as well as a technical matter. 
Nelida worked with the wrong housewives if she wanted to launch a self-
generating diffusion process in Los Molinos. She concentrated her efforts on 
village women like Mrs. A and Mrs. B. Unfortunately, they were perceived 
as a sickly one and a social outsider and were not respected as social models 
of water-boiling behavior by the other women. The village opinion leaders, 
who could have activated local networks to spread the innovation, were ig-
nored by Nelida. · 
How potential adopters view the change agent affects their willingness to 
adopt his or her ideas. In Los Molinos, Nelida was perceived differently by 
lower- and middle-status housewives. Most poor families saw the health 
worker as a "snooper" sent to Los Molinos to pry for dirt and to press 
already harassed housewives into keeping cleaner homes. Because the lower-
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Nelida about water boiling. Their contacts outside the community were 
limited, and as a result, they saw the technically proficient Nelida with eyes 
bound by the social horizons and traditional beliefs of Los Molinas. They 
distrusted this outsider, whom they perceived as a social stranger. Nelida, 
who was middle class by Los Molinos standards, was able to secure more 
positive results from housewives whose socioeconomic level and cultural 
background were more similar to hers. This tendency for more effective 
communication to occur with those who are more similar to change agents 
occurs in most diffusion campaigns. 
In general Nelida was too "innovation-oriented" and not "client-
oriented'' enough. Unable to put herself in the role of the village housewives, 
her attempts at persuasion failed to reach her clients because the message was 
not suited to their needs. Nelida did not begin where the villagers were; in-
stead she talked to them about germ theory, which they could not (and prob-
ably did not need to) understand. 
We have cited only some of the factors that produced the diffusion 
failure with which Nelida is charged. It will be easier to understand the 
water-boiling case once the remainder of this book has been read. We shall 
return to discuss lessons learned from the Los Molinas case in future 
chapters. 
What Is Diffusion? 
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is ~ommunicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system. It is a special type of communication, in that the messages are 
concerned with new ideas. Communication is a process in which par-
ticipants create and share information with one another in order to 
reach a mutual understanding. This definition implies that communi-
cation is a process of convergence (or divergence) as two or more in-
dividuals exchange information in order to move toward each other 
(or apart) in the meanings that they ascribe to certain events. We think 
of communication as a two-way process of convergence, rather than 
as a one-way, linear act in which one individual seeks to transfer a 
message to another (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). Such a simple concep-
tion of human communication may accurately describe certain com-
munication acts or events involved in diffusion, such as when a change 
agent seeks to persuade a client to adopt an innovation. But when we 
look at what came before such an event, and at what follows, we often 
realize that such an event is only one part of a total process in which in-
-,> 
~;--
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formation is exchanged between the two individuals. For example, the 
client may come to the change agent with a problem or need, and the 
innovation is recommended as a possible solution. And if we look at 
the change agent-client interaction in a broader context, we may see 
that their interaction continues through several cycles, and is indeed a 
process of information exchange. 
So diffusion is a special type of communication, in which the mes-
sages are concerned with a new idea. It is this newness of the idea in the 
message content of communication that gives diffusion its special 
character. The newness means that some degree of uncertainty is in-
volved. 
Uncertainty is the degree to which a number of alternatives are 
perceived with respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative 
probability of these alternatives. Uncertainty implies a lack of predict-
ability, of structure, of information. In fact, information represents 
one of the main means of reducing uncertainty. Information is a dif-
ference in matter-energy that affects uncertainty in a situation where a 
choice exists among a set of alternatives (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981, p. 
64). • As we show in a later section of this chapter, a technological in-
novation embodies information and thus reduces uncertainty about 
cause-effect relationships in problem solving. For iHstance, my adop-
tion of residential solar panels for water heating reduces my uncer-
tainty about future price increases in the cost of oil. We find it useful 
to conceptualize the diffusion and adoption of innovations in terms of 
a framework based on information and uncertainty. The use of these 
key concepts helps us to understand the diffusion of technological in-
novations as one type of communication process. 
Diffusion is a kind of social change, defined as the process by 
which alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social 
system. When new ideas are invented, diffused, and are adopted or re-
jected, leading to certain consequences, social change occurs. Of 
course, such change can happen in other ways too, for example, 
through a political revolution or through a natural event like a 
drought or earthquake. 
Some authors restrict the term "diffusion" to the spontaneous, 
unplanned spread of new ideas, and use the concept of "dissemina-
•"Information is something which reduces uncertainty. Communication is exchange 
of information. Most writers in the field of communication research would have no 
difficulty in agreeing with the first definition above. Just as many writers, no doubt, 



















Elements of Diffusion 7 
tion" for diffusion that is directed and managed. We use diffusion 
and dissemination interchangeably in this book because the distinc-
tion often is not very clear in actual practice. And the general conven-
tion is to use the word "diffusion" to include both the planned and 
the spontaneous spread of new ideas. 
But we do find it useful to distinguish between centralized and 
decentralized diffusion systems. In a centralized diffusion system, 
decisions about such matters as when to begin diffusing an innova-
tion, who should evaluate it, and through what channels it will be dif-
fused, are made by a small number of officials and/or technical ex-
perts at the head of a change agency. In a decentralized diffusion 
system, such decisions are more widely shared by the clients and 
potential adopters; here, horizontal networks among the clients are 
the main mechanism through which innovations spread. In fact, in ex-
tremely decentralized diffusion systems there may not be a change 
agency; potential adopters are solely responsible for the self-manage-
ment of the diffusion of innovations. New ideas may grow out of the 
practical experience of certain individuals in the client system, rather 
than coming from formal R & D activities. Originally, it was assumed 
that relatively centralized diffusion systems like the agricultural exten-
sion service were an essential ingredient in the diffusion process, but in 
recent years several relatively decentralized diffusion systems have 
been investigated and evaluated, and found to represent an ap-
propriate alternative to centralized diffusion under certain conditions 
(as detailed in Chapter 9). 
Controlling Scurvy in the British Navy: 
Innovations Do Not Sell Themselves 
Many technologists think that advantageous innovations will sell them-
selves, that the obvious benefits of a new idea will be widely realized by 
potential adopters, and that the innovation will therefore diffuse rapidly. 
Unfortunately, this is very seldom the case. Most innovations, in fact, dif-
fuse at a surprisingly slow rate. 
Scurvy control provides an interesting historical case of how slowly an 
obviously beneficial innovation spread (Mosteller, 1981). In the early days of 
long sea voyages, scurvy was the worst killer of the world's sailors, worse 
than warfare, accidents, and all other causes of death. For instance, of 
Vasco de Gama's crew of 160 men who sailed with him around the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1497, 100 died of scurvy. In 1601, an English sea captain, 
James Lancaster, conducted a kind of experiment to evaluate the ability of 
~ 
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lemon juice to prevent scurvy. Captain Lancaster commanded four ships 
that sailed from England on a voyage to India; he served three teaspoonfuls 
of lemon juice every day to the sailors on the biggest of his four ships. Most 
of these men stayed healthy. But on the three smaller ships, by the halfway 
point in the journey, 110 out of 278 sailors had died from scurvy. The three 
smaller ships constituted Lancaster's "control group"; they were not given 
any lemon juice. So many of these sailors were sick, in fact, that Lancaster 
had to transfer men from the large ship to staff the three smaller ships. 
These results were so clear-cut that one might expect that the British 
Navy would decide to adopt citrus juice as a scurvy prevention on all its 
ships, or at least to carry out further investigations on the effects of citrus 
fruit. But it was not until 1747, about 150 years later, that James Lind, a 
British Navy physician who knew of Lancaster's results, carried out another 
experiment on the ship Salisbury. To each scurvy patient on this ship, Lind 
prescribed either two oranges and one lemon, or one of five other diets: a 
half-pint of sea water, six spoonfuls of vinegar, a quart of cider, nutmeg, or 
seventy-five drops of vitriol elixir. The scurvy patients who got the citrus 
fruits were cured in a few days, and were able to help Dr. Lind care for the 
other patients. Unfortunately, the supply of oranges and lemons was ex-
hausted in six days. 
Certainly, with this further solid evidence of the ability of citrus fruits to 
combat scurvy, one would expect the British Navy to adopt this technologi-
cal innovation for all ship's crews on long sea voyages, and in fact, it did so. 
But not until 1795,f orty-eight years later. Scurvy was immediately wiped out. 
And after a further wait of only seventy more years, in 1865, the British 
Board of Trade adopted a similar policy, and eradicated scurvy in the mer-
chant marine. 
Why were naval authorities so slow to adopt the idea of citrus for scurvy 
prevention? Historians are not able to provide a very clear explanation. But 
it seems that other, competing remedies for scurvy were also being proposed, 
and each such cure had its champions. For example, Captain Cook's reports 
from his voyages in the Pacific did not provide support for curing scurvy 
with citrus fruits. Further, Dr. Lind was not a very prominent figure in the 
field of naval medicine, and so his experimental findings did not get much at-
tention in the British Navy. While scurvy prevention was generally resisted 
for years by the British Navy, other innovations like new ships and new guns 
were accepted more readily. 
Many other historical illustrations could also be cited to show that more 
than just a beneficial innovation is necessary for its diffusion and adoption 
to occur. The reader may think that such slow diffusion could only happen in 
the distant past, before a scientific and experimental approach to evaluating 
innovations was very well accepted. We answer by calling the reader's atten-
tion to the contemporary case of the nondiffusion of the Dvorak typewriter 
keyboard. 
.)· 
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Nondiffusion of the Dvorak Keyboard* 
Most of us who use a typewriter-and this includes about I 8 million indi-
viduals who earn their living as typists-don't even know that our fingers tap 
out words on a keyboard that is called "QWERTY," named after the first 
six keys in the upper row of letters. Even fewer of us know just how ineffi-
cient the QWERTY keyboard is. For example, this typewriter keyboard 
takes twice as long to learn as it should, requires twice as long to use as it 
should, and makes us work about twenty times harder than we should. But 
QWERTY has persisted out of inertia since 1873, and today unsuspecting in-
dividuals are still being taught to use the QWERTY keyboard, unaware that 
a much more efficient typewriter keyboard is available. 
Where did QWERTY come from, and why does it continue to be used, 
instead of much more efficient alternative keyboard designs? QWERTY was 
invented by Christopher Latham Sholes in I 873, who designed this keyboard 
to slow the typist down. In that day, the type bars on a typewriter hung down 
in a sort of basket, and pivoted up to strike the paper; then they fell back in 
place by gravity. When two adjoining keys were struck rapidly in succession, 
they often jammed. Sholes rearranged the keys on a typewriter keyboard to 
minimize such jamming; he "anti-engineered" the arrangement to make the 
most commonly used letter sequences awkward and slow to use. By thus 
making it difficult for a typist to operate the machine, and slowing down typ-
ing speed, Sholes' QWERTY keyboard allowed these old typewriters to 
operate satisfactorily., His design was used in the manufacture of all type-
writers. 
Prior to about I 900, most typists used the two-finger, hunt-and-peck 
system. But thereafter, as touch typing became popular, dissatisfaction with 
the QWERTY keyboard began to grow. Typewriters became mechanically 
more efficient, and the QWERTY keyboard design was no longer necessary 
to prevent key jamming. The search for an improved design was led by Pro-
fessor August Dvorak at the University of Washington, who in 1932 used 
time-and-motion studies to create a much more efficient keyboard arrange-
ment. The Dvorak keyboard has the letters A, 0, E, U, I, D, H, T, N, and S 
across the home row of the typewriter. Less frequently used letters were 
placed on the upper and lower rows of keys. About 70 percent of the typing is 
done on the home row, 22 percent on the upper row, and 8 percent on the 
lower row. On the Dvorak keyboard, the amount of work assigned to each 
finger is proportionate to its skill and strength. Further, Professor Dvorak 
engineered his keyboard so that successive keystrokes fell on alternative 
hands; thus, while a finger on one hand is stroking a key, a finger on the 
other hand can be moving into position to hit the next key. Typing rhythm is 
thus facilitated; this hand alternation was achieved by putting the vowels 
•Further detail on the Dvorak keyboard may be found in Dvorak et al (1936), Parkin-
son (1972), and Lessley (1980). 
-.;,:, 
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(which represent 40 percent of all letters typed) on the left-hand side, and 
placing the major consonants that usually accompany these vowels on the 
right-hand side of the keyboard. 
Professor Dvorak was able to avoid many of the typing inefficiencies of 
the QWERTY keyboard. For instance, QWERTY overloads the left hand; it 
must type 57 percent of ordinary copy. The Dvorak keyboard shifts this em-
phasis to 56 percent on the stronger right hand and 44 percent on the weaker 
left hand. Only 32 percent of typing is done on the home row with the 
QWERTY system, compared to 70 percent with the Dvorak keyboard. And 
the newer arrangement requires less jumping back and forth from row to 
row; with the QWERTY keyboard, a good typist's fingertips travel more 
than twelve miles a day, jumping from row to row. These unnecessary in-
tricate movements cause mental tension, typist fatique, and lead to more 
typographical errors. 
One might expect, on the basis of its overwhelming advantages, that the 
Dvorak keyboard would have completely replaced the inferior QWERTY 
keyboard by now. On the contrary, after more than 40 years, almost all 
typists are still using the inefficient QWERTY keyboard. Even though the 
American National Standards Institute and the Computer and Business 
Equipment Manufacturers Association have approved the Dvorak keyboard 
as an alternate design, it is still almost impossible to find a typewriter (or a 
computer) keyboard that is arranged in the more efficient layout. Vested in-
terests are involved in hewing to the old design: manufacturers, sales outlets, 
typing teachers, and typists themselves. 
No, technological innovations are not always diffused and adopted 
rapidly. Even when the innovation has obvious and proven advantages. 
As the reader may have guessed by now, the present pages were typed on 
a QWERTY keyboard. 
Four Main Elements in the Diffusion 
of Innovations 
Previously we defined diffusion as the process by which (l) an innova-
tion (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) 
among the members of a social system. The four main elements are the 
innovation, communication channels, time, and the social system 
(Figure l-1). They are identifiable in every diffusion research study, 
and in every diffusion campaign or program (like the diffusion of 
water boiling in a Peruvian village). 
The following description of these four elements in diffusion con-
stitutes an overview of the main concepts and viewpoints that will be 
detailed in Chapters 2 through 11. 
- - -
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I. The Innovation 
An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new 
by an individual or other unit of adoption. It matters little, so far as 
human behavior is concerned, whether or not an idea is "objectively" 
new as measured by the lapse of time since its first use or discovery. 
The perceived newness of the idea for the individual determines his or 
her reaction to it. If the idea seems new to the individual, it is an inno-
vation. 
Newness in an innovation need not just involve new knowledge. 
Someone may have known about an innovation for some time but not 
yet developed a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward it, nor have 
adopted or rejected it. The ''newness" aspect of an innovation may be 
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Figure 1-1. Diffusion is the process by which (I) an innovation (2) is com-
municated through certain channels (3) over time ( 4) among the members of 
a social system. 
Among the important research questions addressed by diffusion scholars 
are (1) how the earlier adopters differ from the later adopters of an innova-
tion (Chapter 7), (2) how the perceived attributes of an innovation, such as 
its relative advantage, compatibility, etc., affect its rate of adoption, 
whether relatively more rapidly (as for innovation I above) or more slowly 
(innovation III), as is detailed in Chapter 6, and (3) why the s-shaped diffu-
sion curve "takes off" at about 10 to 25 percent adoption, when interper-
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It should not be assumed that the diffusion and adoption of all in-
novations are necessarily desirable. In fact, there are some studies of 
harmful and uneconomical innovations that are generally not desir-
able for either the individual or his or her social system. Further, the 
same innovation may be desirable for one adopter in one situation but 
undesirable for another potential adopter in a different situation. For 
example, mechanical tomato pickers have been adopted rapidly by 
large commercial farmers in California, but these machines were too 
expensive for small-sized tomato growers, and thousands have thus 
been forced out of tomato production (Chapter 4). 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS, INFORMATION, AND 
UNCERTAINTY 
Almost all of the new ideas analyzed in this book are technological in-
novations, and we often use "innovation" and "technology" as 
synonyms. A technology is a design for instrumental action that 
reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships involved in 
achieving a desired outcome.* A technology usually has two com-
ponents: (l) a hardware aspect, consisting of the tool that embodies 
the technology as material or physical objects, and (2) a software 
aspect, consisting of the information base for the tool. For example, 
we often speak of (1) "computer hardware," consisting of semicon-
ductors, transistors, electrical connections, and the metal frame to 
protect these electronic components, and (2) "computer software," 
consisting of the coded commands, instructions, and other informa-
tion aspects of this tool that allow us to use it to extend human 
capabilities in solving certain problems. Here we see an illustration of 
the close interaction between a tool and the way it is used. The social 
embedding of the hardware aspects of technology are usually less visi-
ble than its machinery or equipment, and so we often think of technol-
ogy mainly in hardware terms. Indeed, sometimes the hardware side 
of a technology is dominant. But in other cases, a technology may be 
almost entirely comprised of in formation; examples are a conservative 
political philosophy, a religious idea like Transcendental Meditation, 
a news event, a rumor, assembly-line production, and management by 
•This definition is based upon Thompson ( 1967) and on personal communication 
with Dr. J. D. Eveland of the National Science Foundation. Both stress the uncer-
tainty-reduction aspect of technology, and thus the important role of information, a 
view of technology that has not been very widely recognized. 
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objective (MBO). The diffusion of such software innovations has 
been investigated, although a methodological problem in such studies 
is that their adoption cannot be so easily traced or observed in a 
physical sense. 
But even though the software component of a technology is often 
not so apparent to observation, we should not forget that technology 
almost always represents a mixture of hardware and software aspects. 
According to our definition of technology, it is a means of uncertainty 
reduction for individuals that is made possible by the information 
about cause-effect relationships on which the technology is based. 
This information usually comes from scientific R & D activities when 
the technology is being developed, but sometimes a new technology 
comes out of practice (even then, it is often subjected to a scientific 
evaluation before it is widely diffused). Thus, there is generally an im-
plication that a technological innovation has at least some degree of 
benefit or advantage for its potential adopters. But this advantage is 
not always very clear-cut or spectacular, at least not in the eyes of the 
intended adopters. They can seldom be very certain that an innovation 
represents a superior alternative to the previous practice that it might 
replace. 
So a technological innovation creates one kind of uncertainty in 
the minds of potential adopters (about its expected consequences), as 
well as representing an opportunity for reduced uncertainty in another 
sense (that of the information base of the technology). The latter type 
of potential uncertainty reduction (the information embodied in the 
technological innovation itself) represents the possible efficacy of the 
innovation in solving an individual's felt need or perceived problem; 
this advantage provides the motivation that impels an individual to ex-
ert effort in order to learn about the innovation. Once such informa-
tion-seeking activities have reduced the uncertainty about the innova-
tion's expected consequences to a tolerable level for the individual, a 
decision concerning adoption or rejection will be made. If the new 
idea is used by the individual, further evaluative information about 
the technological innovation is thus obtained and uncertainty about 
its effects is further reduced. Thus, the innovation-decision process is 
essentially an information-seeking and information-processing activ-
ity in which the individual is motivated to reduce uncertainty about 
the advantages and disadvantages of the innovation (Chapter 5). 
For the sake of clarity, we need to distinguish between the two 
kinds of information that we have been discussing in respect to a tech-
nological innovation. 
~ 
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1. Software information, which is embodied in a technology and 
serves to reduce uncertainty about the cause-effect relation-
ships involved in achieving a desired outcome. 
2. Innovation-evaluation information, which is the reduction in 
uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. 
The main questions that an individual typically asks in regard to 
software information are, "What is the innovation?" "How does it 
work?" and "Why does it work?" In contrast, the individual usually 
wants to know such innovation-evaluation information as, "What arc 
the innovation's consequences?" and "What will its advantages and 
disadvantages be in my situation?" 
TECH!"OLOGY CLUSTERS 
One of the conceptual and methodological issues facing diffusion re-
searchers and practitioners is the determination of the boundaries 
around a technological innovation. In essence, the practical problem 
is how to determine where one innovation stops and another one be-
gins. If an innovation is an idea that is perceived as new, the boundary 
question obviously ought to be answered by the potential adopters 
who do the perceiving. In fact, this approach is used by diffusion 
scholars and by market researchers in "positioning" studies (dc-
scri bed in Chapter 6). For example, a California study of the diffusion 
of recycling found that households that recycled paper were also likely 
to recycle bottles and cans, but that many families only recycled paper 
(Leonard-Barton and Rogers, 1980a); presumably the two recycling 
behaviors represented two innovations that were part of an interre-
lated cluster. A technology cluster consists of one or more distinguish-
able elements of technology that are perceived as being closely in-
terrelated. Some change agencies promote a cluster or package of 
innovations because they find that the innovations are thus adopted 
more rapidly. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF h-.:OVATIO'.:S 
It should not be assumed, as sometimes has been done in the past. that 
all innovations are equivalent units of analysis. This is a gross over-
simplification. While it may take consumer innovations like blue jeans 
-
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or pocket calculators only five or six years to reach widespread adop-
tion in the United States, other new ideas such as the metric system or 
using seat belts in cars may require several decades to reach complete 
use. The characteristics of innovations, as perceived by individuals, 
help to explain their different rate of adoption. 
I. Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as better than the idea it supersedes. The degree of relative 
advantage may be measured in economic terms, but social-prestige 
factors, convenience, and satisfaction are also often important com-
ponents. It does not matter so much whether an innovation has a great 
deal of "objective" advantage. What does matter is whether an in-
dividual perceives the innovation as advantageous. The greater the 
perceived relative advantage of an innovation, the more rapid its rate 
of adoption is going to be. 
2. Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived 
as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and 
needs of potential adopters. An idea that is not compatible with the 
prevalent values and norms of a social system will not be adopted as 
rapidly as an innovation that is compatible. The adoption of an in-
compatible innovation often requires the prior adoption of a new 
value system. An example of an incompatible innovation is the use of 
contraception in countries where religious beliefs discourage use of 
birth-control techniques, as in Moslem and Catholic nations. 
3. Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
difficult to understand and use. Some innovations are readily under-
stood by most members of a social system; others are more com-
plicated and will be adopted more slowly. For example, the villagers in 
Los Molinas did not understand germ theory, which the health worker 
tried to explain to them as a reason for boiling their drinking water. In 
general, new ideas that are simpler to understand will be adopted more 
rapidly than innovations that require the adopter to develop new skills 
and understandings. 
4. Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may be ex-
perimented with on a limited basis. New ideas that can be tried on the 
installment plan will generally be adopted more quickly than innova-
tions that are not divisible. Ryan and Gross (1943) found that every 
one of their Iowa farmer respondents adopted hybrid-seed corn by 
first trying it on a partial basis. If the new seed could not have been 
sampled experimentally, its rate of adoption would have been much 
slower. An innovation that is trialable represents less uncertainty to 
"'-) 
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the individual who is considering it for adoption, as it is possible to 
learn by doing. 
5. Observability is the degree to which the results of an innovation 
are visible to others. The easier it is for individuals to see the results of 
an innovation, the more likely they are to adopt. Such visibility 
stimulates peer discussion of a new idea, as friends and neighbors of 
an adopter ask him or her for innovation-evaluation information 
about it. Solar panels on a household's roof are highly observable, 
and a California survey found that the typical solar adopter showed 
his equipment to about six of his peers (Rogers et al, 1979). 
About one-fourth of all California homeowners know someone 
who has adopted solar equipment (even though only about 2.5 percent 
of the state's homeowners had adopted by 1979), and about two-
thirds of this one-fourth (15 percent of all homeowners) have seen 
their friend's solar panels. Solar adopters often are found in spatial 
clusters in California, with three or four adopters located on the same 
block. Other consumer innovations like home computers or videotape 
recorders are relatively less observable, and thus may diffuse more 
slowly. 
In general, innovations that are perceived by receivers as having 
greater relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, observability, 
and less complexity will be adopted more rapidly than other innova-
tions. These are not the only qualities that affect adoption rates, but 
past research indicates that they are the most important characteristics 
of innovations in explaining rate of adoption. 
RE-INVENTION 
Until about the mid-1970s, it was assumed that an innovation was an 
invariant quality that was not changed as it diffused. I remember in-
terviewing an Iowa farmer in 'I 954 about his adoption of 2,4-D weed 
spray. In answer to my question about whether he used this innova-
tion, the farmer described in some detail the particular and unusual 
ways in which he used the weed spray on his farm. At the end of his 
remarks, I simply checked "adopter" on my questionnaire. The con-
cept of re-invention was not in my theoretical repertoire, so I con-
densed his experience into one of my existing categories. 
Then, in the 1970s, diffusion scholars began to pay more attention 
to the concept of re-invention, defined as the degree to which an in-
novation is changed or modified by a user in the process of its adop-
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tion and implementation. Some researchers measured re-invention a~ 
the degree to which an individual's use of a new idea departed from 
the "mainline" version of the innovation that was promoted by a 
change agency (Eveland et al, 1977). Once scholars became aware of 
the concept of re-invention and began to work out measures for it, 
they began to find that a fair degree of re-invention occurred for some 
innovations. Other innovations are more difficult or impossible to re-
invent; for example, hybrid seed corn does not allow a farmer much 
freedom to re-invent, as the hybrid vigor is genetically locked into seed 
(for the first generation) in ways that are too complicated for a farmer 
to change. But certain other innovations are more flexible in nature, 
and they are re-invented by many adopters who implement them in 
different ways. 
We should remember, therefore, that an innovation is not neces-
sarily invariant during the process of its diffusion. And adopting an 
innovation is not necessarily a passive role of just implementing a 
standard template of the new idea. 
Given that an innovation exists, communication must take place if 
the innovation is to spread beyond its inventor. Now we turn our at-
tention to this second element in diffusion. 
2. Communication Channels 
Previously we defined communication as the process by which partici-
pants create and share information with one another in order to reach 
a mutual understanding. Diffusion is a particular type of communica-
tion in which the information that is exchanged is concerned with new 
ideas. The essence of the diffusion process is the information ex-
change by which one individual communicates a new idea to one or 
several others. At its most elementary form, the process involves: (1) 
an innovation, (2) an individual or other unit of adoption that has 
knowledge of, or experience with using, the innovation, (3) another 
individual or other unit that does not yet have knowledge of the inno-
vation, and (4) a communication channel connecting the two units. A 
communication channel is the means by which messages get from one 
individual to another. The nature of the information-exchange rela- . 
tionship between the pair of individuals determines the conditions 
under which a source will or will not transmit the innovation to the 
receiver, and the effect of the transfer. 
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ficient means to inform an audience of potential adopters about the 
existence of an innovation, that is, to create awareness-knowledge. 
Mass media channels are all those means of transmitting messages that 
involve a mass medium, such as radio, television, newspapers, and so 
on, which enable a source of one or a few individuals to reach an au-
dience of many. On the other hand, interpersonal channels are more 
effective in persuading an individual to adopt a new idea, especially if 
the interpersonal channel links two or more individuals who are near-
peers. Interpersonal channels involve a face-to-face exchange between 
two or more individuals. 
The results of various diffusion investigations show that most indi-
viduals do not evaluate an innovation on the basis of scientific studies 
of its consequences, although such objective evaluations are not en-
tirely irrelevant, especially to the very first individuals who adopt. 
Instead, most people depend mainly upon a subjective evaluation of 
an innovation that is conveyed to them from other individuals like 
themselves who have previously adopted the innovation. This depen-
dence on the communicated experience of near-peers suggests that the 
heart of the diffusion process is the modeling and imitation by poten-
tial adopters of their network partners who have adopted previously 
(Chapter 8). 
HETEROPHIL Y AND DIFFUSION 
An obvious principle of human communication is that the transfer of 
ideas occurs most frequently between two individuals who are alike, 
similar, or homophilous. Homophily *is the degree to which pairs of 
individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes, such as 
beliefs, education, social status, and the like. In a free-choice situa-
tion, when an individual can interact with any one of a number of 
other individuals, there is a strong tendency for him to select someone 
who is most like him- or herself. 
There are many reasons for this principle of homophily. Similar 
•This concept and its opposite, hcterophily, were first called to scientific attention by 
Lazarsfeld and Merton ( 1964, p. 23). llC!erophily, the mirror opposite of homophily, 
is defined as the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are different in cer-
tain attributes. The term homophily derives from the Greek word humoios, meaning 
alike or equal. Thus, homophily literally means affiliation or communication with a 
similar person. 
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individuals usually belong to the same groups, live or work near each 
other, and are drawn by the same interests. This physical and social 
propinquity makes homophilous communication more likely. Such 
communication is also more likely to be effective, and thus to be re-
warding. More effective communication occurs when two individuals 
are homophilous. * When they share common meanings, a mutual 
subcultural language, and are alike in personal and social characteris-
tics, the communication of ideas is likely to have greater effects in 
terms of knowledge gain, attitude formation and change, and overt 
behavior change. When homophily is present, communication is 
therefore likely to be more rewarding to both individuals. As they be-
come gradually conditioned to homophily, the choice of other homo-
philous network partners is made even more likely. 
One of rhe mos! distinctive problems in the communicalion of in-
novalions is that !he parlicipanls are usually quire heterophilous. A 
change agent, for instance, is more technically competent than his 
clients. This difference frequently leads to ineffective communica-
tion. They simply do not talk the same language. In fact, when two 
individuals are identical regarding their technical grasp of an innova-
tion, no diffusion can occur as there is no new information to ex-
change. The very nature of diffusion demands that at least some 
degree of heterophily be present between the two participants. t 
Ideally, they would be homophilous on all other variables (education, 
social status, and the like) even though they are heterophilous regard-
ing the innovation. Usually, however, the two individuals are hetero-
philous on all of these variables because knowledge and experience 
with an innovation are highly related to social status, education, and 
the like. 
•A further refinement of this proposition includes the concept of empathy, defined as 
the ability of an individual to project him- or herself into the role of another: more ef-
fective cummunicatiun occurs when two individuals are homophi/ous, unless they 
have high empathy. Heterophilous individuals who have high empathy are, in a 
social-psychological sense, really homophilous. The proposition about effective com-
munication and homophily can also be reversed: effecrive communication between 
two individuals leads to greater homophify in knowledge, beliefs, and overt behavior. 
t We shall see in later chapters that individuals oft.en seek network links with others 
who are slightly, but not too much, more technically competent about innovations 
than themselves. For instance, opinion leaders who are sought for information about 
innovations are usually somewhat more innovative in adopting new ideas than their 
followers, yet the opinion leaders are seldom innovators, seldom the very first to 
adopt. This suggests that there is an optimal degree of heterophily in interpersonal 
networks for effective diffusion to occur. 
" \J \!'-' 
20 Diffusion of Innorntions 
3. Time 
Time is an important element in the diffusion process. In fact, most 
other behavioral science research is timeless in the sense ihat the time 
dimension is simply ignored. Time is an obvious aspect of any com· 
munication process, but most (nondiffusion) communication re-
search does not deal with it explicitly. Perhaps it is a fundamental 
concept that cannot be explained in terms of something more fun-
damental (Whit row, 1980, p. 372). Time does not exist independently 
of events, but it is an aspect of every activity. 
The inclusion of time as a variable in diffusion research is one of its 
strengths, but the measurement of the time dimension (often by means 
of respondents' recall) can be criticized (as we point out in Chapter 3). 
The time dimension is involved in diffusion (1) in the innovation-
decision process by which an individual passes from first knowledge 
of an innovation through its adoption or rejection, (2) in the innova-
tiveness of an individual or other unit of adoption-that is, the 
relative earliness/lateness with which an innovation is adopted-com-
pared with other members of a system, and (3) in an innovation's rate 
of adoption in a system, usually measured as the number of members 
of the system that adopt the innovation in a given time period. 
THE INNOVATION-DECISION PROCESS 
The innovation-decision process is the process through which an indi-
vidual (or other decision-making unit) passes from first knowledge of 
an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation, to a deci· 
sion to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea, and to con-
firmation of this decision. We conceptualize five main steps in the 
process: (J) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) decision, (4) implementa-
tion, and (5) confirmation. Knowledge occurs when an individual (or 
other decision-making unit) is exposed to the innovation's existence 
and gains some understanding of how it functions. Persuasion occurs 
when an individual (or other decision-making unit) forms a favorable 
or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation. Decision occurs when 
an individual (or other decision-making unit) engages in activities that 
lead to a choice to adopt or reject the innovation. Implementation oc-
curs when an individual (or other decision-making unit) puts an inno-
vation into use. Re-invention is especially likely to occur at the imple-
mentation stage. Confirmation occurs when an individual (or other 
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decision-making unit) seeks reinforcement of an innovation decision 
that has already been made, but he or she may reverse this previous 
decision if exposed to conflicting messages about the innovation. 
Previously we stated that the innovation-decision process is an 
information-seeking and information-processing activity in which an 
individual obtains information in order to decrease uncertainty about 
the innovation. At the knowledge stage an individual mainly seeks 
software information that is embodied in a technological innovation, 
information that reduces uncertainty about the cause-effect relation-
ships that are involved in the innovation's capacity to solve a problem. 
At this stage an individual wants to know what the innovation is, and 
how and why it works. Mass-media channels can effectively transmit 
such software information. 
But increasingly at the persuasion stage, and especially at the deci-
sion stage, an individual seeks innovation-evaluation information in 
order to reduce uncertainty about an innovation's expected conse-
quences. Here an individual wants to know the innovation's advan-
tages and disadvantages in his or her own situation. Interpersonal net-
works with near-peers are particularly able to carry such evaluative 
information about an innovation. Such subjective evaluations of a 
new idea are especially likely to influence an individual at the decision 
stage, and perhaps at the confirmation stage. 
The innovation-decision process can lead to either adoption, a 
decision to make full use of an innovation as the best course of action 
available, or to rejection, a decision not to adopt an innovation. Such 
decisions can be reversed at a later point; for example, discontinuance 
is a decision to reject an innovation after it had previously been 
adopted. Discontinuance may occur because an individual becomes 
dissatisfied with an innovation, or because the innovation is replaced 
with an improved idea. It is also possible for an individual to adopt the 
innovation after a previous decision to reject it. Such later adoption 
and discontinuance occur during the confirmation stage of the 
innovation-decision process. 
The innovation-decision process involves time in the sense that the 
five steps usually occur in a time-ordered sequence of knowledge, per-
suasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. The innova-
tion-decision period is the length of time required to pass through the 
innovation-decision process. Exceptions to the usual sequence of 
the five stages may occur, such as when the decision stage precedes the 
persuasion phase. 
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sion of the innovation-decision process mainly to a single individual, 
and thus to the case of individual-optional innovation-decisions. But 
many innovation-decisions are made by organizations or other types 
of adopting units, rather than by individuals. For example, an orga-
nization may decide to purchase word-processing equipment on the 
basis of a staff decision or by an official's authority decision; the in-
dividual office worker in the organization may have little or no say in 
the innovation-decision. When an innovation-decision is made by a 
system, rather than by an individual, the decision process is usually 
much more complicated (we discuss the innovation-decision process 
in organizations in Chapter 10). 
Nevertheless, time is still an important dimension in this innova-
tion-decision process. 
hNOVATIVENESS AND ADOPTER CATEGORIES 
Innovativeness is the degree to which an individual or other unit of 
adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the other 
members of a system. Rather than describing an individual as "less in-
novative than the average member of a social system," it is handier 
and more efficient to refer to the individual as being in the "late ma-
jority" or some other adopter category. This short-hand notation 
saves words and contributes to clearer understanding, for diffusion 
research shows that members of each of the adopter categories have a 
great deal in common. If the individual is like most others in the late 
majority category, he is low in social status, makes little use of mass-
media channels, and secures most of his new ideas from peers via in-
terpersonal channels. In a similar manner, we shall present a concise 
word-picture of each of the other four adopter categories (in Chapter 
7). Adopter categories are the classifications of members of a social 
system on the basis of innovativeness. The five adopter categories arc: 
(I) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, ( 4) late majority, 
and (5) laggards. 
Innovators are active information seekers about new ideas. They 
have a high degree of mass media exposure and their interpersonal 
networks extend over a wide area, usually reaching outside of their 
local system. Innovators are able to cope with higher levels of uncer-
tainty about an innovation than are other adopter categories. As the 
first to adopt a new idea in their system, they cannot depend upon the 
- - - -
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subjective evaluations of the innovation from other members of their 
system. 
Obviously, the measure of innovativeness and the classification ol 
the system's members into adopter categories are based upon the rela-
tive time at which an innovation is adopted. 
RATE OF ADOPTION 
There is a third specific way in which the time dimension is involved in 
the diffusion of innovations. Rate of adoption is the relative speed 
with which an innovation is adopted by members of a social system. 
When the number of individuals adopting a new idea is plotted on a 
cumulative frequency basis over time, the resulting distribution is an 
s-shaped curve. At first, only a few individuals adopt the innovation 
in each time period (such as a year or a month, for example); these are 
the innovators. But soon the diffusion curve begins to climb, as more 
and more individuals adopt. Then the trajectory of the rate of adop-
tion begins to level off, as fewer and fewer individuals remain who 
have not yet adopted. Finally, the s-shaped curve reaches its asymp-
tote, and the diffusion process is finished. 
Most innovations have ans-shaped rate of adoption. But there is 
variation in the slope of the "s" from innovation to innovation; some 
new ideas di ff use relatively rapidly and the s-curve is quite steep. 
Another innovation may have a slower rate of adoption, and its 
s-curve will be more gradual, with a slope that is relatively lazy. One 
issue addressed by diffusion research is why some innovations have a 
rapid rate of adoption, and why others are adopted more slowly 
(Figure 1-1 ). 
The rate of adoption is usually measured by the length of time re-
quired for a certain percentage of the members of a system to adopt an 
innovation. Therefore, we see that rate of adoption is measured using 
an innovation or a system, rather than an individual, as the unit of 
analysis. Innovations that are perceived by individuals as possessing 
greater relative advantage, compatibility, and the like, have a more 
rapid rate of adoption (as we pointed out previously in this chapter). 
There are also differences in the rate of adoption for the same in-
novation in different social systems. Clearly, there are aspects of dif-
fusion that cannot be explained only by the nature of individual 
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direct influence through its individual members. What is a social 
system? 
4. A Social System 
A social system is defined as a set of interrelated units that are engaged 
in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The members 
or units of a social system may be individuals, informal groups, 
organizations, and/or subsystems. The system analyzed in a diffusion 
study may consist of all the peasants in an Asian village, high schools 
in Wisconsin, medical doctors in a hospital, or all the consumers in the 
United States. Each unit in a social system can be distinguished from 
other units. All members cooperate at least to the extent of seeking to 
solve a common problem in order to reach a mutual goal. This sharing 
of a common objective binds the system together. 
It is important to remember that diffusion occurs within a social 
system, because the social structure of the system affects the innova-
tion's diffusion in several ways. The social system constitutes a boun-
dary within which an innovation diffuses. Here we shall deal with the 
following topics: how the social structure affects diffusion, the effect 
of norms on diffusion, the roles of opinion leaders and change agents, 
types of innovation decisions, and the consequences of innovation. 
All these issues involve relationships between the social system and the 
diffusion process that occurs within it. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DIFFUSION 
To the extent that the units in a social system are not all identical in 
their behavior, structure then exists within the system. We define 
structure as the patterned arrangements of the units in a system. This 
structure gives regularity and stability to human behavior in a social 
system; it allows one to predict behavior with some degree of ac-
curacy. Thus, structure represents one type of information in that it 
decreases uncertainty. Perhaps we see an illustration of this predict-
ability that is provided by structure in a bureaucratic organization like 
a government agency; there is a well-developed social structure in such 
a system consisting of hierarchical positions, giving officials in higher-
ranked positions the right to issue orders to individuals of lower rank. 
ThPir ordrr' ::ire exnt>cted to be carried out. Such patterned social re la-
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tionships among the members of a system constitute social structure, 
one type of structure. 
In addition to this formal structure among the units in a social 
system, there is also an informal type of structure that exists in the in-
terpersonal networks linking a system's members, determining who 
interacts with whom and under what circumstances. We define such 
communication structure as the differentiated elements that can be 
recognized in the patterned communication flows in a system. Pre-
viously we mentioned the homophily principle, that most individuals 
in a system talk with others who are similar to themselves; a communi-
cation structure is thus often created in a system in which homo-
philous sets of individuals are grouped together in cliques. A complete 
lack of communication structure in a system would be represented by 
a situation in which each individual talked with equal probability to 
each other member of the system. Such a situation might occur when a 
set of complete strangers first come together. But regularized patterns 
soon begin to occur in the communication network of the system. And 
these aspects of communication structure predict, in part, the behav-
ior of individual members of the social system. 
The structure of a social system can facilitate or impede the diffu-
sion of innovations in the system. The impact of the social structure 
on diffusion is of special interest to sociologists and social psychol-
ogists, and the way in which the communication structure of a system 
affects diffusion is a particularly interesting topic for communication 
scholars. Katz (1961) remarked, "It is as unthinkable to study diffu-
sion without some knowledge of the social structures in which poten-
tial adopters are located as it is to study blood circulation without ade-
quate knowledge of the structure of veins and arteries." 
Compared to other aspects of diffusion research, however, there 
have been relatively few studies of how the social or communication 
structure of a system affects the diffusion and adoption of innova-
tions in that system. One explanation may be that, methodologically, 
it is a rather tricky business to untangle the effects of a system's struc-
ture on diffusion, independent from the effects of the characteristics 
of the individuals that make up the system. But let us consider an illus-
tration of system effects, the influences of the structure and/or com-
position of a system on the behavior of the members of the system. 
Our example is drawn from a study by Rogers and Kincaid (1981, pp. 
239-240): two Korean women are both illiterate, married, have two 
children, and are twenty-nine years of age. The husbands of both 
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expect that both women would be about equally likely, or unlikely, to 
adopt a contraceptive method. 
But the two women are different in one crucial respect: they live in 
different villages, one in Village A and one in Village B. The rate of 
adoption of family-planning methods is 57 percent in Village A, and 
only 26 percent in Village B. Obviously, the social and communication 
structures of these two villages are quite different regarding the diffu-
sion of contraception, even though these innovations had been pro-
moted equally in both villages by the national family-planning pro-
gram in Korea. Certainly, we would predict that the woman in Village 
A would be more likely to adopt a contraceptive method (than her 
counterpart in Village B) because of system effects: Mrs. A's friends 
and neighbors are more likely, since they themselves have adopted, to 
encourage her to adopt, and the village leaders in Village A are 
especially committed to family planning, while in Village B they are 
not. 
From this example we can see how a system can have an effect on 
the diffusion and adoption of innovations, over and above the effect 
of such variables as the individual characteristics of the members of 
the system. Individual innovativeness is affected both by the individ-
ual's characteristics, and by the nature of the social system in which 
the individual is a member. 
SYSTEM NORMS AND DIFFUSION 
The Korean investigation by Rogers and Kincaid ( 1981, p. 249) also il-
lustrates the importance of village norms in affecting the rate of diffu-
sion of family-planning methods. For example, our study of twenty-
four villages found big differences from village to village, both in the 
level of adoption of family planning and in the adoption of particular 
types of contraceptive methods. One village had 51 percent adoption 
of the IUD (intrauterine device) and only one vasectomy adopter. 
Another village had 23 percent adoption of vasectomy. Yet another 
was a "pill village" in which all of the adopters chose to use contra-
ceptive pills. Clearly these differences were not due to the nature oft he 
national family-planning program in Korea, which had promoted the 
same "cafeteria" of contraceptive methods in all villages for ten years 
prior to our data gathering. The explanation for the different contra-
ceptive behavior from village to village had to come mainly from 
within each village. One explanation was these systems' norms. 
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Norms are the established behavior patterns for the members of a 
social system. They define a range of tolerable behavior and serve as a 
guide or a standard for the members of a social system. 
A system's norms can be a barrier to change, as was shown in our 
example of water boiling in a Peruvian community. Such resistance to 
new ideas is often found in norms that relate to food habits. In India, 
for example, sacred cows roam the countryside while millions of peo-
ple are undernourished. Pork is not consumed by Moslems and Jews. 
Polished rice is eaten in most of Asia and the United States, even 
though whole rice is more nutritious. These are examples of cultural 
and religious norms. Norms can operate at the level of a nation, a 
religious community, an organization, or a local system like a village. 
OPINION LEADERS AND CHANGE AGENTS 
We have been discussing the influence of the structure of a system on 
its members' diffusion and adoption behavior. Now we turn to the 
different roles that certain individuals play in a social system and the 
effect of these roles on diffusion. Specifically, we look at two roles: 
opinion leaders and change agents. 
The most innovative member of a system is very often perceived as 
a deviant from the social system, and he or she is accorded a somewhat 
dubious status of low credibility by the average members of the 
system. This individual's role in diffusion (especially in persuading 
others about the innovation) is therefore likely to be limited. On the 
other hand, there are members of the system who function in the role 
of opinion leader. They provide information and advice about inno-
vations to many in the system. 
Opinion leadership is the degree to which an individual is able to 
influence other individuals' attitudes or overt behavior informally in a 
desired way with relative frequency. It is a type of in formal leadership, 
rather than a function of the individual's formal position or status in 
the system. Opinion leadership is earned and maintained by the indi-
vidual's technical competence, social accessibility, and conformity to 
the system's norms. Much research indicates that when the social 
system is oriented to change, the opinion leaders are quite innovative; 
but when the norms are opposed to change, the behavior of the leaders 
also reflects this norm. By their close conformity to the system's 
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havior of their followers. Opinion leaders thus exemplify and express 
the system's structure. 
In any system, naturally, there may be both innovative opinion 
leaders and also leaders who oppose change. These influential persons 
can lead in the promotion of new ideas, or they can head an active op-
position. In general, when opinion leaders are compared with their 
followers, we find that they (1) are more exposed to all forms of exter-
nal communication, (2) are more cosmopolite, (3) have somewhat 
higher social status, and (4) are more innovative (although the exact 
degree of innovativeness depends, in part, on the system's norms). 
But one of the most striking characteristics of opinion leaders is their 
unique and influential position in their system's communication struc-
ture: they are at the center of interpersonal communication networks. 
A communication network consists of interconnected individuals who 
are linked by patterned flows of information. The opinion leader's in-
terpersonal networks allow him or her to serve as a social model whose 
innovative behavior is imitated by many other members of the system. 
The influence and respect with which the opinion leader is held 
can be lost, however, as when an opinion leader deviates too far 
from the norms of his or her system. There is research evidence that 
opinion leaders can be "worn out" by change agents who overuse 
them. Opinion leaders may be perceived by their peers as too much 
like the change agents and may therefore lose their credibility with 
their former followers. 
Opinion leaders are members of the social system in which they ex-
ert their influence. In some instances individuals with influence in the 
social system are professionals who represent change agencies external 
to the system. A change agent is an individual who influences clients' 
innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change 
agency. He or she usually seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas, 
but may also attempt to slow down diffusion and prevent the adoption 
of what he or she believes are undesirable innovations. Change agents 
use opinion leaders within a given social system as lieutenants in diffu-
sion campaigns. 
Change agents are often professionals with· university degrees in 
technical fields. This professional training, and the social status that 
goes with it, usually means that change agents are heterophilous from 
their typical clients, thus posing problems for effective communica-
tion about the innovations that they are promoting. However, be-
cause of a manpower shortage of professionally qualified change 
agents and/or because of a lack of adequate financial resources to 
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employ adequate numbers of them, many change agencies use change-
agent aides. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent who 
intensively contacts clients to influence their innovation decisions. 
Aides are usually more homophilous with their average client, and 
thus provide one means of bridging the heterophily gap frequently 
found between professional change agents and their client audience. 
TYPES OF INNOVATION-DECISIONS 
The social system has yet another important kind of influence on the 
diffusion of new ideas. Innovations can be adopted or rejected (1) by 
individual members of a system, or (2) by the entire social system, 
which can decide to adopt an innovation by a collective or an author-
ity decision. 
1. Optional innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject an 
innovation that are made by an individual independent of the deci-
sions of other members of the system. Even in this case, the individ-
ual's decision may be influenced by the norms of his system and by his 
interpersonal networks. The decision of an individual housewife in 
Los Molinas to adopt or reject water boiling was an optional innova-
tion-decision, although this choice was often influenced by commu-
nity factors, like the hot-cold complex. The distinctive aspect of op-
tional innovation-decisions is that the individual is the unit of decision 
making, rather than the social system. 
As stated previously, the classical diffusion model evolved out of 
early diffusion research, which comprised almost entirely investiga-
tions of optional innovation-decisions: the diffusion of hybrid corn 
among Iowa farmers, the spread of a new antibiotic drug among med-
ical doctors, and the like. Only in the past decade have we begun to ex-
pand the scope of the diffusion paradigm also to include collective and 
authority innovation-decisions. 
2. Collective innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
an innovation that are made by consensus among the members of a 
system. All of the units in the system usually must conform to the 
system's decision once it is made. For example, the voters in some 
California cities and counties have decided that all new homes to be 
constructed must be equipped with solar water heating, as must any 
old home that is resold; the individual homeowner has little practical 
choice but to adopt solar panels. On the other hand, once a city 
decides to have cable television, each household has to sign up individ-
}.._) 
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ually for this new service. The freedom of choice allowed the individ-
ual depends on the nature of the collective innovation-decision. 
3. Authority innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
an innovation that are made by a relatively few individuals in a system 
who possess power, status, or technical expertise. The individual 
member of the system has little or no influence in the innovation-
decision; he or she simply implements the decision. For instance, the 
president of a large U.S. electronics corporation some years ago 
decided that all of his male employees should wear white shirts and 
dark suits; this authority decision had to be followed by every man 
who worked for this company. 
These three types of innovation-decisions range on a continuum 
from optional decisions (where the adopting individual has almost 
complete responsibility for the decision), through collective decisions 
(where the individual has some influence in the decision), to authority 
decisions (where the adopting individual has no influence in the inno-
vation decision). Collective and authority decisions are probably 
much more common than optional decisions in formal organizations, 
such as factories, schools, or government organizations, in com-
parison with other fields like agriculture and consumer behavior, 
where many of the innovation-decisions by farmers and consumers 
are optional. 
Generally, the fastest rate of adoption of innovations results from 
authority decisions (depending, of course, on how innovative the 
authorities are). Optional decisions can usually be made more rapidly 
than collective decisions. Although made more rapidly, authority 
decisions are often circumvented during their implementation. 
The type of innovation-decision for a given idea may change or be 
changed over time. Automobile seat belts, during the early years of 
their use, were installed in autos as optional decisions by the car's 
owner, who had to pay the cost of installation. Then, in 1968, a 
federal law was passed requiring that seat belts be included in all new 
cars in the United States. An optional innovation-decision thus be-
came a collective decision. But the decision by the auto driver or 
passengers to fasten the belts when in the car was still an optional deci-
sion-that is, except for 1974 model cars, which a federal law required 
to be equipped with a seat belt-ignition interlock system that pre-
vented the driver from starting the engine until everyone in the auto's 
front seat had fastened their seat belt. So for one year, the fastening of 
seat belts became a collective authority-decision. But the public reac-
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tu re reversed this law, and the fastening of auto seat belts again be-
came an individual-optional decision. 
There is yet a fourth type of innovation-decision that is a sequen-
tial combination of two or more of the three types we have just dis-
cussed. Contingent innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
that can be made only after a prior innovation-decision. For example, 
an individual member of a social system may be free to adopt or not to 
adopt a new idea only after his system's innovation-decision. In the 
example just discussed, until the 1968 law (a collective innovation-
decision by elected legislators representing the public), it was difficult 
for an auto owner to make an optional decision to install seat belts. In 
a university setting, a professor may not be able to make an optional 
decision to use a word processor until a prior authority decision to 
purchase the word-processing equipment has been made by the pro-
fessor's department chairperson. 
One can also imagine other types of contingent innovation deci-
sions in which the first decision is of an authority sort followed by a 
collective decision. The distinctive aspect of contingent decision mak-
ing is that two (or more) tandem decisions are required; either of the 
innovation decisions may be optional, collective, or authority. 
The social system is involved directly in collective, authority, and 
contingent innovation-decisions, and perhaps indirectly in optional 
innovation-decisions. There is a final way in which the social system 
plays a role in the diffusion of innovations: it is involved· in the conse-
quences of innovations. 
CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATIONS 
A social system is involved in an innovation's consequences because 
certain of these changes occur at the system level, in addition to those 
that affect the individual. We discuss consequences briefly here and in 
an expanded form in Chapter 11. 
Consequences are the changes that occur to an individual or to a 
social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation . 
There are at least three classifications of consequences: 
1. Desirable versus undesirable consequences, depending on 
whether the effects of an innovation in a social system are func-
tional or dysfunctional. 
2. Direct versus indirect consequences, depending on whether the 
"!.,,, ::-, 
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havior of their followers. Opinion leaders thus exemplify and express 
the system's structure. 
In any system, naturally, there may be both innovative opinion 
leaders and also leaders who oppose change. These influential persons 
can lead in the promotion of new ideas, or they can head an active op-
position. In general, when opinion leaders are compared with their 
followers, we find that they (1) are more exposed to all forms of exter-
nal communication, (2) are more cosmopolite, (3) have somewhat 
higher social status, and (4) are more innovative (although the exact 
degree of innovativeness depends, in part, on the system's norms). 
But one of the most striking characteristics of opinion leaders is their 
unique and influential position in their system's communication struc-
ture: they are at the center of interpersonal communication networks. 
A communication network consists of interconnected individuals who 
are linked by patterned flows of information. The opinion leader's in-
terpersonal networks allow him or her to serve as a social model whose 
innovative behavior is imitated by many other members of the system. 
The influence and respect with which the opinion leader is held 
can be lost, however, as when an opinion leader deviates too far 
from the norms of his or her system. There is research evidence that 
opinion leaders can be "worn out" by change agents who overuse 
them. Opinion leaders may be perceived by their peers as too much 
like the change agents and may therefore lose their credibility with 
their former followers. 
Opinion leaders are members of the social system in which they ex-
ert their influence. In some instances individuals with influence in the 
social system are professionals who represent change agencies external 
to the system. A change agent is an individual who influences clients' 
innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change 
agency. He or she usually seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas, 
but may also attempt to slow down diffusion and prevent the adoption 
of what he or she believes are undesirable innovations. Change agents 
use opinion leaders within a given social system as lieutenants in diffu-
sion campaigns. 
Change agents are often professionals with university degrees in 
technical fields. This professional training, and the social status that 
goes with it, usually means that change agents are heterophilous from 
their typical clients, thus posing problems for effective communica-
tion about the innovations that they are promoting. However, be-
cause of a manpower shortage of professionally qualified change 
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employ adequate numbers of them, many change agencies use change-
agent aides. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent who 
intensively contacts clients to influence their innovation decisions. 
Aides are usually more homophilous with their average client, and 
thus provide one means of bridging the heterophily gap frequently 
found between professional change agents and their client audience. 
TYPES OF )NNOVATION-DECISIONS 
The social system has yet another important kind of influence on the 
diffusion of new ideas. Innovations can be adopted or rejected (I) by 
individual members of a system, or (2) by the entire social system, 
which can decide to adopt an innovation by a collective or an author-
ity decision. 
I. Optional innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject an 
innovation that are made by an individual independent of the deci-
sions of other members of the system. Even in this case, the individ-
ual's decision may be influenced by the norms of his system and by his 
interpersonal networks. The decision of an individual housewife in 
Los Molinas to adopt or reject water boiling was an optional innova-
tion-decision, although this choice was often influenced by commu-
nity factors, like the hot-cold complex. The distinctive aspect of op-
tional innovation-decisions is that the individual is the unit of decision 
making, rather than the social system. 
As stated previously, the classical diffusion model evolved out of 
early diffusion research, which comprised almost entirely investiga-
tions of optional innovation-decisions: the diffusion of hybrid corn 
among Iowa farmers, the spread of a new antibiotic drug among med-
ical doctors, and the like. Only in the past decade have we begun to ex-
pand the scope of the diffusion paradigm also to include collective and 
authority innovation-decisions. 
2. Collective innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
an innovation that are made by consensus among the members of a 
system. All of the units in the system usually must conform to the 
system's decision once it is made. For example, the voters in some 
California cities and counties have decided that all new homes to be 
constructed must be equipped with solar water heating, as must any 
old home that is resold; the individual homeowner has little practical 
choice but to adopt solar panels. On the other hand, once a city 
decides to have cable television, each household has to sign uo individ-
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ually for this new service. The freedom of choice allowed the individ-
ual depends on the nature of the collective innovation-decision. 
3. Authority innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
an innovation that are made by a relatively few individuals in a system 
who possess power, status, or technical expertise. The individual 
member of the system has little or no influence in the innovation-
decision; he or she simply implements the decision. For instance, the 
president of a large U.S. electronics corporation some years ago 
decided that all of his male employees should wear white shirts and 
dark suits; this authority decision had to be followed by every man 
who worked for this company. 
These three types of innovation-decisions range on a continuum 
from optional decisions (where the adopting individual has almost 
complete responsibility for the decision), through collective decisions 
(where the individual has some influence in the decision), to authority 
decisions (where the adopting individual has no influence in the inno-
vation decision). Collective and authority decisions are probably 
much more common than optional decisions in formal organizations, 
such as factories, schools, or government organizations, in com-
parison with other fields like agriculture and consumer behavior, 
where many of the innovation-decisions by farmers and consumers 
are optional. 
Generally, the fastest rate of adoption of innovations results from 
authority decisions (depending, of course, on how innovative the 
authorities are). Optional decisions can usually be made more rapidly 
than collective decisions. Although made more rapidly, authority 
decisions are often circumvented during their implementation. 
The type of innovation-decision for a given idea may change or be 
changed over time. Automobile seat belts, during the early years of 
their use, were installed in autos as optional decisions by the car's 
owner, who had to pay the cost of installation. Then, in 1968, a 
federal law was passed requiring that seat belts be included in all new 
cars in the United States. An optional innovation-decision thus be-
came a collective decision. But the decision by the auto driver or 
passengers to fasten the belts when in the car was still an optional deci-
sion-that is, except for 1974 model cars, which a federal law required 
to be equipped with a seat belt-ignition interlock system that pre-
vented the driver from starting the engine until everyone in the auto's 
front seat had fastened their seat belt. So for one year, the fastening of 
seat belts became a collective authority-decision. But the public reac-
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ture reversed this law, and the fastening of auto seat belts again be-
came an individual-optional decision. 
There is yet a fourth type of innovation-decision that is a sequen-
tial combination of two or more of the three types we have just dis-
cussed. Contingent innovation-decisions are choices to adopt or reject 
that can be made only after a prior innovation-decision. For example, 
an individual member of a social system may be free to adopt or not to 
adopt a new idea only after his system's innovation-decision. In the 
example just discussed, until the 1968 law (a collective innovation-
decision by elected legislators representing the public), it was difficult 
for an auto owner to make an optional decision to install seat belts. In 
a university setting, a professor may not be able to make an optional 
decision to use a word processor until a prior authority decision to 
purchase the word-processing equipment has been made by the pro-
fessor's department chairperson. 
One can also imagine other types of contingent innovation deci-
sions in which the first decision is of an authority sort followed by a 
collective decision. The distinctive aspect of contingent decision mak-
ing is that two (or more) tandem decisions are required; either of the 
innovation decisions may be optional, collective, or authority. 
The social system is involved directly in collective, authority, and 
contingent innovation-decisions, and perhaps indirectly in optional 
innovation-decisions. There is a final way in which the social system 
plays a role in the diffusion of innovations: it is involved in the conse-
quences of innovations. 
CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATIONS 
A social system is involved in an innovation's consequences because 
certain of these changes occur at the system level, in addition to those 
that affect the individual. We discuss consequences briefly here and in 
an expanded form in Chapter 11. 
Consequences are the changes that occur to an individual or to a 
social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation. 
There are at least three classifications of consequences: 
1. Desirable versus undesirable consequences, depending on 
whether the effects of an innovation in a social system are func-
tional or dysfunctional. 
2. Direct versus indirect consequences, depending on whether the 
.,__, 
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changes to an individual or to a social system occur in im-
mediate response to an innovation or as a second-order result 
of the direct consequences of an innovation. 
3. Anticipated versus unanticipated consequences, depending on 
whether the changes are recognized and intended by the mem-
bers of a social system or not. 
Change agents usually introduce innovations into a client system 
that they expect will be desirable, direct, and anticipated. But often 
such innovations result in at least some unanticipated consequences 
that are indirect and undesirable for the system's members. An illus-
tration is the case of the steel ax introduced by missionaries to an 
Australian aborigine tribe (Sharp, 1952, pp. 69-72). The change 
agents intended that the new tool should raise levels of living and 
material comfort for the tribe. But the new technology also led to a 
breakdown of the family structure, the rise of prostitution, and 
"misuse" of the innovation itself. Change agents can often anticipate 
and predict the innovation's form, the directly observable physical ap-
pearance of the innovation, and perhaps its function, the contribution 
of the idea to the way of life of the system's members. But seldom are 
change agents able to predict another aspect of an innovation's conse-
quences, its meaning, the subjective perception of the innovation by 
the clients. 
Diffusion of Hybrid Corn in Iowa 
We have already mentioned the Ryan and Gross (1943) study of the dif-
fusion of hybrid seen corn as one of the most influential diffusion studies of 
all time. Although more will be said about this study in Chapter 2, it is an 
ideal illustration at this point because the hybrid corn investigation includes 
each of the four main elements of diffusion that we have just discussed. 
The innovation of hybrid corn was one of the most important new farm 
technologies when it was released to Iowa farmers in 1928, and it ushered in a 
whole set of agricultural innovations in the 1930s through the 1950s that 
amounted to an "agricultural revolution" in farm productivity. Hybrid seed 
had been developed by agricultural scientists at Iowa State University and at 
other state land-grant universities. The diffusion of hybrid seed was heavily 
promoted by the Iowa agricultural extension service and by salesmen from 
seed companies. Hybrid corn yielded about 20 percent more per acre than 
the open-pollinated varieties that it replaced, and it was also more drought 
resistant and better suited to harvest with mechanical corn pickers. But the 
seed lost its hybrid vigor after the first generation, so farmers had to pur-
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chase hybrid seed each year. Previously farmers had saved their own seed, 
selected from their best-looking corn plants. The adoption of hybrid corn 
meant that a farmer had to make important changes in his behavior. 
In 1941, Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross (1943), two rural sociologists at 
Iowa State University, personally interviewed 259 farmers Jiving in two small 
communities. Each of these respondents was asked to recall when and how 
he had adopted hybrid corn, and to provide certain information about them-
selves and their farm operation. 
All but 2 of the 259 farmers had adopted hybrid corn between 1928 and 
1941, a rather rapid rate of adoption. When plotted cumulatively on a year-
by-year basis, the adoption rate formed ans-shaped curve over time. After 
the first five years, by 1933, only 10 percent of the Iowa farmers had 
adopted. Then, the adoption curve "took off," shooting up to 40 percent 
adoption in the next three years (by 1936). Soon the rate of adoption began 
to level off as fewer and fewer farmers remained to adopt the new idea. The 
overall shape of the rate of adoption looked like an "S" (Figure 1-1). 
Farmers were assigned to adopter categories on the basis of when they 
adopted the new seed (Gross, 1942). Compared to later adopters, the in-
novators had larger-sized farms, higher incomes, and more years of formal 
education. The innovators were more cosmopolite, as measured by the 
number of trips they had taken to Des Moines (Iowa's largest city, located 
about seventy-five miles away). 
Although hybrid corn was an innovation with a high degree of relative 
advantage over the open-pollinated seed that it replaced, the typical farmer 
moved rather slowly from awareness-knowledge of the innovation to adop-
tion. The innovation-decision period from first knowledge to the adoption 
decision averaged about nine years for all respondents, a finding that led to a 
clearer realization that the innovation-decision process involved con-
siderable deliberation by most adopters, even in the case of an innovation 
with spee::tacular results. The average respondent took three or four years 
after planting his first hybrid seed, usually on a small trial plot, before 
deciding to plant I 00 percent of his corn acreage in hybrid varieties. 
Communication channels played different roles at various stages in the 
innovation-decision process. The typical farmer first heard of hybrid seed 
from a salesman, but neighbors were the most frequent channel leading to 
persuasion. Salesmen were more important channels for earlier adopters, 
and neighbors were more important for later adopters. The Ryan and Gross 
(I 943) findings suggested the important role of interpersonal networks in the 
diffusion process in a system. The farmer-to-farmer exchange of personal 
experiences with use of the hybrid seed seemed to lie at the heart of diffusion. 
When enough such positive experiences were accumulated by farmers 
(especially the innovators and early adopters) and exchanged within the com-
munity, the rate of adoption really took off. This threshold seemed to occur 
in about 1935. After about that point, it would have been impossible to halt 
p 
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the further diffusion of hybrid corn. The farm community as a social system, 
including the networks linking the individual farmers within it, was a crucial 
element in the diffusion process. 
In order to understand the role of diffusion networks and opinion leader-
ship, Ryan and Gross (1943) should have asked sociometric questions* of 
their respondents, such as "From which other farmers have you obtained in-
formation about hybrid corn?" The sample design, which consisted of a 
complete enumeration in two communities, would have made the use of 
sociometric questions easy. But "information was simply collected from all 
community members as if they were unrelated respondents in a random sam-
ple" (Katz et al, 1963). 
Even without sociometric data about diffusion networks, Ryan and 
Gross (1943) sensed that hybrid corn spread in the two Iowa communities as 
a kind of social snowball. They wrote: "There is no doubt but that the 
behavior of one individual in an interacting population affects the behavior 
of his fellows. Thus, the demonstrated success of hybrid seed on a few farms 
offers a changed situation to those ·who have not been so experimental. The 
very fact of acceptance by one or more farmers offers new stimulus to the re-
maining ones." Thus, the two rural sociologists intuitively sensed what later 
diffusion scholars were to gather more detailed evidence to prove: that the 
heart of the diffusion process consists of interpersonal network exchanges 
and social modeling between those individuals who had already adopted and 
those who then would be influenced to do so. 
In her study of the invisible college of rural sociologists investigating di f-
fusion as of the mid-1960s, Crane (1972, p. 74) identified the researchers 
who first utilized a new concept and/or methodological tool in studying dif-
fusion. According to her analysis, Ryan and Gross deserve credit for launch-
ing fifteen of the eighteen most widely used intellectual innovations in the 
rural sociology research tradition. Th is is perhaps another way of saying that 
Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross really formed the classical diffusion paradigm. 
As such, the hybrid corn study has left an indelible stamp on the history 
of diffusion research. 
Summary 
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system. Diffusion is a special type of communication concerned with 
• SociornC!r_~· is a means of obi ain ing and analyzing q uan! it at i ve data about comm uni-
cat ion patterns among the individuals in a system by asking each respondent to whom 
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the spread of messages that are new ideas. Communication is a proc-
ess in which participants create and share information with one 
another in order to reach a mutual understanding. It is the newness of 
the idea in the message content that gives diffusion its special 
character, as some degree of uncertainty is thus involved. Uncertainty 
is the degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with 
respect to the occurrence of an event and the relative probabilities of 
these alternatives. The degree of uncertainty can be reduced by an in-
dividual by obtaining information. Information is a difference in 
matter-energy that affects uncertainty in a situation where a choice ex-
ists among a set of alternatives. 
The main elements in the diffusion of new ideas are: (l) an innova-
tion, (2) which is communicated through certain channels, (3) over 
time, (4) among the members of a social system. An innovation is an 
idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other 
unit of adoption. Almost all of the new ideas discussed in this book 
are technological innovations. A technology is a design for instrumen-
tal action that reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships 
involved in achieving a desired outcome. Most technologies have two 
components: (I) hardware, consisting of the tool that embodies the 
technology as material or physical objects, and (2) software, consist-
ing of the knowledge base for the tool. The software information em-
bodied in a technology serves to reduce one type of uncertainty, that 
concerned with the cause-effect relationships that are involved in 
achieving a desired outcome. But a technological innovation also 
creates another kind of uncertainty because of its newness to the indi-
vidual, and motivates him or her to seek information by means of 
which the new idea can be evaluated. We call this innovation-
evaluation information; it leads to a reduction in uncertainty about an 
innovation's expected consequences. 
The characteristics of an innovation, as perceived by the members 
of a social system, determine its rate of adoption. Five attributes of in-
novations are: (I) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) complex-
ity, (4) trialability, and (5) observability. 
Re-invention is the degree to which an innovation is changed or 
modified by a user in the process of its adoption and implementation. 
A communication channel is the means by which messages get 
from one individual to another. Mass-media channels are more effec-
tive in creating knowledge of innovations, whereas interpersonal 
channels are more effective in forming and changing attitudes toward 
the new idea, and thus in influencing the decision to adopt or reject a 
1: 
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new idea. Most individuals evaluate an innovation, not on the basis of 
scientific research by experts, but through the subjective evaluations 
of near-peers who have adopted the innovation. These near-peers thus 
serve as social models, whose innovation behavior tends to be imitated 
by others in their system. 
Another distinctive aspect of diffusion as a subfield of com-
munication is that some degree of heterophily is present. Heterophily 
is the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are different in 
certain attributes, such as beliefs, education, social status, and the 
like. The opposite of heterophily is homophily, the degree to which 
pairs of individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes. 
Generally, most human communication takes place between individ-
uals who are homophilous, a situation that leads to more effective 
communication. Therefore, the heterophily that is often present in the 
diffusion of innovations leads to special problems in securing effective 
communication. 
Time is involved in diffusion in (1) the innovation-decision proc-
ess, (2) innovativeness, and (3) an innovation's rate of adoption. The 
innovation-decision process is the mental process through which an 
individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from first knowl-
edge of an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation, 
to a decision to adopt or reject, to implementation of the new idea, 
and to confirmation of this decision. We conceptualize five steps in 
this process: (1) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) decision, (4) imple-
mentation, and (5) confirmation. An individual seeks information at 
various stages in the innovation-decision process in order to decrease 
uncertainty about the innovation. At the knowledge stage, an individ-
ual obtains software information that is embedded in a technological 
innovation; he or she wants to know what the innovation is and how it 
works. But at the persuasion and decision stages, an individual seeks 
innovation-evaluation information in order to reduce uncertainty 
about an innovation's expected consequences. The decision stage 
leads (1) to adoption, a decision to make full use of an innovation as 
the best course of action available, or (2) to rejection, a decision not to 
adopt an innovation. 
Innovativeness is the degree to which an individual or other unit of 
adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other mem-
bers of a social system. We specify five adopter categories, classifica-
tions of the members of a social system on the basis of innovativeness: 
(1) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, ( 4) late majority, 
and (5) laggards. Rate of adoption is the relative speed with which an 
;nnAVatirrn i<: adontPri by JT)PmberS Of 3 Social SVStem. 
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A social system is a set of interrelated units that are engaged in 
joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. A system has 
strocture, defined as the patterned arrangements of the units in a 
system, which gives stability and regularity to individual behavior in a 
system. The social and communication structure of a system facili-
tates or impedes the diffusion of innovations in the system. 
Norms are the established behavior patterns for the members of a 
social system. Norms are often exemplified in the behavior of the 
opinion leaders in a system. Opinion leadership is the degree to which 
an individual is able to influence informally other individuals' at-
titudes or overt behavior in a desired way with relative frequency. A 
drange agent is an individual who attempts to influence clients' 
innovation-decisions in a direction that is deemed desirable by a 
change agency. An aide is a less than fully professional change agent 
who intensively contacts clients to influence their innovation-
dccisions. 
We distinguish three main types of innovation-decisions: (1) op-
tional innovation-decisions, choices to adopt or reject an innovation 
that are made by an individual independent of the decisions of other 
members of the system, (2) collective innovation-decisions, choices to 
adopt or reject an innovation that are made by consensus among the 
members of a system, and (3) authority innovation-decisions, choices 
10 adopt or reject an innovation that are made by relatively few indi-
viduals in a system who possess power, status, or technical expertise. 
A fourth category consists of a sequential combination of two or more 
of these types of innovation-decisions: contingent innovation-
decisions are choices to adopt or reject that can be made only after a 
prior innovation-decision. 
A final way in which a social system may function as an element in 
diffusion concerns consequences, the changes that occur to an indi-
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1 Dialectics of Understanding the 
Third World 
INGOLF VOGELER and ANTHONY R. de SOUZA 
Almost every day we hear about Third World problems: overpopulation in the 
Sahel of Africa, high energy costs in India, massive urban unemployment in 
Brazil, and balance of payments difficulties in the banana republics of Central 
America. Yet there is little agreement on what causes and perpetuates these 
problems or how they might be eliminated. 
The classic fable of five blind Indian gentlemen touching an elephant recalls this 
dilemma. Each gentleman feels a different part of the beast, and thinks that he can 
identify it correctly. The man who grabs the tail thinks it is a rope; the one who 
holds the leg believes it is a tree trunk; the one who touches the side of the 
elephant says it is a wall; the one who feels the ear proclaims it is a big leaf; and, 
the one who holds the trunk cries it is a snake. A concrete example will illustrate 
this dilemma. Consider the world food problem. 1 A hypothetical American 
resource pessimist declares: "Soaring numbers of people are over-running avail-
able food ·supplies. It seems to me that an acceptable solution to the world food 
supply situation is 'lifeboat ethics.' I believe that compassion is a luxury that we 
can no longer afford in this era of scarcity. Countries like Bangladesh are 'basket 
cases.' Their populations should not be recipients of American food aid, which 
will help only to maintain high population growth rates. We must learn to let the 
starving die for the survival of the human race." A United Nations adviser pipes 
up: "I think that high population growth rates and consequent population 
pressure, land fragmentation, poor soils, and unreliable rainfall keep people from 
feeding themselves. The best way to stabilize the overpopulation/food scarcity 
problem is to provide the poor with the contraceptive means to practice responsi-
ble parenthood." A World Bank official adds: "People are hungry because of 
insufficient food production. To solve the world food supply situation we must 
transform traditional agriculture which is inefficient. The only way to do this is for 
rich industrial countries to supply progressive farmers with imported technology, 
new seeds, artificial fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and machinery." A Marxist 
from Tanzania breaks in: "The cause of hunger is not the tropical environment, 
not too many people, not scarcity of available land, not lack of technology, and 
not overconsumption by greedy Americans. Every country has the capacity to 
feed itself. The real problem is the inequality generated by the world's political 
economy. The unequal distribution of global wealth is an historical product, the 
end result of the process by which the capitalist countries through colonialism and 
neo-imperialism gained control of the global economy. Today the hungry cannot 
be fed because of Third World elites and foreign corporations who benefit from the 
way things are. The only guarantee of long-term food security is for us Third 
World people to take control of our own food resources." 
3 
Box A 
LABELING/LIBELING THE THIRD WORLD 
The yawning chasm between prosperity and poverty in the world has created a 
language of its own. Or, is it in fact the rich person, not the yawning chasm, who has 
created this language? Author Goran Palm, writing for the Swedish International 
Development Authority (SIDA) journal RAPPORT, took a closer look at the vocabulary 
we use. 
"The developed world" is contrasted to "the Third World." "Industrialized countries" 
are contrasted to "'the poor in the South." 
UN trade statistics commonly divide the world into three areas or "economic 
classes": industrialized countries or developed (Western) countries; developing coun-
tries or underdeveloped countries; socialist countries, Eastern bloc countries, or 
planned economies. 
In addition to North America and Western Europe, the "industrialized countries" 
include Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and sometimes Israel. The 
"developing countries" are mainly the nearly one hundred nations of Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, and Oceania which within the framework of the UN, form the Group of 77 
(sometimes identified with the non-aligned states). This latter includes several nations 
with certain ties to the Soviet Union or China such as Guinea, Yugoslavia, India, 
Tanzania, but also members of the "Eastern bloc." Lastly, the "socialist countries" 
include all nations of Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia, a handful of countries in Asia 
and a single country in Latin America-Cuba. 
This may seem like a good enough preliminary classification but on closer inspec-
tion, we find that the first group of countries is the only one to be given an indisputably 
positive label. To be labelled "underdeveloped" or to represent a "developing country" 
~) is less gratifying. Such labels imply that one is somehow a little inferior or backward, 
· that one, say, lives in tribes, worships holy cows, is afraid of contraceptives, doesn't 
'1 know one's own best interests. 
To be reckoned a member of the "Eastern bloc" or one of the "communist 
countries" is not much better. It amounts to being excluded or discriminated against on 
political grounds. Such countries are not a part of the "development" and "indus-
trialization" so craved throughout the southern hemisphere. 
Labels like "socialist countries" and "planned economies" are in that case more 
accurate, but here, too, a different norm is applied to these countries than to the other 
groups. They are identified not according to their level of development, but according 
to ideology and the nature of their economic system. 
If we take industrialization as the criterion, any differences between the Eastern and 
Western countries evaporate. A similar lexicographical justice might be extended to all 
the countries outside the industrial world. Most of the countries of Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia depend on the production of foodstuffs and primary materials for 
industry for their livelihood. To sidestep the problem of ideology we may conveniently 
categorize the world into "industrialized countries" versus "raw materials-producing 
countries." 
It is perfectly acceptable to say "industrialized countries" just as long as they are not 
contrasted to "developing countries" but to "agrarian" or "raw materials-producing 
countries." It is fine to say "socialist countries" as long as _they are contrasted to 
"capitalistic countries." Fine to say "underdeveloped" just as long as it is contrasted to 
"overdeveloped." The old terminology is perfectly admissible; the problem lies in the 
misleading pairs of opposites so frequently used. 
Source: "Lexical Lapses on the Line," Development Forum, 6, no. 10 (November-
December 1978): 6. 
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Different perspectives on the causes of world hunger lead to different solutions 
with profoundly different effects on Third World people. If human suffering and 
misery are to be eliminated as expediently as possible, then alternative world 
views must be understood and the best one must be selected to solve problems of 
underdevelopment. The question we invite you to consider is: What perspective 
provides the best explanation of the facts of underdevelopment? To answer this 
question we will have to become aware of the different theoretical and analytical 
frameworks scholars use to argue their cases. And such an awareness can only be 
achieved if we go beyond the usual level of learning common in Western 
educational institutions. 
We can recognize four levels to the acquisition of knowledge. 1 First-level learn-
ing involves simple perception of fact. For example, we are hungry and are 
conscious of that fact. Second-level learning occurs when at least two facts are 
interrelated. When there is a drought we harvest less food per acre, and there-
fore, the likelihood of huriger increases. When we attain a higher level of 
performance within an existing system of understanding we are learning on the 
third level. Several options are possible: (I) If there is recurring drought, we can 
improve food yields either by planting drought resistant crops or by irrigating 
traditional crops. (2) If we choose not to change our traditional agricultural 
practices, we will be less well fed. When fourth-level learning is achieved, 
we are able to perceive the nature of existing systems and to re-examine 
them to discover how new options can be created by improving or changing 
the system. If we stay with the overpopulation/food scarcity issue; we can 
consider solutions beyond improved food yields if we evaluate the entire agricul-
tural system. For instance, we could consider expropriating prime agricultural 
lands which are now used to produce exports crops such as coffee and cotton. 
This land could be given back to local farmers who could then produce food for 
their own needs instead of depending on purchased food and food aid from the 
industrialized countries. 
Western educational systems are geared primarily to third-level learning. At this 
level, learning in the social sciences is synonymous with status quo theories 
supporting existing social systems. Consequently, most scientists stress 
techniques that permit them to optimize existing institutions rather than consider a 
wide range of alternative paradigms. In fourth-level learning the goal is to move 
beyond present perceptions of reality. This point may be illustrated with a simple 
problem. Connect the nine points drawn here with four continuous straight lines. 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
In looking for a solution you will find that there is none so long as you stay within 
the area limited by the points. But if you move outside the self-imposed square. a 
solution quickly springs to mind. (For the answer, see footnote 3 in the NOTES 
AND REFERENCES.) Similarly, if we are to understand the nature and causes of 
Third World underdevelopment, we must be willing to broaden the basis of our 
L 
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enquiry and examine alternative ideologies outside the ones currently limiting our 
perceptions of problems and solutions. 
Most of us find it difficult to restructure the way we think and learn. Perspec-
tives we hold about the world tend to persist. There is much danger that a 
perspective that subtly leads us to see the world in a particular way will prevent us 
from seeing the world in a more meaningful way. A drawing by Toulouse-Laut rec 
which is a perceptual illusion (Figure 1.1) illustrates this point. Those of us who see 
an old woman in the picture have difficulty seeing a young woman, and vice versa. 
To learn to see is to impose order on stimuli. The manner in which we impose that 
order is determined by our expectations and is therefore value-laden. If everything 
were as it seems then there would be no need for science. 
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science. After all, science is as socially conceived and just as subject to bias ar 
misinterpretation as all other forms of knowledge in society. To meet the cha 
lenge of Third World development problems we must become aware ofalternati' 
and competing world views. In order to select the best explanations and directior 
for solving Third World problems, we suggest the dialectical approach. Webster 
Third International Dictionary defines "dialectic" as "The theory and practice c 
weighing and reconciling juxtaposed or contradictory arguments for the purpm 
of arriving at truth especially through discussion and debate." Not all theories ca 
be compatible with each other, and hence scientists are forced to make difficu 
decisions about the adequacy and validity of competing paradigms. By affirmin 
one paradigm, another one must be negated. In this way, the dialectical approac 
necessarily becomes synonymous with controversy, polemics, and challenge t 
status quo theories. 
The dialectical approach adopted in this book provides a structure to help yo 
determine which arguments are superior in terms of analytical strength and i 
terms of your own values. This book was designed as a reader because we wante• 
the authors to argue their own cases. To summarize or even to paraphrase th. 
authors would prevent you from judging their arguments without distortion an< 
bias. The readings have also been selected for their concise and well-reasone• 
positions on Third World problems. Individually and collectively, they are mean 
to be provocative, and designed to facilitate the evaluation of the presuppositions 
the explanatory power, and the implications of alternative theoretica 
frameworks. 
Analytically, the readings reflect three general perspectives: conservative 
liberal, and radical.• These three paradigms rest on different assumptions abou 
human nature, normative values, and social authority, and they employ differen 
concepts to describe the nature and causes of underdevelopment. 5 A discussion o' 
the major components of each paradigm will help you to begin to choose the 
perspective which you find most convincing. 
ANALYTICAL CHOICES 
The Conservative Perspective 
The conservative view of the world is inherited from the ideas of Adam Smith 
Ricardo, and their modem-day followers. 8 Conservatives assume that human~ 
need positive (wage raises) and negative (threats of unemployment) materia 
incentives to be productive. They are convinced that a capitalistic free enterprise 
economy based on competition and maximizing profits allows egoistic and cal-
culating individuals to achieve maximum personal liberty and material well-being 
Individual decision-making units (individuals, households, firms) act freely anc 
rationally to produce a harmonious and moving equilibrium by means of market 
forces. Consequently, the process of social and economic change is a gradual 
cumulative and undirectional evolution. Faith in the efficiency and optimality of 
private market mechanisms, especially those of supply and demand, allow~ 
conservatives to postulate a limited role for governments. Probably, the single 
most important function of the State is to maintain social order, that is, provide 
national and international law and order through use of police and military forces. 
so that capitalism can operate freely. Given this view of the State, conservative~ 
8 lntroducticJ •. _.., the Readings 
Table 1.1 Alternative Explanations of Reality under Capitalism 
Unit 
Alternative Human Work of Analysis 
Paradigms Nature Incentives Analysis Based on 
Conservative Humans are Essentially Individuals: Classical and 
naturally material: persons or nee-classical 
unproductive 1) positive- companies economics: 
and individ- raise in income competition and 
ualistic 2) negative- individuals 
unemployment maximizing 
profits 
Liberal Humans are Essentially Individuals Keynesian 
naturally material: and groups economics: 
unproductive, 1) positive- in society competition and 
but of goodwill raise in income individuals 
2) negative- maximizing 





.._, Radicals Humans are None really Classes in Marxist 
naturally necessary; society economics: 
productive and socially labor theory 
cooperative valuable of value, 





hold that government involvement in the economy usually causes more problems 
than it solves. They argue that many national and international problems are due 
to government interference and that the solutions to these problems lie in fewer 
government regulations and programs. Finally, conservatives believe that social 
change occurs gradually through the free actions of individuals in the market 
place. 
The conservative approach to Third World development rests on two points. 
First, more participation by Third World countries in the world market economy, 
not less as some socialists argue, will assure faster and greater economic growth. 
Second, difficulties of economic growth can be traced to internal obstacles in the 
environment and culture (Table I. I). The most dominant theory conservatives use 
to assert that underdeveloped countries will benefit from more interaction in the 
world economy is Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage. Ricardo wrote, 
"It is quite important to the happiness of mankind that our enjoyments should be 
increased by a better division of labor, by each country producing those com-
Dialectics of Understanding the Third World ~ 
Nature of 
Market Nature of 
Human Exchange Societal Role of Social 
Goals Economy Problems State Change 
Maximum per- Harmonious 1) Individuals: Ideally. only Gradual change 
sonal liberty state of lack of rnotiva- police power to results from 
and material equilibrium: tion, unrealistic maintain law individual inter-
well-being created by demands, cut· and order so actions in the 
supply and lure of poverty. that the market market place 




Individual State of 1 ) Monopolistic Police power Rapid change 
equality and equilibrium, tendencies in and offsetting through govern-
social justice achievable with major economic inadequacies in men! actions 
(equal oppor- government in· sectors the economy 
!unity) volvement in 2) Insufficient whenever basic 
the economy and inappro· human needs 
priate govern· and social 
ment programs justice are not 
achieved 
Social equality: Contradictions Private owner- Police and Revolutionary 
from each and crises of ship of re- economic power change through 
according to production and sources; pro- is used to mass move-
one's ability, to consumption; duction for maintain and ments to trans-
each according exploitation of profit rather enhance capi· form society's 
to one's need workers; irra· than for human ta I ism structure and 
tional allocation use; alienation; values 
of natural and class conflict; 
human re- unequal re-
sources gional develop-
men! 
modities for which by its situation, its climate and its other material or artifici< 
advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the commodites r 
other countries .... Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each countr 
naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficia 
to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with th 
universal good of the whole." Ricardo illustrated his trade theory by means of. 
two-nation labor-cost model. The theory holds that it is in the best interests c 
underdeveloped countries to exchange more labor for less. According to conse1 
vatives, this unequal division of labor works to the advantage of all, for it permit 
each country to make the best use of its natural resources, stock of skills, an 
infrastrnctures. Moreover, any deviation from free trade sacrifices efficiency an 
reduces world outputs and income. An example of a contemporary Ricardian i 
Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State. At the Seventh Special Sessin 
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. he said, "Comparative advar 
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Dialectics of Under~,.dnding the Third World 
the spur to productivity that competition provides-these are central elements l 
efficiency and progress. For developing nations, trade is perhaps the mo· 
important engine of development" (Table 1.2). 
Despite the advantages of free trade, conservatives recognize that many Thir 
World countries have not yet developed. They explain this by considering intern: 
obstacles in the form of local environments and indigenous cultures. The tropic: 
environment, in particular, is viewed as a major obstacle to progress. Soils ar 
poor and fragile; rainfall is unreliable; and numerous endemic, debilitating di· 
eases reinforce low levels of productivity. Above all, conservatives hold that th 
traits of individuals, rather than international market forces, prevent the ac 
vancement of people in underdeveloped countries. They account for the lack c 
development on the basis of backward cultures: traditional religious belief, 
values, and habits of life, insufficient incentives and entrepreneurialship, igno: 
ance of science and technology, and unstable political systems. 
BoxB 
TONGUE-IN-CHEEK DEFINITIONS OF COMMON 
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Socialism: You have two cows, and you give one to your neighbor . 
Communism: You have two cows, the government takes both of them, and gives you 
milk. 
Fascism: You have two cows, the government takes both of them, and sells you 
milk. 
Nazism: You have two cows, the government takes both of them, and shoots 
you. 
Bureaucracy: You have two cows, the government takes both of them, shoots one of 
them, milks the other, and pours the milk down the drain. 
Capitalism: You have two cows, you sell one of them, and buy a bull. 
The Liberal Perspective 
The liberal view of the world did not attract much attention until the depression • 
the 1930s. Keynes' General Theory analyzes the causes of unemployment ar 
discredits the conservative belief that the capitalist economic system is sel 
righting. He did not think that a modem capitalist economy would sustain a hif 
enough level of investment to maintain full employment. While advocating go-
emment control of the level of economic activity in the national interest (sta· 
capitalism), he advised that the economy in general be left free to respond to tt 
decisions of welfare-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing producer 
Keynes presented an alternative to socialism. His theory, which permitted go• 
emment to borrow and spend money to prevent economic depressions, did n• 
amend the conservative paradigm to any great degree. It was designed less to alt• 
market exchange economies than to preserve and revitalize them. 
Like Keynes, liberals of the present day do not launch a thorough-going critiqt 
of either the conservative theory of human nature or the capitalist system (Tah 
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I. I). Indeed, liberals share with conservatives the view that humans are naturally 
unproductive, and they share a faith in the capitalist system. Unlike conserva-
tives, however, they place great emphasis on the goals of individual equality and 
social justice. To achieve these goals. government legislation and programs are 
necessary. Although liberals criticize inequality of opportunity based on wealth, 
position, and power, they understand that certain inequalities are based on 
inherited characteristics such as family structure or ethnic culture (e.g. "culture of 
poverty"). The State redistributes wealth by taxing the rich to assist the poor, 
and, therefore, societal changes can occur more rapidly than under the conserva-
tive laissez-faire model. Problems at national and international levels result from 
monopolistic tendencies in major economic sectors and insufficient and/or inap-
propriate government programs. The State must intervene on behalf of everyone 
whenever market mechanisms fail to satisfy consumer preferences and provide 
basic human needs (e.g. housing. health care. food. and adequate income). 
Galbraith's analyses of the industrial state and the affluent society refiect thi-, 
perspective (Table 1.2). 
Liberals share with conservatives many of the same assumptions about barriers 
to Third World development. They believe that traditional values and social 
institutions are the prime obstacles to development. and they are convinced that 
the town is the gateway for Third World innovations. As centers of innovation. 
large towns can transmit modem values and social institutions to smaller centers 
and rural areas. Although liberals also employ the "blaming the victim" approach 
(see Ryan's article in Section 111) to explain the causes of world problems. they. 
unlike conservatives. are willing to provide governmental assistance to the 
world's needy. Consequently, liberal governments provide unilateral (e.g. U.S. 
~Agency for International Development) and multilateral (e.g. World Bank) foreign 
...>:,aid. food aid (e.g. U.S. Food for Peace Program). volunteers (e.g. U.S. Peace 
Corps). and military and technical assistance. 
The Radical Perspective 
Conservative and liberal perspectives are widely accepted by social scientists. 
although at present the latter has more followers than the former. 7 They arc not 
radical because their analyses do not go to the root or origin of prohlems. Radicals 
argue that the dynamics of socio-economic organization (mode of production. to 
use a Marxist term) in capitalist societies produce particular kinds of class and 
institutional structures. Classes and institutions formed by the capitalist mode of 
production explain a particular set of social problems that cannot be solved 
without changing the form of socio-economic organization at national and inter-
national levels (Table I. I). 
Contrary to con<.ervatives and liberals. radical-, assume that humans are natur-
. ally productive and cooperative and therefore. that material rewards are not really 
necessary. They argue that humans are not inherently passive beings at the mercy 
of their cultural and physical environments: rather they are active creatures of 
their own destiny. If we behave passively. unproductively. or uncooperatively. it 
is hecause our economic system demands such behaviors. They reject the libcral's 
helief that people can enjoy equality of opportunity in a class society when the 
majority produce the wealth and when power is in the hands of the few. In such a 
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society, the pursuit of profit by the dominant class shapes all aspects of lif• 
including the quality of personal relations. Under capitalism human needs ar 
subordinated to the needs of the market place. Only commodities (goods an 
services) which have exchange value are produced, while other use value 
remain unmet. An illustration: The United States sells (exchange value) most of i· 
food surpluses to countries who can afford to buy it rather than distributing fo0 
to countries on the basis of need (use value). 
Radicals claim that in a market economy the State predominantly serves th 
interests of the ruling class-the capitalists-not the workers whose labor pr< 
duces more wealth than is returned to them in the form of wages. Marx called th 
extra wealth "surplus value." Surplus value (or the product of exploitation) is t ti 
difference between the value produced by workers (value of units of lab1 
produced) and workers' wage (value of labor power). Marx, in discussing th 
labor theory of value, asked: How can one class of people, capitalists, g1 
something for nothing? How do they acquire a portion of produced value fr 
themselves without contributing any labor in return? Marx defined labor as 
commodity, and its value is determined in just the same way as the value of an 
other commodity. by the amount of socially necessary labor required to produc 
it. This is nothing more than workers' subsistence wages. For example, if laborer 
have to work six hours to obtain a subsistence income, then that is the sociall 
necessary amount of labor time required to "produce" workers. If workers hav 
to work 12 hours instead of six hours to hold a job in a factory, Marx said, worker 
create surplus value, or profit for capitalists. Workers labor six hours for therr 
selves and another six hours for their masters, and the rate of surplus value o 
exploitation is six hours or 100 percent. 
Exploitation of workers can be intensified. and the surplus value appropriate 
by capitalists increased when employers stretch the working day. If the work wee 
were stabilized. employers could expand surplus value by substituting capital fn 
labor. Marx argued that the process of introducing even more labor-savin 
equipment is inimical to workers. Displaced laborers form a reserve army of th 
unemployed. which keeps wages at minimal levels. The existence of a pool r 
unemployed workers means that employed workers know that others are availahl 
to take their jobs if productivity falls. 
The essence of the radical argument is that the engine which drives economi 
growth is capital accumulation for its own sake. Economic growth is alway 
unbalanced. The capitalist mode of production fails to achieve equilibrium a 
claimed by conservatives and liberals because of the contradictory nature o 
competitive production. As a result. there are short-run cyclical crises (un 
employment and declining rates of profit) which are connected by increasing rate 
of accumulation through concentration (the trend toward larger, more efficicn 
factories in each industry), and geographical extension (imperialism). Periodi, 
crises become more frequent over time. In each crisis big capitalists devour lit ti' 
capitalists. and individual capitalism becomes corporate capitalism. Capitali~t 
seek larger outputs and bigger profits, and they deploy bigger machines whicl 
replace more and more laborers, whose work generally consists of small. in 
significant. and tedious operations that are repeated for hours. This expansin1 
intensifies the misery and alienation of workers so that increasing class struggl1 
charts the course of socio-economic development (Table 1.2). 
14 Introduction to ine Readings 
From this sketch of Marxist theory, it is plain that radicals argue that inequality 
of wealth among classes originates in the capitalist system. Exploitation of one 
class by another is based on the private ownership of the means of production. 
Irreconcilable conflict between classes is the key to understanding the need for 
revolutionary change through mass movements. 
Uneven development pertains not only to the unequal distribution of wealth 
among classes, but also to spatial dimensions of development: underdevelopment 
and dependence. Radicals argue that Third World countries have been underde-
veloped first by the development and expansion of Europe, later neo-European 
countries (United States, Canada. Australia, and New Zealand), and most re-
cently Japan. The capitalist world economy causes underdevelopment by 
generating and reinforcing an infrastructure of dependency which includes in-
stitutions, social classes, and processes such as urbanization and industrialization. 
Thus dependency is not merely an external matter. Foreign exploitation is 
possible only when it finds support among local elites who profit from it. To break 
out of dependency and to achieve development, Third World countries must go 
beyond capitalism to a collectively owned and collectively governed economic 
system. To achieve the goals of socialism different paths may be followed: in 
Cuba, Castro used a military approach; and in Tanzania, Nyerere uses an 
evolutionary approach (Table 1.2). 
It is important to remember that each of the three perspectives lumps a great 
many different theories and models together. Traditional social science practices 
splitting, the art of ever-increasing articulation of minute theoretical and empirical 
details. On the other hand, in this reader we are interested in lumping broadly 
similar scientific arguments to facilitate the reexamination of existing theoretical 
positions. The labels conservative, liberal, and radical are not so important as the 




THE THREE WORLDS 
Westerners divide the countries of the world into three parts: the First World, Second 
World, and Third World. The First World includes the countries of Western Europe, 
North America, Israel, Australia, New Zealand. and Japan. Some would even include 
the Republic of South Africa and Argentina. The Second World is represented by the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Third World consists of the remaining countries 
in Latin America. Africa. the Middle East. and Asia. Through the eyes of "the free 
world," the Second and Third Worlds are associated with negative and undesireable 
trails (Communism and poverty, respectively). while the First World countries reflect 
positive and desireable characteristics. 
Many Third World people disagree with this ethnocentric view. Mao Tse-lung's 
Three World theory categorizes the world's people in very different terms. The 
First World consists of the superpowers, i.e. the Soviet Union and United States. 
with their negative military and economic influence on the rest of lne world. The 
Second World includes the allies of the two superpowers-the remaining indus-
tralized countries. The Third World represents the underdeveloped countries and 
the hope for the whole world. not the dispair that most Westerners see. In dialectical 
fashion. Mao saw Third World "problems" as assets to create a better future for the 
masses everywhere. 
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libel them by labeling them. We should not dismiss any perspective because of its 
label but rather, we should judge it on the basis of its theoretical merits. 
These viewpoints are most useful for providing alternative explanations of 
Third World problems, not in providing detailed and specific blueprints for the 
future. A great deal of dissent exists among the three groups on the specific 
directions change should take. 
How can we choose among these different perspectives? From a scientific point 
of view, this question can be answered easily: That approach which most 
accurately and completely explains the past and present realities of the Third 
World. The readings are designed to provide an opportunity to answer this 
question. From our research and field experiences in Africa, Latin America, 
Western Europe, and North America. we are convinced that the radical paradigm 
provides the most complete explanation of conditions in the Third World. In other 
words, we believe it explains more of reality than the other two paradigms. 
VALUE CHOICES 
We stated earlier that one deficiency of most Western educational institutions is 
that they fail to train students in fourth-level learning-that of seeking solutions 
outside of status-quo frameworks. Another deficiency is that most schools fail to 
acknowledge the values that are both explicit and implicit in their teachings, and 
help students to recognize and judge those values along with their own. Such 
learning is essential for a full comprehension of this book and of Third World 
issues. 
Values Clarification 
Comprehensive understanding requires cognitive and affective learning. Deter-
mining the analytical power of the readings is part of the cognitive realm; judging 
their value content falls both within the cognitive and affective realms. Each realm 
is an imrortant and necessary part of each person. We all hold imrlicit and explicit 
values on a whole range of issues, which we express in verbal and written 
communications and through actions. We need to distinguish between our es-
poused values and our innermost values, often unknown even to ourselves 
without reflection. Among the various approaches to teaching values-
inculcation. moralization, laissez-faire attitudes, and action learning-we find the 
values clarification method the most useful." This approach is not concerned with 
the content of people's values but with the processes of valuing. 
What are the processes by which we develop values and decide what we stand 
for, and what we wish to live for? To discover the answer to these questions, we 
need to explore the values in our ideas, feelings, choices, and behavior. Hirschen-
baum identifies five major valuing processes to achieve this goal (Table 1.3). 9 
Feelings have traditionally been avoided in schools, since educators believe 
that solutions to human problems are best solved through rational processes. The 
denial of feelings, however, deprives us of important information in making 
decisions which affect us and others. Our thinking, communicating, choosing, and 
acting processes all suffer as a result, particularly since on any given issue, these 
may derive from a feeling of which we are unaware. Humans think at variou~ 
,. 
) . 
Table 1.3 The Valulng Process• 
I. Feeling 
1. Being open to one's inner experience. 
a. awareness of one's inner experience 
b. acceptance of one's inner experience 
II. Thinking 

























a. distinguishing fact from opinion 
b. distinguishing supported from unsupported arguments 
c. analyzing propaganda, stereotypes, etc. 
Logical thinking (logic). 
Creative thinking. 
Fundamental cognitive skills. 
a. language use 
b. mathematical skills 
c. research skills 
Communicating-Verbally and Nonverbally 
Sending clear messages. 
Empathetic listening. 
Drawing out. 
Asking clarifying questions. 
Giving and receiving feedback. 
Conflict resolution. 
Choosing 
Generating and considering alternatives. 
Thoughtfully considering consequences, pros and cons. 
Choosing strategically. 
a. goal setting 
b. data gathering 
c. problem solving 
d. planning 
4. Choosing freely. 
V. Acting 
1. Acting with repetition. 
2. Acting with a pattern and consistency. 
3. Acting skillfully, competently. 
aFm further information on materials available in the values education field, write the National 
Humanistic Education Center, 11 O Spring Street, Saratoga Springs, New York 12866. 
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levels, from memorization to synthesis and evaluation, and they usually progres 
as Hirschenbaum says, "to higher, more flexible levels of thinking," given tt 
right environment. Ultimately, the level of our thinking will determine the kinds 1 
cognitive and emotive decisions we make. 
Leaming communication skills is critical in the valuing and understandin 
processes. Making clear statements, drawing people out, asking clarifying que· 
lions, and listening to arguments empathetically are the essence of basic corr 
munication skills. In the values clarification approach, choices are based on free I 
choosing from alternatives, after thoughtful consideration has been given to th 
possible consequences. 10 Again, the kinds of choices made depend on the earlie 
processes of feeling, thinking, and communicating. Existentialists point out tha 
we define ourselves through our actions. The more we act on what we feel an1 
think, the more we value these particular emotions and thoughts. 11 
Hirschenbaum's valuing processes can be applied to the articles in this book 
When reading the selections, try to answer each of the following questions. 
(I) Feeling. Try to recognize the feelings you are experiencing as you considc1 
each author's arguments. Are they positive or negative feelings? 
(2) Thinking. What values can you identify in the articles and how do they 
compare with your own values? 
(3) Communicating. What clarifying questions would you like to ask the 
authors, before you could fully determine their values and your reactions to them? 
(4) Choosing. After reading the alternative viewpoints in each topic section. 
which perspective most closely matches your values? 
(5) Acting. Is the perspective you have choosen one you would be willing to 
Some additional questions may help you to develop your own thinking process. 
Given what we have said earlier in this chapter on the three analytical 
frameworks, you should also be able to answer the following analytical questions 
for each selection. 
(I) What overall questions are asked? 
(2) What specific questions are asked? 
(3) What concepts are used? (e.g. life-boat analogy) 
(4) What evidence and/or data are used to answer the questions? 
(5) What conclusions are drawn? 
(6) Are you convinced by the data and arguments that the specific and general 
questions are answered? 
(7) Which theoretical framework is employed? 
Moral Development 
Another aspect of critical thinking is to assess the moral content of arguments. 
Koh Iberg presents a developmental sequence of moral thinking which is based on 
a long series of studies with children and adults in the United States and was 
consequently tested in other countries (Mexico, Turkey, and Taiwan). 12 He has 
found that we develop through some or all of these stages in a generally linear 
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Figure 1.2 Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development 
Basis of Judgment Stages of Development 
Preconventionaf morar values 
reside in ~xtemal, quast-phrsical 
happenings, in bad acts, or in 
qu.asi-ph~ic.il needs rather 1han in 






Concern about self. Obedience lo a powerful authority. Fear of 
pun1shmenl dominates motives. One sees oneself as berng 
dominated by other forces. Actions are judged in terms of their 
physical consequences 
One-way concern about another person (what he/she ran do 
for me, how we can agree to act so f will benefit.) The bds1c 
motive is to satisfy my own needs. I do no! consider the nC'l•d\ 
of rhe other person, un/e<;.s I 1h1nk 11 will benefit me ro do so 
Con\'ent1onal moral values reside Stilge fll Concern about groups of people, and conformity to group 
in performing good or right roles, norms There is a two-way refatronship (we are good to l'Jrh 
in ma1nta1n1ng the conventional olher) Morive is to be a "nice guy/gal,' to be accepled 








Concern for order in society Honor and duty come from 
keeping the rules of the society. The focus is on preserving the 
society (not just obeying, as in Stage I). 
l:o \ Society 
I 
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its stage of development. According to Kohlberg's research, the basic set of moral 
stages are not significantly affected by widely varying socioeconomic, cultural, or 
religious conditions. Only the rate at which individuals progress through the 
sequence is different. 
For Kohlberg. a moral stage does not represent a type of person, but a way of 
thinking. People usually use more than one stage of moral thinking for any 
particular topic. and certainly employ different stages for different topics. In other 
words. people are rarely morally and intellectually consistent. Kohlberg points 
out that at each stage individuals see themselves as being "honest," "fair." and 
"descent," within their own terms of reference. Consequently. moral judgments 
are. first. judgments of value. not of fact. They are also social judgments about 
people. "Third. they are prescriptive or normative judgments, judgments of 
ought. of rights and duties. rather than value judgments of liking and prefer-
ence. " 13 
' 
Basis of Judgment 
Postconventional moral values are 
derived from principles which can 
he applied universally 
\ Free ag·~~~;ent and conrracr 
~/~ts,~,'<1 
A \ 
I \ I ~'~ __ ,..,./7 
Oemorra11c agreement on 
rights, sundards, 
ch.ange 
Dialectics of Understanding the Third World 
Stages of Development 
Stage V· 
Stage VI 
Social contract, legalistic orientation. Wh.u is right is what th 
whole >ociety decides. There are no l~I •lxolutes. The 
society can change standards by everyone agreeing 10 the 
change. Changes in lhe law are u•u•lly m•de for ,..,.son• of th· 
gre•te•t good for the greatest number of people. Where law 
is not affected, what is right is a matter of personal opinion 
and agreement between persons. The U.S. Constitution is 
written in Stage S terms. 
Universal ethical principles. What is right is a decision of one" 
con>cience, based on ideas about rightness that apply to 
everyone (all nations, people, etc.). These are called ethical 
principles. An ethical principle is different from a rule. A rule i~ 
specific (Thou shalt nor kill). An elhical principle is general 
(All persons •re created equal). The m05t importanl elhical 
principles deal wilh justice, equality. and the dignity of all 
people. These principles are higher th•n any given l•w. 
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Kohlberg identifies three levels, each with two stages, of moral development 
(Figure 1.2). 14 
(I) At the preconventional level individual decisions are based on physical 
power and physical consequences (punishment and reward). Stage I moral 
thinking corresponds to "might makes right" and "survival of the fittest." 
Avoidance of phyiscal punishment and unquestioning obedience of power are 
valued for their own sake. Morality does not play a large part in a person's life. 
Stage-2 behavior conforms to obtain rewards and have favors returned: "Look 
out for number one" and "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Fairness 
and reciprocity are evaluated only in concrete and pragmatic ways. 
(2) Within the conventional level of moral development, identification with and 
maintainence of the dominant social order prevails. At this level, two stages 
emerge. Stage 3 is the "good boy, good girl" or a limited conformity orientation. 
Morality is seen in terms of helping and pleasing a limited group of people whose 
'· ~-
\ '\ 
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well-being and approval is valued. At this stage stereotypical images of conven-
tional wisdom or "natural" behavior determine moral thinking. Stage 4 is a 
law-and-order orientation. Right behavior consists of confonning to fixed niles, 
respecting established authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own 
sake. 
(3) Postconventional or autonomous moral thinking rests on moral values 
which are valid apart from the authority of the groups who hold them and apart 
from one's identification with these groups. In Stage 5 social contracts expressed 
in legal terms are the guiding principle. Laws are understood to be constitutionally 
and democratically agreed upon, yet individual opinions can differ with estab-
lished laws and practices. Hence, emphasis is also placed on changing laws to 
serve greater social needs. This is the official morality of the United States 
government and the United States Constitution. Stage-6 persons behave accord-
ing to "self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensivenes'>. 
universality, and consistence." Abstract and ethical principles, such as the 
Golden Rule, are dominant, not concrete moral ones, like the Ten Command-
ments." For Stage-6 persons the sole purpose of morality is to serve fundamental 
life goals, such as freedom. justice, equali1y. happiness. and self-respect. Moral 
values are means to maximize ultimate life goals for one's self and for humanity. 
Gandhi. Socrates. Thoreau. and Martin Luther King are among the relatively few 
people to attain Stage-6 moral thinking. 
Moral thinking and judgments are complex and diverse. To better understand 
and appreciate Kohlberg's stages of moral thinking, a concrete example might be 
helpful. 16 Let us use our earlier example of world hunger. The possible responses 
given below might be those of middle class North Americans. 
Since no coercive force exists to make people help the hungry of the world. 
Stage- I people fail to be interested in the topic. However. if such people perceived 
an invasion from a hungry country as a possible retribution, they would be willing 
to send food aid. Stage-2 people do not consider the needs of others unless they 
benefit from such actions. If we want fuels and minerals from a particular Third 
World country, we will then provide food assistance. If. on the other hand. they 
have nothing that we want. there is no reason to help them. 
In Stage 3. other people's points of view are usually taken, regardless of 
individual self-interest for the sake of social self-interest. Individuals recognize 
shared social interests and expectations with particular groups, such as religious 
organizations. Going along with the group facilitates social approval, and being 
called a "nice" person. By giving food aid, the United States will be seen as a 
"moral nation" or a "Christian country." Others might phrase it as "the White 
man's burden" to help the less fortunate nations. If the group that people identify 
with does not believe in food aid (such as the John Birch Society). they will gain 
social approval by not supponing assistance !o the Third World. 
Stage-4 people have a societal identification which is defined by and restricted 
to absolute rules which come either from government or God. Any proposals to 
expand current policies and practices to help the hungry are rejected because of 
the strong adherence to "law and order." In religious terms, God may command 
us to help starving people; in legal terms. the United States should provide food 
assistance if Congress mandates it. On the other hand. we may not help the hungry 
ofa particular nation because we have a defense treaty with their political enemy. 
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Stage-5 people believe that the rules identified by Stage-4 people are no 
absolute and can be changed to reflect a particu Jar universal issue. A Stage-: 
person may believe that the world's hungry should be fed regardless of our curren. 
laws. and would support legislative change. But a Stage-5 person could also argut 
that we should not feed the hungry ofa particular nation because their govemmen1 
is communist. Stage-6 people deal with a holistic range of universal ethical 
principles-justice, equality, and freedom, including freedom from hunger-
which allows them to change current laws, and also obligates them, wher, 
necessary, to break the laws through civil disobedience. Stage-6 people would be 
willing to support private agencies who send food to a country with which the 
United States was at war. 17 
Each of the three analytical perspectives can operate at this highest stage of 
moral development. Conservatives would make voluntary, individual donations tc 
local churches or to world organizations, such as CARE or UNESCO. Liberal~ 
would want the government to tax the population at large so that "giving" would 
become official policy and not dependent on the occassional good intentions of a 
few persons or organizations. Individually, then, liberals would do all the things 
conservatives do, plus help lo mandate and subsequently, to expand, foreign aid. 
particularly food relief. At Stage 6 radicals would add yet another layer of 
activism; boycotting certain companies like Nestle for selling formula milk to poor 
mothers in the Third World, and/or contributing resources and energy to organi-
zations such as the World Council of Churches or national liberation groups in 
various Third World countries. At this stage radicals would work towards major 
global stnictural changes to eliminate the root causes of hunger for all times. 
Research on the age and stage of moral development shows that under current 
conditions in the United States, moral maturity stabilizes by late adolescence and 
early adulthood. between the ages of 16 and 25. Indeed, very little moral growth 
occurs after age 25. In their research Kohlberg and Kramer found that l3 percent 
of the 25 year olds used preconventional levels (Stages I and 2) of thinking; 51 
percent used conventional levels (Stages 3 and 4) of thinking; and 35 percent 
adhered to postconventional (Stages 5 and 6) moral thinking. Relating these 
findings to the three analytical frameworks presented earlier in this chapter, we 
would argue that although all three perspectives can be found in several of the si.x 
stages. each perspective by its very definition would tend to be concentrated more 
at some stages than at others. The moral content of the conservative framework 
corresponds largely to Stages I, 2, 3, and 4; the liberal perspective is concentrated 
mostly in Stages 3, 4, and 5; and the radical framework tends to be located in 
Stages 5 and 6. 
In a culturally universal sense, Kohlberg's stages lead toward an expanded 
conception of moral judgment. At each stage. the same basic moral issue i' 
defined, but at each higher stage this definition becomes differentiated. more 
integrated, and more universal. This is illustrated by an experimental study." 
Undergraduate subjects were ordered by an experimenter to administer increas-
ingly more severe electric shock punishment to a stooge victim in the guise of a 
learning experiment. In this case. the principles of justice involved in the Stage-5 
social contract orientation do not clearly prescribe a decision. The victim had 
voluntarily agreed to participate in the experiment and the subjects had contractu-
ally committed themselves to perform the experiment. Only Stage-6 thinking 
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clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the 
moral right to ask them to inflict pain on another person. Accordingly, 75 per cent 
of the Stage-6 subjects quit or refused to shock the victim as compared to only 13 
per cent of all the subjects at lower stages. 
Kohlberg maintains that individuals comprehend all stages up to their own, but 
not more than one stage beyond their own. And significantly, they prefer this next 
stage. Moral development can be facilitated by identifying people's moral stage 
and through subsequent reinforcement and discussion expose them to the next 
highest stage. 
Perry provides further evidence of personal intellectual and ethical develop-
ment. 19 He shows that college students develop from positions of "simple 
dualism" (e.g. good vs. bad) through various stages of"relativism" to final stages 
of "commitment in relativism." Perry found that students did not remain in the 
second stage. characterized by kaleidoscopic possibilities, for more than a year 
before proceeding to some kind of affirmation of values or escape from further 
growth. at least for awhile. The dialectic approach used in this book encourages 
students to take risks. to explore the meanings of explanations, and to dare to 
make commitments to clarified values. Simultaneously, teachers need to provide 
support and encouragement to students regardless of their stages of intellectual 
and moral development. Clearly, for educators to facilitate cognitive and affective 
learning processes, they need to realize that "it is no longer tenable for an 
educator to take the position that what a person does with his [or her] intellectual 
skills is a moral rather than intellectual problem and therefore none of the 
scholar's business. " 20 
~ > You are therefore urged to determine your own stage of moral development in t response to the selected readings and to analyze carefully your objections to the 
moral stage presented in the readings. In the introduction to each section, only the 
analytical differences will be outlined; the ideological and value statements arc left 
for readers to determine. Hopefully, teachers will assist students in this task. 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
In the next article, the Third World is defined and delineated. Through text and 
maps Buchanan shows that the countries of the Third World are distinctive from 
the industrialized countries. Although he uses data from !he 1950s and 1960s, his 
statistics are merely illustrative and later data would make little difference to the 
dimensions of the problems discussed. The Third World still has the same 
characteristics Buchanan identified almost two decades ago: low rates of GNP per 
capita, calorie and protein intake; high rates of employment in the farm and 
tertiary sectors; and high rates of urbanization. illiteracy. infant mortality. popu-
lation growth, and resource exports. 
How can these conditions be explained'l In which directions do the solutions 
lie? One way of answering the above questions is to consider a number of 
empirical topics. The remaining readings have been grouped under six possible 
causes of Third World underdevelopment. Each section has several articles which 
reflect alternative points of view. Although each perspective tends to stress 
certain causes and omit others, among the six topics the three analytical perspec-
tives present a vast range of explanations (Table 1.4). 
- - - -
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Table 1.4 Authors In the Reader Grouped by the Three Paradigms 
Topic Sections in the Reader 
Climate 
Alternative and Cultural Plantation 
Paradigms Resources Traditions Agriculture Population Tourism Imperialism 
Conservative Huntington Heston May and Hardin Bond 
Plaza and 
Ladman 
Liberal Hodder Harris Beckford Ritchie- Britton 
Ryan Calder 
Radical Szentes Dorfman Tobis Commoner Perez Galtung 
and Harvey Chilcote 
Mattelart Harvey 
Environmental factors are discussed in Section 11. The emphasis on the 
environment to account for underdevelopment is a characteristically conservative 
approach. Although the older climatic determinism is now out of fashion, particu-
larly among geographers, many liberal social scientists still consider the presence 
of tropical climates and the absence of certain natural resources in a country to be 
of major importance to its economic development. In the radical paradigm. 
environmental conditions are essentially irrelevant to explain the present level of 
development. 
In Section Ill cultural traditions in the Third World are examined as possible 
causes of underdevelopment. Anthropologists, geographers, psychologists. and 
economists have written about the inferiority of "non-western" cultures to 
explain the lack of incentives and institutions that allow nations to prosper. The 
blatant racism of the past is now modified to blaming the victim, which is another 
important conservative concept in explaining Third World poverty. To cite one 
specific example: many of India's population and food problems are often linked 
to the Hindu practice of revering cattle. The conservative approach sees this 
non-western religion as a barrier to economic progress. The liberal perspective, on 
the other hand, argues that the Indian sacred cattle practice performs positive 
functions for small-scale farmers, but it fails to examine the national and interna-
tional economic institutions (e.g. landlordism, money lenders, merchants, and 
international oil companies), which radicals argue can best explain India's 
underdevelopment. Disney comic books in South America still show evidence of 
racism and cultural imperialism, which facilitates the exploitation of these Third 
World people. 
Developments in agriculture are of utmost importance to Third World people 
because so many work in this sector and so many are hungry. In Section IV one 
aspect of this vast topic is examined. Colonial rule provided the means for 
Europeans to establish plantation agriculture. The conservative viewpoint argues 
that plantations were and remain beneficial to tropical countries and foreign 
countries alike. The profits of foreign companies were and are more than offset by 
providing local employment, social services, taxes, and the transfer of technol 
ogy. But the liberal perspective points out that while plantations enhance private 
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commercial interests, they distort, if not retard. the national development of Third 
World econQmies. From the radical perspective plantations have had and continue 
to have mostly negative consequences. Colonialism with its plantation crops 
underdeveloped these countries and this process explains Third World poverty. 
For most Westerners the single most important cause of problems in the Third 
World is the high rate of population growth. In Section V the ideological basis for 
the scientific study of the relationship between population and resources is 
exposed. Three specific approaches to "overpopulation" can then be assessed: 
lifeboat ethics (conservative); family planning programs (liberal); and political and 
economic revolutions (radical). From the conservative perspective, the world 
already has too many people, all of whom cannot be fed. Some will have to perish. 
The liberal perspective agrees that the population/food supply relationship is 
unbalanced. but Third World and First World governments can temporarily 
alleviate these problems with food aid and permanently solve overpopulation 
through birth control programs. Within the radical paradigm several kinds of 
explanations exist. but they all agree that "overpopulation" is the result of 
exploitation. The poor have large families because this is their best way of 
safeguarding their survival. Furthermore. such large families are only perceived as 
overpopulation when they exist at the poor end of the economic distribution. 
Social scientists have also considered Rostow's stages of economic growth, and 
the role of transnational corporations and foreign aid to explain underdevelop-
ment. The capitalist analysis concludes that poor countries are only at a lower 
economic stage than rich countries at the present time, and that eventually the 
current poor countries will develop, if they follow the Western model of economic 
growth. While geocentric mining, manufacturing. and service corporations diffuse 
U modem technology and provide revenue for national development, foreign aid 
;;· may actually do more harm than good in the short-term and long-run. 
) The liberal perspective prefers to curb some of the more blatant abuses of 
multinationals, such as bribing and blackmailing foreign governments and avoid-
ing their full share of taxes. This viewpoint sees foreign aid from industrial 
countries in conjunction with multinational corporations as the means of helping 
developing countries. The radical view is fundamentally different. Marxists 
maintain that underdevelopment is caused by the exploitative relations between 
capitalist and Third World countries in the past and in the present. Hence. 
transnational corporations take advantage of their monopoly position to extract 
more capital in the form of profits from underdeveloped countries than they 
invest. Indeed, foreign aid, like multinational and international trade in general. 
benefits the donor countries more than the recipient countries, thus perpetuating 
the economic and political power of privileged elites in the Third World. The 
length of the original manuscript precluded the inclusion of reading selections for 
these topics. Since Rostow's stages of economic growth. the debate about 
multinationals, and foreign aid are well known, we decided to exclude these topics 
in favor of a less recognized topic-tourism. 
Tourism is another path towards economic development. Or is it? In Section VI 
the conservative perspective holds that tourism avoids many of the problems 
associated with mineral and luxury crop exports. Foreign capital and ideas 
provide the necessary engine and steam for development. The benefits of interna-
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elites. The indigeneous populations gain only seasonal and menial jobs and Jo,t 
their culture and resources in return. From the radical perspective tourism i· 
another form of exploitation and imperialism. which drains and concentrate~ 
Third World wealth primarily among the elites of the First World. 
In Section VII the radical paradigm employs the concept of imperialism as a 
primary explanation for Third World material poverty. To account for global and 
national inequalities, the radical analysis. depending on its specific formulation. 
employs such concepts as center-periphery relations. dependency. and the theory 
of capitalist accumulation. Within both the conservative and liberal framework-;. 
the importance radicals place on the concept of imperialism is discounted. The 
conservative perspective dismisses the concept altogether and its value in ex-
plaining current Third World conditions. The liberal perspective sees no casual 
correlation between capitalism and imperialism. hut it does recognize that gov-
ernments use their political and military power to expand geographically. 
Before reading the articles. we recommend that you tum to the awareness 
exercises in the Appendix. The first exercise allows you to compare your own 
view of the Third World with those of others. In Exercise 2 you can assess your 
knowledge ahout some of the attributes of underdeveloped countries. The re-
maining exercises help you to get in touch with the ideological nature of descrip-
tion and explanation with reference to Third World issues. 











Topic Sections in the Reader 
Plantation 
Agriculture Population Tourism Imperialism 
Starting with Section II, we suggest that you note the important concepts and 
terms presented by the three analytical perspectives under each of the six 
substantative topics. The completion of Table 1.5 will allow you to choose intelli-
gently the analytical framework which provides the best explanation of Third 
World underdevelopment. 
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The Story of Fire 
~~~00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ONCE upon a time a man was contemplating the ways in which 
Nature operates, and he discovered, because of his concentration 
and application, how fire could be made. 
This man was called Nour. He decided to travel from one com-
munity to another, showing people bis discovery. 
Nour passed the secret to many groups of people. Some took 
advantage of the knowledge. Others drove him away, thinking 
that he must be dangerous, before they had had time to under-
stand how valuable this discovery could be to them. Finally, a 
tribe before which he demonstrated became so panic-micken that 
they set about him and killed him, being convinced that be was 
a demon. 
Centuries passed. The first tribe which bad learned about fire 
reserved the secret for their priests, who remained in affluence and 
power while the people froze. 
The second tribe forgot the art and worshipped instead the in-
struments. The third worshipped a likeness of Nour himself, be-
cause it was he who had taught them. The fourth retained the 
story of the making of fire in their legend!: some believed them, 
some did not. The fifth community really did use fire, and this en-
abled them to be warmed, to cook their food. and to manufacture 
all kind! of useful articles. 
After many, many years, a wise man and a small band of his 
disciples were travelling through the lands of these tribes. The 
disciples were amazed at the variety of rituals which they en-
countered; and one and all said to their teacher: 'But all these pro-
cedures arc in fact related to the making of fire, nothing else. We 
should reform these people!' 
The teacher said: 'Very well, then. We shall restart our journey. 
39 
TALES OF THE DERVISHES 
By the end of it, those who survive will know the real problems 
and how to approach th.cm.' 
When they reached the first tribe, the band was hospitably re-
ceived. The priests invited the travellers to attend their religious 
ceremony, the making of fire. When it was over, and the tribe was 
in a state of excitement at the event which they had witnessed, the 
master said: 'Does anyone wish to speakr 
The first disciple said: 'In the cause of Truth I feel myself con-
strained to say something to these people.' 
'If you will do so at your own risk, you may do so,' said the master. 
Now the disciple stepped forward in the presence of the tribal 
chief and his priests and said: 'I can perform the miracle which you 
take to be a special manifestation of deity. If I do so, will you accept 
that you have been in error for so many years?' 
But the priests cried: 'Seize him!' and the man was taken away, 
never to be seen again. 
The travellers went to the next territory where the second tribe 
were worshipping the instruments of fire-making. Again a disciple 
volunteered to try to bring reason to the community. 
With the permission of the master, he said: 'I beg permission to 
speak to you as reasonable people. You arc worshipping the means 
whereby something may be done, not even the thing itself. Thus 
you are suspending the advent of its usefulness. I know the reality 
that lies at the basis of this ceremony.' 
This tribe was composed of more reasonable people. But they 
said to the disciple: 'You arc welcome as a traveller and stranger in 
our midst. But, as a stranger, foreign to our history and customs, 
you cannot understand what we are doing. You make a mistake 
Perhaps, even, you arc trying to take away or alter our religion. 
We therefore decline to listen to you.' 
The travellers moved on. 
When they arrived in the land of the third tribe, they found 
before every dwelling an idol representing Nour, the original fire-
maker. The third disciple addressed the chiefs of the tribe: 
Th.is idol represents a man, who represents a capacity, which 
can be used.' 
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'This may be so,' answered the Nour-worshippers, 'but the pene-
tration of the real secret is only for the few.' 
'It is only for the few who will understand, not for those who 
refuse to face certain facts,' said the third disciple. 
'This is rank heresy, and from a man who does not even speak 
our language correctly, and is not a priest ordained in our faith,' 
muttered the priests. And he could make no headway. 
The band continued their journey, and arrived in the land of the 
fourth tribe. Now a fourth disciple stepped forward in the 'lSSembly 
of the people. 
'The story of making fire is true, and I know how it may be done,' 
he said. 
Confusion broke out within the tribe, which split into various 
fa<.•1vuS. Some said; 'This may be true, and if it is, WC want to find 
out how to make fire.' When these people were examined by the 
master and his followers, however, it was found that most of them 
were anxious to use firemaking for personal advantage, and did 
not realize that it was something for human progress. So deep had 
the distorted legends penetrated into the minds of most people 
that those who thought that they might in fact represent truth 
were often unbalanced ones, who could not have made fire even 
if they had been shown how. 
There was another faction, who said: 'Of course the legends are 
not true. This man is just trying to fool w, to make a place for 
himself here.' 
And a further faction said: 'We prefer the legends as they are, for 
they are the very mortar of our cohesion. If we abandon them, and 
we find that this new interpretation is useless, what will become of 
our community then?' 
And there were other points of view, as well. 
So the party travelled on, until they reached the lands of the 
fifth community, where firemaking was a commonplace, and 
where other preoccupations faced them. 
The master said to his disciples: 
'You have to learn how to teach, for man does not want to be 
taught. First of all, you will have to teach people how to learn. And 
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before that you have to teach them that there is still something to 
be learned. They imagine that they are ready to learn. But they 
want to learn what they ima9int is to be learned, not what they have 
first to learn. When you have learned all this, then you can devise 
the way to teach. Knowledge without special capacity to teach is 
not the same as knowledge and capacity.' 
1:#:1 
Ahmed el-Bedavi (died 1276) is reputed to have said, in answer 
to the question: 'What is a barbarianr: 
'A barbarian is one whose perceptions are so Insensitive that 
he thinks that he can understand by thinking or feeling 
something which can be perceived only through develop-
ment and constant application to the striving towards God. 
'Men laugh at Moses and Jesus, either because they are 
utterly insensitive, or because they have concealed from 
themselves what these people really meant when they talked 
and acted.' 
According to dervish lore, he was accused of preaching 
Christianity by Moslems, but repudiated by Christians be-
cause he refused to accept later Christian dogma literally. 
He was the founder of the Egyptian Bcdavi Order. 
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LESSON 3 
INTERVENING AND MOTIVATING WHO FOR WHAT? 
Learning Objectives 
The participants will: 
1. Discuss issues surrounding the problems of intervening and 
motivating people. 
2. Recognize factors that could be considered in an effective 
intervention that motivates people to participate in development. 
3. Better understand the complexity of intervention of outsiders 
in the development process. 
Activities 
1. Discussion of homework assignments (30 min) 
a) what aspects of human nature most affect people's 
inability to learn or change? 
b) what are the ways in which people do change? 
c) why should people in rural areas of the third world 
change at all? 
d) how should the directions of change be determined? 
2. Lecture - Carmen Deere (1 hour) 
Factors to Be Considered in Rural Development Intervention 
3. Break (15 min) 
4. Discussion with Carmen Deere (30 min) 
5. Triads (20 min) 
Discussion of each participants problem/issue/topic and 
factors they should consider in solving/addressing it. 
6. Process Consultation (20 min) 
a) what dimensions did the learning environment have in 
today's class? 
b) are there any problems that you feel need to be 
discussed? positive, negative aspects of class that you want 
changed now? 
7. Handout Homework 3 - Affecting others 
Materials Required 
1. Water and cups. 
2. Flip chart and newsprint. 
3. Carmen Deere and any materials she may require. 
~30 
HOMEWORK 3 
AFFECTING OTHERS EFFECTIVELY 
1. Read: 
1. Korten, pp. 1-52. 
2. Chambers, chapters 1 and 2, pp.1-46. 
3. Heilbroner, Economics Explained. 
4. Hewes, Rural Development: World Frontiers, pp.58-81. 
5. Hyden, pp. 39-92. 
2. Write: 
In 3 to 5 pages develop guidelines/considerations for 
effective intervention and motivation of rural communities. 
You may wish to discuss the structural pre-conditions that 
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POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS 
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT SIGNIFIES A 
great deal more than increased farm output. Farming may be con-
ceived as a series of activities carried on by individuals on a particular 
piece of land to achieve a material objective; rural development not 
only includes increased farm production but also connotes a continu-
ous social and political process among rural people ceaselessly reach-
ing out toward a better life. It is possible to increase farm production 
without imprO\·ing rural society. Thus in the United States vast in-
creases in farm output were achieYCd at the same time rural progres~ 
ceased because American rural society ceased to exist. 
The situation in the LDCs is very different from that in America; 
there are large metropolitan regions, but none of these is presently 
able to engulf a large portion of rural society. Instead LDCs continue 
, to confront the need to increase farm production and achieve rural 
development. However, for the most part these rural people ha\"C 
not been able to improve the quality of their own society nor to partic· 
ipate in the political life of the country. 
In the Latin-American democracies the rural political power struc-
ture is largely a matter of status, and since most rural people have 
little or no status they are largely disenfranchised. In the newer coun-
tries of Africa and Asia numerically small political elites rule because 
there is no one else to do the job. Thus political life in the LDCs 
tends to evolve as an oligarchic process. Political action in some of 
these governments is limited to infighting among members of the 
elite, and resulting coups d'etat sometimes become a means for effect-
ing meaningless changes in personnel. 
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Apparently L'ltin-Americans have never been able to solve the 
political dilemma posed by the conflict between democratic political 
fonns and an extremely status-conscious, prestige-oriented social order. 
The problem of overcoming the political limitations imposed by a 
colonial past stilI persists among the newly independent countries of 
Asia and Africa. In the latter case the changing of the guard was 
negotiated primarily between elites on both sides. Then, faced with 
the staggering task of governing a newly independent country, the 
new leaders depended on an incumbent bureaucracy to keep the 
country going while they sought to consolidate and expand their 
leadership. But this effort did not create a broader political power 
base; it simply organized, more efficiently perhaps, those already in 
positions of power. In the rural areas these were larger landholders, 
religious leaders, and merchants who by one means or another main-
tained political and economic control of the rural masses. In any 
event the traditional hierarchical controls of caste ;me! tribe went 
largely unchanged, and the bureaucracy went on functioning in the 
colonial tradition-the only way it knew. 
There were occasional improvements. In some places and at 
some times some rural people in some LDCs enjoyed some material 
benefits from improved farming. But it is not apparent that rural 
people as a whole have participated more fully in policy decisions 
affecting them. It is questionable whether LDC rural development 
connoting continuous forward movem<."nt of the rural masses has 
made any significant gains. 
In the LDC capitals the terminology of government and political 
affairs is speciously modern and the component parts of up-to-date 
government seem to be in place. In this congenial atmosphere it is 
quite easy for an observer to be lulled into believing that all is done 
that can be done. The verbiage and the terminology one hears are 
similar to what one has been trained to accept. Although perhaps 
only superficially, many of the LDCs are organized along proper demo-
cratic and parliamentary Jines, and tables of organization have a 
familiar appearance. In some respects several of the LDCs seem even 
more politically progressive than their European or American proto-
aypes. At least formally, these countries are committed to planning as 
a central tool of government, whereas the United States prefers the 
opaque profundity of annual Presidential messages on the state of the 
union and the national budget, and somehow Britons find solace in 
backward-looking reports of Chancellors of the Exchequer and Chair-
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l\fost of the LDCs accept the need to use the powers of go\'ern-
ment to direct, control, and guide national economic affairs. At least 
their intentions in this respect seem clear, and this is much to their 
credit despite substantial lags in performance. On the surface then, 
one might conceive that the LDCs are in pretty fair political shape if 
their adherence to democratic forms, their acceptance of the use of 
planning. and their adoption of an interventionist role of govern-
ment in economic affairs are accepted at face value. 
Unfortunately all this applies only in the capital at the center of 
government and not at all or only to a ,·ery limited extent in rural 
areas among rural people. It is not that these governments have not 
tried to reach rural people; they have. In India and Pakistan real 
effort was put into the systems of Panchayat Raj and Basic Democracy 
designed to achieve grass roots political expression. But neither of 
these has yet demonstrated ability to deal effectively with the tradi-
tional centers of rural power, and the same may be true of the Ujamaa 
Village program of Tanzania. l\fany LDCs find it nearly impossible 
to deploy an adequate field staff to carry out their policies. Moreover, 
in a number of these countries, despite lip service, many of the elite 
are hesitant to unleash the latent political power of rural people. 
The result has been few organs and routines for effectively mobilizin~, 
and expressing rural political judgments. A political chasm exists, 
with leaders and bureaucrats on one side and a vast voiceless rural 
population on the other. 
This is particularly true of the planning process, accepted and 
endorsed by most LDCs as essential to the conduct of their affairs. 
0l';pite the trappings and apparatus of planning, LDC government~ 
lt:ive not inherited or created the means for effectively involving rur;il 
people in the process. At best the plans of LDCs arc prepared and 
reviewed by technicians (often expatriate technicians), so whatever 
satisfaction LDC elites may obtain from plan preparation and pro-
mulgation should be muted by realization that these documents are 
not plans in anv real sense. Since they do not represent a political 
consensus, there is no certainty that they will or can be implemented. 
They remain simply recorded exercises in economic, statistical, and 
financial projections and extrapolations representing possibilities, not 
probabilities. ~ 
The architects of LDC gO\-crnment are in a predicament. \.They t 
haYe opted for policies dependent on wide political involvement but j 
have been unable to create the institutions linking the center to rural 
communities. To put it another \1·ay. LDC leaders have not yet 
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find a substitute by sending large numbers of gO\·ernment people into 
the rural area to tell people of their good intentions. However, the 
task of training such cadres has proved time-consuming and costly, and 
it is doubttul that these government newcomers have been accepted 
by the people. More likely these agents are taken into camp by the 
existing power structure and never achieve significant liaison with the 
people. Although the LDC authorities genuinely desire rural politi-
cal participation, they have not been able to reconcile themselves to 
use tactics of political agitation and organization somewhat along the 
lines used by trade unions and perhaps similar to methods used in 
China. 
Those arrangements for working with rural people that have 
been attempted have not resulted in strengthening the governments 
of the Third vVorld. Indeed the continuing turmoil testifies rather to 
basic political weakness. Since the bulk of those populations is rural, 
this weakness reflects a serious lack of solidarity among rural people 
and between them and the nation. While the weakness of fledgling 
nations is comprehensible, less reassuring is the persistence of attitudes 
and policies sustaining elites but reinforcing political weakness and 
inhibiting development. The time may have come for the LDCs to 
recognize the political strength accruing to the nation from forth· 
rightly yielding to the rural constituency powers, enabling them to 
participate effectively in formation and execution of development 
programs. 
This commentary is not original; 137 years h;!Ye passed since 
Alexis de Tocqueville described what he conceived to be the political 
dynamics of rural New England. Whether he was correct in his in· 
terpretation of the New England scene is less important than his suc· 
cess in demonstrating how a vigorous political unit composed of free 
individuals could contribute to national strength and solidarity. In 
today's terms Tocqueville's description is a political model. 
Examination of the mechanics of LDC government operations 
reveals the lack of availability of functions presented in Tocqueville's 
model. Instead, a small political leadership and an imperfectly func-
tioning central bureaucracy seek to run the entire country, although 
they lack local support and cannot depend on responsible citizen per· 
fonnance in the rural hinterland. Unfortunately neither the history 
nor the traditions of many of these nations provided for free local 
political expression. Being unaware of this gap, the new leaders did 
not perceive the need to create these political precincts. Instead they 
tinkered with existing local power structures and the inherited ad· 
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into a semblance of valid political institutions. But these local power 
structures represented not equality and free association but the exact 
opposite. Too often they were instruments of petty despotism operat-
ing on the custom-sanctioned ethic that the weak existed for exploit:i-
tion. Indeed the entire rural landscape in many regions came close 
to constituting a mosaic of political fiefdoms ruled by men strongly 
opposed to the very democratic principles promulgated by the elites 
and stated as the foundations of new national constitutions. 
"'hile Tocqueville's model may never have existed in real life 
(and, if it did, is nowhere significant in today's American political 
life), his concept or something close to it may be apropos of the trans-
formation of LDC rural institutions to further the ends of rural de-
velopment. 
One of the aspects of the New England village emphasized by 
Tocqueville was the broad assignment of public duties among the 
citizens. These included almost the entire spectrum of local govern-
ment-taxes, police, records, finance, public instruction, the poor, 
roads, weights and measures, and parish committees. Administrative 
authority, vested in elected selectmen, was strictly limited by the re-
quirement for referral to village meetings of any changes or proposals 
for additional undertakings. Another ;ispcct was the ease of making 
new proposals whenever small groups in the community wanted to 
make them. The system provided a broad distribution of power; the 
right of public participation in review and proposal was important, 
but more important was the wide opportunity to participate in 
managing community affairs. The result was to elicit maximum 
citizen interest and wide distribution of power, and at the heart of 
this structure was universal personal freedom and equality. 1 
In contrast, Myrdal and others indicate that in many LDC rural 
communities authority and the use of power are restricted to a small 
group attaining its prerogatives through birth, caste, tribal affiliation, 
or wealth. Central government tends to deal with this group; its 
representatives ally themselves with this leadership and so become a 
part of the traditional establishment. As a result, community under-
takings are involuntary for most of the participants and have the 
features of forced and therefore unwilling contributions. Most of the 
community generate nothing of public significance on their own 'ini-
tiative. Instead each family draws into itself, seeking to avoid as 
much as possible any contact with authority.~ 
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ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERS 
So far, our discussion of the political and administrative impedi-
ments to rural development has emphasized relations between rural 
people and government. Other impediments flow from specific atti-
tudes of LDC political leaders and government officials toward agri-
culture, natural resources, and the environment. These attitudes in-
fluence decisions in rural development; their effects are emphasized by 
Stefan Robock who, in his discussion of natural resource development 
in the northeastern Brazil SUDENE program, points to the political 
aspects of large natural resource undertakings, particularly among 
top echelon political leaders.~ In order for major development to start 
at all, strong support must be provided by national leadership. How-
ever, this support evolves through political negotiation possibly calling 
for sacrifices of technical principles and even of some objectives. Thus 
the SUDENE program as finally implemented represented important 
compromises. Roback concedes l11at a later evaluation of the program 
may support its wisdom, but he suggests that the inten'ening political 
struggle was very costly. It seems likely that, in the political bargain-
ing, hopes for rapid development were encouraged; in order to satisfy 
these, important longer-range benefits had to be subordinated. 
Political leaders can be tough bargainers; they also seek at times to 
avoid issues involving direct confrontation. When the opposition is 
strong and well organized and proponents arc not, political common 
sense dictates that issues be soft-pedaled even though basic principles 
of social equity are sacrificed. Politicians with records of supporting 
lost causes do not stay long in office. Probably such considerations are 
responsible for long delays in changing existing LDC land tenure 
arrangements and instituting broad agrarian reform. \Vhile these 
changes and refonns are generally recognized as essential to rural 
modernization and progress in many of the LDCs, exploitation is 
most extreme where landed interests are strongest and best organized 
and small farmers and tenants are poorly organized and led. The 
oppressed do not constitute a viable base for enlisting leadership sup-
port. So, short of revolution, the land tenure and agrarian reform 
issue is not likely to emerge as a major issue at the national level. If 
it does, it is very likely to be subjected to crippling compromise. 
The urban-industrial populations in LDCs are probably confused 
or uninformed about agrarian reform and the associated rural political 
issues, so these issues have not become clear-cut national issues. There 
is no national climate for rural reform, and political leaders have not 
64 CHAPTER 
displayed the slalesmanship necessary lo raise the issue lo its real na-
tional significance. As Hiram Phillips sees il, the need is for a sense 
of national direction.4 The least that conscientious political leadership 
could do is to evaluate the strength-overt and latent-of opposing in-
terests and determine those aspects susceptible of remedy. Such leaders 
could support widespread study and debate of this pressing national 
issue, and from such activity more a blc leadership might arise. Ho\1·-
e\ er, ne\\' LDC political leaders have not been willing to incur even 
the minimal risks of such encouragement. 
When LDC political leadership is willing to sacrifice major 
long-term de\·elopment goals for less important short-term advantage 
and is further unwilling to incur even minimal risks for important 
reforms, what can be said of its real objecli\·es? One interpretation is 
that the entire universe of rur;1l development, natural resource man-
agement, agTiculture, and the environment has no priority in the 
panorama of the LDC political elite. The most generous interpreta-
tion of this perspective is that the foremost LDC political concern has 
P to be immediate national survival. This paramount responsibility 
~~~ focuses attention on political management and enforces a short-term 
pragmatic view. The immediate demands of today :ind tomorrow 
must take precedence over potentials of next season, next year, or the 
next five or ten years. Unfortunately the time span of cyclical move-
ments of natural events-seed time :ind harvest, plant and arboreal 
growth, farming, environmental transition, and rural development-· 
correspond to "God's time," not to man's. 
It can also be noted that politicians ;ire seldom held accountable 
for natural disasters or environmental dam;ige, even if these events 
could have been prevented or mitigated. No one seem5 lo be an-
swerable when schistosomiasis appears on Lake Nasser and in the 
canals below the Aswan Dam. No heads roll when lands in the Indus 
Basin and northern India are gradually lost to salinity because of 
bacl irrigation practices. In the Soviet Union dissident writers may 
go to jail, but there arc no reprisals when enormous areas of im-
properly used lands increasingly become "dust bowls." Soil damage 
causes abandonment of farmland in Asia, lhe :"•fiddle East, North 
Africa, and Central America because of inadequate safeguards; but the 
unhappy farmers seek no political sacrifices. Since there are no penal-. 
ties, problems of population grnwth and food supp! y are reflected in 
\·astly complex environmental consequences." 
Related to their pragmatic concern for immediate problems is 
the preoccupation of LDC leaders with nation building. This preoc-
cupation is probably due to the recent arri\'al of these nations at in-
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dependent statehood or because their administrations rest on very re-
cent coups d'etat. In the view of the new leadership, their challenge 
is not development but rapid accomplishment of vertical political 
integration. \.\'. David Hopper, long a close student of the develop-
ment aspects of newly emergent states, says: 
The problem of creating a state out of a colony and molding 
its people into a nation is a problem which is uppermost and 
foremost. ... The rationale of locating steel plants or the ra-
tion;ilc of bringing in reforms or not bringing in reforms, as the 
c;ise may be, is a rationale within the framework of a political 
structure .... The issue that faces the political elites as a para-
mount issue is not only the retention of their own power, but 
the retention of their own power is very much dependent upon 
creating a vertical integration of the nation. of breaking out the 
disassociated units, the villages, the rather independent separate 
groups. of breaking these and combining them into a nation.6 
Jn Hopper's terms, politically important developments in the 
LDCs are those with fast payoff in national prestige and leadership 
credit. The Green Revolution might ha\·e been long delayed had not 
it' promise coinciclecl with the Indian drought of the mid-60s and 
the accompanying threat of starvation. Thus political motivation 
concentrates leadership attention on the trappings of power and partlv 
accounts for the initial emphasis on large-scale industrial plants and 
monument;il public works rather than on rural development. 
Alll\.11'.'ilSTRATIVE ARRAl>'GF.MF.l>TS 
In the organizational structure of LDC government administra-
tion functions, rural development, farming, natural resources, and 
environmental matters are placed in junior-grade ministries. This 
administrative pattern is not unique with the LDCs; it is more or Jess 
universal. The ranking government services are those concerned with 
foreign affairs, national defense, fiscal affairs, economic policy, com-
merce, and industry. For example, in the United States farming, 
forestry, fisheries, and land and water use are responsibilities delegated 
lo administrative echelons al least one step below cabinet level. This 
is also the case for rural development, rural social problems, and 
rural education. 
Among the richer nations this govemmemal pecking order may 
not be immediately critical, but in the case of the LDCs the junior 
rank accorded services responsible for rural development reinforces 
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these less glamorous ser\'ices, standing apart from the trappings of 
central power, may then develop their own separate power structures 
in combination with rural political and economic interests, and these 
interests will likely be selfish and \"cry conser\'atiYe. In time this semi-
syndical relationship flourishing in semiobscurity develops its mrn 
objecti\'es and priorities. It becomes exclusiYc, monopolistic, and diffi-
cult to penetrate or evaluate. 
The professional staffs of these particularistic go\'ernmcnt struc-
tures are in a strategic position. They have been trained in n:1rro\\' 
specialized fields; since the sole profession a I outlet for this training is 
in these governmental institutions, these officials come to hz1\·e a 
dominant role in the conduct and content of the training institutiom. 
Ultimately, professional recognition in these fields depends on sen ice 
in and for the specialized structure. Since there are \'ery fe\1· career 
opportunities outside these services, the institutions have a monopoly 
of skills in these fields. So it becomes increasingly difficult to establish 
any objectiw informed insight or oversight of the work performed by 
these bodies or for any informed criticism of their operations or policy 
to arise. 
Organizational discipline within these specialized services is made 
more severe because of the lack of outside employment opportunities. 
It is extremely difficult to transfer to higher-ranking ministries; the 
kind of people who become foresters, soil scientists, and agronomists 
\·ery seldom aspire to become cabinet ministers or members of Parlia-
ment. \\That may be important to such individuals is security, followed 
by improYed professional status and recognition within the institution. 
However, these rewards are determined not entirely by professional 
excellence but probably more by conformance to the conventions of 
the syndical power enclave. One of these conventions requires avoid-
ance of conflict or controversy with syndical allies. Another requires 
that any differences that may arise be settled "within the family"'; 
thus there may be a tendency to reYcal Yery little of the inner workings 
of the enclave to the public and to closely guard and closely edit public 
utterances. Indeed this diffidence applies not only to the public and 
the communications media but also to other ministries and the Parlia-
ment. 
An inevitable consequence of this organizational discipline is lo 
defeat and frustrate independent professional judgment while en-
couraging a protective and conservati\·e service morale. At the same 
time that these services become less capable of perceiving the general 
public interest they tend more and more to become the instruments 
of the special political and economic interests of the syndicate. In 
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these circumstances the objective of these services is not the welfare of 
of the great mass of the rural people but the overriding desires of the 
syndical allies. 
FUNCTIONAL DISPERSION OF GOVERN:\!ENT SERVICES 
Complicating the effects on rural development of low political 
and administrative rank are those arising from inappropriate separa-
tion of government functions. Here we encounter administrative pat-
terns, in developed as well as developing nations, defying any system 
of logical arrangement but receiving almost universal acceptance. 
Everyone accepts the concept of an integrated environment, but 
everywhere the government services for environmental problems are 
so badly dispersed and fractionalized that a major effort has to be 
mounted to achieve coordinated action. 
The LDCs had the opportunity of a voiding the illogical func-
tional arrangements of developed nations with respect to development, 
use, and control of natural resources and the environment, but many 
of them repeated the schizoid pattern. Now very commonly one finds 
among the LDCs that irrigation is a responsibility of one ministry 
and agricultural development of another. In some countries not only 
are agriculture and irrigation administratively separated, but also 
rural development is divorced from agricultural cooperatives. In 
Panama an agricultural component at the National University per-
forms some agricultural research functions quite separate and apart 
from similar research functions of the Ministry of Agriculture also 
administering agricultural training institutions. Ethiopia has a Minis-
try of Land Reform separate from the Ministry of Agriculture; a Min-
istry of Community Development conducts rural community develop-
ment projects; irrigation is still another administrative entity. India 
and Pakistan place irrigation development in one ministry and agri-
culture in another. In a number of LDCs the functions of farm 
credit are separate from those of agricultural development. 
Not only does this atomization of function make for administra-
tive problems, it is also very expensive. Seemingly these administra-
tive disfunctional arrangements would call 0111 for reorganization in 
the name of efficiency, but this does not happen readily. However. 
very wisely India did merge its separate ministries of Cooperative and 
Community Development with its Ministry of Agriculture some years 
ago. One suspects that more of these reorganizations are not effectecl 
because of political considerations, particularly the resulting reduc-
tion in attractive patronage opportunities or the embarrassment of 
"! ~- r--~ 
°"' 
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forcing some incumbent politician out of a comfortable post. Then 
too, the alliances these specialized units may ha\'e formed represent 
forces able to cause considerable political disturbance. Certainly in 
the United States considerations such as these ha\'e set at naught for 
nearly half a century efforts to reorganize into more efficient patterns 
those administrati\'e units of the federal government responsible for 
administration of natural resources. 
Among the LDCs the situation is aggn\';ited by bureat1cratic 
jealousy and competition among UN affiliates such as betwern the 
Food and Agriculture Oragnization and the International L1bo11r 
Organization. Thus in one country the ILO may attempt to promote 
its concepts of rural cooperatives under the aegis of Commt1nity De-
Yelopment in one ministry at the same time that FAO pushes a similar 
operation as a function of the Ministry of Agriculture. This is not 
fun and games for the target country, for the effect is to confuse tlte 
development effort and to intensify wasteful and inefficient cleplorn1cnt 
of scarce LDC resources. 
QUALITY OF ;\.D~II:'>ISTRATI\'E PERSO:\':\'EL 
The quality of personnel in the go\·ernment services of the LDCs 
and their attitude toward that service greatly affects the perform;rnce 
of government functions. In turn, the quality of personnel attracted 
to these services is affected by the career opportunities they afford. It 
is only natural then that the secondary rank of go\'ernment ministries 
concerned with rural development and the administration of natural 
resources does not make these sen·ices attractive to abler people. 
More ambitious, brighter, and better-trained young people seek careen 
in the higher-ranking services. Moreover, placement in these sen·ices 
usually means that one will work in the capital city with all its com-
forts and amenities while enjoying the status conveyed by high-ranking 
service, and among the LDCs these are extraordinarily important con-
~iderations. 
In a number of LDCs the process of career selection begins at :rn 
early age. In order to qualify for entrance to the higher-ranking sen·-
ices one must have attended the prestigious universities at Calcutta, 
Bombay, Manila, Monte\'ideo, Addis Ababa, or their equivalents. But 
only the select can afford to attend these institutions. Thus to many 
young people the agricultural colleges and other institutions t~aining 
for careers in rural areas represent second choices. Those who fail to 
meet the higher academic requirements of the prestige institutions or 
1d10 cannot afford them turn to these less prestigious schools. Thc1e 
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candidates may not be as interested in farming, in rt1ral people, or 
in the natural cmironment as in achieving a degree of status attached 
to higher education and ultimately the security of a government job-
albeit one of >econclary rank. Thus it frequently happens that incli-
\'icluals who begin this kind of career are not from rural areas and 
have no previous connection with farming or farm people. And so 
the system works as a selection process, automatically routing to pro-
fessional work in the junior ministries many who accept such careers 
not out of preference or interest but out of necessity or lack of alterna-
tive. 
Reinforcing this process is the general low esteem for the rural 
sector and its affairs by the elites of these countries. 'Vhile land own-
ership-particularly abstentee ownership of large estates-may convey 
prestige, farming itself is considered to be a distinctly inelegant occupa-
tion. Hence those who work with farm people may suffer humiliation; 
their social status suffers and so does their self-esteem. In these cir-
cumstances many individuals devote much energy to wrangling trans-
fers from posts in rural areas to the seat of government. 
In the end the government workers in rural development services 
are not highly motivated toward their work. l\fany of them are serving 
time waiting for retirement or a possible but unlikely transfer out of 
rural areas to a larger city and a desk job. Their own status preoccupa-
tion inhibits sympathy for their clients and the desire to understand 
rural people. These officials tend not to be innovati\·e but rather to 
reduce the scope of their activities to routine tasks requiring neither 
initiative nor energy. Jn the field they receive little support or com-
munication from upper echelons, so they lead an isolated existence. 
As newcomers to the village scene they find it difficult to achieve ac-
ceptance among their rural clientele and are frmtratecl in efforts to 
initiate meaningful relations enabling them to demonstrate new agri-
cultural techniques or to make helpful suggestions for improvement 
of fanning practices. Sometimes they are denied materials essential 
to performance of their duties, such as new tires for bicycles or re-
placement of worn-out batteries for radio receiving sets. Sometimes 
funds enabling them to travel to higher headquarters are lacking so 
they cannot even report their needs. Their own youth and inexperi-
ence put them at a dis.1dvantage in rural societies where age is equated 
with wisdom. Eventually these representatives of the central govern-
ment lapse into indifference and inertia. 
This kind of arrangement lacks valid local institutions for the 
formulation and expression of local will. It was precisely this vital 
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made the Japanese Land Reform Program of 1946-51 an outstanding 
success-a success due almost entirely to the vigor and enterprise of 
locally elected Village Land Commissions vested with full responsi-
bility for decision and action. vVith this impetus their work and sense 
of responsibility succeeded in transforming in a few short years a cen-
turies-old feudal land tenure system into a new egalitarian system 
dominated by small independent landowners. The role of the cen-
tral government and its agents was advisory and infomlalive. No one 
at the time thought much about it, but the commissions-both in the 
manner of their formation as freely elected bodies and in the distri-
bution of their responsibilities-seem in retrospect Lo have followed 
very closely the Tocqueville pattern. vVhat followed was a tremen-
dous release of energy directed toward realization of local objectives. 
Of course this analogy is subject to the reservation that Japan was 
not an underdeveloped nation. Yet, given the circumstances prevail-
ing nationwide at the end of the war involving dislocation, wide dn·-
astation, and disruption plus the universal acceptance of feudal prin-
ciples and traditional organization, the situation was much closer to 
today's LDCs than to the developed countries. 
The revolutionary change in Japanese rural society consisted in 
endowing local communities with an instrument for full self-expres-
sion with an equal opportunity for every individual, regardless of 
economic or social status, to have a hand in formulating community 
decisions. In this system government people appear in a new role. 
Their advice and assistance gain authority by endorsement of these 
local bodies. Thus officials do not appear as an arm of the central 
power. ln the Japanese experience their work had meaningful con-
tent; what they had to contribute was something everyone wanted, 
and they became identified with the communily. 7 Community moti-
vation became their motivation; their progress and recognition was 
the result of their success in meeting self-determined village needs 
and in helping to solve village problems. 
As the rural sector achieves success, political power accrues to i l. 
with a corresponding accretion of prestige and rank. In this process 
the agricultural and rural institutions become politically powerful 
and influence national policy. As the rural sector gains power and 
prestige, the careers of rural civil servants become more attractive and 
abler people seek to enter the service. Moreover, 'these recruits in-
creasingly come from a rural background and share the aspirations of 
rural people. This is the process to be set in motion by LDCs in their 
efforts toward rural development. 
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ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
Many LDCs have adopted central planning for achieving devel-
opment and growth and for allocating national resources. vVhether 
LDCs use central planning or more occult procedures, all of them in 
common with universal practice make some kind of estimate of the 
amount of central resources to be deployed for development purposes. 
Jn all these forward projections governments reveal their intentions 
toward the rural sector. At this point decisions are made about the 
extent of steps to redress the inadequacy of rural infrastructure and 
amounts of central resources intended for feeder roads, rural electri-
fication, irrigation works, schools, storage facilities, regulated markets, 
extension services, manpower training, and research. It is also at this 
point that qualities of vision and imagination of the administration 
personnel are most important and the need to upgrade the quality of 
the administrative services is most keenly felt. At a recent joint OECD 
Development Center /World Bank seminar on rural development, 
several participants expressed the view that before improvement in 
rural development procedures could be effective the en tire status of 
rural affairs would have to be improved. 8 
At the outset of the planning process the effect of lower rural 
rank-order would mean lower allocations to rural development items. 
This was the case in India, at least through its third Five-Year Plan 
(1960-65). I noted this trend in 1964 in a study for USAID outlining 
a strategy for long-range assistance for rural India. Observing that 
under the third Five-Year Plan the proportionate share of resources 
proposed for Agriculture and Rural Community Development was 14 
percent compared to 24 percent for Industries and Minerals, 22 per-
cent for Irrigation and Power, and 20 percent for Transport and 
Communications, I commented: 
India's very substantial efforts to achieve planned and bal-
anced economic development have probably been less effective in 
the agricultural sector. From First Plan to Third and looming 
over Fourth Plan formulation and perspective planning through 
1976 is the largely unresolved problem of adequately quantifying 
agriculture's base, potentials, and proper role in the nation's sus-
tained economic growth. Inability to organize an economical 
sound approach to sectoral development of agriculture inevitably 
weakens economic planning and perspective for all other sectors.9 
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E\'eri if the o\·erall amounts allocated for rural deYelopment 
among the LDCs were adequate, there would remain the equally irn-
porLllnt function of programming and scheduling the investment 1!011· 
to rural de\'elopment. It is in the performance of funding functions 
that heavy demands on skill and training are imposed. Even if these 
are present, they have to be organized properly in an effective admin-
istrati\'e structure, and here too weakness is encountered. Thus neglect 
of the rural deYelopment role in government places a double handi-
c.1p of less-qualified personnel and poorly articulated organization on 
the planning function. It was the latter handicap that attracted 
comments from participants in the 1972 OECD/lBRD seminar: 
It seemed to many of the par11c1pants that the existing or-
ganization of the administration in many countries was a major 
obstacle to adopting an integrnlcd approach and tl1e evidence 
provided by l\[r. Mule from Kenya on this point was oE particular 
interest. A large measure of agreement was also reached on the 
need to devise organizational arrangements which would enable 
decision-making to be really decrntrali:ed. (Emphasis added)IO 
Those familiar with the planning function understand the heavy 
demand it imposes: it takes acute, detailed, and intensive effort suo-
tained over long periods to fit together in proper sequence the com-
ponents of a balanced scheme for rural development. \Vhen these 
burdens are placed on inadequately tra)ned staff, the result may be 
sloppy planning and poor implementation. This performance is not 
so much the fault of those engaged in the task but rather in the bias 
resulting in establishing a second-rank standing for go\'ernment work 
in rural development. As time passes and these workers gain experi-
ence, perfonnance may progressively improve. Still the lag is ex-
pensive for the nations and for their rural constituencies. 
In our concern with planning we should not lose sight of the need 
to link plans closely to implementation. Thus planning for rural de-
velopment and the execution of these plans arc a continuous process. 
Plans, to be effective, must comprehend an awareness of the capacitv 
of the executing agencies to carry them out. Moreover, no plan is so 
good that it does not have to be modified continuously during imple-
mentation stages. On the other hand, if implementation is laggard or 
careless, no plan can succeed. 
Past experience has shown that e\'cn the most wrll-concei\'cd 
and well-designed schemes flop :it the implementation le\'cl. Se,·-
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era! reasons are adduced for this: lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of top political and administrative leadership and/or its inability 
to transmit the same to middle and local level of leadership; red-
tape. archaic administrative procedures and general ineptitude 
and inefficiency of the administrative machinery at lower levels; 
economic and political vested interests which are indifferent to 
the schemes which are of no direct benefit to them. Numerous 
cases have been noted in which funds allocated to such schemes 
arc di,·erted to schemes which benefit the better-off.! I 
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It was such a combination of sloppy planning and indifferent 
execution that resulted in a failure of Ethiopia's second Five-Year 
PLm (I %3-68) to meet its agricultural objecti\'es when government 
capital expenditures for agriculture were only 42 percent of planned 
objecti\'cs. 1 ~ The explanation seems to be that planners overestimated 
the performance capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and possibly 
also the availability of resources. One specific shortfall was a three-
and-a-half-year delay in establishing the important Agricultural Re-
search Institute with a subsequent failure to implement research pro-
grams. More generally those departments of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture responsible for extension services, agronomy, education, training, 
statistics, ri,·cr surveys, and the Cadastral land survey were unable 
to meet pbnned goals because of insufficient funds. Recurrent ex-
penditures (used for the payment of salaries) for the ministry as a 
whole were only two-thirds of planned levels. 
Several factors- probably worked in combination to create this un-
happy record. One is the likelihood that funds, originally allocated 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, were diverted to higher-ranking min-
istries. Another possibility is that personnel to staff the se\'eral pro-
grams were una\'ailable; some regular staff may have transferred to 
other ministries and recruits in the process of in-service training went 
to other jobs_ The overall cause of the poor performance was the low 
ranking of the Ministry of Agriculture plus bad planning practices. 
In any event, the encl result was a deplorable shortfall in the progress 
of rural de\'elopmcnt. 
Sometimes conscientious planners may be misled by inaccurate or 
erroneous data. This in turn may be the result of neglect of rural 
statistical reporting services. Also the newer LDCs may not have been 
in business long enough to accumulate sufficient time series data to 
justify using them as a base for extrapolations. This deficiency may be 
aggra\'atcd by the bias inherent in syndical loyalties (referred to above) 
taking the form of overstating organization performance capacity in 
\'. 
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the interest of making one department or bureau "look good." \Vhen 
these distortions get cranked into a plan there is bound to be a break· 
down, because the plan simply cannot work. 
Something like this happened in the case of Tanzania's first Fivc-
Year Plan ending in 1969. Almost from the outset it became appar-
ent that the departments concerned with rural development could not 
carry out their assignments. 13 A second cause of near failure was a 
substantial underestimate of national population and rate of popula-
tion growth. This error led to further miscalculations of per capita 
income, saving, and capital formation. As if this were not enough, 
progress was further impeded by an acute shortage of trained man-
power for the rural program and a major overestimate of foreign ex· 
change flows. However, what distinguishes the Tanzania situation 
was the careful supenision enabling the government to detect thc1e 
error.; and the resiliency of the leadership in makin~ the ncce5>:1n 
difficult midstream adjustments to offset what otherwise could h.1, c 
been a real disaster. 
A further critical element in planning for rural development is 
the degree of understanding of the proceS5 of rural de,·elopmen t pos-
sessed by planners. This quality of perception is manifested in the 
o\·erall development strategy and in the priorities and emphases of 
the accorded plan components. From this standpoint it is not so much 
whether rural planners are right or wrong in selecting component' 
for rural development but rather how they conceive the total de' c]. 
opment process as evidenced by the choices they make in allocating 
resources. Do they see that process as systemic unity where all cornpo· 
nents are related? If they do not perceive this unity, it is likely that 
the flow of development investment will be atomized in smh a fashion 
that there is no coherent integration of dewlopment. John P. Lewis, 
who was familiar with Indian planning procedures, caJled attention 
to the blithe disregard by planners of demographic concentrations in 
the Indian rural landscape in contrast to what he conceived to he the 
critical importance for development of planning of these clusterings 
because they provided a central focus for administrative, political, :ind 
economic activity.B 
In more specific terms, neglect of the systemic aspects of rural de-
velopment tends to permit uncoordinated programs for the location 
of processing plants, warehouses, supply depots, marketing point~. 
fertilizer mixing plants, and feeder roads. If these components are 
located without respect to other components, the paramount advan-
tage of maximizing development complementaries is lost, as is the op-
portunity to break through the isolation and stagnation of small 
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villages. According to E. A. J. Johnson, this lack of coordinated 
planning effort is due to poor training of planners aggravated by 
political incentives to dole out projects in a political pork-barrel 
fashion.I~ 
If the central plan for rural development becomes a collection of 
separate undertakings, the corresponding investment flow will be ir-
rational. Thus installations constructed "out of phase" with the de-
velopment process or located inappropriately will be underutilized or 
completely unused. "Whereas Lewis and Johnson view these planning 
miscues as a result of poor training, ignorance, indifference, or political 
expedience, our thesis inclines toward the view that these short-
comings have their origin in the low ranking of rural affairs among 
LDC governments. 
1'01.n1cAL SYSTEMS 
LAT 1 N AMER 1 c A. Throughout Latin America, by one means or 
another, programs of land reform have frequently been initiated 
and usually stifled or sidetracked through the political maneuverings 
oE large landowners and their allies. Yet it is generally agreed that 
the existing farm tenancy system is largely responsible for low pro-
ductivit y, rural misery, and a technically backward agriculture. There 
haYe been some exceptions to this in Bolivia's insurrectionist land 
seizures by tenants, and to some extent colonization in Venezuela has 
provided a partial answer to the problem of land reform. Chile's long-
stalled land reform program might have stood a chance of resuscita-
tion under the Allende regime. But Brazil's situation is characterized 
as limited to a few small-scale projects and half measures. The gen-
eral outlook in Latin America is a frustration of the necessary reforms 
to provide dynamic change from the present rural stagnation.16 
Backward agricultural development in Colombia affects the 
national economy and is related to the preponderance of rural people 
among the nation's poor.1 7 One observer related this situation to de-
ficient le~1denhip not competent to support rural development plan· 
ning and operations. ·while more than JOO separate agencies are 
engaged in rural development activities, rural stagnation and decline 
are universal. Also apparent is a completely inadequate system of 
rural education. Since only about 3 percent of those entering first 
grade in rural areas will later register for the fifth and final grade, 
there is an almost complete absence of rural students among those re-
ceiving professional agricultural training. This means that the staffs 
of agricultural agencies are made up mostly of people who have had no 
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personal familiarity with farming or rural life. Consequently an 
almost complete Yacuum of interest and concern exists between those 
who farm and those who seek to improve farming teclmolog·y ;rnd 
rural development. The technical and official group seems primarily 
to have been recruited among lawyers, economists, and cnginccn." 
A further conclusion is that Colombian taxpayers are unwilling to 
support rural education, preferring to support urban public cd11c1-
tion. Because taxpayers arc usually an elite group, it has been co11-
jectured that those who financially support government are un\\·illing 
to support measures that would give poor people an opportunity to 
compete with the young of the powerful elitcs.rn 
EA s T AFR 1 c A. In Ethiopia agriculture and rural dcvclop111ent 
suffer the consequences of an old feudal system. Grants of land to 
those sen·ing the imperial establishment have preempted large areas. 
l\Lmy of the cultivators in the northern and central highland regiom 
arc tenants with insecure tenurial rights. ln the late 19GOs Emperor 
Haile Selassie undertook sC\'eral measures designed to reform thi., 
system; he established a l\linistry of Land Reform and appointed ;" 
l\finister one of his abler administrators. Unfortunately, very lilllc 
has been accomplished since these beginnings except for the crc:ition 
of a sizable bureaucracy. It appears that while the Emperor lent hi' 
personal support and prestige to the reform, the vested po\\·er of IJotl1 
his hereditary nobility and the Amharic Christian Church had 'llffi· 
cient po\\·er to obfuscate and inhibit action. Parliamentary delays ;rnd 
maneuvers preYented passage of basic legislation, disregarding rcpc:tt· 
eel imperial insistence on enJ.ctment. These powerful interests \1Trc 
also instrumental in securing the ITmo,·;iJ of ;rn able l\Iinister of l .:l!1d 
Reform and the appointment of a more amenable replacement. 
Among younger Ethiopi:ms, particularly among uni\·ersiLy ~tu­
dents, land reform has become one of 3 number of burning political 
issues which have aroused their opposition to the Establishment. Up 
to the present time this opposition has not achieved significant ex-
pression. On the other hJ.nd, there have been rumors of strong re-
pressive police action serving to increase tensions and anti-Establish-
ment sentiment. However, this unrest is probably an urban phenom-
enon confined largely to Addis Ababa and its environs. Little is knmrn 
about fam1er reaction, perhaps because of the substantial amount of 
unsettled land in the southern part of the country. There is some evi-
dence of a gradual southward migrJ.tion out of northerly regions. 
which may ha,·e been hastened by Lirge ten:rnt displacement as a re· 
sult of increasing mechanization. 
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Agricultural development in Ethiopia is impeded by the prim-
iti\ c level of farming and lack of means to improve productivity. 
Technical assistance to farmers through the extension work of the 
l'viinistry of Agriculture is impeded by the low rJ.nking of that ministry. 
Extension field workers arc poorly paid and poorly trained. Moreover, 
the ministry is handicapped both by budgetary limitations and by the 
manner in which budgeted funds are disbursed and is also plagued 
by competition from and conflicts with more powerful units of govern-
ment having peripheral and tangential responsibility for both rural 
development and farming. 
ln contrast to other countries of the Third \Vorld, Ethiopia seems 
to neither fear nor distrust foreign assistance or investment. Under 
the prompting of overseas assistance agencies several promising and 
forward-looking agricultural projects J.re under way. Large-scale and 
succe<,sful foreign-owned agricultural enterprises have been developed; 
and Ethiopia has not been unresponsive to suggestions for improve· 
mcnt in agricultural administration, organization, trarnmg, and 
re,c;1rch. The major uncertainty relating to the widespread imple-
mentation of these initial steps is with respect to the highly conserva· 
tivc and very powerful elite group whose basic entrenchment in con· 
trol of land resources will sooner or later have to be challenged. To 
what extent, if any, this confrontation would involve the development 
role of foreign entrepreneurs is a matter of speculation. 
Socialist Tanzania. under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, has 
adopted a unique administrative and political approach to agricul-
tural and rural development based on the principle of rural village' 
conceived as communal organizations. Nyerere, as leader of the TANU 
party,20 visualizes rural development primarily along political lines. 
ln rural areas agricultural technicians work to assist the political arm 
of government, the Ministry of Rural Development, in its efforts to 
create Ujamaa villages-a form of communal social organization based 
on the concept of the indigenous extended family. One might con-
jecture that this concept is not unrelated to the rural communes of 
the Peoples Republic of China and the philosophy of l\fao Tse-tung. 
These concepts arc in the process of implementation within a 
process of nation building and rapid tramition from previous colonial 
status. Thus the Ujamaa principle is making its way among Tan-
7anian farmers who are mostly small holckrs. These farmers will re· 
ceive government assi-;tance encouraging them toward collectivism in 
farming operations. 
Land reform in its distributive aspect is absent because the Tan-
zanian Linc! tenure system is apparently not characterized by land· 
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lordism or typical tenancy patterns. Thus the poliliG1l and adminis-
trative aspects of rural development seem to take the form of indoctri-
nation and persuasion. To the extent possible, government exercises 
its power by helping rural people in such a fashion that they find them-
selves better off within a Ujamaa context. 
\Vithin the bureaucracy this means that everyone conforms to 
TANU party discipline: T ANU sets the major principles for nalion;il 
planning, and ministerial conferences on planning are subject to 
party dictates. In the field T ANU policy is continually manifested to 
farm advisors and all other government functionaries. Just what effect 
this may have on technical and professional personnel in the se\'Cral 
ministries is difficult to judge, and just how well the Ujamaa principle 
conforms to the imperatives of agricultural technology is still a 11i;1 t 
ter of conjecture. But what Nyerere does is lo instill a sense of nation-
hood among a population historically tribal in outlook. He also 
seeks to socialize farming while stimulating it to achieve higher le\·cls 
of output. 
In contrast to other LDCs, although most of the rural people <'f 
Tanzania are very poor and ignorant, they are at least not oppressed 
or exploited. On the other hand, evidence that the Ujamaa principle 
has or will result in raising levels of production is not apparent. Tan-
zania has also undertaken several ventur~ in large-scale state fanns. 
Opinion on the likelihood of success of these ventures is divided. 
Another aspect of agricultural policy with a doubtful outlook is that 
of producing food grains at costs above world market prices. Finally, 
the continued discouragement of small traders of agricultural com-
modities in some areas without providing alternate marketing outlets 
was not wise. Thus one is forced to the conclusion that short-run 
political actions may have doubtful effects, but that in the longer run 
Ujamaa policy may be dynamic in raising farm production levels and 
improving rural life-sty!~. The contrast may be between production 
as a short-run goal and ultimate integrated rural development. 
1 ND 1 A. The dominant political party in India since independence 
is the Congress Party, and all Indian governments since independence 
ha\'e been Congress Party governments; it was the party of Gandhi, 
Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi. \\'hoever controlled the Congress 
Party ruled India. Consequently Indian agricultural and rural policy 
has been set by the Congress Party. This party has included a great 
variety of economic interests; one very important component in terms 
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of establishing rural policy was the farm group, particularly land· 
O\\'ners. 
The Constitution of India places much power in the hands o{ 
the several Indian states, including administrative responsibility for 
agriculture. BeG1use many of the states are predominantly rural and 
agricultural, it is natural that dominant landowner interests should 
strongly color state politics. This deployment of political power was 
decisive in offsetting the original land reform objectives of the central 
government which visualized as a [uncbmental political tenet redis· 
tribution of agricultural lands to tenants along with rights to secure 
tenure on lands they might rent. 
Initial efforts of reform began and largely ended with abolition of 
a particular layer o[ rent receivers, the Zamindari. The Zamincbr 
system was established by the British in the latter part of the eight-
eenth century. 21 It was conceived that these functionaries would re· 
ceive rent in perpetuity and forward a stipulated amount as taxes. 
In time the Zamindari parceled out these rent alloG1tions to others; 
in some cases there were as many as 15 or 20 layers of rent receivers 
between the cultivator and the last receiver.22 Apparently this system 
did not uniformly cover all Indian states; the relations between 
Zarnindar right and land ownership varied in different localities. 
It was relatively easy in the period after independence to abolish 
the inexcusably exploitive Zamindar system as an example of the 
malfunctions of the British raj. And that, to all intents and purposes, 
was the extent of Indian land reform. Some states passed legislation 
setting ceilings on the amount of land in a single ownership, but from 
that point on the record is replete with a tangle of land litigation 
and proceedings of commissions 0£ various kinds_ Today both land-
lordism and tenancy are almost universal throughout India. It is in 
this setting that the Green Revolution in India has taken place. 
It has been difficult for the central government to exert sufficient 
influence over state policy and administration to achieve a national 
consistency in implementing its rural objectives beG1use agriculture is 
a "state matter." Nearly twenty years ago Paul Appleby reported to 
the government of India on this situation: 
The Centre is without any real powers in almost the en tire 
field of development; its function is the "staff" function rather 
than the "line" or "action" function, and its method slows greatly. 
and expedites hardly at all. Land policy is related to develop-
ment of agriculture. but land policy is exclusi,·ely within the field 
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can never hope to do anything of consequence, is in their field. 
And farm credit is important to agTicultural development. The 
influence that is associated with Central financial assistance is so 
cumbered by an intricate system of multiple reviews hoth in the 
states and in the Centre that the Centre often may be said to 
rescue the states from trouble rather than stimul;ning the st:ites to 
bold, big, new action. And responsibility for all this is so diffus~d 
that almost no one knows who can be held accountable for 
what.23 
In this context the charisma of Indian leaders becomes the prin-
cipal unifying force in pushing a progressive rural policy. The formal 
structure, the division of administrative power, and the limited 
colonial procedures act as impediments to the design and extension of 
powers. For this reason the maintenance of personal qualitie' of 
prestige and elitism become extremely important aspects of leadership. 
But this also means that the reservoir of leadership power cm be 
drawn upon only for critical issues. This consideration may expbin 
the past unwillingness of leadership to forthrightly challenge en-
trenched rural land interests. The price for a greatly expanded food 
production so vital to national well-being apparently has been to 
permit these landed interests to reap major benefits from the Green 
Revolution and to risk widespread exploitation of small and wea ke1 
cultivators and landless laborers. 
The political paradox bet"·een an enlightened leadership and 
a backward electorate was due to the political power of conservatiYe 
economic interests in local and state politics. Since these intere't' 
constituted the dominant power centers, they controlled politic;tl 
machinery up to the state level. Their followers, who gave these loci! 
power centers control of politic.11 majorities, were the same small 
farmers, tenants, and landless hborers who needed relief. The5e op-
pressed rural people provided the clientele for the wielding of local 
power, and this political structure was reinforced by the caste system. 
Exploited rural people provided the numerical support to keep their 
exploiters in power. Since national and state elections coincided. 
consen•ative control of national politics continued, but so did the 
frustration of the progressive le;idership. This political procc''' 11·:1' 
also causing erosion of the prestige of the Congress Party and grm1·ing 
social discontent with a mounting threat of violence and revolt. Efforts 
by the Prime Minister to implement !;incl reform were threatened or 
brought no response; the response to the government's efforts to en-
force a new wealth tax on agricultural property was challenged by 
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sever;t! of the ministers and overturned by the Punjab and Haryana 
high court.~ 4 
Perhaps no one in India perceived what was going on as well as 
Mrs. Gandhi or saw better the threats an uncorrected future might 
imply. She took a calculated risk, first separating state and national 
elections and then setting the latter in 1971-a full year in advance of 
the regularly scheduled date. This enabled her wing of the party-
now called for purposes of the election the New Congress Party-to go 
to the rural areas with a specific call for support of liberal and pro-
gressive parliamentary candidates while emphasizing the need to cor-
rect social in justices, including unemployment and land reform. She 
won an overwhelming victory. 
This important political victory opens the prospect of orderly 
change in the Indian countryside, but it will still be difficult to achieve 
in practice the measures advocated by the Prime Minister. The com-
plex state-central administration arrangement will have to be sur-
mounted, and there may be need for amendment of the Constitution-
a step hitherto found infeasible. If the central government can win 
and hold the loyalty of the rural masses, the opposition interests may 
be forced to a workable compromise. 
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The GNP 
One of the reasons for the mystification that obscures 
economics is the vocabulary it employs. Not only does it use 
common, ordinary words, such as saving or investing, in ways that 
are not exactly the way we use them in everyday talk, but it leans on 
barbarous and intimidating terms like macroeconomics or gross nation-
al product. 
It would be nice if we could purge economics of its jargon, 
but that would be like asking doctors to tell us about our troubles in 
plain English. Instead, we must learn to speak a certain amount of 
economics-that is, to become familiar with, and easy about, some 
of the basic terms in which economists tell about our economic 
condition. 
One of these is that odd word "macroeconomics." It comes 
from the Greek macro, meaning big, and the implication is that 
macroeconomics therefore grapples with very big problems. It does, 
including such problems as inflation and recession and unemploy-
ment and economic growth. But that is not what distinguishes 
macro from its brother, microeconomics, whom we will meet later. 
Rather, macroeconomics refers to a perspective, a vantage point, 
that throws into high relief certain aspects of the economic system. 
What does the economy look like from the macro perspec-
tive? The view is not unlike that which we have gained in the 
chapters just past. We look down on the economy, as from a plane, 
to see it as a vast landscape populated by business firms, house-
holds, government agencies. Later, when we take up the micro 
perspective, we will examine the selfsame landscape from a worm's-
eye, rather than a bird's-eye view, with surprising changes in the 
features of the landscape that spring into sharp focus. 
The purpose of looking down on the economy from the 
macro vantage point is that it allows us to see, more clearly than 
from ground level, a process of crucial and central importance. This 
is the ceaseless activity of production on a national scale, the 
never-ending creation and re-creation of the wealth by which the 
country replenishes and renews and expands its material life. This 
great central flow, on which we all depend, is called the gross 
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national product, often abbreviated as GNP. When TV newscasters 
say that GNP has gone up or down, what they mean is that the river 
of output has gotten larger or smaller, that we are producing more 
or less. Leaming about why production varies is the first task of 
macroeconomics. 
JV.HAT GNP IS MADE UP OF ________ _ 
We start to unravel the question by looking more closely at 
the river itself. One thing is immediately clear. The flow of output 
arises from the cooperation of the factors of production-from the 
efforts of the labor force mustered from the nation's households, 
working with capital and land mainly owned by the nation's 
businesses, under the rules and laws established by the govern-
ment. We can literally see the flow of production originating in ten 
million farms and factories, offices and agencies, over which we fly. 
It is from these wellsprings that the river of national output is 
formed. 
\:';:-· As we look down on it, the river seems at first to be made up 
~ of an unclassifiable collection of outputs. There are hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of kinds of goods and services in the 
stream of production-foods of every conceivable kind, spectrums 
of clothing, catalogs of machinery, jumbles of junk. But at second 
look, we can see that this vast and variegated output can be divided 
into two basic sorts of production. One of them consists of goods 
and services that will be bought by households for their personal 
use: cars, haircuts, jewelry, meat. We call this branch of the river of 
production consumption, and the various goods and services in it 
consumers' goods. · 
The consumption branch of our production process is famil-
iar to us. But looking again from our macro vantage point, we can 
see that there are goods and services that never end up in any 
consumer's possession. Here is a stream of outputs such as ma-
chines, roads, office buildings, bridges, not to mention smaller 
objects such as office furniture and office typewriters. These goods 
are also obviously part of our gross national product, but they are 
not consumers goods. We give them a special name-investment 
goods or capital goods-and we will soon see that they play a vital role 
in determining our economic well-being. 
The macro view also enables us to see a rather surprising 
thing about the two branches of output. It is that each stream 
supports a different part of the economy. The flow of consumers' 
- - - -
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goods obviously goes to restore the working strength and well-being 
of the nation's households. Without it, we would perish in a few 
weeks. But the investment flow of output also plays a restorative 
function. Investment output replenishes and renews the capital 
wealth of the nation, mainly owned by its firms and, to a smaller 
extent, by the government. The flow of investment output termi-
nates in repairs to and extensions of our system of dams and roads, 
assembly lines and warehouses, lathes and drill presses, farm 
equipment and apartment houses. If that stream of output dried up, 
we would not perish as quickly as if consumer output disappeared, 
but our productive strength would soon wither, and by degrees we 
would be forced back to the level of an underdeveloped, then of a 
primitive, society. 
GNP, then, consists of two main kinds of output-
consumption goods and investment goods. The nearly $3 trillions 
that gross national product amounted to in 1981, for instance, is 
nothing but the total sales value of these two basic kinds of output. 
It may help to think of the river of production as passing through 
the checkout counters of an immense supermarket. The sales ticket 
on each item is run up on a cash register. After a year of ringing up 
the checkouts, a total is taken of the tapes. That's GNP for the 
year. 
A few things ought to be noticed about this GNP. One of 
them is that the flow of output through the checkout counter is 
comprised of both public and private goods and services. Take the 
flow of consumption, for example. Consumption goods or services, 
as the words indicate, are goods that we consume or use up, usually 
in a fairly short period. Most consumption goods are bought by 
private households for their personal use-food or clothing, for 
instance, or services such as movie admissions or legal advice. But 
some consumption outputs are bought by local or state or federal 
governments. Teachers' or firemen's services, for example, resemble 
the professional services of lawyers or oil-well fire fighters, but they 
are part of public consumption, not private. This is true even though 
households in the end get the benefit of teachers' or firemen's 
performances: the "person" who pays the bill for their services is 
the state. 
The same division into private and public can be observed if 
we look at investment. Investment goods typically last a long time 
and are replaced when they wear out, as in the case with a factory. 
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But this is also true of a road or a dam or a city-owned incinerator 
plant. These are investment goods, too, but they are public, not 
private ones. 
It's important to remember that there is an investment 
component in the GNP bought by government, because we will see 
that investment plays a very important role in determining our level 
of productivity. Many people speak of the public sector as if it 
consisted only of consumption goods that were used up, rather than 
of investment goods that contribute to future output. That's a 
misconception, and a serious one. 
While we are concerning ourselves about public output, one 
further thing should be noted. It is that very large and important 
flow of government spending, mainly federal, called transfer pay-
ments. As we know, this is a stream of payments mainly for "safety 
net" purposes: Social Security payments, unemployment compen-
sation, help for the disabled or disadvantaged, plus subsidies of 
various kinds. Federal transfers came to about $280 billions in 1981, 
,. equal in size to a little less than 10 percent of GNP. 
c. Yet when we add up GNP, we do not include any transfer 
_, payments in it! This is because transfers, as the name indicates, are 
payments made for social purposes, not because the recipients 
perform a useful service. Here is the difference: when we pay our 
deaning bills, we transfer money to someone who has done work 
for us. So too, when we pay taxes to help finance schools or fire 
departments or even armies, we also pay individuals who perform 
services on our behalf. But the portion of the taxes we pay that is 
used to provide income to individuals who cannot find work, or are 
too infirm to support themselves, or who have reached the age of 
retirement, is not a reward for effort. It is a pure transfer payment 
-a form of institutionalized social responsibility that has become 
part of every advanced nation. It is, in fact, the public equivalent of 
private charity. But because no production takes place in exchange 
for a transfer payment, such as a Social Security check, transfers are 
simply left out when we calculate GNP. The same is true for 
gambling outlays, or the buying of stocks and bonds, or disaster 
relief. These are all large and important flows of spending, but they 
do not reflect the activity of production that GNP sets out to 
measure. 
When GNP is actually calculated by Commerce Department 
statisticians, the river of output is imagined to pass through not one, 
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but four checkout lines. One of them rings up the total of personal 
consumption expenditures, all of them made by private households. 
A second register totals up all the private domestic investment 
output of the country, mainly business plant and equipment and 
new homes for families. A third checkout line keeps track of all 
public output, whether for consumption or investment purposes. 
There is really no reason why we do not separate public output into 
a consumption and an investment stream, as we do with private 
output, and it might help us better understand the government's 
place in the economy if we did. But we don't, so school lunch 
programs and new subway trackage are put together in one govern-
ment output figure. 
Finally, there is a fourth counter, where we ring up all the 
U.S. production that is sold abroad and where we subtract all the 
foreign production that is bought here. Usually we sell more abroad 
than we buy, so there is an "export balance" as part of GNP, a 
rivulet that arises within our shores and wends its way across the 
borders. 
Thus the GNP figure we read about is the sum of four 
separate tallies (involving hundreds and hundreds of detailed 
reports and estimates) of our national output. In 1980, for example, 
the four tallies were: 
GNP, 1980 
Personal consumption expenditure 
Private domestic investment outlays 
Government purchases 
Export balance 







There is one last matter. In adding up our GNP, government 
statisticians do not record the value of every good that is produced, 
each time it is sold. If they did, they would have to add up the value 
of a bushel of wheat sold to a grain elevator, the grain sold to a 
miller, the flour sold to a baker, the bread sold to a supermarket, 
and, finally, the loaf sold to a consumer. This would be a much 
bigger figure than the value of the final loaf, and yet the value of the 
loaf clearly contains the payments that have been previously made 
to the baker, the miller, the grain elevator, and the farmer. 
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Following along this line, statisticians only keep track of final 
goods, not of intermediate ones. As we would imagine, each of the 
checkout counters tots up one category of these final goods: 
consumer goods, investment goods, government output, and net 
exports. 
;__~ WHAT DOES GNP TELL US? ________ _ 
It should be pretty clear by now what GNP consists of. What 
is not yet so clear is how important it is. Does the size of GNP tell us 
accurately if we are better off or not? Is it good if GNP goes up, and 
bad if it goes down? 
The answer is yes and no. The yes part is easy to under-
stand. When the value of production rises, more people are likely to 
be employed. When the value of total output increases, more 
incomes are sure to be received. So there is an evident connection 
between the size of GNP and the level of employment and of 
national incomes. The size of GNP also serves as a general measure 
of the amount of goods and services that we can buy, individually 
and collectively. That is why, all things considered, a rising GNP is 
always welcome, and a falling one unwelcome. 
Yet GNP is also a flawed and deceiving measure of our 
well-being, and we should understand the weaknesses as well as the 
strengths of this most important single economic indicator. 
To begin with, GNP deals in dollar values, not in physical 
units. Therefore we have to correct it for inflation. As we know from 
our last chapter, trouble arises when we compare the GNP of one 
year with that of another to determine whether or not the nation is 
better off. If prices in the second year are higher, GNP will appear 
higher even though the actual volume of output is unchanged or 
even lower. Thus, GNP is an accurate indicator of well-being only if 
we can accurately take out the inflation factor in comparing one year 
with another. Can we? Well, partly, but not perfectly. There is 
always a margin of uncertainty in comparing the "real" GNP of 
today with that of yesterday. 
A second weakness of GNP also involves its inaccuracy as 
an indicator of "real" trends over time. The difficulty revolves 
around changes in the quality of goods and services. In a technolog-
ically advancing society, goods are usually improved over time, and 
new goods are constantly being introduced. At the same time, in an 
increasingly high-density society, the quality of other goods may be 
lessened: an airplane trip today is certainly preferable to one of 
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thirty years ago, but a subway ride is not. Government statisticians 
try to adjust GNP statistics for such changes in quality, but obvious-
ly there is a margin of uncertainty here too. 
A third difficulty with GNP lies in its blindness to the 
ultimate use of production. If in one year GNP rises by a billion 
dollars, owing to an increase in expenditure on education, and in 
another year it rises by the same amount because of a rise in 
cigarette production, the figures in each case show the same amount 
of growth. Even output that turns out to be wide of the mark or 
totally wasteful-such as the famous Edsel car that no one wanted 
or military weapons that are obsolete from the moment they 
appear-all are counted as part of GNP. 
The problem of environmental deterioration adds another 
difficulty. Some types of GNP growth directly contribute to 
pollution-cars, paper or steel production, for example. Other types 
of GNP growth are necessary to stop pollution-sewage disposal 
plants or the production of a clean internal-combustion engine. 
Our conventional measure of GNP makes no distinction 
among such outputs. For instance, the cleaning bills we pay to undo 
damage caused by smoke from the neighborhood factory become 
part of GNP, although cleaning our clothes does not increase our 
well-being, but only brings it back to what it was in the first place. 
These problems also cloud the meaning of GNP. 
Finally, GNP does not indicate anything about the distribu-
tion of goods and services among the population. Societies differ 
widely in how they allocate goods and services among their popula-
tions: compare Sweden and Mexico, whose total GNP's are roughly 
the same; or Sweden and the U.S., whose per capita GNP's are 
much alike. Thus to know the size of GNP or the level of GNP per 
capita is to know nothing about the social consequences of that 
GNP. A rich country may have lots of poverty which it is indifferent 
to, or perhaps impotent to correct. A poor country can produce a 
few millionaire families: some Indian princes used to receive their 
weight in gold from their peoples each year. 
All these doubts and reservations (and some others we've 
left unmentioned) should instill in us a caution against using GNP 
as if it were a clear-cut measure of social contentment or happiness. 
Economist Edward Denison once remarked that perhaps nothing 
affects national economic welfare so much as the weather, which 
certainly does not get into the GNP accounts! Hence, because the 
U.S. may have a GNP per capita that is higher than that of, say, 
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fact, by the indices of health care or incidence of crime, it probably is 
worse. 
Yet, with all its shortcomings, GNP is still the simplest way 
we possess of summarizing the overall level of activity of the 
economy. U we want to examine its welfare, we had better tum to 
specific social indicators of how long we live, how healthy we are, 
how cheaply we provide good medical care, how varied and 
abundant is our diet, and so forth-none of which we can tell from 
GNP figures alone. But we are not always interested in welfare, 
partly because it is too complex to be summed up in a single 
measure. fur instance, the indices of health care or crime are better 
in Japan than in the United States, but not the index of living space 
per person. There are lots of other data that could be consulted. 
GNP has the great value of being at everyone's fingertips, and of 
being, for better or worse, the yardstick that has become accepted by 
most nations in the world. It will remain a central term in the 




















Why does GNP fluctuate? Accidents of weather or natural 
disasters aside, why does the river of production run fast one year 
and slow the next? The question begins to take us into the real 
purpose of macroeconomic inquiry. Now that we know what GNP 
is, we want to know why it behaves the way it does. 
A good way to begin is to look once again at the flow of 
output-this time paying heed not to the actual production of goods 
and services that get tallied by the Commerce Department statisti-
cians, but at the buyers standing at those checkout counters to take 
delivery of the nation's production. As we would expect, the 
nation's households are gathered at the consumption counter, its 
business firms cluster around the investment counter, government 
agencies make up the buyers at the government counter, and 
foreign firms and individuals and governments wait at the last 
counter. 
Looking at GNP from this perspective, we see it not so much 
as a stream of goods, but as a flow of buying, of expenditure, of 
demand. Each and every good that moves along the river of output 
is drawn by someone's expenditure for it. Money makes goods 
move. As Adam Smith said, "Money is the great wheel of circula-
tion." 
Switching our attention from production to buying brings us 
much closer to an answer for why the level of GNP fluctuates. 
Output fluctuates because the demand for it rises and falls. This is 
not the only reason why production varies-droughts and earth-
quakes, strikes and technical hang-ups, government regulations 
may also alter the level of production. Later in this chapter we will 
take a first look at "supply side" economics, which emphasizes the 
adverse effects of taxation on the incentive to produce. But even the 
most determined supply sider will agree that demand-the willing-
ness and ability to buy goods-is essential for the river of produc-
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tion to flow. Thus the way to begin our investigation is by examining 
where demand comes from and what makes it rise or fall. 
HOUSEHOW SAVING, BUSINESS SPENDING ___ _ 
We tum to the first checkout counter, where the nation's 
households are queuing up to buy the national output of consum-
ers' goods and services. Where does the flow of household spend-
ing come from? 
The answer is that it comes in the main from household 
earnings-from the wages, salaries, rents, dividends, profits, or 
whatever other payments householders have received from the 
work they have performed. It also comes from transfer payments, 
such as Social Security checks. The flow of spending can be 
augmented, at least for a while, if households actually draw down 
their savings accounts or liquidate stocks or bonds, but people rarely 
do that to buy ordinary consumers' goods. Finally, the flow can be 
also augmented by borrowing, so that in any one year some 
households will spend more than their current incomes-often the 
•:_case when there is an expensive purchase such as a car. 
',;;i Just the same, when we look at the sum total of all 
-
household incomes and compare it with the total of all household 
expenditures for consumers' goods, we discover that households as 
a whole (as a "sector," economists say) regularly save some portion 
of their incomes.• Year in and year out, the fraction is about 5 
percent. That is, even after households have borrowed, used their 
credit cards and charge accounts and all the rest, they still take in 
more money than they lay out. 
Hence there is no difficulty in understanding where the 
demand comes for the part of GNP that is made up of consumers' 
goods. All of it comes directly out of the earnings and transfer 
incomes of households, supplemented by their borrowings. In fact, 
looking at GNP from the macro viewpoint, the question that occurs 
to us is not where consumer demand comes from, but what 
happens to the 5 percent of household earnings that do not get 
returned to the economy, but are instead saved. 
That question turns our attention to the next checkout 
*This includes household spending for autos, but not for houses. They are 
counted as investment goods, not as consumer goods. 
-I t - - - - -
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counter, where investment goods are bought by private business. 
Just as the household sector buys its everyday consumption goods 
mainly out of its earnings, so the business sector buys its ordinary 
day-to-day requirements from the money it regularly takes in from 
its sales. We can picture the nation's business as a gigantic house-
hold, buying its needed services of labor and its inputs of raw 
materials or semifinished goods from the receipts it takes in by 
selling its finished output. 
There is, however, a critical difference between the house-
hold sector and the business sector. It is that the business sector 
does not normally save some portion of its receipts. On the contrary, 
it spends more than it takes in through its sales. That idea is so important 
that it warrants saying a second time. The normal, regular, healthy, 
and even necessary behavior of the business community as a whole 
is to lay out more money for wages, salaries, raw materials, 
semifinished goods, land, and capital than the total amount it takes 
in by selling its own output. 
When we put it this way, business behavior sounds very 
unsafe. How can even the largest corporation afford to lay out more, 
year after year, than it takes in from its sales? The answer is that 
business does not spend all its earnings. Part of these it too "saves" 
as profits, although it may disburse these profits in whole or part as 
dividends or as expenditures for capital goods. But over and above 
its normal revenues, business takes in additional financial revenues 
by borrowing from banks or by selling its stocks and bonds. These 
additional resources-the new capital funds it raises-are also 
spent, not to pay the regular running expenses of firms, but to pay 
for their capital improvements. AT&T does not use the proceeds 
of its bond issues to pay the wages of its phone operators, but 
to pay for the additions to its phone lines, its new buildings, its 
satellites. 
Thus the process of saving and investing goes directly to the 
central issue of macroeconomics. Household savings are "acquired" 
by the business sector to finance the building of new capital goods. 
In tum, this becomes a primary means by which we increase our 
productivity and thereby cause GNP to increase. Here is the first 
explanation of how GNP grows and why it fluctuates. The explana-
tion is important enough to set apart: 
1. Gross national product grows because savings are con-
verted into capital equipment. 
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2. The savings that originate in the household sector are 
invested by the business sector.* 
3. GNP fluctuates because the process of transforming 
savings into investment is not always smooth or steady. 
HOH! THE SECTORS INTERLOCK _______ _ 
These critical relationships may come as something of an 
anticlimax, because everyone knows that saving and investing lie at 
the heart of economic grO\vth, even if the process is not often 
described so precisely. But there are aspects of the saving and 
investing process that everyone does not know, and it is these to 
which we should now tum. 
Let's begin with saving. We think of saving as putting 
money in a bank or in a financial institution of some other kind. 
What we do not often realize is that saving has two quite distinct 
meanings. The first of these is indeed putting money aside-not 
spending it. The second is letting go of resources. As we shall see, 
the two aspects have quite different consequences: the first bad, the 
second good. 
'', Putting money in a bank or in a new insurance policy or a 
new issue of stock has the immediate effect of creating a gap or a 
shortfall in demand. The gap arises because some of the earnings 
that householders have received from firms or government will not 
be returned to circulation as part of the consumption flow. In a 
word, saving means not consuming. As we have just seen, this 
doesn't mean that those savings remain permanently removed from 
circulation. We can picture householders on the consumption 
queue, lending or otherwise transferring their savings to the busi-
nessmen standing at the investment queue. But until the transfer is 
actually made, through the banking system or the stock market or 
the purchase of life insurance, saving means only that householders 
have taken some of their earnings and decided not to use it for 
buying consumption goods. 
We'll return in a moment to the question of getting the 
money into the hands of the business queue. Meanwhile, however, 
*The degree to u·hich the /msincss sector depends 011 the savings of the 
household sector varies a good deal from one nation to another. In 
Germany and fapan, the dcprndencc is high. In the United States it is 11ot, 
a11d /'lisincss fi11a11ccs itself through its 0<<.111 cami11gs to a very considerable 
extent. 
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we must also understand that saving is more than just a financial 
matter. It is also an action that frees labor and resources from the 
production of consumers goods and thereby makes them available 
for producing other goods. 
An illustration may help us see this. Suppose, for example, 
that businessmen decided to double their investment spending, in 
anticipation of a boom. Or suppose that the government wanted to 
double its military spending, in anticipation of a war. It is obvious 
that such an increase in the spending of the business or government 
sectors would send the price of labor and of other materials shooting 
upward, as business and government struggled to get their hands 
on the labor force and the materials they needed. That would result 
in higher costs, and could start an inflationary scramble. 
In fact, there is only one way in which a large increase in 
investment or government spending can possibly be undertaken 
without such a scramble: the resources and labor they need must be 
made available to them. One way in which this can be done is by 
taxing-simply taking away spending power from households and 
giving it to government. But industry has no taxing power. For 
business, the only way that resources can be made available on a 
large scale is for them to be voluntarily relinquished by the house-
hold sector. We call that process of voluntary relinquishment saving. 
(Of course householders may be tempted to give up their spending 
by all sorts of inducements from banks or other institutions, but it is 
a voluntary, not a forced act nonetheless). 
Thus the really constructive aspect of saving is not so much 
its financial side, which merely creates a gap in spending, but its 
"real" side-giving up a claim on land and labor and capital for the 
immediate enjoyments they could produce. 
This leads to the last vital link in the chain. The released 
resources must now be taken up and put to use by the business 
sector. If they are not put to use, the shortfall in demand created by 
the financial act of saving will simply hurt consumer sales without 
any compensation in the sales of other goods, and the labor and 
other resources released by households will stand idle. Thus the 
last, most active and creative part of the whole process lies in the 
decisions of the business sector to undertake the act of capital 
formation. As we will see in our next chapter, this is inherently a 
risky and uneven process. 
So saving and investment have implications and meanings 
less familiar to us than the general recognition that there is a 
saving-and-investing process at work. Indeed, there is one unfa-
;~ 
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miliar aspect that we can now see is the key to how the macro 
system works. It is that economic growth takes place through the 
coordination and cooperation of the sectors. 
As ordinary participants in the economy, we never think of 
coordinating our activity with that of anyone else, much less that of 
a sector. Nor does any businessman think of cooperating with the 
household or any other sector when he undertakes plans for an 
addition to his establishment. Nevertheless, it is by such a continu-
ous coordination and cooperation that the system grows-and it is 
by imperfections in the interplay of the sectors that it falters. 
The interplay can be very simply stated: 
l. A gap in demand, in any sector, must be offset by 
additional demand in another sector. If this act of coordination does 
not take place, there will be a fall in demand, a decline in GNP, 
unemployment, and trouble. 
2. An increase in investment or in government spending, 
assuming there is reasonably full employment, requires that re-
sources be made available to the expanding sector. This can only be 
accomplished by taxing or by voluntary saving. 
3. If expanding sectors spend more than the savings made 
available to them, there will be an upward pressure on the system, 
and the possibility of inflation. If the active sectors spend less than 
the flow of savings, there will be a downward pressure on the 
system, and the possibility of a recession. 
Of course this is not the whole story of boom and bust, 
inflation and recession. We have not touched on such crucial matters 
as money, productivity, or the role of government. But a first 
structural understanding of the economy has begun to emerge. We 
can see that growth does not just happen, but comes about from a 
mutually supportive interaction of the sectors of the system. How 
that interaction is brought about and how it can be corrected when it 
fails to achieve the right result are the problems that will occupy us 
over many pages to come. 
THE GOVERNMENT ENTERS ________ _ 
But we are not yet done with the checkout counter. We have 
seen how demand for GNP arises because households spend most 
of their earnings and businesses spend most of their own revenues 
plus the savings they have acquired from the household sector. But 
we have not yet observed what happens at the government check-
out station or at the counter where foreigners line up. 
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Government first. At first glimpse there is an immediate 
resemblance between the government sector and the sector of 
business or of private households. Considering government as a 
collection of local, state, and federal purchasing agencies, we can see 
that the sector buys its goods and services with its everyday 
receipts-its tax revenues-just as businesses and families spend 
their normal receipts. In an important way, however, the receipts of 
government are different from those of households and businesses. 
With rare exceptions, government does not sell its outputs, however 
useful they may be. Toll roads or the fees for landing at an airport 
are exceptions to the general rule that government distributes its 
services without charge. Therefore it has to assure its income by 
some other means, and so the government simply commandeers a 
portion of household or business income. The word commandeer may 
seem extreme, but we must recognize that taxes are not like ordinary 
charges. A household or a business may refuse to purchase the 
output of another household or business, but they cannot refuse to 
purchase the output of government. Taxes are a compulsory pay-
ment. 
On the other hand, it is well to bear in mind that taxes are 
also the expression of the will of the electorate, however clumsily 
that will may be expressed. Moreover, we should bear in mind that 
government provides one absolutely essential service in exchange 
for its taxes-a service without which no household or business 
could earn a cent. That is the service of the maintenance of law and 
order and the protection of property rights. "It is only under the 
shelter of the civil magistrate," wrote Adam Smith, "that the owner 
of ... valuable property ... can sleep a single night in security." 
Thus there is a profound difference between the political 
roles of the public and private sectors. But we must also recognize 
that there is a striking resemblance between the sectors with regard 
to their economic cooperation and coordination. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the household sector creates a demand gap by making its 
normal savings, and that the business sector, for whatever reason, 
fails to offset that gap by borrowing or gathering the savings 
through new stock issues and the like. Could not the government 
borrow these unused savings and close the demand gap by spending them for 
public purposes, such as public investment? 
The answer, of course, is that it can. If there is a demand gap 
that must be "closed" by investment spending, what difference does 
it make if the investment is for a communications satellite owned 
by AT&T or one owned by the government, or a rail line owned by 
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Santa Fe or owned by Amtrak, or a private utility plant or a public 
one, a private factory or a public dam? There is no difference. What 
is essential is that the saving of one sector be spent by another, or 
that the investment spending of one sector be saved by another. 
Of course this is not an end to the matter. There is room for 
a great deal of controversy as to which activities the government 
should pursue and which it should not. There is room for debate as 
to whether the government can safely spend its borrowings for 
consumption purposes-Social Security, for instance. There is a 
great deal of controversy as to whether the government may 
inadvertently "crowd out" private enterprise when it expands its 
activities. 
So the question of the role of government is not easily 
settled. What is easily settled, however, is that the government 
sector can play exactly the same investing role as the business sector. 
Government can use its borrowing powers just like business to offset 
a shortfall in spending elsewhere. Whether it should do these things 
is a question we will have to consider further. But it is important to 
see that the government, as a sector, can-indeed must-
\~ coordinate its activities with other sectors. No economist, conserva-
'.·,: tive or radical, would deny that. 
· One last source of demand should be looked at quickly. This 
is the foreign checkout counter, where overseas buyers provide 
demand for U.S. output by taking delivery of grain and computers 
and jet planes and machinery, and where foreign sellers deliver 
coffee and ores and oil and Toyotas to waiting American buyers. The 
workings of the foreign-demand part of GNP are more complicated 
than those of the other sectors. We will come back to this aspect 
later, in Chapter Nineteen. For the time being, we can simply note 
its presence, while we concentrate our attention on the three 
domestic counters-households, business, and government. 
So we have come to see that saving-and-investing-we 
hyphenate the process to emphasize its essential linkage-is the key 
to economic growth and economic fluctuation. It is the key to 
growth because investment is the activity by which we lay down the 
equipment that makes us more productive. It is by investment that 
Adam Smith's pin factories are built, multiplying by factors of ten 
and a hundred and a thousand the material goods that can be 
fashioned in an hour of work. Saving-and-investing is also the key 
to fluctuation in GNP because the process does not go on at a steady 
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unvarying rate, but faster or slower as various factors alter the flow 
of saving-or more usually, as they alter the prospects for invest-
ment. That is a matter we will examine next. 
Last, we can see one vitally important point. Demand is the 
immediate driving force of the economy. It is the volume of total 
spending-the spending of households on consumption goods, of 
business firms on capital goods, of government on its consumption 
and investment purchases, and of foreigners on net exports-that 
supplies the day-by-day stimulus for our gross national production. 
Even supply-side economists, who stress the importance of the 
incentive to produce and the dampening effects of taxes, would 
willingly concede this point. When demand falters for any reason, 
GNP falters, and with it, employment and incomes. Supply-side 
and demand-side economists differ, however, as to whether the 
demand generated by the normal investment activities of the private 
sector, once onerous taxes and regulations are removed, will suffice 
to generate sufficient growth. Supply siders say yes; demand siders 
believe that government will probably have to play a supportive 
role. 
That's obviously an important question for later. But it's no 
use getting into discussions about supply-side economics until we 
understand still more deeply how the household and business and 






The problem of big business is one of old standing, dating 
back to the period just after the Civil War. But recently that problem 
has been given a new twist by the appearance of enormous 
corporations whose business empires literally straddle the globe 
-the multinational corporations. Take PepsiCo, for example. 
PepsiCo does not ship its famous product around the world from 
bottling plants in the United States. It produces Pepsi Cola in more 
than five hundred plants in over orie hundred countries. When you 
buy a Pepsi in Mexico or the Philippines, Israel, or Denmark, you are 
buying an American product that was manufactured in that coun-
try. 
PepsiCo is a far-flung, but not a particularly large multi-
national: In 1979 it was the fifty-seventh largest U.S. company. 
Compare it with the Ford Motor Company in 1979, a multinational 
that consists of a network of 60 subsidiary corporations, 40 of them 
foreign-based. Of the corporation's total assets of $23 billion, over 
one third was invested in 27 foreign nations; and of its 494,000 
employees (as of 1979), more than 175,000 were employed outside 
the U.S. And if we studied the corporate structures of GM or IBM or 
the great oil companies, we would find that they, too, are multi-
national companies with substantial portions of their total wealth 
invested in productive facilities outside the United States. 
If we broaden our view to include the top one hundred 
American firms, we find that two thirds have such production 
facilities in at least six nations. Moreover, the value of output that is 
produced overseas by the largest corporations by far exceeds the 
value of the goods they still export from the United States. In 1974 
sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms (which means 
their wholly or partially owned overseas branches) came to over 
$115 billion. In the same year our total exports of manufactures 
amounted to $47 billion, only 41 percent as much as American firms 
produced abroad. 
Another way of establishing the spectacular rise of interna-
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tional production is to trace the increase in the value of U.S. foreign 
direct investment; that is, the value of foreign-located, U.S.-owned 
plant and equipment (not U.S.-owned foreign bonds and stocks). In 
1950 the value of U.S. foreign direct investment was $11 billion. In 
1980 it was over $213 billion. Moreover, this figure, too, needs an 
upward adjustment, because it includes only the value of American 
dollars invested abroad and not the additional value of foreign 
capital that may be controlled by those dollars. For example, if a U.S. 
company has invested $10 million in a foreign enterprise whose total 
net worth is $20 million, the U.S. official figures for our foreign 
investment take note only of the $10 million of American equity and 
not of the $20 million wealth that our equity actually controls. If we 
include the capital controlled by our foreign direct investment as a 
whole, the value of American overseas productive assets may be as 
large as $300 billion. In general, something between a quarter and a 
half of the real assets of our biggest corporations are abroad. 
Effectively, American big business is today world big business. 
The movement toward the internationalization of produc-
tion is not, however, a strictly American phenomenon. If the 
American multinationals are today the most imposing (of the 
world's biggest five hundred corporations, over three hundred are 
American), they are closely challenged by non-American multina-
tionals, as the table below shows. Philips Lamp Works, for example, 
is a huge Dutch multinational company with operations in sixty-
eight countries. Of its 225,000 employees, 167,000 work in nations 
other than the Netherlands. Royal Dutch/Shell is another vast 
multinational, whose home is somewhere between the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (it is jointly owned by nationals of both 
countries): Shell in the United States ranks among "our'' top twenty 
biggest companies. Another is Nesti~ Chocolate, a Swiss firm, 97 
percent of whose $2 billion revenues originate outside Switzerland. 
Measured by the size of the Swedish capital invested there, 5ao 
Paulo is Sweden's second biggest industrial city! 
Indeed, if we take the ten leading capital-exporting nations 
together (including the United States), we find that in 1%7 their 
combined exports came to over $130 billion, but their combined 
overseas production amounted to well over $240 billion. In 1970 an 
economist for the International Chamber of Commerce estimated 
that total international production-U.S. production abroad, for-
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countries-accounted for as much as one sixth of the total value of 
all world output, and a much higher fraction of the world output of 
industrial commodities. It is greater than that today, although we do 
not know exactly how large international production is. 
What drives a firm to produce overseas rather than just sell 
overseas? One possible answer is straightforward. A firm is success-
ful at home. Its technology and organizational skills give it an edge 
on foreign competition. It begins to export its product. The foreign 
market grows. At some point, the firm begins to calculate whether it 
would be more profitable to organize an overseas production 
operation. By doing so, it would save transportation costs. It may be 
able to evade a tariff by producing goods behind a tariff wall. A very 
important consideration is that it may be able to take advantage of 
lower wage rates. And so, gradually, it ceases shipping goods 
abroad and instead exports capital, technology, and management-
and becomes a multinational. 
Calculations may be more complex. By degrees, a successful 
company may change its point of view. First it thinks of itself as a 
domestic company, perhaps with a small export market. Then it 
builds up its exports and thinks of itself as an international company 
with a substantial interest in exports. Finally its perspective changes 
to that of a multinational, considering the world (or substantial 
portions of it) to be its market. In that case, it may locate plants 
abroad before the market is fully developed, in order to be firmly 
established abroad ahead of its competition. 
More and more of the great corporations of the world have 
come to consider their "natural" markets to be the globe, not just 
their home countries. The struggle in automobiles, in computers, in 
telecommunications, in steel, is for shares of a world market. That is 
why we find companies such as IBM or General Motors considering 
the entire globe as their oyster, not only with regard to the 
"sourcing" of raw materials, but to the location of plants, and finally 
the direction of sales effort. With modem rapid jet transportation, 
instant global data retrieval, and highly organized systems of 
production and distribution, the manufacture of commodities is 
more and more easily moved to whatever country produces them 
most cheaply, whereas their sale is focused on the countries that 
represent the richest markets. Thus we have a transistor radio 
whose parts have been made in Hong Kong or South Korea or 
Singapore, assembled in Mexico, and sold in the United States-by 
a Japanese manufacturer! In early 1972-a figure already ten years 
out of date, but the best we have-such multinational production 
The Multinational Corpori. 
' 
223 
mE TOP 15 MULTINATIONALS, 19n• 
Number of 
countries 
Total sales Foreign sales in which 
(billions of as percent- subsidiaries 
Company dollars) age of total are located 
General Motors $28.3 19% 21 
Exxon 18.7 so 25 
Ford· 16.4 26 30 
Royal Dutch/Shew• 12.7 79 43 
General Electric 9.4 16 32 
IBM 8.3 39 80 
Mobil Oil 8.2 45 62 
Chrysler 8.0 24 26 
Texaco 7.5 40 30 
Unilever" 7.5 80 31 
rrr 7.3 42 40 
Gulf Oil 5.9 45 61 
British Petroleum" 5.2 88 52 
Philips 
Gloeilampenfabrieken" 5.2 NA 29 
Standard Oil of California 5.1 45 26 
•Latest available data 
••Not a U.S. firm 
was estimated to account for between 15 to 20 percent of the gross 
output of the capitalist world. 
ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION __ 
Whether or not the multinational boom continues at its past 
rate, the startling rise of multinationals has already changed the face 
of international economic relationships. One major effect has been a 
dramatic shift in the geographic location and the technological 
character of international economic activity. 
The shift away from exports to international production has 
introduced two changes into the international economic scene. One 
\ :, 
' " ~-\ 
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change is a movement of foreign investment away from its original 
concentration in the underdeveloped areas of the world toward the 
richer markets of the developed areas. Fifty years ago, in the era of 
high imperialism, most of the capital leaving one country for 
another flowed from rich to poor lands. Thus foreign investment in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was largely associ-
ated with the creation of vast plantations, the building of railways 
through jungles, and the development of mineral resources. 
But the growth of the multinational enterprise has coincided 
with a decisive shift away from investment in the underdeveloped 
world to investment in the industrial world. In 1897, 59 percent of 
American foreign direct investment was in agriculture, mining, or 
railways, mainly in the underdeveloped world. By the end of the 
1970s our investment in agriculture, mining, and railways, as a 
proportion of our total overseas assets, had fallen to about 20 
percent; and its geographical location in the backward world came to 
only 36 percent of all our overseas direct investments. More striking, 
almost three quarters of our huge rise in direct investment during 
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s were in the developed world; and 
the vast bulk of it was in manufacturing (and oil) rather than in 
plantations, railroads, or ores. Thus the multinational companies 
have been investing in each others' territories rather than invading 
the territories of the underdeveloped world. In recent years there 
has been a highly visible thrust of multinational investment in 
manufacturing facilities in a few poorer nations-big factory invest-
ments in Mexico, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea. Nonethe-
less, these investments are still much smaller than the multination-
als' investments in the developed countries. 
The second economic change is really implicit in the first. It 
is a shift away from heavy technology to high technology industries 
-away from enterprises in which vast sums of capital were associat-
ed with large, unskilled labor forces as in the building of railways or 
plantations-toward industries in which capital is perhaps less 
strategic than research and development, skilled technical manpow-
er, and sophisticated management techniques typical of the comput-
er, petrochemical, and other new industries. Our table sums up the 
overall shift. 
Note the dramatic shift away from Latin America into 
Europe and away from transport, mining, and agriculture into 
manufacturing, a shift that would be even more accentuated if it 
were not still dependent on oil as a major source of the world's 
energy. If nuclear power or the fuel cell displace oil within the next 
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SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
1929 1950 1980 
Total (millions) $7,528 $11,788 $213,468 
Disbribution by market(%) 
Canada 27 30 21 
Europe 18 14 45 
Latin America 47 41 18 
Asia, Africa, Near East 8 15 16 
Distribution by industrial sector(%) 
Manufacturing 24 31 42 
Petroleum 15 '29 22 
Transport and utilities 21 u n.a. 
Mining 15 9 3 
Trade 5 7 u 
Agriculture 12 5 n.a. 
Other 8 6 11 
two decades, we can expect a still more rapid decline in investment 
in the backward areas (especially in the Near East), and a propor-
tionately still-larger concentration of foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing. 
MULTINATIONAL PROBLEMS ________ _ 
Multinationals have not only changed the face of intemati-
nal economic activity, but also have added considerably to the 
problem of controlling domestic economies. Assume that a country 
wants to slow down its economy through monetary policies de-
signed to reduce plant and equipment spending. A restrictive 
monetary policy at home may be vitiated by the ability of a 
multinational to borrow abroad in order to finance investment at 
home. Conversely, a monetary policy designed to stimulate the 
home economy may end up in loans that increase production in 
someone else's economy. Thus the effectiveness of national eco-
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suggest that monetary policies should be coordinated among coun-
tries, since the economic needs of different countries may not be the 
same: what is right for one country at a given time may be wrong for 
another. 
More important, the jealous claims of nation-states who 
seek to retain national control over productive activity within their 
own borders and the powerful thrust of pan-national corporations 
for new markets in foreign territories introduce profound tensions 
into the international world. On the one hand, the multinational is 
in a position to win hard bargains from the host country into which 
it seeks to enter because the corporation is the main bearer of new 
technologies and management techniques that every nation seeks. 
Therefore, if one country-say, India-refused to give a would-be 
entrant the right to come in (and possibly cause financial losses to its 
established firms), the multinational may well place its plants, with 
their precious economic cargo of productivity, in another country, 
leaving the recalcitrant nation the loser in the race for international 
growth. 
On the other hand, the power is by no means entirely 
one-sided, for once a multinational has entered a foreign nation, it 
becomes a hostage of the host country. It is now bound by the laws of 
that country and may find itself forced to undertake activities that 
are "foreign." In Japan, for example, it is an unwritten law that 
workers engaged by giant corporations are never fired, but become 
permanent employees. Japan has been extremely reluctant to allow 
foreign capital to establish manufacturing operations on Japanese 
soil, to the great annoyance of foreign companies. But if, as now 
seems likely, Japan is opened to American and European capital, we 
can be sure that American or European corporations will be expect-
ed to behave in the Japanese way with their employees. This will not 
be an easy course to follow, since these corporations are not likely to 
receive the special support that the Japanese government gives to its 
own big firms. 
Or take the problem of a multinational that is forced by a fall 
in demand to cut back the volume of its output. A decision made 
along strictly economic lines would lead it to close its least profitable 
plant. But this may bring very serious economic repercussions in the 
particular nation in which that plant is located-so serious that the 
government will threaten to take action if the plant is closed. What 
dictates shall the multinational then follow-those of standard 
business accounting or those of political accounting? 
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THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD _______ _ 
All these problems take on a special significance in the 
relation between the multinationals and the underdeveloped world. 
For the multinationals are now the main conduit between the 
dynamic expansive thrust of Western capitalism and the restive, but 
still passive, periphery of Asia and Africa and Latin America. This 
raises problems of great difficulty. As former Under Secretary of 
State George Ball has candidly asked: "How can a national govern-
ment make an economic plan with any confidence if a board of 
directors meeting five thousand miles away can, in altering its 
pattern of purchasing and production, affect in a major way the 
country's economic life?" 
For these and other reasons there is a great deal of suspicion 
and unease surrounding the attitude toward the multinationals on 
the part of the less-developed countries. And for good reason. There 
is something profoundly disturbing in the spectacle of breakfast 
foods and Coca-Cola displacing native diets, often to the detriment 
of people living at the edge of nutritional safety; of transistor radios 
and plastic ornaments pushing aside native entertainments and 
adornments; of Hilton hotels towering over squalid tenements; of 
ugly and monotonous factory labor driving out peasant and artisan 
skills and crafts. Anyone who has traveled in the underdeveloped 
world cannot help but be struck by the careless violence with which 
the multinationals have uprooted established ways, exposing un-
trained and unreadied people to the hurricane winds of modem 
technology and modem values-and all in the name of profit, 
certainly not in that of human development. 
And yet it is too easy to wax indignant before we have 
thought the matter over. The societies that are being torn apart by 
the multinationals have indeed great traditions of solidarity and 
stability-if they did not, they would have perished long ago-but 
they have achieved their endurance by harsh and exploitative ways 
of their own, keeping their lower castes and classes, and their 
women, in conditions of severe oppression and ignorance. From 
this perspective, the multinationals, for all their ruthless exploita-
tion of naive appetites and docile labor, are also carriers of social 
relationships and technical abilities without which the underdevel-
oped world would remain hopelessly subordinate to the invincible 
material and organizational capabilities of the West. 
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multinationals-more effective ways of transferring technologies 
and social skills to the peoples of Africa and Southeast Asia, China 
and Latin America? The question really raises for examination the 
complex relationship between the core of capitalist nations and the 
periphery of the regions into which capitalism has partly penetrat-
ed. This relationship, historically of great importance for capitalism, 
is now in a period of stress and strain as the underdeveloped world 
seeks to loosen its dependency on the West. To explore the prob-
lem in depth would take us far beyond the scope of our book. 
Moreover, whatever that relationship has been, over the near-term 
future there seems to be no workable alternative to the present 
tension-ridden mutual dependence of core and periphery. Socialist 
governments in all the underdeveloped regions have tried to 
institute the process of economic and social development without 
recourse to the conduits of capitalist enterprise, but the results have 
been disappointing at best and catastrophic at worst. However 
inadequate or lopsided the development process may be when it 
occurs through the channels of the multinationals, so far it has been 
superior to the development that can be conjured up from scratch, 
or to the technology and organization that pour in from regimes 
such as the Soviet Union. The disrupting effects and the social 
deformations that result from connections with IBM or Exxon may 
be easier to deal with, in the end, than those of Ministries of 
Computer Technology or of Energy. 
To make this assertion is not to denigrate the efforts of the 
developing countries to create independent socialist governments. 
But the practical reach of these governments, for a considerable 
period, is more likely to be effective when applied as a corrective to 
the abuses inseparable from a dependence on multinationals than as 
a wholly independent alternative to them. 
The multinationals will therefore occupy a strategic position 
in world economic affairs for a long time. Yet in the end, it seems 
doubtful that the world will be made in their image of hierarchical 
efficiency. There are many things that the multinationals can do 
which the emerging nations cannot, but there is one central thing an 
emerging nation can do that the multinationals cannot. This is to 
command the devotion of huge masses of people. Men and women 
will die for the image of their nation, but they will not die for the 
profits of a company. 
Thus, perhaps what we must say in conclusion is that at this 
stage of history, both nation-states and huge corporations are 
-- -
-
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necessary. They seem to be the only ways in which we can organize 
mankind to perform the arduous and sustained labor without which 
humanity itself would rapidly perish. Perhaps after the long age of 
capital accumulation has finally come to an end and sufficient capital 
is available to all peoples, we may be able to think seriously about 
dismantling the giant enterprise and the nation-state, both of which 
overpower the individual with their massive organized strength. 
However desirable that ultimate goal may be, in our time both state 
and corporation promise to be with us, and the tension between 
them will be part of the evolutionary drama of our period of history. 
LESSON 4 
DIFFERENTIATING HELP AND HINDRANCE 
Learning Objectives 
The participants will: 
1. Discover the dynamics of the helping relationship from the 
point of view of the "helper" and the "helpee." 
2. Explore the affects of colonialism on rural development 
progress in Tanzania. 
3. Develop factors that outsiders should consider when initially 
becoming involved in a rural development situation. 
Activities 
1. Simulation - The Nature of the Helping Relationship (40 min) 
Participants will divide into partners. The class will walk 
over to the Newman Center for a drink. One partner will be 
blindfolded and assisted by the other partner from the 
moment the class leaves until they return. They will go to 
the Newman Center and spend 20 minutes there, talking about 
any thing they like. After 20 minutes at the Newman Center 
the class returns to the classroom. 
2. Discussion of simulation 
a) How did each partner 
help and how did the 
(20 min) 
feel? How did the helper actually 
helpee convey when there was enough 
help or not? 
b) list considerations on newsprint. 
3. Break (10 min) 
4. Discussion of Hyden's view of peasantry. (30 min) 
a) How does he view the nature of the helping relationship 
between government, colonist and peasant? 
b) How does this relationship contribute to the 
underdevelopment of the peasantry? 
5. Triads (30 min) 
Task - generate list of factors that outsiders should 
consider when becoming involved in a rural development 
situation, regardless of the sector or task. 
6. Process Consultation (20 min) 
a) Observations about this session 
b) likes and dislikes of class assignments. 
7. Handout Homework #4 - Designing an Approach to Rural 
Development. (10 min) 
Materials 




DESIGNING A RURAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
1. Read: 
1. Hyden, chapters 4 and 5, pp.96-155. 
2. Gurley, pp.5-25. 
3. Korten, pp.162-180. 
4. Chambers, pp. 47-101. 
5. Moris, pp. 47-65. 
6. Gudeman article. 
2. Write: 
In 3-5 pages develop a design strategy that you would employ 
to address your rural development case and justify why you 
think your stategy would be effective. 

















Rural Development in China 
1949-75, and the Lessons 
to be Learned from it 
JOHN G. GURLEY 
The precarious position of the Chinese peasants down through the ages and the 
oppressive conditions under which they laboured are too well known to require much 
comment from me. One can read at length about their diseases, their illiteracy, their 
superstitions and fatalistic attitudes, the natural disasters and periodic famines that all 
but wiped them out, in Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), rang (A.O. 618-906), or Sung 
(A.D. 906-1279) records, and indeed right down to yesterday. 
Nevertheless, the records also reveal, if one examines them closely, an ingenious 
peasantry producing a substantial surplus during most of this long period, not of course 
for itself, but mostly for the sustenance and pleasures of a few people who made up the 
ruling classes-the Emperor and his family and retainers, bureaucrats, landlords, 
money-lenders, and military officers. This small but powerful ruling group pumped the 
surplus out of the countryside through taxes, rents, interest, corvee labour, enslave-
ment, extortion, and by other means fair and foul. It may well be that, on the average 
over these many centuries, one third of what this peasantry produced was taken away 
from it for the enjoyment and support of less than two per cent of the population. What 
was left to the peasants was usually just enough for their survival, but from time to time 
not enough even for that. Undernourishment was common, starvation not unusual. 
Let R.H. Tawney, who with much acumen observed the Chinese peasants in the 
early 1930s, have the last word: 
Exaggeration is easy. Privation is one thing, poverty to the point of wretched-
ness---«z misere-another. A sturdy and self-reliant stock may grow in a stony soil. 
But, when due allowance has been made for the inevitable misconceptions, it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that a large proportion of Chinese peasants are 
constantly on the brink of actual destitution. They are, so to say, a propertied 
proletariat, which is saved-when it is saved-partly by its own admirable 
ingenuity and fortitude, partly by the communism of the Chinese family, partly by 
reducing its consumption of necessaries and thus using up its physical capital ... 
It is true, however, that, over a large area of China, the rural population suffers 
horribly through the insecurity of life and property. It is taxed by one ruffian who 
calls himself a general, by another, by a third, and, when it has bought them off, still 
owes taxes to the government; in some places actually more than twenty yean' 
taxation has been paid in advance. It is squeezed by dishonest officials. It must cut 
its crops at the point of the bayonet, and hand them over without payment to the 
local garrison, though it will starve without them. It is forced to grow opium in 
defiance of the law, because its military tyrants can squeeze heavier taxation from 
s 
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opium than from rice or wheat, and make money, in addition, out of the dens where 
it is smoked. It pays blackmail to the professional bandits in its neighbourhood; or 
it resists, and, a year later, when the bandits have assumed uniform, sees its villages 
burned to the ground ... 
There arc districts in which the position of the rural population is that of a man 
standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to 
drown him. The loss of life caused by the major disasters is less significant than the 
light which they throw on the conditions prevailing even in normal times over 
considerable regions. 1 
I. EXPLANATIONS OF PERSISfENT POVERTY BEFORE 1949 
There were of course reasons for the persistence of this deprivation and misery. 
The conventional explanation is that, even with the highest efficiency in carrying out the 
best-intentioned policies to alleviate rural poverty, the job would have been a most 
difficult one for any government. During the past century, for example, successive 
governments had to contend with several rebellions, civil wars, the Japanese invasions, 
and the continued encroachment of other foreign imperialist powers on the economy. 
The argument continues that, when one considers all of this turmoil within the context 
of how widespread and deeply embedded poverty was in the society, it is no wonder that 
very little was accomplished. 
While this argument has some validity, it represents a very narrow view of the 
social forces at work in this period. For the disruptive events themselves emanated 
partly from the failure of the Chinese authorities to alleviate the poverty. It was a 
two-way street. The battles that went on were fed by the rural misery, but these 
struggles in turn contributed to further political disintegration and so to a growing 
inability of governments to shore up the crumbling base. 
However, even with this reformulation, the foregoing is only a part of the total 
story. Most of the rest of it has to do with the "best intentions" assumed above. Social 
scientists these days usually suppose that all governments really want economic 
development, and, if they do not achieve it, then it must be because the problems are 
unusually difficult to solve, or that solutions take a rather long time to work themselves 
out. Persistence and technical knowledge arc what is required for success. This supposi-
tion, however, docs not adequately take account of the class structures of societies, the 
often conflicting aims that exist among the various classes, and the class nature of 
"success" and "failure". When poverty is looked at from the standpoint of the ruling 
classes, it may not be a failure of the system at all but rather a prerequisite for the 
continuation of their accumulation of wealth, their privileges, and their social, political, 
and economic domination of the society. 
This is partly because poverty is often the carcass left from wealth acquisition; or, at 
best, it is the stagnant backwaters of society, not yet touched by a development process 
that stresses private profit-making and hence efficiency and "building on the best''. But 
poverty persists also because it is closely associated with peasant characteristics which 
are highly supportive of the existing class structures and hence of the privileges and 
wealth of the dominant classes. I refer to the peasants' illiteracy, passivity, obedience, 
fatalism; to their lack of awarene~ of the world around them and therefore to their 
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to their lack of organization, their willingness to work hard for very little; to their being 
easy set-ups for all sorts of manipulation by their "superiors". 
A thorough-going programme of economic development, which is spread widely 
and reaches deeply into the structure of society, is a dangerous thing to ruling classes, 
for it tends to undermine the very attnbutes of the masses of people that nourish the 
wealthy and powerful. Such a programme awakens people, and it is often best that they 
doze; it mobilizes people for gigantic economic efforts, and such organization can be 
turned into political subversion; it sweeps away illusions, but may open their eyes to the 
causes of their own oppression. 
Furthermore, any serious economic development programme that involves indus-
trialization within an agrarian and commercial society threatens existing class structures 
by creating new economic bases from which arise new social classes, and weakens the 
economic foundations which support the present dominant classes. Economic 
development stin up the society, establishing new classes that compete with the old 
order, socially, politically, and economically. 
These considerations were applicable to China prior to 1949. The peasant misery 
of that country during the century preceding the Communist victory was due not only to 
the inherent difficulty, during a century of violence, of raising millions of people out of 
abject poverty, but, more important, to the almost complete lack of interest by the 
Chinese governments and foreign investors in doing any such thing. The peasants 
remained poor in large part because poverty served a purpose; or, at best, because it did 
not interfere with the wealthier classes extracting the economic surplus from the 
countryside. 
II. CHANGES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE SINCE 1949 
That degrading and humiliating sort of peasant misery is now gone from China, 
which is not to say, of course, that a rural paradise has miraculously arisen. Chinese 
peasants are still very poor, especially by the standards of industrial countries; the 
struggle against nature goes on, and some Chinese peasants every now and then find 
themselves on the losing end; and there are still plenty of problems to overcome and 
small areas of severe poverty to eliminate. 
However, the overriding economic fact about people in China today is that for over 
twenty years, for the first time in their lives, almost all have had a decent stanJard of 
living in the basic necessities-food, clothing, housing, health care, education, culture, 
and recreation. There is no longer starvation; no longer infanticide, cannibalism, selling 
children into virtual slavery; no longer blank ignorance. The Chinese now have what is 
in effect an insurance policy against pestilence, famine, and other disasters. They have 
all risen together; it is difficult to sec that anyone has been left far behind. And the rural 
areas are alive with water-control projects, small industries, transportation and com-
munication networks, and plans for everything else that promise fuller lives for the 
peasants, who, while not prosperous, are prospering, awake, and optimistic. Some of 
the gains of the Chinese economy since 1952 are shown in Table l. 
How did this happen? I shall fint present some social and political, as well as 
economic, reasons for this rural transformation, reasons which I believe to be basic to 
any understanding of what has happened in China. After that, I shall turn to a closer 
look at the eronomic policies that have changed the countryside. 
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TABLE 1. S<>mt outpUI data of IM People's Republk of Oriluz: 
sel«ud yean, 1951-75 
(iu million metric toos unless ot.be rwisc specified) 
lndustrial 
production Electric 
Crude Chemical i.adell power 
Grain Steel oil fertilizer Cotton 1957•100 Cemeot Coal (m ltwb) 
1952 154 1.4 0.4 0.2 1.3 48 2.9 66 7.3 
1957 185 5.4 1.5 0.8 1.6 100 6.9 131 19.3 
1959 16.5 13.4 3.7 1.9 1.2 173 12.3 300 42.0 
1965 210 12.S 11.0 7.6 1.9 199 1.5.3 220 42.0 
1969 220 16.0 20.4 11.3 1.8 266 18.9 258 60.0 
1975 270 26.0 74.5 27.9 2.3 .502 40.0 427 121.0 
Sourcu: CIA, Peopk's Rtpublk of CJUM: Handbook of EcoMmic /ru:ticaton, August 1976. The grain 
figure tor 197.5 is from US Department of Agrkulture, People's Republic of Chin.a Agricultural Situatio", May 
1977, p.3. 
m. PREREQUISITF.s FOR THE TRANSmON 
The Chinese peasants have been able to improve their lives over the past two 
decades because they carried out a revolution of blood and fire, the only way which 
enabled them to break the bonds that retarded their economic progress. This violent 
revolution was necessary but not sufficient to transform an agrarian society into an 
industrial one. The following five developments, however, established a polit1cal-
social-economic framework for such a transition. 
1. After 1949 the Chinese C.Ommunist Party fashioned itself and a government into 
organs that represented the masses and wanted thorough-going and penetrating 
economic development for the purpose of improving the lives of almost everyone. This, 
perhaps, is the most important thing that one can say in this regard. The Communist 
Party did not represent and work on behalf of a small group of merchants and traders, or 
a class of landed proprietors and money-lenders, or foreign interests allied with domes-
tic entrepreneurs; instead it gained victory through a nation-wide revolution of peas-
ants against domestic oppression and foreign imperialism, and it continued to be a party 
representing the interests of these masses of poor people. That may not be exactly an 
economic determinant of peasant prosperity, but there is nothing more important. 
2. The government and party proved to be efficient, honest, and well organized in 
carrying out its development programmes. Some inefficiencies occurred, some bribes 
were taken, and some confusion sown, but on the whole the party and its cadres 
performed remarkably well in translating plans into actions. 
3. The party demonstrated its ability to mobilize the enthusiasm and energy of the 
masses with worthy and inspiring goals; to educate and give good health and improved 
nutrition to the people, enabling them to pursue these goals. It li"berated women and 
youth from their previous oppression, and liberated most people from debil.itating 
beliefs in "ghosts and monsters". 
4. Tb.rough land reform, nationalization of industry, and cooperativization in the 
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party generated a high savings rate, and with a fair amount of efficiency used the savings 
for investment across the board, in heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. 
5. The USSR aided China substantially during the 1950s. The bulk of this "aid" 
was Soviet exports for Chinese goods (rather than Chinese securities), but the Soviet 
goods consisted of over 150 complete industrial plants accompanied by thousands of 
Soviet technicians. Soviet aid was designed to establish, in a short period of time, the 
industrial base for a full-scale economic development effort. It remains, despite the 
subsequent rancour between the two countries, as an outstanding example of how one 
country can help another, if it really wants to. 
IV. SPECIFIC POLICIES IN RURAL AREAS: 1949-75 
The developments just described established the general environment in which 
specific economic policies were fashioned and carried out for rural improvement. These 
economic policies, however, were not neatly laid out in the early 1950s, all ready for 
sequential implementation later on. Instead, they have had at times an ad hoc nature; 
they have been fought over at the leadership level; and some have oot worked well and 
have had to be replaced. But, even allowing for this, the policies in general have 
achieved a remarkable transformation in the rural areas. 
These policies can be grouped into four categories: land reform (1949-52), 
collectivization-communization (1955-9), capital formation for agriculture (196~ 75), 
and the alteration of terms of trade between agriculture and industry in favour of 
agriculture and the peasants (1953-75). The first set of policies redistributed wealth 
and income from the rich to the poor, eliminated the former ruling classes and, by so 
doing, raised both peasant consumption and rural savings. The second set of policies 
raised output in the rural areas mainly by encouraging better utilization of the labour 
supply. The third set further boosted agricultural output by increasing capital goods and 
other inputs available to this sector and by establishing small industries almost every-
where in the countryside. Finally, throughout most of the period, the terms of trade 
were steadily turned in favour of the peasants by the raising of prices paid by the state 
for agricultural products and the lowering of prices of many goods purchased by the 
peasants. In addition, the tax burden on the peasants was steadily reduced. Thus, the 
masses of peasants initially gained control; their labour was then better utilized; 
increasing agricultural inputs were next acquired by them; and they gradually gained 
throughout the period by more favourable terms of trade . 
The following four sections consider, without much detail, these four sets of 
agricultural policies. Section lX illustrates, as an example of some of the above policies, 
the transformation of one rural county in China, Tsunhua, located about I 00 miles from 
Peking. Finally, the possible relevance of all this for other poor countries is taken up in 
the last section. 
V. THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF LAND REFORM: 1949-52 
The primary objectives of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 were to eliminate the 
feudal landlord system in the countryside, improve the lives of the poor, and develop 
agricultural production as a precondition for the country's industrialization. Land 
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reform took not only land from landlords and some rich peasants, but also their draft 
animals, farm implements, houses, and grain-and redistributed them all to middle and 
poor peasants. Altogether, 300 million peasants received 700 million mou of Jand1 
(about 45 per cent of total arable land) formerly owned by perhaps 10-12 million 
persons; of all land redistributed, two-thirds was taken from landlords and one-third f 
from rich peasants; two-thirds of this land was given to poor peasants and one-third to 
middle peasants. Many rich peasants retained much of their land and other assets (but 
not their hired labourers) and so, even after the reform, were on the whole still better off 1;·. 
than the middle and poor peasants. Further, since the land reform regulations did not 
forbid the resale or the renting of land afterwards, some of the redistributed land 
gravitated back to the rich peasants. Landlords, on the other hand, as a class, were 
wiped out by mass peasant struggles against them, confiscation, and sometimes 
execution. 
It is important to stress that land reform was not simply legislation passed and 
carried out from above, for it was much more than that. It was a revolutionary 
movement involving millions of peasants struggling against their former oppressors, 
gaining confidence and understanding in the process, and taking actions themselves 
against the landlords which committed them to new lives and new ways, and which 
made the entire movement quite irreversible. Keith Buchanan quotes Liu Shao-ch'i on 
this as follows: 
In carrying out the land reform our Party did not take the simple and easy way 
of merely relying on administrative decrees and of "bestowing" land on the 
peasants. For three solid years after the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China, we applied ourselves to awakening the class consciousness of the peasants ... 
We consider the time spent was absolutely necessary. Because we had used such a 
method the peasant masses stood up on their own feet, got themselves organized, 
closely followed the lead of the Communist Party and the People's Government, 
and took the reins of government and the armed forces in the villages firmly into 
their hands .... The broad masses of the awakened peasants held that exploitation, 
whether by landlords or by rich peasants, was a shameful thing. Conditions were 
thus created which were favourable to the subsequent socialist transformation of 
agriculture and helped shorten to a great extent the time needed to bring about 
agricu I tural cooperation.' 
A few results of the land reform are shown in Table 2, which also contains definitions of 
terms used above. 
The land reform, through its redistribution of rural assets, not only broke the 
domination of the landlord-gentry class and transferred power for the first time to poor 
and middle peasants, but it also immediately raised the consumption level of most 
peasants and at the same time increased rural savings available for investment. These 
were results principally of wealth redistribution and not of gains in total output flowing 
from land reform, for such gains were not substantial, though there were output gains 
that came from the cessation of civil strife and the reconstruction and repair of dikes, 
irrigation canals, and equipment. Much of the increase in rural savings was captured by 
the state for investment purposes. Thus, land reform contributed in a major way to the 
higher investment ratios of these earlier years. 
The ratio of net investment to national income rose rapidly from perhaps 1-2 per 
cent in 1949 to around 20 per cent in 1953. After that, despite the cooperativiz.ation 
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TABLE 2. Some results of Uuid rt:form in ChiNl: 1949-51 
Share of crop area owned Avenge aop area O'litlCd 
Percentage 






Undlords 2.6 28.7 2.1 116.10 11.98 
Rieb peasants 3.6 17.7 6.4 35.15 26.3-0 
Middle pcaMnts 35.8 3-0.2 44.8 15.81 18.53 
Poor peasants and 
farm labouren 57.1 23.5 46.8 6.25 12.14 
Other 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Soiuu. Peter S<:bran, ~ Dcvelopm.ml of Cltinae Agricidturt:, 1950-1959 (University o{ Illinois 
Press, 1969) pp. 21, 22, and 25. 
Households were classified by amounts of income and wealth, sources of income, and siu of household. 
l..&Ddlords: Owners or land not enpged in labour, who depend oo exploitation for their livelihood-that 
is. land rent, mooey-lcoding, hiring of labour, etc. 
Rieb peasants: Similar to landlords, except that exploitation chiefly took the form of hiring loog-~rm 
labouren and it constituted somewhat lesser shares of their total inccmes. 
Middle peasants: Owned ail or 1 portioo of the land they worked, or perhaps none at all. They de pc oded 
for a living wholly or mainly oo their own labour. 
Poor peasants: Rented land fOf cultivatioo and were exploited by others through rent and interest. 
Farm labourers: Owned neither land nor farm implements; depended whoDy or mainly oo the sale of 
their labour for their living. 
l mc11 of land=one-si.nh of an acre or one-fifteenth of a hectare. 
drive in the countryside during 1955-6, the ratio rose very little more until 1958-9, 
when communes were introduced. Thus, the initial rapid increase in saving and invest. 
ment came in the very early years of the period 1949-57. 
Land reform bad much to do with this, for it redistributed wealth and hence income 
from the rich to the poor, and much of what was redistributed was captured by the state 
in savings, through taxation, profits of state enterprises, differential pricing, and private 
savings. The land reform eliminated the lwcury consumption of the rich, raised by lesser 
amounts the basic consumption of the poor, and made much of the rest available to the 
state for investment. 
Victor Lippit bas computed that the income flow to the rural propertied classes, in 
rent, interest, and farm business profits, plus net taxes to the state, were as much as 19 
per cent of national income, just a decade before land reform.' This income flow, which 
was almost entirely consumed, was redirected downward, after land reform, by rural-
asset redistribution to middle and poor peasants. From there it found its way into 
investment via several channels: self-financed investment in agriculture; increased tax 
payments to the state; increased profits of government and private enterprises, which 
wholly or partly reverted to the state budget; increased profits of state purchasing 
agencies (mostly grain purchases); and increased financial asset holdings of peasants, 
which released real resources for investment, financed by borrowed funds from the 
banking system. Land reform probably contnouted over one-third of the total savings 
in 1952 (and, presumably, in later years, too) to the investment programme. 
It bears repeating: the Chinese land reform did not give land to the poor peasants. 
It encouraged them to organize themselves to tau it, and in the process to crush their 
former opprC$SOTS. This was the prerequisite for later socialist development in the 
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countryside, for, without it, the old class structures and wealth ownership patterns 
would have been regenerated by the persistence of old attitudes and of institutions 
favourable to the rich.' 
Vl. RURAL COLLECTIVIZATION AND LABOUR 
MOBILIZATION: 1952-9 
After land reform, the Chinese leaders, in four stages, transformed small private 
holdings into large-seal~ communes. The first step was the encouragement of mutual 
aid teams, wrucb were units of several households, the function of which was to pool 
privately-owned resources in order to compensate for shortages of labour and other 
inputs during the rush seasons of planting and harvesting. This was at first done on a 
temporary, seasonal basis, the teams being dissolved at the end of the planting or 
harvesting period, but later some of the teams were organized on a permanent, year-
round basis. These permanent teams were somewhat larger than the others and often 
held some capital goods and animals as common property. By 1954 almost 10 million 
mutual aid teams, about half of them seasonal and half permanent, were in operation, 
and they comprised 58 per cent of all peasant households. 
The second stage was the formation of elementary agricultural producers' coopera-
tives (APCs), some of which were organized as early as 1950 but most of which were 
formed in the second half of 1955. They comprised several mutual aid teams of around 
30 to 40 households, that is, a village. Land and other capital goods continued to be 
privately owned, but these assets were now pooled in the APCs for use according to 
annual plans prepared by central management. Peasants were compensated according 
to their labour and their contributions of land, implements, animals, etc., labour 
however, usually claiming most of the output. By early 1956, almost all peasant families 
were in these APCs. 
The third stage, in 1956-7, saw the consolidation of elementary APCs into 
advanced APCs, each comprising several small villages or perhaps one large village, 
varying in size from 100 to 300 house bolds. In the advanced APCs, peasants held title to 
a share in the collective equity, and they no longer bad any private claim on their former 
holdings of land and other capital goods. Accordingly, net earnings were distributed to 
the peasants only on the basis of work done, and the earnings withheld, including those 
contributed by capital goods, were collectively owned. The advanced APCs, owing to 
their large size, were able to withhold larger percentages of income for collective 
purposes. Similarly, the payment of the agricultural tax became a collective obligation, 
whereas it bad been an individual responsibility in the elementary APCs. 
In the final step, during 1958-9, people's communes were established. The com-
mune, as the Chinese have stated, "is the basic unit of the social structure of our 
country, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education and the military. At the same 
time, it is the basic organization of social power". Filling th.is out somewhat more, the 
communes were organized to provide larger, more efficient units for carrying out 
large-scale water-control projects and the building of native-type factories and work-
shops throughout the countryside. They were organized, moreover, to provide addi-
tional labour through the establishment of communal mess halls and other communal 
services which released many women from household tasks. The communes also 
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own militia; and they served to weaken the patriarchal family unit and, in general, 
peasants' identification only with very small groups. Further, a half-wage, half-supply 
system was set up, which provided free supplies of many of the necessities to peasants 
quite aside from whether they worked or not, the remainder of income being distributed 
according to work done. 
The communes were quickly organized during the Great Leap Forward, which was 
an all-out effort by the Chinese to industrialize rural areas, to build a large iron and steel 
industry, to grow record agricultural crops, to raise the education, health, and cultural 
levels of the peasants, and to catch up within 1 S years to the leading industrial nations of 
the world. 
The objective is to build China in the shortest possible time into a great 
socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science 
and culture .... To carry out our socialist construction at a high speed naturally 
requires constant readjustment to the relations of production and constant adapta-
tion of the superstructure to the developing economic base. The fundamental 
thing, however, is to develop the productive forces rapidly .... The objectives are to 
abolish exploitation of man by man, and to build a classless society in which the 
difference between city and countryside, between mental and manual work will 
disappear and the ideal of"from each according to his ability, to each according to 
bis needs," will become the order of the day.' 
Within a short time, over 26,000 communes were organized, each containing 
around 5 ,000 households on the average, but the range was from 1,500 to 10,000. The 
former advanced APCs became 500,000 production brigades within the communes, 
_and the former elementary APCs became 3 million production teams. 
To summarize, during the 1950s the basic organizational unit in the countryside 
was enlarged from individual peasant households, to mutual aid teams (at first tempor-
ary and later permanent), to production teams (former elementary APCs), to produc-
tion brigades (former advanced APCs), and finally to communes. The basis for the 
distnoution of income also changed from distribution according to work and asset 
ownership, to distnoutioo according to work only, to distribution according to work and 
needs; and, at the same time, the value of a peasant's work points was based on the work 
done by increasingly larger groups. 
Some of these advances, however, were reversed in the early 1960s, during the 
downturn of economic activity, when Maoist ideology waned. Communes were greatly 
increased in number and so reduced in size of population; decision-making authority 
was moved down to lower units; income distribution by need was de-emphasized; 
communal services were greatly reduced; and private incentives in several forms were 
restored. 
1be enlargement of rural units and the collectivization which accompanied it 
during the 1950s no doubt, on balance, raised the standard of living of the masses of 
peasants, but the policies probably did not increase by much the economic surplus from 
agriculture until the Great Leap Forward in 1958-9. There were both positive and 
negative features of this series of rural programmes, but I shall concentrate only on the 
principal advantage gained by the economy from the rural policies just described, 
namely the fuller and more efficient use of the rural labour force. 
Throughout the 1950s, the percentage of the rural population comprising the 
labour force tended to decline sharply owing to the rapid absorption of children of 
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school age by the school system. However, since children did not work the long hours of 
adults or as effectively, this downward tendency was less in actual output than it was in 
sheer numbers of workers. In any case, it remained simply a tendency, for it was more 
than offset by the rapid growth of women in the labour force during the 1950s as rural 
collectivization and communization proceeded. 
These rural policies also induced increases in the total number of days worked each 
year by greatly raising the number of labour-days for each employed peasant in general 
and for each female in particular. The total expansion effect, coming from the increased 
employment of women and the greater number of days worked for each employed 
person, was extremely large, as can be seen in Table 3. In fact, under normal circums-
tances, total annual labour-days would have risen by no more than 2-3 billion from 
1950 to 1959. Instead, the rise was 29 billion. Furthermore, Peter Schran believes that 
even this might well understate the full impact of communization in this regard. 
TABLE 3. Rural popu/arion, employment, and labour-days: 
1950, 1955, 1957 and 1959 
(1) (2) (3) (.) (5) 
Total Average Total lndcx of 
Peasant employed annual annual col. (4) 
population peasants labour-days labour-days 1952=100 
19SO 479.7m 22.6m 119.0 26.Sb 97.S 
19S5 523.8 243.3 121.0 29.4 108 4 
1957 541.3 260.3 159.5 41.5 152.8 
1959 539.6 309.l 189.0 58.4 215.0 
C.ODectivi.z.a ti on, 
1955-7 + 17.S + 17.0 +38.S +12.I +44.4 
C.Ommuniz.ation, 
1957-9 -1.7 +48.8· +29.S + 16.9 +62.2 
Source. Peter Schran, ~Development of Chwse Agriculrure, 1950--1959, Chapter 3 
•1.ocreasc owing largely to increased mobili.utioo of women and the part-time employment of school 
children. 
TABLE "4, !Mic~ of the structure of rural emp/oym.eru by labour·days: 
1950, 1955, 1957 a/Id 1959 
(Total labour-days in 1952 = 100) 
C.Orvee, 
TotAI Fann Subsidiary basic 
labour-da Y' work work• construction Otbert 
1950 97.5 75.2 19.2 3.1 0 
1955 108."4 83.0 21.0 3.9 0.4 
1957 152.8 113.4 25.8 9.7 3.8 
1959 215.0 lSl.7 29.5 12.3 21.4 
Sowct. Peter Schrall, op. cit., p. 75. 
•lodudcs ,athcri.n' activitie$, domestic handicrafts, administration, professional services, care of private 
plots and livestock. 
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The increased labour was employed not only in basic farm work and in subsidiary 
occupations, but increasing amounts of it were set to work on large-scale water-control 
projects, basic construction, and rural industrial efforts; and much labour was increas-
ingly used for communal services-administration, cultural activities, medical care, 
education, etc. These data are in Table 4. Consequently, th.is mobilization of additional 
labour-days served to raise not only agricultural input but also capital formation in the 
countryside, and it also increased the communal services offered to the peasants. 
Instead of fiddling away their time individually during off-seasons, the peasants were 
mobilized into large units for community and area projects. 
The gains in total labour-days worked, however, did not result in commensurate 
increases in total output, for other inputs did not keep pace with labour inputs, and so 
resulted in diminishing marginal returns to labour, the additional labour was sometimes 
employed inefficiently and at tasks with quite low returns, and there was some loss of 
incentives to work hard during 195~9. Nevertheless, total production in the rural areas 
did increase considerably throughout most of the 1950s, and capital formation made 
some impressive gains toward the end of the period. A few indicators of rural activity 
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Source. Nai-R~nn Oien, Orine3~ EcoMrnic Stati.stU:s (AJdinc, 1967), pp. 338-9, 289, 364. 
•These are Western estimates, which are probably fairly accurate. 
t Figures in this column are in 1 9 5 2 price$_ 
ff iprei in 195 7 prices. 
VII. INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE RURAL AREAS: 1960--75 
Adverse weather conditions which lasted for three years(" the worst in a century"), 
the pull-out of the Soviet advisers, and disincentives of peasants arising out of the 
extremes to which some Great Leap policies were pushed-all of these combined in 
1959-{)0, first to reduce agricultural output, including the commercial crops which fed 
light industry, then to hit heavy industry as the Soviet advisers withdrew with their 
blueprints and expertise. By late 1960 and early 1961, the economy had been damaged 
so severely that the Chinese leadership (probably no longer dominated by Mao), in the 
face of a decline of national output of around 2~5 per cent, altered its economic 
priorities to place agriculture first, light industry second, and heavy industry last. This 
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offi~ally changed ~e pri?rities tha~ had b«o established un~er Soviet-type planning 
dunng the 1950s, lll which heavy industry was the ceotrep1eu and agriculture was 
relatively neglected so far as state investment funds were concemed.7 
These new rankings, however, did not reflect any diminished interest in industriali-
zation. Rather they served notice that the top priority would go to those industrial 
pursuits that directly served agriculture, either by producing modem inputs for that 
sector or by processing output coming from it. Industries farther out would be 
emphasized to the extent that they directly served these inner firms, aod so on. 
Increasingly, as the 1960s proceeded, the countryside was expected to establish not 
only the small industries that directly served agriculture but also, whenever possible 
small basic industries such as iron and steel making, cement making, coal-mining, etc. 
By the end of the decade, the economy was better able than it had been to support 
agriculture both with the output of large-scale industry in the urban areas and with tens 
of thousands of small, indigenous industries throughout the countryside. Thus, the 
effort was redirected from the mobilization of traditional inputs (labour, natural fer-
tilizers, draft animals, traditional tools) to the production of modem inputs such as 
chemical fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides, small hydroelectric plants, electric 
motors, rice transplanters, tractors, trucks, other machinery, and seed-improvement 
stations. The agricultural task of the 1960s and 1970s was, in short, to industrialize and 
modernize the rural areas. 
Some of the results of these policies are recorded in Table 6, where it may be seen 
that chemical fertilizers, tractors, and powered irrigation equipment all rose very 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. The table also shows fairly good growth for a few of the 
output series that are available. 
TAB LE 6. Some agriculrural inpuI.J and outpul.J: Sdected years, 1952, 
1965, 1975 
Cbinesc production of inputJ Chinese production of outputs 
Inventory 
Oiemica.I of powered Proce~d 
fe rtiliz.e rs Tnctors irrigation Grain sugar Soybeans C-Onon 
(million (thousand equipment (million (million (million yield 
metric standard (million metric metric metric (kg per 
tons) units) HP) tons) tons) tons) be~) 
1952 0.2 2.0 0.1 154 0.5 9.5 234 
1965 1.6 23.9 8.5 210 1.S NA 346 
1975 27.9 180.0 43.0 270 2.3 17.0 495 
Sources: Same .publicatioru as for Table 1. 
However, we do not bave enough information to make a confident assessment 
regarding the impact of these increasing dosages of modem inputs on agricultural 
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harvesters, and trucks. Fwthcr, we do not know the distribution of the various inputs 
among the several crops (wheat, rice, cotton, etc.), nor the changes in land area devoted 
to each type of crop during the period. Moreover, the grain output estimates at the 
beginning of this period arc uncertain. Consequently, the most that can be said on a 
general level is that grain output rose fairly rapidly during the 1960s, apparently 
responding to modern inputs in this decade to about the same degree as it responded to 
traditional inputs in the previous decade.' It is probably true that, if further institutional 
changes and dosages of traditional inputs bad been heavily relied upon throughout the 
1960s as they were in the previous decade, agricultural output would have fared much 
Jess well than it actually did. 
Somewhat more detail, however, can be supplied for chemical fertilizers, which 
seem to have been the most important of the modem inputs during the 1960s. The 
Chinese leadership did not neglect chemical fertilizers during the 1950s, though after 
the downturn of 1959--{)1 they placed much more emphasis on them. The USSR 
constructed several complete plants for China in the initial decade, and China imported 
machinery to modernize two plants inherited from the pre-1949 period. There was an 
increase in the production of these fertilizers from 1952 to 1959. In the ne:tt d~de, 
China purchased four complete nitrogenous fertilizer plants from the Netherlands, 
Britain, and Italy, which were installed in 1966. She began building her own plants in 
1964, and around this time set a goal of one large-scale plant for each of the 18{}-190 
special districts and one smaller plant for each of the 2,200-odd counties in the country. 
In fact, as things turned out, much of the increase of chemical ·fertilizers during the 
1960s came from the medium- and small-scale plants that were constructed throughout 
the countryside during this decade. Moreover, China began to import chemical fertiliz-
ers in increasingly larger volume, mostly from Japan and Western Europe. By 1970 
available chemical fertilizers from both domestic and foreign sources totalled more than 
18 million metric tons, whjch was six times the level of 1959. 
It is possible to relate only in an approximate way the 15 million ton increase in the 
supply of chemical fertilizers to the 70 million ton increase in grain output during the 
period 1959-70. Considering the information available on this relationship, it may be 
roughly acrurate to say that, during this period, chemical fertilizers contributed bet-
ween 40 per cent and 55 per cent of the increase in grain output.• While this is not very 
exact, it probably does suggest accurately that chemical fertilizers had a substantial 
marginal impact on grain output in the 1960s, probably more than that of any other 
input. This impact, however, was most likely centred on rice output which is grown in 
areas where water is generally available. The impact on wheat and cotton output, grown 
mostly in the north where water supplies are unreliable, was undoubtedly Jess strong. 
As I noted previously, the countryside bad been industrialized to some extent 
during the past decade by the establishment of thousands of small industries under local 
authority. 10 These industries produce and repair farm implements and machinery; they 
produce fertilizers, consumer goods, insecticides, building materials, rural transporta-
tion eqwpment; they process agricultural products and develop power sources. Such 
industries have been encouraged by the central government to be as self-reliant as 
possible by developing new sources of raw materials from their own areas, utilizing 
waste materials and older machinery from the larger central industries, and using 
relatively labour-intensive, indigenous methods of production. These rural endeavours 
have been fashioned into more or less integrated industrial structures in each locality for 
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the prime purpose of serving that area's agricultural needs. 
The advantages claimed for these local industries are: (1) they have the abilit)' to 
utilize dispersed deposits of material resources; (2) they lower average capital--0utput 
ratios and shorten the gestation periods; (3) they have the ability to undertake repair-
ing, maintenance, and processing activities, freeing large-scale capacity for jobs which 
the modern sector alone could do; (4) they lower the costs of urbanization and social 
overhead capital in general; (5) they have a capacity to create industrial consciousness 
among the peasantry; (6) they contribute to national defence; and (7) they ameliorate 
the contradictions between cities and countryside. 
More generally, this rural industrialization effort has certainly had some measure 
of success in expanding employment opportunities in the countryside, in balancing 
production geographically, and in raising agricultural productivity generally. 
VlO. IMPROVEMENT IN AG RI CULTURE'S TERM.S OF TRADE 
The fourth and final programme that has raised living standards in the rural areas is 
the change in terms of trade between agricultural and industrial products in favour of 
the former. This improvement for agriculture has apparently been fairly constant 
throughout the period, as shown in Table 7. By 1957, a given amount of agricultural 
produce was purchasing about a third more industrial goods than at the beginning of the 
decade. By the early 1970s, this had risen to over a half. 
Over the past two decades, the government has several times raised the price at , 
which it purchases grain from the peasants. At the present time, this purchase price is 
above the level at which grain is sold by the state in urban areas and in rural areas 
devoted mostly to industrial crops. The difference in the prices is a subsidy from the 
state to the cultivators of grain. Other agricultural goods have also been purchased at 
higher prices. On the other hand, prices of industrial products bought by the peasants 
rose very little for a decade after 1952, and the increases in more recent years have been 
relatively modest. Indeed, the prices of many industrial products, some of which are not 
in this index, have declined markedly. For example, the general price level of medicines 
is 80 per cent lower now than in 1950, and most of this drop occurred in the last few 
years. "For the same amount of wheat, a peasant can get 70 per cent more salt than at 
TABLE 7 Indicators of agricultural welfare gairu, 1950-74 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agricultural Industrial retail Agricultural ta.t 
purchase price price~ in ru raJ as perccol of 
inde1 areas index Ratio of agricultural 
(1952=100) (1952= 100) (1) to (2) crop output 
1950 82.2 91.2 90.l NA 
1952 100.0 100.0 100.0 13.2 
1957 122.4 101.6 120.5 11.5 
1963 154.7 114.3 135.3 NA 
1971 156.2 114.0 137.0 6.0 
1973 16-0.0+ NA NA 5.0+. 
Sowces. Dwight H. Perk.ins, Constraints Influencing Oiina's Agricultural Perfonnance, m Joint 
Economic Committee, China: A Reassessrrurtl of th< Economy, July 10, 1975, pp. 362-3. 
1 Figure is for 1974. 
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the time of the birth of the People's Republic, and for the same amount of cotton, be 
receives 2.4 times as much kerosene." 11 Prices of fertilizers, fuel, livestock feed, 
electricity, and various types of equipment have been lowered. 
The last column of Table 7 shows a sharp reduction over the full period of the tax 
burden on peasants, which is another indicator of shifting terms of trade in favor of 
agriculture. 
IX. RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TSUNHUA COUNTY 
Some of the agricultural policies which I have discussed up to this point will 
perhaps have more meaning if they are shown in actual operation in one rural locality. I 
attempt this as follows. 
Tsunhua county is one of six counties within the special district of Tangshan, which 
is located in the north-eastern part of Hopei Province, about 100 miles cast and a bit 
north of Peking. The county, the size of which is about 1,640 square kilometres, has a 
population of over half a million, though it has only one town, Tsunhua, the county seat. 
The land is mostly hilly, with three mountain ranges and two valleys or plains. The 
economic activities of the population are largely agricultural-that is, growing wheat, 
kaoliang, millet, other grains, fruit orchards, chestnut trees, vegetables-but there arc 
increasing numbers of small industries in the county, and of courSe some people engage 
in various sideline occupations. Table 8 records some of the basic economic facts about 
the county. 
The heart of the county's economy is agriculture, mostly food-grains. Since 1949, 
the output of food-grains per hectare has risen more than threefold, or at an average 
annual rate of 6 per cent. However, since 1958 the rate has been only 2 per cent; it was 
rather stagnant between 1958 and 1969, but recorded substantial increases during 1970 
and 1971. The Revolutionary Committee of the county attributed the stagnant period 
TABLE 8. Somt tconorrtic statistics of Tsunhua county: I 970-1 
Total area 
Cultivated area 








Value of gni.o production 
Value of industrial production 
locome from sideline occupations 
164,000 hectares (or 1,640 sq km) 
64,000 hectares 




43 (av. of 12,800 per commune) 
691 (av. of 800 per brigade) 
2,664 (av. of 200 per tum) 
3.8 tons per hectare 
about 50 million yuan 
18 million yuan 
22.7 million yuan 
Soiucu. Joo Sisurdson, Rural industry- a traveller's view, TM CJUNJ 
Quarurly (July-September 1972); Colltietivt Nott.s of visiting economists to 
China durin& August 1972, mimeographed by Tbomu Wci.sskopf. Department 
ol Eoooomics., Univemty of Michipn. 
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to the revisionist policies of Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers, who discouraged sell-
reliant policies in the county, the building of small industries, and the full use of local 
resources. Since 1968 or 1969, however, the leaders of the county have "organized 
mass activities to change the backwardness of agriculture, make substantial use of local 
resources and rapidly develop local industry". 12 
The county has attempted to promote agricultural development by producing its 
own cement, chemical fertilizers, and iron and steel for the manufacture of agricultural 
machinery and implements, and it bas supported these heavy industries, especially iron 
and steel, with profits from light industry and sideline activities. That is, the county bas 
attempted to industrialize mainly on its own initiative and using its own resources for 
the purpose of raising agricultural productivity and the living standards of the people. 
In order to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, and iron and steel, the people of 
the county first had to locate the necessary ores and minerals." Initially, we were aware 
only of the presence of gold and iron in the hills, but now local people have discovered 
23 kinds of ore, helped by the geologicaJ team."" They then set up the iron and steel 
plant-first the small blast furnace, then a converter, after that a rolling mill. The iron 
and steel aided in establishing the cement factory, and the latter was used largely to 
expand water conservancy projects. 
The iron and steel plant, however, ran at a loss. So light industry and sideline 
activities were developed which made more than enough profits to subsidize iron and 
steel. The county planted tens of thousands of fruit trees, for example, then constructed 
a small fruit bottling factory with an annual capacity of 250 tons of bottled 
fruit-apples, apricots, pears, grapes, peaches, etc. This factory required sugar, so some 
peasants began growing sugar beets, and turned out 10 tons of sugar per year. The 
factory also needed glass for the bottles and so a small glass manufacturing plant was set 
up. The glass, of course, required pure soda, hence, this called for the establishment of a 
32-ton per year soda factory. And so on and on. The result is that the county is now able 
to produce a complete set of machinery, such as crushers, threshers, oil presses, and 
machinery for digging drainage and irrigation systems, for the development of agricul-
tural and sideline activities. 
Locaf industries are run not only by the county but also by the communes and 
production brigades. At the county level, the aim of national policy is for every county 
to have the" Five Small Industries": iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, energy 
(coal, electricity), and machinery. Such complete sets were established in one~half of 
the 2,200 counties by 1971. Tsunhua was engaged in all of these activities, except that 
its electricity was produced outside of the county. In addition, the county runs a 
sulphuric acid plant, an electromechanic factory. a plastics factory, a paper-making 
plant, engages in mining operations, has a textile mill, does major repairs on agricultural 
machinery, processes agricultural and sideline product~.g., flour-milling and 
cotton-ginning. 
The communes and the production brigades are also involved in small industries. 
For example, there is a three-level agricultural machinery repair and manufacturing 
network, which 90 per cent of the counties, including Tsunhua, had established by 
1971, in which the county does the manufacturing and major repairs in seven plants, the 
communes in 37 plants do lesser repairs and assembly, and production brigades do 
minor repairs in their 407 shops. The three-levels also engage in processing agricultural 
and sideline products. Further"Three-level county, commune, and brigade agricultural 
---------------------------- ----------------11111111• 
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scientific networks have been rapidly expanded aU over the country [including 
Tsunhua) in recent years. One important objective of this is to achieve a rapid seed-
selection proccs.s which together with modern inputs to agriculture may quickly 
increase the yield per unit."" Sideline occupations are engaged in by households, 
brigades, and communes, and they include such things as raising silkworms and bees, 
quarrying stones and mining ores, making mat bags, growing fruit. 
In all of these enterprises, there were 12,000-15,000 of the 200,000 labour force 
employed. In the 39 county-run industries, employment was 5,500 in 1971; it was 2,500 
in the 71 plants managed by communes; and 5,000 in the industrial units of the 
production brigades. 15 These are not large figures relative to the total labour force, but 
there are many other workers who are in the industrial sector indirectly. In any case, 
employment creation is probably not the main purpose of rural industrialization. For 
given the increased school enrolment of children, the fact that it is unnecessary any 
longer for older people to remain in the labour force and work, the continuation of 
large-scale labour projects in water control and reforestation, the increasing numbers of 
people engaged in sideline occupations (in cultural activities, medical services, educa-
tion, and party work), the movement of millions of people to the north-west and west 
and to other relatively virgin areas of the country, and the continued rising demands for 
just about every kind of agricultural product-given all these things, there would seem 
to be no significant surplus of labour in the rural areas. This, of course, is especially true 
during the seasonal peaks of planting and harvesting. Instead, rural industrialization is 
for the principal purpose of achieving mechanization in agriculture and hence greater 
agricultural productivity. It is also meant to narrow the differences between town and 
country, workers and peasants, and to widen the horizons and the abilities of the 
peasants. 
X. MAOIST DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ITS RELEVANCE 
FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
What possible relevance has China's attempts at rural development for other 
underdeveloped countries? To begin to answer this, it is first necessary to specify 
exactly what the Maoist strategy for economic development is, within which rural 
development is contained. Since this strategy is an evolving one and has already taken 
several twists and turns, one cannot be certain of getting it right. But as of now the 
over-all development strategy appears to consist of the following steps. 
1. Destroy the feudal-landlord-bureaucrat class structure, and redistribute land, 
other assets, income, and power to the peasants and workers. 
2. Establish socialist relations of production as soon as possible, and use the party 
to educate peasants and workers in socialist values and ideals. That is, nationalize 
industry as soon as feasible and bring about cooperativization in the countryside 
without waiting for agricultural mechanization; begin transforming the superstructure 
into a socialist one. 16 
3. Establish a full planning mechanism to take the place of market-price-
determined allocation of resources and distribution of incomes, and go all out for 
industrialization, but emphasize those industries having direct links to agriculture. 
4. Achieve high rates of capital formation by encouraging savings at aU levels and 
the use of the savings at each level for self-financed investment. Encourage rural areas, 
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in particular, to produce whatever can be produced by small-scale, indigenous methods 
to finance these investments from their own savings, and to manage these industrie~ 
themselves. Capital goods that can be produced only by large-scale, modem methods 
should be financed and managed at higher political levels. 
5. Develop and release human energy and creativity by promoting socialist values 
("serve the people", selflessne~. collective incentives) over bourgeois values (indi-
vidualism, selfishness, materialism), by providing health-care facilities everywhere, 
educating as many people as po~ible, providing worthy goals that inspire people to 
work hard, and encouraging basic decision-making at the lowest possible level. 
6. Carry out a continuing revolution at all levels of society, and maintain the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. 
It seems to me that the Maoist strategy, considered as a whole, probably has very 
little relevance to governments of most underdeveloped countries today, for it involves 
breaking the power of ruling classes and their foreign supporters, opting for socialism 
and eventually communism over capitalism, for full-scale industrialization over tracte, 
commerce, and agrarianism, for continuing revolutionary activity over orderly proce-
dures. Since most Third World countries today play more or less subordinate and 
dependent roles in the international capitalist system, serving the wealthier countries of 
that system with raw materials, oil, cheap labour, or additional markets, for them to 
follow China's path would mean first breaking out of this global system and then taking 
their chances on an all-out development effort with their own resources plus whatever 
aid can be obtained from socialist countries. 17 • This may be a programme favoured by 
some classes in these poor countries, but it is hardly a prescription that would be 
appealing to their governments and propertied classes. Furthermore, such thoughts are 
anathema to the United States, as the leader of global capitalism, the duty of which is to 
try to prevent such break-aways through some combination of economic aid, military 
aid, counterinsurgency, cultivation of domestic elites, or force. The alliance between 
the US, on the one hand, and the propertied classes and elites in the poor countries, on 
the other, is a powerful one. 
That is the over-all picture. It stre~es that one thing does depend on another in 
Maoist strategy, and indeed this is so in any development strategy. To make any 
substantial headway, the problem of underdevelopment often bas to be tackled as a 
whole, not piecemeal. For example, in the Chinese experience, rural industrialization 
depended on the general acceptance of goals other than profits and efficiency. Tb.is 
general acceptance in turn was based on the prior inculcation of socialist values 
throughout the society, which were reinforced daily by the prior establishment of 
socialist institutions, including a full planning mechanism. These socialist relations of 
production could be developed only by the prior break-up of the old class structures of 
society. And so on. 
I have emphasized the holistic view, the Maoist way. I now wish to ask whether 
other underdeveloped countries can benefit, to some extent at least, from separate parts 
of Oiina's total experience. Some socialist policies should be adaptable to capitalist 
developmental programmes. 
It is well to recognize at the beginning that many Chinese policies for development 
are univerully known and in fact have been acquired by China from the theoretical and 
practical work of bourgeois economists and other development experts, as well as from 
the experience of the Soviet Union. To this extent, China bas learned from others, and 
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there are, of course, no reasons why other countries cannot take advantage of the same 
information. I refer to policies of raising capital formation relative to consumption to 
attain higher growth rates, of encouraging saving for this purpose through taxation, 
financial institutions, and in other ways, of using relative factor supplies to good 
advantage, of aiming for developmental government budgets and moderate growth 
rates of the money supply, of utilizing aid and trade efficiently, and so on. Much of 
China's over-all performance can be explained "simply" in terms of the very high 
investment and saving ratios that were attained by 1953-4 and were more or less 
maintained thereafter. (Recall, however, that to attain these the old class structures 
were overthrown by revolution. That is what lies behind "simply".) And larger shares of 
this total capital formation were applied to agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
goes a long way in explaining China's recent gains in rural development. Thus, much of 
the story is standard fare, known to everyone. 
But, while China has learned much from others, she may also be able to teach a few 
things. rll'St, China has demonstrated the importance of industrialization to economic 
development; that the large resources initially devoted to iron and steel, machine-
building, non-ferrous metals, oil, electric power, and chemicals were indispensable in 
establishing a base for later advances in agriculture, transportation, consumer goods, 
and military weapons, and in freeing the economy from its dependency on foreign 
direction and influence. The initial stress on heavy industry, rather than on infrastruc-
ture and consumer goods, was made possible only by socialist aid and trade. Despite the 
growing bitterness between the USSR and China, no other country has ever received so 
much help toward full-scale industrialization as China did during the 1950s. This is 
something of a lesson in itself. 
Second, China bas shown, especially during the 1960s, how to industrialize without 
generating social problems that threaten eventually to blow the society sky high. China 
has involved increasing numbers of people, especially in the rural areas, in industrial 
activities in order to break down the potentially antagonistic relations between city and 
country and between workers and peasants; to spread knowledge of industrial proces-
ses as widely as possible so as to promote talent, ingenuity, confidence, and the scientific 
attitude among masses of workers and peasants; and to transform rural areas into 
self-reliant agrarian-industrial-cultural local economies, which are attractive places to 
live in and which can, at least partly, break their dependent relationships with higher 
political units, including the state. This is relevant for other poor countries becall54! it 
demonstrates a pattern of industrialization that does not generate severe imbalances 
between urban and rural areas, between rich and poor, between employed and unem-
ployed or between one region and another. The lesson that many developing countries 
arc learning from their own experience is that high output growth rates are often the 
"good face" on an increasingly diseased body. Thus, a recent annual report of the 
World Bank, after noting the respectable growth rates of many underdeveloped coun-
tries, went on to say: "Statistics cooceal the gravity of the underlying economic and 
social prblcms, which arc typified by severely skewed income distribution, excessive 
levels of unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, low rates of Literacy, serious 
malnutrition, and widespread ill-health." The statistics also conceal the growing urban 
problems, foreign debt difficulties, social unrest, and much else in many of these 
countries. Perhaps the most important message that China can send to other poor 
people is that not one item in the above list applies to her. 
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The third lesson is the importance of raising work motivation and how to do it. 
Capitalist economists have concentrated far too much on how to rcaUocate economic 
resources to attain higher levels of national output and far too little on how to get people 
rcaUy interested in their work and so willing to exert great efforts to achieve their goals. 
I think that China has shown that the latter is much more important than the former; 
that people who really want to work completely eclipse the effects of nice adjustments 
toward more competitive markets and fine calculations regarding factor inputs. 
The Maoists believe that they have inspired and enabled people to work hard by 
altering their work environments, changing their incentives, and providing them with 
education, good health, and technical training. The first point is that, in capitalist 
development, to raise growth rates of national output, it is necessary to do it in such a 
way as to rcinf orce the existing class structures of society and the values which support 
such structures. The pursuit of higher growth rates, therefore, has generally reduced 
many human beings to unthinking, specialized, manipulated inputs in the production 
process, in which hierarchical structures of capitalists and workers, bosses and "hands", 
mental experts and manual workers, face each other in more or less antagonistic 
relationships. Such alienated work environments lower the general intelligence, initia-
tive, and willingness to work hard of broad masses of workers, which are the obvious 
costs of pursuing growth in the context of such sharp class alignments. the Maoists feel 
that the development of people as full human beings, working in a warm, egalitarian, 
and cooperative atmosphere, leads to the rapid development of material output; that 
the former is possible only in the absence of capitalist or feudal class structures; and that 
the latter is desirable only within the context of the former. 
Thus, the Chinese lesson, in this regard, is that it is possible to increase greatly the 
over-all productivity of peasants and workers by establishing less alienated work 
environments. In the absence of full-scale revolution, underdeveloped countries might 
benefit from China's experience by questioning their own organizations of work both in 
the countryside and in the cities, and by experimenting with other forms. Are existing 
organizations efficient from a factor productivity point of view, or are they mainly 
efficient in channelling part of the economic surplus to a landed aristocracy or to a 
capitalist class? Do work organizations exist to maintain discipline and order or do they 
promote energy and initiative? And, if the former, why? Are they designed to set off 
one group of workers against another to the benefit of the dominant class and to the 
detriment of factor productivity? China may have much to teach us in this regard. 
Work motivation in China has also risen, according to the Maoists, because of an 
increase in socialist consciousness among the masses of workers and peasants, which 
means that collective incentives--thc willingness to work hard for increasingly larger 
groups of people without expectation of personal gain-have gained over individual 
ones. Maoists believe that people arc inspired and can sec real meaning in their lives 
only if they are working for goals worthy of human beings and not merely for their own 
selfish, material welfare. Indeed, people throughout China do seem inspired in this way, 
for whatever reason, and seem not only completely involved in their present accomp-
lishments but in achieving the plans for the future: "ln two years, we'll have this and 
have a good start on that, and then .... " Just about everyone talks this way. 
Further, with regard to work motivation, it is necessary to repeat that increasing 
numbers of people arc able to work bard and more effectively by being more literate, 
having better health and improved nutrition, and having more technical training. 
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Finally, the Chinese Communist Party bas developed high motivation among its 
own cadres to "serve the people" in honest and incorruptible ways. The work motiva-
tion and collective incentives engendered within this large group have been of vital 
importance in getting policies translated into proper actions at all levels, in ways that do 
not dissipate the intentions of policy-makers. The CPC has for several decades now 
demonstrated the importance of having such cadres for the actual realization, as 
contrasted to the verbalization, of national goals. 
China offers other lessons, too, which there is space only to mention: how to adapt 
education to the needs of an industrializing society; that it is not necessary for economic 
development to invite foreign capital into the country; the desirability of maintaining 
rather stable prices of important commodities over long periods of time; and so on. 
The principal lesson, however, is the necessity of breaking out of all dependency 
relationships with advanced industrial countries and pursuing the course of self-
reliancc, both at the national and the local levels. 
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RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ...) 
Throughout the book we have .referred tangentially to the implications of 
the findings for development strategy. In this concluding chapter, we shall try 
to deal with them directly, grouped under three topics. The first topic is the 
rationality of villager behavior and its implications for designing local inter-
ventions. The next topic deals with the selection and assessment of rural 
development programs-if economic growth is a priority goal of rural develop-
ment, what kinds of programs are most likely to succeed? Or should economic 
growth even be the first order of business in rural development? The final topic 
deals with an even broader issue: What role can be assigned to the village in 
the modernization process? 
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AS AN EXPLANATION 
OF VILLAGER BEHAVIOR 
The development administrator typically comes to his task needing two 
sets of tools. One set involves the content of a development sector, whether it be 
agribusiness. preventive medicine, industrial economics, or road engineering. He 
needs expertise in some specific activity that is to be conducted. The second set 
of tools involves the people who are the intended beneficiaries of this develop-
ment; for to be successful, it is almost invariably true that a development input 
must elicit a behavioral response. People must use the new road-or grow the 
new crop, water their fields from the new irrigation canal, or plow with the new 
tractor. Good planning and efficient implementation of rural efforts require 
therefore that the development administrator understand the mainsprings of 
villager behavior. Along with substantive expertise, he must have the tools to 
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incorporate features into the development project that will make it work in the 
context of the rural population he is trying to help. 
In the process of making these plans, however, the development adminis-
trator runs into a major barrier-the visible, tangible differences that separate 
him from the villager. The anthropological legacy on this subject is especially 
rich and intricate-it provides detailed accounts of the often radically variant 
belief systems, economies, social conventions, ceremonies, and eccentricities 
of major and minor ethnic groups around the world. But the very "other-ness" 
of villagers that feeds the anthropologist's interest in village life can be an 
impediment to the development administrator who designs interventions in the 
village during modernization .. The peculiarities and the points of difference tend 
to deflect simple thinking about why villagers behave as they do. 
The deflection is entirely understandable. Villagers are different from 
"us"-meaning modern urban folk-on a variety of dimensions .. The development 
administrator and the villager do in fact live in different material and cultural 
worlds. The modes of communication across those worlds are not as simple or as 
efficient as the ones the development administrator can use with his urban neigh-
bor. Communication breaks down, and misunderstandings are frequent-often 
for no cause that the modern visitor to the village can reasonably ascribe to his 
own behavior. The "we-they" characterization of the relationship between 
modernizer and villager that is so often evident in the literature and in the field 
not only is understandable, but is also in many ways an accurate way to look at 
the relationship. 
Nonetheless, the differences appear to get in the way of the development 
administrator's perceptions of his job. More specifically, the we-they split in 
which the "we" stands in such an obviously superior position technologically 
tends to create in turn a certain condescension when the development adminis-
trator tries to assess the reality behind the villager's viewpoint. 
The most thoroughgoing form of condescension is the assumption that 
villagers-peasants-are so different from you and me in their world view, 
motives, desires, and fears that they are a species apart. They are seen as "be-
nighted," to use the old-fashioned word for it. In this context, the purpose of 
development is conceived as being to pull them out of their ignorance and 
squalor to the level of modern folk. It is a twentieth-<:entury version of the 
"white man's burden." It is also perhaps not as scarce a viewpoint as we would 
like to believe, even if it is not always put so baldly. Foreign-educated elites in 
the developing contries often find this view congenial; so do some Americans. 
The result is a development strategy that does things "for" a rural population. 
The content of the package and how it is to be delivered are decided through the 
wisdom in the capital city. The mode of implementation is management by the 
modernizer with the villagers either wholly uninvolved, or serving as a passive 
source of labor. 
'1--:> ;,....,., 
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A second, less virulent form of condescension is what might be called mis-
directed cultural relativism. The customs and the ethnic peculiaritities of the 
villagers are "accepted," but with 2 kind of tolerance more characteristic of a 
parent's relationship toward a child than the relationship that exists among 
adults who happen to do things differently. The result is a manipulative 
approach. The classic example of this occurs when planners attempt to tie the 
design or implementation of a development project to some local custom. At its 
best, when applied to basic factors like planting cycles, or traditional organiza-
tion of labor, this is a sensible way to approach local implementation. Too often, 
however, it is applied to religious or purely social customs as a way to circum-
vent village resistance. It is tacitly assumed that a cosmetic change will solve the 
problem. The possibility that the villager's resistance is a function of sound 
objections that call for a basic redesign (or cancellation) of the project tends tu 
get short shrift. 
Perhaps the most common form of condescension is the tendency to pay 
lip service to the villagers' good qualities. Westerners and often the local govern-
ment elites in developing countries delight in rediscovering the "shrewdness'' and 
"common sense" of the villager. In Thailand-other countries undoubtedly have 
analogous situations-they enjoy the forays upcountry and the evenings spent 
sipping rice wine with the village elders. They have their favorite headmen, the 
ones who helped them pull off a successful project, of whom they speak with 
admiration. But this amiable approach, like the more detached ones, can get in 
the way of clear thinking about what to do and how to do it in rural develop-
ment. For along with the good headmen are the bad headmen who did not help 
pull off the development official's pet project. Along with the pat on the back 
for the good villager go the lectures and admonitions to the villagers who do not 
come up to expectations. At the higher administrative levels, these occasional 
experiences in the field can lead to stereotypes that have no relationship to 
reality. More insidious, the development administrator in the ministry and the 
organizer on the ground tend to take on in their own minds the roles of sponsor, 
protector, and adviser to "their" villagers. It is a paternal relationship. It has the 
virtues of paternalism, but also the ma_ior defect of encouraging a false sense of 
role and importance by the people on top. A development official can always 
find evidence that he is needed, that these charming, simple people still arc not 
ready to get along on their own. 
Overall, then, an argument can be made that it is easy for development 
planners, implementors, or evaluators to become excessively conscious of the 
differences between villagers and themselves. The exotica of the village setting 
are too distracting from a much simpler proposition, and the one that is 
advanced here: Villagers generally behave rationally. They are no more rational 
than the rest of the world-they, like their urbanized counterparts, do strange 
things on occasion. But it is proposed that typically villagers count costs and 
risks and benefits as thoroughly as they can with the information at hand, and 
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that their decisions generally make sense. The aspects of village life which a 
alien to the outsider's way of behaving may obscure the outsider's perception < 
the calculations at work, but they do not mean that the calculations are n< 
rational ones. 
We have touched on this theme at a number of points in the book. \\ 
have suggested that the basic social behavioral patterns of villagers in premode1 
cultures can be explained as a rational response to reality. When a villager 
living on the ragged edge of survival in an environment of great scarcity, he 
justifiably suspicious of anything that upsets a familiar balance-the mo 
precarious the balance, the more suspicious he is likely to be_ When survival 
not at issue, in an environment like Thailand's, the villager is more open, ar, 
social behavior is more trusting because he has some margin for error, for los 
Despite the wide gap between the social behaviors of a Thai villager and (fl 
example) an Indian one, their behaviors can be seen as sharing a common origii 
the reaction of reasonable people to the objective conditions of their enviro1 
men ts. 
The readiness to adopt innovation draws on the same distinction betwee 
scarcity and "sufficiency" village environments. In the scarcity case, we borro· 
from George Foster's image of limited fPOd to understand the rationality 2 
work: 1 
Peasant societies are ... conservative and backward, brakes on 
national economic progress, [not] because of economic irrationality 
nor because of the absence of psychological characteristics in ade-
quate quantities. They are conservative because individual progress is 
seen as-and in the context of the traditional society in fact is-the 
supreme threat to community stability, and all cultural forms must 
conspire to discourage changes in the status quo .... Show the 
peasant that initiative is profitable, and that it will not be met by 
negative sanction, and he acquires it in short order. 
Decisions to innovate in the sufficiency environment of Thailand were a 
gued to have a parallel rationale. When the extra work involved in taking al 
vantage of free or low-cost resources were not "worth it" in terms of things t 
do and goods to buy, then aspirations remained delimited. When the incentivl 
started to appear, aspirations started to expand, and so also did behaviors t 
realize them. 
Conspicuous rationality was also described as being evident in the chain c 
events that make personal investment competitive with civic investmen· 
Villagers who find their contributions to civic goods becoming more expensiv 
will tend to decrease those contributions. Leaders given a choice between oppo; 
tunities for tangible gains in life quality will pursue them; and as things stam 
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When it comes to decisions about what to do and how as a community, 
Thai villagers in the sample villages are argued to have made plans and carried 
them out with greater efficiency and effectiveness than the government develop-
ment officials attempting the same kinds of projects. The reason was not that 
the government officials were lazy or corrupt or stupid, but that the villagers had 
access to knowledge that the government officials did not have, and took ad-
vantage of it in simple but very sensible ways. 
Finally, when we addressed the question of why government development 
and training inputs appear to be effective in sustaining or raising functional 
capacity, it was again suggested that rational decision-making is at work: Raise 
the job rewards of being a leader, and villagers are more willing to take on the 
job. 
None of these arguments is intended to convey that villagers are espe-
cially virtuous. On the contrary, we contend that they are very ordinary ways for 
people and communities of people to respond to stimuli. And that is precisely 
the point: There is Jess to the we-they distinction in rural development than 
meets the eye. 
The first implication of this view for rural development strategy is simple: 
The administrator should put himself in the villager's place and ask whether he 
as a reasonable man would want to grow that new crop or join the cooperative 
or take that injection given the costs, risks, and benefits involved. The trick, of 
course, is to make sure that the costs, risks, and benefits arc calculated using 
information and experience available to the villager, not to the administrator. 
This points to a second and more important implication: In trying to elicit 
behavioral response from the village there are sharp limits on what should be 
done to change the villager's perceptions of reality without changing the reality 
itself. It was common among the development projects in the 41 villages of the 
sample that villagers chose not to participate in a project because of a lack of 
trust that the promised benefit would actually occur-that by joining the 
farmers' group the villager really would be able to buy fertilizer at cut-rate 
prices, or that the new rice strain would really work in the local soil. It is true 
that one way to deal with this problem is by changing perceptions. The per-
suasiveness of the right publicity is undeniable. The difficulty with this solution 
is that the villager's perceptions are often right to begin with. Governments often 
do not have a good track record of delivering on promises. Implementation even 
of the best programs often breaks down at the local level. In this regard, the 
villager's perception of the odds is likely to be more unflinching than the 
develpment administrator's; among the villages of the sample, very few 
respondents had missed out on a good thing by taking a wait-and-sec attitude 
toward programs that relied on government as5urances about the future. Perspec-
tive can also be a factor. If an administrator can claim success on 80 percent of a 
certain kind of project, he may have reason for satisfaction. But it may also be 
that the individual villager cannot tolerate a 20 percent chance of failure. 
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In short, we are suggesting that when villager resistance to a progr; 
exists, do not redouble the publicity and persuasion efforts, but instead ta 
another look at the real risks and the real costs that the program poses from t 
villager's perspective. Ask whether the answer is to take another whack at 
typical peasant obstinacy or to change the substance of the opportunity tha1 
being offered to him. 
The assumption that villagers behave rationally is bound to be wrong 
some topics in some cultures, as it is sometimes wrong about all populations. 
is also true that the rationality is grounded in the specifics of the local situatic 
and the lessons to be learned from the anthropological and sociological lite 
ture can be essential for any given country. Here, we simply argue that expla 
ing villager behavior is easy-or at least easier-once anomalies in villa1 
behavior are assumed to be a reflection of the observer's ignorance of t 
reality of the village, not a reflection of strange peasant outlooks on reality. F 
the villagers of this study, "rational decision-making" explained the great bulk 
the anomalies, very parsimoniously. 
PROGRAMS AND PRIORITIES 
Village Economic Development 
Increasing villager income is a priority goal, often the priority goal, of ru 
development programs throughout the world. The discussion of "persor 
investment"-in effect, attempts to increase income-and its apparent causes t 
an immediate relevance to this objective. 
If the villager does indeed react in a fashion that is consistent with t 
historical scarcity or sufficiency of his environment, then the obvious first st 
in developing an income-increasing strategy is to ask what kind of environmen1 
model applies to the local situation. 
In the real world, of course, very few nations fall into the extremes 
scarcity or sufficiency. Most countries fall somewhere in between the pol< 
often, the environment varies dramatically in different areas within a countr 
But even if these gradations make it unrealistic to seek for a few "pure" develo 
ment strategies, planners can at least be warned against taking seriously glob 
generalizations about how the peasant mentality constrains their options. Tl 
relevant experiences for a Thai official are those of peasants in parts of Indones 
or Malaysia, or other places with a tradition of independent peasants farmi1 
productive land. He can easily be led astray if he tries to learn from the expc· 
ences among peasants who have been coping with a hostile natural environmc; 
or a feudal tenure system. It is just as dangerous to take the lessons learned t 
modernizing nations at face value as it is to treat each culture as a unique cas 
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(though more fortunate) sufficiency nations that draw the wrong conclusions 
from others' development experiences. 
Exactly what the differences in strategy ought to be is a question that we 
can address only partly_ The scarcity case is not informed by the data in this 
study. One may speculate that a patient, tutorial approach to income-raising 
opportunities is likely to be necessary in the scarcity case. For that villager, 
penalties for being wrong are so great and the perceived risks so high that the 
initial resistance to change may be very stubborn. 
In the Thai case, however, and for some unknown range of sufficiency 
environments, the data in this study point to a shift away from community-level 
economic development efforts and toward general infrastructure development. 
The data for this study have portrayed a village population that is increasing its 
entrepreneurial behaviors dramatically, quite possibly at an exponential rate. But 
these behaviors were not being discernibly affected by the Thai government's 
income-promoting programs at the village level-a finding that, if it holds true. 
should have important effects on the budgets of a number of community-level 
development programs. The logic that is being used to justify substantial 
expenditures and to tie up some thousands of Thai extension workers finds no 
support in the data from these villages. Instead, villager behaviors to increase 
income appear to have followed naturally from additions to rural resources. in 
the form of roads, dams, irrigation, electrification, health services, police 
services, and contact with the modernizing outside world. Give the Thai villager 
exposure to what is available and the opportunities to take advantage of it, and 
rural economic investment will take care of itself-this was the consistent lesson 
among the villages in the sample. 
Another implied alteration in strategy, and one that is applicable to both 
the scarcity and sufficiency cases. involves the framework for assessing the 
success or failure of local economic development programs. The most commonly 
used measures of program success are what might be called "input verification"--
number of bags of fertilizer distributed, number of villages visited by the mohilc-
development unit, number of village reservoirs built, and so on. For the 41 
villages of this study, these measures would have produced an image of a high 
level of income-raising inputs. Because the ultimate measure of success-a real 
increase in villager income over time-is exceedingly difficult to measure at the 
micro level, a common next step in the analysis is to compare the high level of 
local income-raising inputs with macroeconomic measures of agricultural 
product. If gross agricultural product is rising (as it is in Thailand), the best guess 
of the evaluator has to be that a causal relationship is at work. Certainly there 
are no grounds for claiming that none exists. 
The kinds of behavior we classified as "personal investment" indicators 
provide an intermediate outcome measure for assessing whether that inference is 
tenable. The use of it has three strengths. The data can be collected inexpen-
sively at the micro level: Data for the six indicators in the index we used could be 
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collected in an hour's visit to a village. The d;ita are objective: Three of the six 
indicators in our index employed observational data;a fourth can be determined 
by looking at existing records; none of the six requires a subjective judgment. 
Most importantly, the data provide a genuine "outcome" measure that tests 
whether the logic behind the input is being borne out. The same indicators 
cannot be used interchangeably among countries, but the concept would seem to 
apply everywhere .2 
The Question of Priorities 
The preceding discussion was based on the assumption that income groW1h 
in rural areas is the top priority. But the scarcity/sufficiency issue also raises the 
question of whether it should be so. Unqeuestionably, an India faced with the 
prospect of massive food shortages and perhaps famine must think first about 
economics. But do countries with sufficiency cultures have to make higher 
villager income their top priority objective in rural development? At least in the 
Thai case, it is by no means clear that poverty holds first place among the many 
sectors in which village life is deficient. 
Compared to Western standards of living, of course, Thai villagers are poor, 
and villagers would welcome a higher economic standard of living. But if the 
question is how village life can best be improved, answers other than higher 
income come to mind. Better health care is one-for every case of malnutrition 
caused by poverty, how many are caused by ignorance about nutrition? For 
every infant death caused by poverty, how many are caused by lack of prenatal 
and post natal care? 
Or if economics are to be given priority, is growth or distribution the more 
important sector? Two of the great advantages that Thailand brought to the 
advent of modernization were its high proportion of independent landholders and 
its low population relative to arable land. A case could be made that Thailand's 
development resources should be focused not on increasing its rural wealth, but 
on population control and measures to protect the villager from losing his land. 
"Way of life" is another potential competitor with economics, though it is 
seldom perceived as such by development planners. It happens that the Thai 
people in general, urban and rural alike, believe that they possess certain 
approaches to life and personal relationships that are superior to other ap-
proaches. Among the Thai elite, there is no conscious intention to let moderni-
zation destroy these patterns. In view of this, why not treat the nourishment or 
adaptation of them as a subject to be considered in designing development 
strategy? It would be an unusual approach for a country to take; it is by no 
means a nonsensical one. 
Other needs in Thailand could be identified that compete with economic 
groW1h for attention. Presumably similar examples could be cited in other 
"-' c/::>. 
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sufficiency cultures. The point is that although there are few things worse than 
starving, there are many things worse than being "poor" in the sense that most 
Thai villagers are poor. The governments of sufficiency cultures, like the govern-
ments of other developing countries, do not have the resources to give every 
problem the attention it deserves. What does set the sufficiency nations apart is 
the luxury they enjoy of being able to choose priorities on some other basis than 
the simple physical survival of their populations. In the Thai case, it is a luxury 
that has not been recognized_ 
We are not suggesting that a developing nation deliberately avoid economic 
growth or higher income for villagers_ There is no intention of arguing that 
villagers ought to be guarded from the evils of Western materialism, still less that 
it would be possible to do so. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that villager 
efforts to increase income have a life of their own once villager incentives have 
been activated, regardless of further government encouragement. A pragmatic 
argument against concentrating rural development resources on economic growth 
could be made on these grounds alone. Why spend scarce resources to encourage 
a phenomenon that seems to be accelerating anyway? But that stance misses the 
more important possibility that, for a country like Thailand, rural economic 
growth might rank well below the top in a rational list of priorities. 
THE USES OF THE VILLAGE 
The village is not in favor among development planners. Sometimes it 1s 
criticized as being anachronistic, or too small to serve as an effective unit of 
administration, or too poor in resources. More often, as we discussed at the out-
set of the book, the village is simply overlooked. Its deficiencies as a tool for 
modernization are assumed. In contrast to this backdrop are two of the key con-
clusions of this study: that Thai villages possess or are able to acquire a sclf-
governing capacity that is equal to a wide range of tasks, and that unless some-
thing is done about it that capacity will deteriorate as modernization continues. 
The underlying question is how the village fits into the structure of the 
nation-state that each less developed country is struggling to build. Is it assumed 
that the eventual product will be an urbanized society similar to those of the 
West? Is the village a unit to be deliberately discarded as soon as possible. or 
allowed to atrophy as nature takes its course, or deliberately sustained through 
government policy? 
These questions do not permit prescriptive answers; they are among the 
most intensely individual to each country. In the scarcity case, when something 
on the order of an amoral-familism moral code has become deeply rooted, it 
may be futile to try to work through traditional local institutions. Perhaps 
centralization or reorganization of the countryside is the best approach. 13ut 
what is characteristic of local government in the scarcity environment is not 
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necessarily true of local government in the sufficiency environment, as the dis 
cussion of functional capacity in Thai villages sought to demonstrate. Thes1 
comments based on the Thai case appear to be in order. 
The first conclusion, that Thai villages show a remarkable latent ability tc 
take care of their own affairs, has implications at two levels. On the operationa· 
level, it suggests that developing nations look to the possibility of pushing more 
responsibility out the end of the administrative structure, to the village. 
Implementation of small-input local development projects is an obvious 
use of the village. Too often, village participation in these projects has been 
justified in terms of its psychological or public relations effects-the common 
(and patronizing) rationale is that the villagers arc more likely to use the input if 
they feel they have a stake in it. The tendency has therefore been to limit the 
village's real control over the managerial tasks to cosmetic levels. Symbolic 
decision-making roles plus the contribution of the village's labor have been 
thought to be adequate for generating the desired sense of ownership. The data 
from the sample villages point to the far-reaching possibility that real village 
control is the best way to get the job done right. If we use the most unsenti-
mental of indices-cost control, appropriateness of design, efficiency in imple-
mentation and maintenance-the evidence that the village does better than the 
government on small-input local development deserves much closer examination 
in the Thai case, and perhaps elsewhere. Even if the village is found to do only 
"as well" as the government, the possibilities for reducing the existing drain on 
the government's limited manpower resources are obvious. 
But beyond using the village to manage its own projects, developing 
nations sLould look more closely at questions about where to locate police 
powers, juridical authority, tax collection and disbursement, and the other gov-
ernmental functions that are so widely being arrogated to centralized bureaucra-
cies that are undermanned, underskilled, and too often undermotivated. How 
long will it be, for example, before the Thai court system can provide the same 
judicial services to villages that village leaders now provide? More importantly, 
should it try to do so? Or is it instead desirable to look for ways to adapt and 
bolster the traditional system already in place? 
As we have attempted to show throughout the study, there are good 
reasons for considering the latter course_ What it amounts to is a reevaluation of 
the proper structural goals for the government of a developing country_ Unfor-
tunately, the widespread identification of nationbuilding with the development 
of centralized and national institutions makes this reevaluation especially diffi-
cult. In theory, there is no contradiction between delegating substantial author-
ity to local government and at the same time developing national institutions. 
But at least among Thai officials and, for that matter, among most scholars in 
the field of political development, even limited autonomy in the hinterlands is 
seen as being a hallmark of the premodern state. In historical perspective, that 
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modern or oesirable. The proposition is that the village is inherently in a better 
position than the central government to perform certain important tasks of 
governance, sometimes alone and sometimes in tandem with support services 
from the district and provincial levels. It is this possibility that makes the 
prospective deterioration of the village's functional capacity a potentially tragic 
consequence. 
Even on a pragmatic level, the deterioration would be costly. In the Thai 
case, there were at the beginning of the 1970s some 43,000 villages with some 
30 million people living in them. For the foreseeable future, the Thai govern-
ment will not be ready to take on the burden of the de facto services now pro-
vided by those communities to their inhabitants. Insofar as deterioration in 
functional capacity takes place, those services will go unprovided. And insofar as 
they are not provived, it will mean fundamental deterioration in the quality of a 
villager's life for some extended period of time. It is hard to accept that this 
must be part of a "successful" modernization process. It is even harder to accept 
in view of the evidence that public policy designed to enrich the content of 
village government may be effective in halting or even reversing the tendency to 
deterioration. 
This is the pragmatic argumerit, based on the exigencies facing moderniz-
ing governments whose administrative ambitions outreach their current capacity. 
But perhaps the long-range possibilities for building upon the village as a base 
should be engaging the attention of development planners. It seems particu-
larly appropriate at this particular point in history that a country like Thailand 
look to its villages as a continuing focal point for self-government. There is no 
good reason to acquiesce reflexively in the consolidation of authority at the 
center at the same time when we in the West are casting about for ways to 
decentralize units of government that have grown too large and unresponsive, 
and at the same moment when communications and information technology are 
creating possibilities for combining centralized resources with local authority. 
The developing countries bear a number of costs for modernizing after the 
West. If there is any advantage in modernizing late, it should be in the possibili-
ties for learning from the West's experience and for traveling on a somewhat 
straighter course to points that the West is approaching very circuitously. In 
assessing its village heritage, a developing country should consider whether it is 
seeing only its society as it has been or also a latent image of what its society 
might wish to become. 
NOTES 
I. George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," American 
Anthropologist 6 7 (1965): 310. Emphasis added. 
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2. The use of investment as an indicator of development impact and an application of 
the theory to the Thai context is described in Robert E. Krug, Paul A. Schwarz, and 
Suchitra Bhakdi, "Measuring Village Commitment to Development," in Values in 
Development: Appraising Asian Experience, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and 




The participants will: 
1. Compare and contrast two cases about rural development and 
recognize the perspectives from which each was written. 
2. Understand the concepts behind Kalb's experiential learning 
model. 
3. Discuss the limitations of the model and its applicability. 
4. Apply the concept of learning styles to assess their 
participation in the debate. 
Activities 
1. Debate on two cases. (1 and 1/2 hours) 
a) allow each side ten minutes to develop strategy. 
b) opening statements. 
c) have external evaluators to determine winner? 
2. Break 
3. Lecture - Experiential Learning Theory 
(15 min) 
(30 min) 
4. Triads (30 min) 
Task - Discuss role taken in the debate. How was your 
particular learning style demonstrated in the debate? Were 
you silently observing, actively participating? What aspects 
did other people consider in the two cases that you had not? 
How do you think your learning style affects what you learn? 




1. Letham, Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance. 
2. Lacroix, Integrated Rural Development in Latin America. 
3. Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid. 
4. Hildebrand, "The Sondeo Approach." 
5. Marcotte, "Farming Systems Research." 
6. Chambers, chapter 5, 103-139. 
2. Task for the week: 
List ten people whom you tend to mistrust. Choose on of 
these and engage in activities with him or her to raise the 
level of trust between you and that person. 
3. Write: 
In 3 to 5 pages discuss what strategies you used to 
establish trust and the problems you encountered with the 
person and with yourself. Relate this to the readings by 
analysing what assumptions the strategies of Lacroix, 
Hilderbrand, Marcotte and Chambers make about the 
establishment of trust in their approaches. 
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SUMMARY 
Mul1itlisciplinari· ugric11l11.ral research f<'illlls cu11 u11gl1Ji'nf i11/ornw1io11 011 
ogric11l11iral tc·ch11olng_1· lll'l'.l'. In C11atc·111a/11 a r<'!'!//1naissanu· .rnrvcy f<'0/11 o( tl'n. 
equally .1p!i1 he/ween .wcio-<'conomi.1·1s and 1echnologis1s, has heen t1sed 10 asses.1· 
farmer cons/rain!s and 1eclinology needs in advance of agriculiural research. 
Quanlijied informa1ion and !/t1es1ionnaires are no/ required and 1hc survey Iasis only 
one week. The !cam investigated farmer conditions in pairs made up of a social 
scicn1is1 and d nalural scienlist. On each of four days the pairing changes. Daily post-
survcy /cam discussions are r<:gardcd as cssenl ial. Each member of the team prepares 
a report and these are .finally amalgamated into one joint repor!. Experience has 
shown that comhined disciplines can, 1/ \\'ell managed, produce incisive and efficienl 
diagnoses of rural conditions and needs and educate the participants in 
multidisciplinary 1hinking. 
INTRODUCTION 
Several characteristics are cr:tical to an efficient and functioning multidisciplinary 
effort: first, those concerned must be well trained in their own field: secondly, they 
need a working understanding of-and must not be afraid to make contributions 
in--0ne or more other field:.. Team members must not feel the need to defend 
themselves and their field fro111 intrusion by others. Working together, all members 
of the team should view the final product as a joint e!Tort in which all have 
participated and for which all are equally responsible. That means that each must be 
•Formerly Agricultural Economu. The Rockefeller Foundation, assiiJlcd as Co.:Ordinador de 
Sociocconomia Rural, lnsliluto de Ciencia y Tcchnologia Agricolas. lCTA, Guatemala. 
42) 
Agricu/1ural Administration 0309-58~Xl8ll0008-0423/S02·50 (!)Applied Science Publishers Ltd, England. 
1981 
Printed in Great Britain 
\ 
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satisfied with the pr,·,duct. given the goals of the team. and be willing and abk to 
defend it. ~ 
Perhaps the mdst critical characteristic required to achieve success in a 
multidisciplinary team is this identification with a single product in which all 
participate. The product can be complex and involve a number of facets but it sh:rnld 
result from the joint effort of the whole team and not contain strictly identifi.,ble 
parts attributable to individual team members. Failures of multidisciplinary efforts 
in agricultural institutions frequently result because teams are organised as 
committees that meet occasionally to 'co-ordinate' efforts, but in which the crop 
work is left to the agronomists, the survey to the anthropologists and the desks to the 
economists. In these cases there is not a single identified product but, rather, several 
products or reports purported to be concerned with the same problem. 
·1 FAM Er-FORTS IN AGRIC\11.TURAL INSTITUTI'_<; 
In the genera ti on of i;nproved agricu I tur~il technology for small traditional farn;ers, 
;i\I rnultidiscirlin;1ry team members must be oriented towards and identified with 
·technology' ;1s the ·rroduct' of the te;1m (normally just the agronomists or an!1;~al 
scientists identify with the product). All must be willing to consider a wide rang~ of 
v;1riables and constraints and not leave these worries only to the anthropologists or 
sociologists. Further, all members must be willing to spend some desk time 
considering alternatives and their consequences on the clients' goals and not leave tJis 
just to the economists. The agronomists should be capable and willing to criticise the 
economic or social aspects of the work, and the social scientists, the agronomic 
aspects. In turn. these criticisms should be used to improve the product so that all 
can be satisfied witl1 the final result. 
In most agricultural institutes agronomists (who usually greatly outnumber the 
social scientists) are concerned about too much influence from the socioeconomic 
group in work at the farm level. This is manifest in resistu.nce by agronomists to 
identifying too closely with the farmers (even with those on whose land they conduct 
trials). It also surfaces with respect to the evaluation of technology. The agrono1.~:st 
is much more comfortable if a final evaluation follows the farm trial phase of the 
work where he. himself, makes the evaluation. The agronomist, then, decides if a 
technology is 'good'. If, later, the farmer evaluates this 'good' technology and d.:x:s 
not accept it, the agronomist considers it a problem for the extension service, or of 
poor infrastructure. of low prices, or of lack of initiative on the part of the farn:er 
himself, but not a problem for the agronomist, who has produced what he considers 
to be a 'good' product. In this situation. evaluation by the farmer is equated with 
influence by socioeconomists, who dare ask the farmer his opinion and who woJld 
tend to take into consideration more variables, including the present weaknesses in 
infrastructure, the price level, the farmers' capabilities, etc., in the development uf a 
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technology SO th;Lt the rroduct or the tc;1m's efforts COuJd be LISed immediately 
without the need to await the development or other ra~ets of the sector. 
THE SONDE(/: t\ TEAM RAPID SlJRVl:Y Al'l'IHlt\Cll 
The Sondeo is a modified suryey technique develorcd by the Guatemalan Institute 
of Agricultural Science and Technology, JCT A. as a response to budget restrictions. 
time requirements and the other methodology utilised. to augment information in a 
region where ;1gncultural technology generation ;md promotion is being initiated. 
In order to understand the 1:1ethodology. it is first necessary to understand how 
ICTA is org<rnised at the regi,J;ial level. Each of the regions in which the Institute 
functions has a Regional Director who is the representative of the Director General 
of the Institute and of the Technical Director. Within the region. each area in which 
work is being c;1rried out is in charge or ;i 'Sub-regio1ul dclcg;1Le'. ;i tech11iei;i11 who 
has a minimum amount of administrative responsibilities. All the technicians, from 
whatever discirlinc or rrogramrnc. who work in the ;1re:1. arc rcsronsiblc to him. 
This multidisciplinary team is usually comprised of >Orne or all of the following: 
plant breeders. pathologists. a socioeconomist and approximately four general 
agronomists who are the Technology Testing Team This group, backed up by the 
national Co-ordinators of Programmes (corn, beans. etc.) and Support Disciplines 
(socioeconomics, soi I management) are responsible for orienting and conducting the 
generation and promotion of technology in the area. The work includes basic plant 
breeding and/or selection on the (usually small) experiment station in the area, farm 
trials, tests by farmers of promising technology, evaluation of the acceptability of 
the technology tested by farmers and economic production or farm records 
maintained by farmers with ti1e help of the technicians. In order to provide the 
original oriel)tation to the team. the Sondeo. or reconnaissance survey, is conducted 
by members of the Technology Testing Team who are going to work in the area, 
sometimes personnel from an appropriate Programme, and a team from 
socioeconomics comprised of one or more of the following: anthropologists. 
sociologists, economists, agricultural economists and/or engineers. Usually, there 
are five people from socioeconomics and five from the Technology Testing Team 
who form a ten-man Sohdeo team for an area. 
The purpose of the Sondeo is to provide the information required to orient the 
work of the technology generating team. The cropping or farming systems are 
described, the agro-socioecon0mic situation of the farmers is determined and the 
restrictions they face arc defined so that any proposed modifications of their present 
technology are appropriate to their conditions. 
If ICT A is to work in an area that is not previously defined, such as by the bounds 
of a land settlement or an irrigation project, one of the objectives of the Sondeo is lo 
delimit the area. This is done by first selecting the predominant cropping or farming 
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system used by potential target !'armers in the <trea and later determining the area i:1 
which this system is important. The reason that an homogeneous traditional or 
pn.:sc11I cruppi11g ur hrn1i11g systc111 is used is th:1t it is this system th:1t ICTi\ will k 
modii'ying with rn.:w \lr improved technology. Hcncc. having a well dclincd. 
homogencous system with which to work simplilies the procedure or generating anJ 
promoting technology. The premise on which the selection or an homogencOll\ 
cropping or farming system is based is that all the farmers who presently use it havr 
made similar adjustments to a set or rcstrictions which they all face and. since they 
made the same adjuotments. they must all be facing the same set of agro· 
socioeconomic conditi.:ins 
As well dS delimiting the drea of this homogeneous system, the tasks of the Sondeo 
team are to discover wl~at agro-socioeconomic conditions all the farmers who us~ 
the system have in con .• non and then to identify which are the most important ir. 
determining the present system ;ind therefore would be the most important to 
consider in any modifications to be made by the team in future. Finally, the enJ 
product of the Sondeo is to orient the first year's work in farm trials and variety 
selection. It also serves to locate future collaborators for the farm trials and for the 
farm record projects. 
Because the farm trials are conducted under farm conditions, during the first yec.r 
they provide an additi0nal learning process into the conditions that affect th-: 
farmers and are invaluable in acquainting the technicians with the realities of 
farming in the area. The farm records-which are also initiated in the first year-
provide quantifiable technical and cost information on the technology being used by 
the farmers. At the end of the first year's work, then, the technicians have not only 
been farming under the conditions of the farmers in the area, but they also have the 
information from the farm record project. For this reason, it is not necessary to 
obtain quantifiable information in the Sondeo, which is not a benchmark study. 
Quantifiable information for impact evaluation in the area is available from farm 
records which increase in value each year. 
THE SONDEO PROCEDURE 
The primary purpose uf the Sondeo, then, is to acquaint the technicians with th~ 
area in which they are going to work. Because quantifiable information is not 
needed, the Sondeo can be conducted rapidly and no lengthy analyses of data are 
required following the survey in order to interpret the findings. No questionnair~s 
are used so farmers are interviewed in an informal manner which does not alienate 
them. At the same time, the use of a multidisciplinary team serves to provide 
information from many different points of view simultaneously. Depending on th<! 
size, complexity and accessibility of the area, the Sondeo should be completed in 
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studied in this period of time. The following is a description of the methodology for a 
six-day operation. 
Day 1 
The first day is a general reconnaissance of the area by the whole team as a unit. 
The team must make a preliminary determination of the most important cropping 
or farming system th<it will serve as the key system. become acquainted in general 
terms with the area and begin to search out the limits to the homogeneous system. 
Following each discussion with a farmer. the group meets out of sight of the farmer 
to discuss each one's interpretation of the interview. In this way, the team members 
begin to become acquainted with ;1ow each other thinks. Interviews with farmers (or 
other people in the area) should be very general and wide ranging because the team is 
exploring and scarchingjiJr an un/.:nown numher ofun/.:no1rn elements. (This does not 
imply. of course. that the interviews lack orientation) The contribution or point of 
view of each discipline is critical throughout the Sondeo because the team does not 
know beforehand what type of problems or restrictions may be encountered. The 
more disciplines that are brought to bear on the situation. the greater is the 
probability of encountering the factors which are. in fact. the most critical to the 
farmers of the area. It has been established th~1t these restrictions can be agro-
climatic. economic or socio-cultural. Hence. all disciplines make equal contri-
butions to the Sondeo. 
Day 2 
The interviewing and general reconnaissance of the first day serve to guide the work 
of the second day. Teams are made up of pairs: one agronomist or animal scientist 
from the Technology Testing Team and one person from socioeconomics who 
work together in the interviews. T:-ie five teams scatter throughout the area and meet 
again either after the tirst half-day (for small areas or areas with good access roads) 
or day (for larger areas or where access is difficult and requires more time for travel). 
Each member of each team discusses what was learned during the interviews and 
tentative hypotheses are formed to help explain the situation in the area. Any 
information concerning the limits of the area are also discussed to help in its 
delimitation. The tentative hypotheses or doubts raised during the discussion serve 
as guides to the following interview sessions. During the team discussions. each of 
the members learns how interpretations from other points of view can be important 
in understanding the problems of the farmers of the region. 
Following the discussion, the team pairs are changed to maximise in-
terdisciplinary interaction and minimise interviewer bias and they return lo the field 
guided by the previous discussion. Once again, following the half-day's or day's 
interviews, the group meets to discuss the findings. 
The importance of these discussions following a series of interviews cannot be 
over-stressed. Together, the group begins to understand the relationships 
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encountered in the region, delimits the zone and starts to define the type of rese;.reh Di. 
that is going to be necessary to help improve the technology of the farmers. O<her 
problems-such as marketing-are also discussed and, if solutions are required, co 1 
relevant entities can be notified. It is important to understand the effect that these on 
other limitations will have. if not corrected. on the type of technology to be bo 
developed so that they can be taken into account in the generation process. she 
During the second day there should be a notable convergence of opinion and a 
corresponding narrowing of interview topics. In this way, more depth can be mt 
acquired in following days on the topics or increasing interest. Ft; 
sh· 
n111·3 th• 
This is a repeat o( day 2 and a lw;t ys 1 ncl udes a change in the makeup of the le .1ms 
;11'ter c;1ch discussio'n At le;1st ;1 minimum of four interview-discussion cycles is 
nccess;1ry to complete this part or the Sondeo. Ii' the area is not too complex, these 
cycles should be adequate. Of course. if the area is so large that a full day is required 
!'or interviewing between each discussion session.then four full days are required for Tc 
this part of the Sondeo. wr 
thi 
Duy 4 Jil 
Before the teams return to the field for more interviews on the fourth day, cach he 
member is assigned ;1 portion or section of the report that is to be written. T~.en. or 
knowing for the first time for what topic each will be responsible, the te;::ms, 01 
regrouped in the fifth combination. return to the field for more interviewing. for ot 
smaller areas, this also is a half day. In the other half day, and following ancther hu 
discussion session, the group begins to write the report of the Sondeo. All members da 
should be working at the same location so that they can circulate freely and di::;cuss de 
points with each other. For example, an agronomist who was assigned the secti0.1 on ju: 
maize technology may have been discussing a key point with an anthropologist and 
needs to refresh his memory about what a particular farmer said in a brief discussion ar· 
with him. In this manner the interaction among the disciplines continues. fo 
ar 
Day 5 Cl 
As the technician3 are writing the report, they invariably encounter point~ for 
which neither they nor others in the group have answers. The only remedy is lo Pr 
return to the field on the morning of the fifth day lo fill in the gaps found the 'day 
before. A half day can be devoted lo this activity, together with finishing the writing 
of the main body of the report. H 
In the afternoon of this day, each team member reads his written report tu the 
group for discussion, editing and approval. The report should be read from the in 
beginning just as it will be when finished. As a group, the team should approve ar 
and/or modify what is presented. ar 
. <I 
•· t l, 






COMlllNIN(; DISCll'LINL'> IN RAPID Al'l'RAISAL: TllE SONDEO Al'l'ROACll 429 
Dny ti 
The report is read once again and. following the reading of each section. 
conclusions are drawn and recorded. When this is finished. the conclusions are read 
once again for approval and specific recommendations are then made and recorded 
both for the team who will be working in the area and for any other agencies that 
should be involved in the general development process of the zone . 
The product of the sixth day is a single report generated and authored by the entire 
multidisciplinary team and should be supported by all of the members. 
Furthermore, after participating for all six days with each other. each member 
should be able to defend all ~he points of view discussed, the conclusions drawn and 
the recommendations made. 
these THE REPORT 
uired 
d for To a certain extent, the report of the Sondeo is of secondary value because it has been 
written by the same team that will be working in the area. Most of its value lies just in 
the fact that they have written it. By being forced into a situation where many 
different points of view had to be taken into consideration and coalesced, the 
each horizons of all will have bten greatly amplified. Further, the report can serve as 
"hen, orientation for non-participants, such as the Regional Director or the Technical 
ams, Director, in discussing the merits of various courses of action. However, it is also 
For obvious that the report will appear to be one written by ten different persons in a 
Hher hurry, which isjusl exactly what it is 1 It is not a benchmark study with quantifiable 
ibers data that can be used in the future for project evaluation; rather, it is a working 
;cuss document to orient the research programme and that served one basic function in 
m on just being written. 
: and The exact format and content of a report of a Sondeo will vary according to the 
;sion area being studied and the nature of the crops or livestock enterprises included. The 
s for 
following is a brief description of an outline of a report recently completed in one 
area of Guatemala where grains and vegetables were of primary. interest (see 
Chinchilla 1). 
is to Purpose 
:·day Describes the reason the Sonedo was undertaken and the dates. 
·iting 
Homogeneous technology 
o the Describes the principal characteristics of the technology regarding the crops of 
ri the interest found within the limits of the area and the important differences outside the 
>rove area that changed the nature of the cropping system and defined the limits of the 
area. 
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Description of the delimited area 
Geographical Lmits. altitude. soils and other important features, including :i map 
drawn with the boundaries as precise as possible. 
Land 
Land tenure and farm size were important restrictions in the cropping syste:n and 
were described. : 
Labour 
General labour availability and periods of scarcity and the specia' tasks 
performed by women in the homogeneous system were described. 
Capital 
The capital Aow in the traditional system which provides the funds for inves'.ing in 
both the basic grains and the vegetables was described and the poor functioLing of 
the small farm credit system was noted. 
Corn 
The most important components of the corn production system were des;:ribed. 
Beans 
The role beans play in the system and their lack of general importar:;:e was 
discussed. 
Vegetables 
The production system and the marketing of vegetables were described. 
Livestock activity 
The special importance of livestock and of the livestoclc-crop interaction was 
discussed. 
Conclusions 
Conclusions for each of the above sections were drawn with special emphasis on 
their meaning to the future work of ICTA. 
Recommendations 
Those relevant to !CT A and to other organisations in the public agricultural 
sector as well as the private sector. 
Because one of the principal purposes of the Sondeo is to guide the efforts of the 
resident Technology Generating Team, some of the important recommendations 
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the type of technology which will be included in the farm trials and requested from 
the experiment station in support of farm trials. Specific treatments to be included 
and the cxrcrimcnt;il designs lo be used arc generally left to the team members and 
the national Programme <ind Discipline Co-ordinators to determine. 
( l) Maize is the most important subsistence crop in the area. The farmers tend to 
think in terms of a fixed minimum quantity required for the family and the animals. 
Because of the competition of the vegetables for labour and capital, low technology 
. . . I . . . . . 
1s used 111 the maize and, frequently, land 1s substituted. This must be considered in 
the mix of technology generated. 
(2) Cropping systems must be devised that rotate or intercrop vegetables with 
maize, but not at the cost of1educing maize production. It is also necessary in these 
systems to realise that most of the capital and labour will be utilised on the vegetables 
and not on the maize. 
(3) Jn vegetable technology, priority should be given to disease control and 
fertilisation. 
(4) Even though beans are an important subsistence crop, given the importance of 
vegetables and the shortages of funds for research, it is recommended that little 
emphasis be given to beans in this area at the present time. 
(5) Because of problems with the small farm credit programme, it is recommended 
that the technology to be generated should not be based on the hope of such a 
programme in the short run 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The disciplinary speciality of each member of the Sondeo team is not critical so long 
as there are several disciplines represented, and, if the Sondeo is in agriculture. a 
significant number of them are agriculturalists. At least some of these should also be 
Alas from among those who will be working in the area in the future. The discipline of the 
Co-ordinator of the Sonedo is probably not critical, either, if he is a person with a 
broad capability, an understanding of agriculture (if it is an agricultural So.ndeo) 
and experience in surveying and survey technique. However, the Co-ordinator must 
on have a high degree of mulridisciplinary tolerance and be able to interact with all the 
other disciplines represented on the team. 
The Co-ordinator, in a sense, is an orchestra director who must assure' that 
everyone contributes to the tur1e but that, in the final product, all are in harmony. He 
iral must control the group and maintain discipline. He arbitrates differences, creates 
enthusiasm. extracts hypotheses and thoughts from each participant and ultimately 
the will be the one who coalesces the product into the final form. It is perhaps not 
ons essential that he has prior experience in a Sondeo, but it would certainly improve his 
1ide efficiency if he had. 
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SUMMARY 
Despile ejforis of !he 1960s and 1970s, such as capital and technology /rans/er 
and high yielding varie1ies of lhe Green Revolu1ion. undesirablt· social and 
f_Conomic changes persist and in mos/ cases have accelera·t~d. One of 1hc 
current merhodolo!;ical approaches Iv anaty2ing and solving agricultural 
prohlems, farming systems research. i.\ l't1cou11teri11x the santt' frustration.\ 
and lack <!{SUC<'t'.\.\ U.\ II.\ 1hn1r('tital fOfl'fWll/Cr.\. ii I.\ 1hc CO/l[('l/f/Ull of th/.\ 
fhlfltT that unleJ.\ FSR '·' arf/( u/aJt•d 'H"ith if.\ puli1ical <'.~·<!1101111 and un 
e11fI;htt'1u·d 1w1tonal .. ax:il:i~/!~ff~?.. po(icy cfc:~·/Fncd tt ith ~:~it 11 di 11111 
\U("(1't'd -~:~-
INTR.ODUCTION 
With the onsel of 1lw 198(h decade came the increasing realization that 
world food securily needs were not being met. Despilc the increased 
agricullural production accompanying the much acclaimed capital and tech-
nology transfer programs of the 1960s and the high-yield plan I breeding of the 
Green Re\'Olution in lhc 1970s, undesirable social and economic changes 
persist and in most case_~_ha_ve __ <!~lerated. These programs have hcen 
associa1cd wi1h ·r;::;:~a"iiT<lisplacement, ~gJ;;ised.scale thresholds beyond 1he 
reach of self-sullicicnl farmers, and l'yrther ine~itablc distribution of 
~illth. In many counlries farmers left the land due t-;;-~-n-inahility to make 
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were made l<rndless farm laborers as high-tech, capital-intensive agricultural 
production expanded both in scale and market dominance. Furthermore, in 
many instances, increased yields either have no! kept pace wilh population 
growth, which has contributed to declines in pcr__C!!P.iJfl_ a_gricul~ral 
pr()duct_0n, or were ~()_t<:li~t_ri~uti;d t() hungry and even starving populations 
via the marketplace or international relief efforts. That there is continued 
poverty and ~~~~i~.ti()n b.egs the ~a_sc; fo_!_i!_ .critical loqk at the 
international agricultural development strategies and their articulation with 
exis!i~£-r§0:1cal ~concimies. . - . - .. 
Concurrent with this realization was the advent of a new buuword and 
methodological approach 10 analyzing agricultural problems: farming 
systems research ( FSR). (Theoreticall}') the incorporation of small, self-
suflicicnt farmers into a hollQ__~ategy combined with the modern 
technological research centers of national .;gricultural systems (NAS) would 
provide heretofore undiscovered directions for solving the problems. 
In this paper, it is argued that FSR, ~ makiOEslaim~_()_f_be~n_g_holistic;' 
ignores the Jl..Q.J.i!ical~Qn()rn.Y _and clas~s_t!ucture within which recommen-
dations are made, and therefore, fails tl) acc(;u;;·1 r;;;:-·the-ci:lnsiderahle 
disarticula1ion--bei-we-~n_th('. r_ealities of the politic-~I economy and the 
produ_ction goals ofon-farm FSR research. In short, FSR proponents fail to 
take into consideration the international, regional, and naliona~nd 
fiscal policies that militate against their recommendations. Furthermore. 
given the closed systemic character of FSR models, such consideration is 
problematic. It is proposed then. that this failure to consider critical 
exogenous factors is in par! !he product of FSR 's theoretical heritage in 
'svs1cms' and functionalist an;1lvscs. 
D1.wrun"a1im1 1l /'SR ~:ith national arncullural s_rJ1en1J 77 
Agricultural Research Centers. the historical and intellectual limitations of 
FSR's forerunners have been incorporated into its methodolog!cal 7 
approach. ~ __.,.,..,~it·r, .~H.., , 
Another critique is that o~n which the scientistic approach to 
problem selection and solving 1s analyzed. It is argued that the individual 
problem-so~in[_ tc~n_iq~es ~nd ap_J2r~a£_h~s heretofore selected have 
inadequately considered the resource, political, and socio-economic 
~vironments within which the ~s (aiidSOiutjons) occur. 
It is our contention that a complete understanding of these criticisms first 
requires a discussion of the theoretical framework from which FSR 
emerged. The remainder of this section will examine the conceptual origins 
of FSR as a means for analyzing its theoretical and consequently its 
practical limitations. 
According to its proponents, FSR, as an approach to agricultural research 
and development,· ... views the whole f~nn as a system and focuses on (I) the 
interdependencies between the components under the control of members of 
the farm household and (2) how these components interact with the physical, 
hiological. and socioeconomic factors~ under the household's.cOnlrol' 
(p. I 3). 21 Its primary aim is to increase the productivity Oltfie farming system 
through improvement and development of relevant technology and 
complementary governmental policies. An implicit assumption is that in 
so~spccified manner the developed alternative technologies will 
increase total productivity and that such increases, in turn, will yield a 
corresponding increase in wealth, most. if not all, of which will be retained hy 
the producer. ---:~---·--=~ 
I 1 "co11cluded 1h"1 u11less the in lcrcsls of those al !he ho11om of rurcil S(lci;1I 
s1ruuures. for which !·SR. programs have hcen designed. arc consis1e111 with 
the class 1n1cres1' ol 1lwsc rna~ing 11;111011;11 policv decisions. disarl1cula1io11 
"ill occur cat1'lllt'. JSR. 10 e\c111u;illv Lid 10 rnccl i1s objeclJ\·c, 
Whik the political hcrita[!c of FSR ha' hccn discussed 1'·1-' the thcnrc1ical 
hni1agc remains 10 be cxplic<JICd. Among the social sCJL'llCL",. lh1' her11;1gc" 
firmly anchored 111 the as'11111p1ions of func1ion,tlism. which has its rools in 
the vcork nf Emik Durkhe1111 
~( 
\.f-. .,_,, 
TIJ EUR.U !CAL PLACEMENT 01 FSR. 
The discipline of sociolo[!y. in <lll effort IP c:1pture some of 1he soaring 
kg11imacy of ·science·. has adopted 1he quan1i1ativc assump1iom in-
\' ..L-corpora1ed 1n 1he 'cicn1ific method-- thus ma kin[! cL11ms 10 he a social 
"' \Yo f'I science. 9 Durkheim's innovative methodological work. which rested upon 
R,.l·entl\• 1:sR (aiid h,· a''<lci.at· 01 th d 1 d. . r . ~ · • an organic amdogy, reduc<'d sociological phenomena IO social (acls that , _ • , . ., I l C eve opmenl JlllellSIOn-1arm1ng V\ .... · · · · ---. · · . 
systems research and devdopmcnl) has come under cri · · for its limited.~.,•~ : co.uld be quant11<ll1vely measured-:--s1milar to the b1olog1.cal. and rnorgarnc 
application within the political-economy perspecti •e. Oasa and Swanson, < 1 ... 1Lf soences. The. attenda.nt assumpho.ns of soentific empmc1sm. were thus 
in a critique of FSR's limited ;rnalytical framework, ave exp JCatcd its ",..i;;qmcorporated rnlo sociology: soc1et1es were re.d.uced to ~losed. rnlerdepen-
aradigmat1c herita •e of economic devclo ro •r· is. Briefly, a -..i i.l de.nt organisms rnc.onstant. mo11on _1o~·ard .egud1b.num. C o~sequent I: soc1al. 
C'lllneclion is· dr·1 ... 11 c 'l"'e ·n 1--SR ., d 1. h. t · f f . 1 d 1<.. l sc1enlists could claim to sl.tnd ou1s1de their obJClt of stud). unhindered b\ ' 'n IK: n l' un IS IS Or!C OrerunnersO Capita an 1 · . · · · · · · " 
lcctlnolo1,v tr··ii··f·r pr 1 •rai s·n. 1.-SR' . h their own values and biases. ohJeCl1vcly obscrvmg. quant1fytng, and "'' u -' < < g i1s. 1 cc s programmatic approac came . . . . . . . .. directly from tills her ·1.1,. 3 id w· sh 1 • d C . db h 1 . 1 descnbmg the ohJCCt of analysis, <tS would a natural snen11st. This trad111on 
· 
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both Talcott Parsons, and his contemporary biological science counterpart 
Ludwig van BerrnlantTy, into the current farming systems method. 1 '- 24 
It was von BertalantTy's contention that phenomena such as species, solar 
systems and galaxies cannot be fruitfully viewed as mechanistic macro 
objects merely obeying deterministic laws of motion. He proposed an 
alternative mode of analysis in which such phenomena were nested among 
and within one another rather than disaggregating into randomness. His 
new paradigm allowed for the development of theories, systems theories, as 
they deal with specific phenomena such as organisms, populations, 
ecologies, groups, societies and the like. In 1947, von Bertalanffy wrote: 
· ... there exist models, principles and laws that apply to generaliud 
systems or their subclasses irrespective of their particular kind, the 
nature of the componenl elements, and the relations of "forces" 
between them. We postulate a new discipline called General System 
Theory' (p. I l ). 24 
This paradigm necessitated a transdisciplinary synthesis which included 
general phenomenological aspects of organismic systems such as hierarchi-
cal order, trends towards higher organization, differentiation into 
s~s. and progressive centralization. In recognition of the validity of 
Aristotle's statement 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', and 
recognizing that the popular mechanistic approach ignored this wisdom, 
von BcrtalantTy argued· 
'Since the fundamental character of the living thing is its 
organization, the customary investigation of the single parts and 
processes cannot provide a complete explanation of the vital 
phenomen;i. This investigation gives us no information about the 
c1lnrdination of its parts and processes" (p.11). 24 
Since agricultural rcse;trch in general. and FSR practitioners specifically. 
have hccn criticized for not taJ.-ing ;idvantagc of ·systems' concepts in 
ddining physic;tl, biological and social phenomena. H:trt and George" h:ne 
developed a systems model in the von lkrtalantTy tr;1dition (sec Fig. I). This 
model illustrates a hierarchical system that includes hoth vertical and 
horizontal system interactions such that functioning suhsystems' outputs 
serve as inputs for others. It should be noted that this is not the only FSR 
model that is utilized. However, it is one of the models utilized in a collection 
of readings by· ... the leading practitioners in FSR'. 22 
The General System Theory presented by von Bertalanffy rests upon the 
assumption that such a system is both a model with universal traits and a set 
of elements which are interrelated among them selves and their environment. 
This model of interrelated parts is (I) hierarchical, (2) tends toward higher 
\, 
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organization, (3) includes differentiation into subsystems, and (4) requires a 
progressive centralization, and by inference, reductionist analyses. In so far 
as FSR 's proponents claim to be articulating a 'system', it would appear that 
it is a 'system' within von Bertalanffy's paradigm. FSR's proponents do 
attempt to theoretically assess the entirety of the farming 'system' as it 
impinges on the primary unit of analysis-the farm household. Both human 
and technical 'elements' and their internction are observed from a systemic 
perspective. Concern for determining any interaction among the technical 
elements is internal with respect to the environmental endowments and 
constraints .. With regard to the human element there is additional concern 
over exogenous and endogenous factors. Furthermore, in recognition of the 
complexity of the farm household decision process· from a systems 
perspective, the analysis hy necessity becomes general and interdisciplinary 
in its conceptual formulations. 
Clearly, such an approach provides an opportunity to 'systematically' 
examine the target population from multidisciplinary perspectives. Such a 
view. it is argued, provides necessary information beyond the scope and 
capability of a narrow focus on the target population. For example. a policy-
level price change may have critical implications for the individual farm 
household, and yet as an exogenous variable, the farmer may know nothing 
of the change or not be in a position to be proactive, but reactive. Thus. the 
FSR team should be able to broaden the research perspective and provide 
leadership for 'positive' change. 
CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE 
ILl\1ng identified FSR\ ·svstcmic' hcrit;igc it is now possible to examine 
tw" this heritage bo1h directs its paradigm;itic research agenda and limib its 
scope of in4uin An initi;il criti4uc. then. should bc metathcoretical. 
According 1<1 I Li henn;" 7 and Rad111tzl-.y.' 7 c111p11ical sociology is a 
technical appro;ich which views action as rational in a limitcd means-ends 
rationality. Such a positivist approach tends to proceed through stages of 
increasing rationalizatio~ 
In the first stage, conveniently labeled 'technologies', models such as FSR, 
are constructed with specific variables emanating from the technical 
members of the participating sciences. The second stage, referred to as 
·9ecisiou._t.he..ory', involves the making of choices among the various 
technologies under consideration. Since particular technical interests of the 
FSR 'team· mediate the choice of technique, the values ofthese<'fechnic1ai}f> 
are autom<llically included. Within the third stage, 'game ttu:Dry', the rules of 
analysis are schematized and operationalized. At this point the values of the 
y 
Di.wr11rula11011 oj FSR 11·11/i nutirmal tJf:ncul1urul sy.uom 8t 
technicians are accepted as given, and th~reby become domain assumptions 
of the model. In the fourth stage, the c~,rnctjcaHy gyided (or automatically 
controlled) techniques are automated, and decisions are made by computers 
which have been programmed to accept the value premises of the 
technicians. The analysis is accepted as scientific and therefore value-free 
and rational. Radnitzky (p. 327) 17 asserts: 
The idea that man conducts his fate rationally to the extent in which he 
uses social techniques and even the very employment itself of such 
techniques is cybernetically steered.' 
Therefore, given such an instrumentalistic view of scientific theory, action 
may be economically rational and efficient with respect to ends. However, 
the ends themselves are never questioned or criticized. 
Structural Functionalism's theory of development-modernization 
theory-neatly flts this type of rationalization. The problems selected and 
the research methods employed incorporate the assumptions of this 
'scientific' approach. FSR is a conceptual offspring of modernization theory 
and therefore is subject to its ~sand limitations. In FSR particularly, 
the majority of the work that has been accomplished has been a historical. 
procedural, and scientistic. This has impacted upon its approach, its process 
of problem selection, its operationalization, and ultimately its conclusions. 
A contradictory consequence of this process is that the technicians not 
only trust their model's conclusions to be unbiased, but, by acting on these 
conclusions through technical policy recommendations, they consciously or 
unwittinglv assume that science can provide technTca! solutions 
fundamentally socio-ecom)mu:andpOTit!Calprohlerns Thus, the conclu-
sions reached often recommend yield incrqscs. irrigation systems. 
;dternati\'e technologies, and market de\'clnpment. assuming that impro\'c-
ments "·ill benefit societies in encral. Despite three dec;idcs of development 
effort 1rected hv various forms of modernization th.1'.Qry, hum:q1 
i1~1i~cration~~ sta~·at.!£n~"'1xl s~~~1,;i_cgu;dit·i~ cont11~1e to exist. 
and worsen, thus begging the case for a higher !err.I of....a.rtiG!latiQ.n~ Thi; 
alJSruati~~cres:QfanaTySls that ha;e th~ p-otential o!i_ncor o at n • the 
best of FSR are the various perspectives-embodied by th~c:!:r~it~ic;:·~~~Y:,;? 
A common criticism of critical approaches i~· th-at they are no proactive. 
i.e., they offer incisive critiques but lack praxis. While such criticism tends to 
be more polemical than true (the early theorists of Western Marxism were 
also social activists) Radnitzky offers a way of combining the research 
dimension of FSR with the assumptions of political economy. While 
quantitative sociology concerns itself with making societal phenomena 
visible, critical sociology concerns itself with· ... what we ... must do, viz. the 
planning and shaping of the future' (p. 343). 1 7 Thus. in addition to producing 
. • .... •·ff''.-: .~ ::::: .... 
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empirical knowledge, there is also a cri1ical task to historically situate the 
information. II is this addi1ion, the criti ue or reflexivity, throu h which 
social science can achieve an adequate self·un erslanding. 'Empirical 
knowledge can be utilized for social lechnologies and hence be indispens-
able for ra1ional administration; criticism-especially of ideologies-<:an 
contribute to a rationalization of practical questions about ends' (p. 319). 17 
THE CASE FOR DISARTJCULATION: THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
The preceding theoretical orientation perhaps is best employed in de 
Janvry's4 analysis of development policies in Latin America. His principal 
concern is to explain the inabili1y for development lheories and programs to 
reconcile efliciencies of production al lhe micro-level with efficiencies of 
production al the macro-level. That is, how are international and national 
policies disarticulated with development efforts at lhe micro-, or household-
level. Afler carefully discussing 1he historical conlext of Latin American 
development de Janvry describes the inherent contradictions of these 
multiple-level development policies. 
de Janvry's critical focus rests upon 'cheap food policies' and their 
inherent tendency to be disarticulated with household-level development 
strategies despite their intention to enhance production capacities and 
thereby increase family income. de Janvry (p. 39)4 proposes that there are 
three dimensions to this contradiction: 
'(I] cheap food policies that suppress the price of food; [2) 
concessional imports; and [3] technological change and the develop-
ment of capitalism in agriculture. Each of these is in turn contradictory: 
che"p food policies imply the stagnation of domestic food production 
a-. modernization of agriculture is m;1de unprofitable; food imports 
incrca-.e the stress on the ha lance of payments; and the development of 
capitalist agriculture marginalizes pca-.ants and accekrntes the 
liquid<Jtion of functional dualism.' 
Each of these contradictions is in evidence in the case of the Dominican 
Repuhlic, especially in terms of the national policy of suppressing 
agricultural prices in order 10 make food cheaper for impoverished urban 
workers. The artificially low price aimed at p<icifying the urban poor has the 
effect of shifting the surplus-value created by the producer to the consumer. 
Thus, while the urban consumer might be temporarily.satisfied, assuming 
there is an income to purchase the subsidized food, the low price garnered by 
the farm producer has the socio-economic and political consequence of 
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eliminating the marginal, limited-resource farmer and therefore of 
accelerating rural to urban migration. In the Dominican Republic, the urban 
population has increased from 30 per cent in 1960to 53 per cent in 1982 (this 
does not include the 900000 Dominicans in New York Cityl. This rapid 
influx of new labor primarily contributes to even higher urban unemploy· 
menl rates and federal welfare outlays. Presently, unofficial estimates of 
unemployment in the Dominican Republic exceed 40 per cent. This cheap 
food policy has facilitated the internal economic contradictions that 
traditional! have had the consequence of creatin more landless laborers 
with no place to ply their uns 1 e non arm labor. Ironically, then, a cheap 
rood policy that was supposed to pacify is laying the foundation for major 
~i?I upheaval and political repression. 
Concessional imports also have played a contradictory role. Imports from 
the United States in the form of food and feed grains have steadily increased 
since the J950s 6 This policy has tht1 tendency to exacerhate the low 
commodity price policy for the marginal producer as well as to deplete 
federal revenues. Typically, policies that subsidize consumers for imported 
commodities (I) Qecrease the~tity of domestic production, (2) tend to 
t!:i!nsfer surplus-value from the producer to the consumer and middlemen 
(similar to the cheap food policy), and (3) £!!!!!_e a loss in production 
efficiency (p. 195).13 Unsurprisingly, it is the contention of critical theorists 
such as de Janvry4 and Robinson 18 that food self-sufficiency must take 
ereeminance over self-reliance. 
'From every point of view-political economic :rnd bumane~·the 
first necessity for the third world is to increase production of h"sic 
foodm1[s ... Production of food is the most effecti\'C form of irnpPrt 
saving investment. For a country with a deficit in its halancc of 
payments to import food means th:il it is b<,rrowing in order to cat. The 
debt remains tu be paid ;1fter the food has been c;11c11· (p.132). 1" 
A further man1fcstalion of this concessional lr'1de conlrad1etio11 "the 
Dominican Republic's enormous internation~il debt. The deht that remain' 
lo be paid in the Dommican Rcpuhlic has escalated since the assassmat1on 
of Trujillo to almost impossible proportions From virtually nothing in 
1963, the debt has risen to 3 billion US dollars in 1985. Fully 25 per cent of 
the traditionally unstahle export earnings, almost exclusively from 
sugarcane. is required to service the debt ( 18.7 per cent in 1982;"' estimated 
25 per cent for 1985 11 ) 
This problem is compounded hy the International Moneury Fund\ 
(IMF) policies required of dehtor nations. The main elements imposed by 
the IMF on aid seding countries are: (l) reduced expenditures through 
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subsidies or wage rate; and 0) pressme not to impose tariffs, trade licenses, 
and multiple exchange rates that favor exports over imports_ The IMF 
insists on de\'aluation of currencies in lieu of these policies_•~ 'Where the 
main exports are raw materials in inelastic demand [e.g., sugarcane), this 
fails to increase foreign earning and it pours oil on the fires of inflation at 
home· (Robinson. p. 98)_ 18 
The consequences arc all too familiar. Low prices are maintained, 
production growth fails to keep pace with demand, more food is imported, 
and the nationalcurrencyisdevalued(from SI DR peso= SI US to3to I in 
one day), thus further eroding export earnings. Predictably, despite the 
cheap food policies, destabilizing urban riots and general unrest followed 
the most recent IMF negotiations. 
Export policies also may undermine domestic food production. It might 
he expected that exportation of sugarcane, and winter produce, such as 
cantalopes and tomatoes, provides US currency and employment and 
therefore on balance improves the 'general' well-being_ In point of fact, 
unfa\'Orahlc terms of trade resulting from 'monopolistic' conditions 
c~rizc the Caribbean sugarcane market. RoElinson's 1 k analysis of the 
winter produce industry provides an excellent comparison for sugar and 
winter produce production in the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, the 
primary import country, the US, controls the amount of sugar pem1itted 
into the country hy simultaneously setting quotas and very high support 
prices, which protects the indigenous US sugar industry. The support price 
has been about $0- J 9 per pound-as compared to $003 fort he world price. 
The high US government price is designed to support the historically 
concentrated LIS "'~<tr industry and not the sugar industries of the 
Carihhean B:"ni. Come4urnth·. with the decline in demand for sugar in the 
l'S (111 p:trt due to the development of sugar synthetics and suh>titutcs) and 
the dcepcninl' fisctl crisis of the federal government. concessiom in the suµ:ir 
prngr<im h:I\ c come at the cxpemc of the Caribbean natiom. Since 1982, the 
Dnminic:111 Republic suµ:1r4uota has been cut frorn 447000 tons to 27XOOO 
tons in 19Xh The 11 "ul/ S11cct )011rnal (p. 1) 2 ' has reported the following 
concerns of Carl<" Morales Troncoso, the Vice President of the Dominican 
Rcpuhl1c· 
·us suµar policy has hecn ··catastrophic'"_ He estimates that the 
region\ sug:n producers have lost at least $JOO million in export 
earnings since 1984 because of the quota cuts.' 
The domestic agriculture crisis is evident in the inability of the Dominican 
St:1te Sugar Council to pay 8000 small- and medium-si1ed growers, which 
has n"ulted in the layoff of hctwec1L7QOQQ LQ_ !()()()(~rm workcrs--thus 
cx:iccrh;itin!-' the O\ercrowding in Santo Domingo's slums. 2 ' 
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In the competition for export markets such as sugar, the inability of 
countries like the Dominican Republic to control supply has led to a steady 
deterioration in the terms of trade between producing countries and sugar 
importers. 12 - '8 The deterioration of export earnings is further complicated 
by the unstable social conditions within the Dominican Republic. As the 
major source or hard currency income, the production of exportable 
agricultural crops like sugarcane and winter produce is actively encouraged 
by the government This policy forces the producers of exportable 
agricultural commodities into direct competition with the domestic food 
production sector for productive land. As the major share of cultivable land, 
and eventually even marginal land, has been transferred to the production of 
these export commodities, production of domestic food has declined. 
Consequently, the country becomes increasingly less able to sustain its own 
food needs. and thereby further threatens its internal food security_ 
Finally, with respect to technological changes that facilitate the in-
creasing dominance of capitalist formations in agriculture, the liquida-
tion of functional dualism is accelerated. de Janvry refers to functional 
dualism as the relationship between capitalist agriculture and a quasi-
commercial/subsistance farming sector, in which the smallholding sector 
contributes to capital accumulation in the capitalist sector. According to de 
Janvry, subsistence agriculture is the 'ultimate embodiment of contradic-
tions of accumulation in the disarticulated economies' (p. 39).4 He contends 
that it is functionally beneficial for the capitalist agricultural sector to 
coexist with a s allholding fam1 sector which rovides chea labor and 
cheap food That is, the sma olding sector provides a necessary labor pool 
for periods of peak labor demand as well as cheap food which helps to 
maintain lcrn· labor costs_ However. as the forcmentioned contradictions 
unfold. the smallholding sector hc·conies increasingly marginal. Consc-
q urn ti\'. as srn:illholders 4 uit production. this sector can no longer serve the 
function of pro\'iding cheap labor and cheap food for the commercictl 
agricultural sector, and thus is steadily un<ihlc to contribute to capital 
accummulation in the capitalist sector_ 
FSR's SYSTEMIC SHORTCOMINGS 
These contradictions suggest that for deyclopment efforts to be successful. 
all levels of policy, at a minimum must not he disaqjculated with one 
another. Even within a systems-like perspective this disarticulation can be 
explicated_ Figure 2 presents an overly simplistic idiographic description of a 
hierarchical model, hut one that we feel succinctly advances our purpose, i.e .. 
to demonstrate disarticulation, even in a systems framewor~- However. as 
\ ., 
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opposed to the tendency for system theorists to work within the framework 
of a closed model, this heuristic model is open. Once again we will use the 
example of the Dominican Republic to illustrate disarticulation. 
The N;nional Agricultural System (NAS) is responsible for implementing 
miliondl agricultural goals and objectives. The resulting policies are 
supposed to he articulated through regional organizations such as the 
research stations and extension service. In a closed systems model, these 
ohjccti,·es would he oper;itionalized through local institutions into cropping 
patterns al the farm level. However, there are at least two points at which this 
network is disarticulated. First, the type of research performed at the 
regional levels is market-commodity based (usually field crops). It is 
performed on single crops grown independently rather than on intercrop-
ping systems. Replications and results of the regional research ;ire not 
commonly done in on-farm trials. Therefore, generalized regional research 
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often is not applicable at the household-level. 20 Second, while the stated 
policy may be to increase food production for consumption, the realities of a 
cheap food policy include inherent disincentives to maximize local 
production. 
A fully articulated agricultural system aimed at improving the income of 
smallholders through research that increases total productivity not only 
would have to be supported by regional research centers that reflected 
smallholder 'farming systems', but also would include national market 
policies aimed at helping smallholders retain the increased surplus-value 
anained through increased productivity. However, as already noted, IMF 
and concessionary trade policies militate against such agricultural 
objectives. Rather, they support export crop production, such as sugarcane, 
which is highly concentrated and employs large quantities of non-
Dominican labor, primarily Haitians. 
FSR models do not take into account even the possibility of 
disarticulation between its goals Tor greater production at the household 
level and the policy imperatives at the international, national, or regional 
levels. This inability to account for disarticulation, as described earlier, is in 
part a consequence of its functionalist tradition's tendency toward 
reductionism. Reductionism refers to a mode of analysis in which the 
properties of complex wholes, whether molecules or social organizations, 
are explained only in terms of the parts of which each is composed. In brief, 
'reductionism is the claim that the compositional units of a whole are 
ontologically prior to the whole that the units comprise ... (such that] there 
is a chain of causation that runs from the units to the whole' (pp. 5-6). 10 Hart 
and George's (p. 47)" FSR model, presented in Fig. l, provides an apt 
example. 
The principal 'prior ontological assumption' is that the primary objective 
is increased productivity of the 'farming system'. An ancillary aS>tm1ptio11 is 
that such an increase will accomplish the goal of impn"cd vi<ihili1v and 
social well-being of the farm household. Consequcntlv, th<' primary 
objective is simply increased productivity. These assumptions also retlccl the 
assumptions of most agricultural schoob and colleges of the West. 2 This is 
certainly an ubiquitous assumption among FSR proponents The following 
citation from Caldwell (p. 22)' is representative: 
'As Norman 11 states'. "The primary aim of I the Farming Syste111s 
Approach to research) is to increase the overall producl1\ity of the 
farming system -therefore, hopefully the welfare of individual farming 
families." I would suggest that our challenge is to move beyond 
"hopefully". Certainly we cannot assume that, "Tal\e care of 
agricultural income and tht· household will take care of ihelf"' 
\ 
\, 
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The assumption is that increased productivity will produce incraised 
agricultural income even though the household will not necessarily take care 
of itself. Such a seemingly unassuming position has the consequence of 
directing on-farm research toward the maximization of production within 
the agronomic and knowledge limits of the farming household. Oasa and 
Swanson 14 have argued that the history of technologically induced increases 
in productivity. whether among advanced industrial or third world societies, 
is quickly ofT-set by unfavorable terms of trade between producers and 
markets. Hence, it is unreasonable to assume that increased productivity 
leads to increased agricultural income for farm families. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the most elementary parts of the farming 
system-which in Hart and George's model 8 are 'a crop' or 'an animal'-
FSR practitioners are following a reductionist mode of analysis. Given the a 
priori assumption of'increased productivity' within the context of particular 
crop and animal agroecosystems, it is taken for granted that the 
'improvements' in the agroecosystems will articulate with the socio-
economic subsystem, even though there is no apparent reason for making 
such an assumption in the model. Changes in the most elementary part of the 
system, then, are considered to 'cause' the desired change at higher levels of 
aggregation. 
Hart and George's model also does not address how the increased 
productivity of the 'farm system' will interact with either 'market credit and 
information center· or with 'non-agricultural systems' which compose the 
'region', nor how the efforts of the farmers to incorporate FSR 
recommendations are articulated with international or national agricultural 
policies. It mus! be cone! udcd, therefore, that independenl aclion to increase 
produclivity al !he farm level will percolale 'upward' !hrough the 
hinarchical S\'Slems model and ultimately 'improve· !he well-being of the 
region. Once ag;1in. thi'. is an example of !he inherenl reduc1ionis1 cha racier 
of !he model. 
The Han and George model leaves unassessed, then,jusl how much either 
endogenou' or exogenous socio-economic conditions inleract wi1h efforts lo 
increase plant and anim;;I productivity. Such interaction, it is lefl for us to 
surmise, mus! occur in a proverbial 'black box' that is so characteristic of 
olher types of sys1ems analysis models where key points of articulation are 
!cf! unexplica!ed. 19 Indeed, even among social scientists, ii has been all too 
common to !real ·1echnological phenomena as events transpiring inside a 
black bm' (p. vii) 19 
Finally. the assumpl10r1' of !he Hart and George model ul!irnately rest 
upon the undesirahk as>umption of technological deterrninism.~· 14 Simply 
slaled. the model must a5'ume that technologic;il changes induced 1hrough 
on-farm research to increase pi<lnt and animal productivity will ;ichieve the 
~ 
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desired social change. All we have to do is tinker with technology and we can 
change social organization. The converse is, of coune, that changing the 
organization of society as a means of achieving social goals is problematic, 
since traditionally, development programs haye sought to emeliorate 
deteriorating social conditions and therefore maintain the socio-economic 
and political status quo. 
BRINGING FSR BACK lN 
This last observation provides a departure point for recovering the research 
aspect, that is, the information-gathering dimension of FSR while 
discarding its functionalist/reductionist development dimension. It is our 
contention that atherin information on the h sical, a rono~d 
socio-economic characteristics of sma -producer armmg systems is 
essential for any agricultural development effort. This assumption, no doubt, 
appears to be quite familiar since it also underscores much of the thinking 
among FSR advocates presently. However, as we have argued above, such 
research must not be disarticulated with existing fiscal, financial, and 
development policies of the country as is the case currently where FSR is 
being implemented. How, then can FSR be brought back into development 
policy as a mode of research and not as a development policy per se7 
Contrary to implicit assumptions of current FS R advocates, changing the 
soci~anization must be a necessary aspect of development policy. 
Simply changing the technology or increasing smallholding productivity is 
not enough. Increased prodyctjvjly, whether via new technologies or 
olherwise, and the value created mus! be reiained by the producer. In order 
for this to occur, the terms of trade between the producer and the markel 
must be made more favorable to 1he producer and consistent with 01her 
national development policies, such as those for non-agricultural workers. 
Therefore. !he national development policies. including fiscal, export trade. 
fi~l, and internal trade policies, must be geared t-;;;;;rd the goals of 
simultaneously improving the well-b~i_ri_g of both urban and rural residents. 
Many development theorists and agricult~raladrninistrators would argue 
that social change beyond simple reforms-such as those usually offered by 
FSR proponents-is not a serious attempt at praxis. However we would 
counter that by simply following unaniculated development policies that 
are highly associated with particular nationalist or c_!i!.ss ~ 
amounts to nothing more than an effort to milintain the~\ qu~ 
existing political economy (class) relationships. The s1atus quo 1s, as always, 
nothing more than an ephemeral snapshot in a con1ia1111m of social change. 






JO J',111/ Afarn1tlt', loMi.\ £. SM·a1uo11 
international development resources are spent on its maintenance. 
Furthermore, there are recent examples where dramatic political economy 
changes have occurred in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It is quite 
possible that within the fragile political contexts of these nations it may be 
easier to articulate national and local development policies such that the 
information on agronomic, physical, and social characteristics of 
smallholders can he of importance. 
The point here is, however, th~by itself, even under more favorable 
political economy conditions, remains nonetheless, a means of gathering 
necessary scientific information and not a development policy. This 
statement in no way depreciates the value of the information generated by 
FSR. As w·th any information, its use will tend t eHect the class, and its 
inherent values, in power. us, this statement is consistent with our concern 
that such information be articulated within the context of the larger political 
economy. Furthermore, even within such a context, FSR as a research 
strategy continues to be guided by the values and development assumptions 
of its practitioners. The difference is that the research agenda is set by 
policies in which there is full articulation. This docs not mean development 
strategies that utilize FSR will be any more successful. Development will 
always remain a difficult task. 
Efforts intended to produce bottom-up development, regardless of how 
well-intentioned, fail when left unarticulated with the larger political 
economy. To the extent FSR is viewed as a development strategy 
independent of the prevailing political economy-any political economy-it 
is likely to fail. FSR is not a development strategy pt·r se. but a methodology 
for collecting necessarv agricultural information. It is the utilization of this 
information hv the agricultural administrators which will provide for 
cnlightened p<1l1c1cs ;ind, thus, development with equity. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
1. After World War II the emphasis of public development efforts was 
on capital investment projects, in line with prevailing development theories. 
The creation of physical capital, as engine for the "big push" 
(Rosenstein-Rodan), or to bring about the "take-off stage" (Rostow), was seen 
as the basis for economic growth and its attendant accumulation of wealth. It 
was further supposed that the wealth, accumulated principally at the socially 
and economically better off layers of society, would "trickle down" to the 
poor. Although earlier attempts had been made to address the poor directly, 
notably with the community development concept of the SO's; and although 
doubts about the exclusive focus on capital formation had been voiced, 
notably by Viner in 1953 and by Tinbergen in 1958, it was not until the early 
70's that governments started to redirect their focus from the formation of 
physical capital to certain aspects of the promotion of human capital. The 
main reason for this shift in focus was the belief that "trickle down" did 
not occur, or at least did not occur to the extent and with the speed 
previously assumed. As a result, attempts to create wealth were now combined 
with efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of the development 
effort. 
2. Early projects with a poverty orientation, such as the Puebla 
rural development project in Mexico, were purely equity oriented, 
concentrating on increasing production, and hence income, among poor farmers. 
However, it was soon realized that equitable growth required providing social 
services. In practice this meant a shift away from financing hardware towards 
"new style" projects which, although still strong in financing capital 
investment, also included components to satisfy "basic needs" and to supply 
social services. 
3. With respect to lending to agriculture, the focus upon poverty and 
the emphasis on the development of human as well as physical capital, led to 
the concept of integrated rural development projects. These projects are 
concentrated efforts that bring to a specific rural area a basket of goods 
and services including social and infrastructure components. This concept 
had, by 1973, been developed and tested in various parts of the world, by a 
number of development institutions, including the World Bank. Between 1969 
and 1973J)the Bank authorized an average of only 3 of these multi-sectoral 
projects yearly; constituting about 9% of all its agricultural projects, 
and representing less than 6% of its total lending to agriculture. During the 
years from 1974 to 1979 these annual averages had risen to 9 multi-sectoral 
projects, representing almost 12.5% of all agricultural projects and 
accounting for about 11% of all lending to agricu25ure, almost double the 




The shift from fairly well defined and definable engineering-type 
to the far more complicated and uncertain "new style" projects, had 
consequences for the promoting and implementing institutions, 
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inc luu ing for the World Bank. By the nature of the work done, these 
institutions were mainly staffed by engineers and economists; professionals 
whose operating methods and philosophy are dominated by fairly rigorous 
analysis. Now, these same people were confronted with the necessity to 
understand the motivations of people in alien cultures, they had to adapt 
implementation of project components to the wishes of recipients of the 
supposed benefits, they had to contend with personal and inter-institutional 
rivalry in the member countries they worked in, they had to understand and 
appreciate the risk to the beneficiaries of adopting recommendations that 
often looked good only on paper. With respect to the implementation of the 
projects, they had to contend with a large number of components, each dealing 
with a particular economic or social aspect of the multi-task project; 
components that were unrelated and whose simultaneous development created a 
totally new problem of inter-agency coordination. While success or failure of 
most engineering type projects is rather uncontroversial, success or failure 
of a new style project, combining economic and social development goals, can 
become a subjective judgement, often related to moral and political 
convictions. Not surprisingly, there is disagreement about whether certain 
projects, and indeed the whole concept of integrated rural development, 
should be called a success or a failure.In short, human development proved to 
be vastly different and often much more frustrating than building a bridge or 
an irrigation system. The shift in emphasis has thus led to much uncertainty 
and discussion in the institutions involved as well as to much soul searching 
and frustration among their staff. This process of adaptation to a new 
development philosophy is on-going and appears far from finished. 
5. The following report tries to make a contribution to understanding 
and hence to future design of "new style", integrated, rural <levelopment 
efforts in Latin America, and to the adaptation of the institutions involved 
for the task they have set themselves. The degree of participation of 
beneficiaries in design and implementation of integrated rural development 
projects is a special line of inquiry that has been followed throughout the 
report. The work is based on an extensive literature survey, complemented by 
field research in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico. 
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B. RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
6. Agricultural development generally tries to raise agricultural 
production and productivity and is of a technical nature. It is similar to 
other efforts to develop physical capital as a means for economic growth. The 
construction of irrigation works, land clearing, the supply of agricultural 
credit, the support for agricultural research and extension, etc. are all, by 
themselves, technical aspects of agricultural development. Rural development, 
though, by definition is oriented more toward benefitting primarily the poor. 
Hence, in a narrow interpretation, rural development is agricultural 
development among the poor segment of the rural population. Raising the poor 
(usually small) farmer's production and productivity requires not only the 
traditional efforts of agricultural development, but includes other specific 
aspects related to the nature of the clientele as, for instance, the 
provision of health services to increase work capacity; the provision of 
education, to increase comprehension and absorbtion of new knowledge and of 
extension, to increase technical skills, etc. This aspect of rural 
development, as a direct result of working with the poor, makes rural 
development synonymous with human development. Thus, the fundamental 
distinction between pure agricultural and rural development is the emphasis 
on physical capital development for the former, and human capital development 
for the latter. It is this Jistinction that is often over looked and that has 
created much frustration, particularly among the practitioners of 
agricultural development. Most institutions, including the World Bank, 
entrusted rural development, when that became a dominant part of prevailing 
policies in the early 70's, to their specialists in agricultural development. 
These latter were technicians, mostly agronomists, agriculturalists, and 
economists who were trained and experienced in "old style" agricultural 
development projects. For many, the new style rural development projects 
represented nothing more than a shift in target population, i.e. towards the 
poor. The concomitant fundamental change in the nature of the work done was 
net always perceived. 
7. Early in the discussion about rural development, policy makers 
realized that agricultural development activity among the poorer segments of 
the population was probably not sufficient and argued to include other than 
purely production related components in rural development projects. For 
instance, social services and infrastructure related components were proposed 
on the basis of expected synergism between the different components. Further 
arguments to include other than production related components were based on 
equity considerations, t.e. more on moral than on economic grounds. Finally, 
some project workers, familiar with the early years of the new style 
projects, say that the attempt to meet "basic needs" was justified as an 
effort to channel the increased income of small farmers, resulting from 
productivity increases, into socially useful forms of expenditure. Without 
this paternalism, it is alleged, the extra income would be largely spent on 
frivolous forms of entertainment. 
- 4 -
8. The rest of this chapter will deal briefly with : (1) client~le of 
rural development, i.e. the small farmer; (2) the history of efforts at rural 
development, and (3) the institutions involved in this particular facet of 
economic development. 
1. The Smal 1 Farmer 
9. Rural poor are regarded as a single target group for rural 
development efforts, as if this group constitutes a homogeneous mass of rural 
population, but poor rural societies are at least as diverse as the better 
known urban societies. There are landless laborers, seasonal workers and 
sharecroppers at the lower end of income distribution. There are small 
farmers with production insufficient, or barely sufficient, for their own 
subsistence. And there are small farmers with a marketable surplus which 
contributes to total family income. Apart from groups directly linked to the 
land. and its production potential, there are small entrepreneurs and 
tradesmen either itinerant or located in rural towns. The primary target 
population of rural development is the small farmer, and the other groups 
will benefit only indirectly from most rural development projects. It is 
sometimes argued that "integrated" rural development project must include all 
rural poor, but in practice attention has generally been focussed on the 
existing small farmer, since to help the others would usually require 
sweeping social and political changes (land reform, etc.). 
10. The definition of a small farmer is difficult, because of the 
diversity of natural endowments for agricultural production. A definition of 
small farmer cannot simply be related to the area of land owned or worked on. 
It cannot be related solely to the type of production obtained or even to the 
absnlute level of income generated. For the practical purposes of defining a 
target population for rural development, the small farmer should best be 
defined relative to his production and social environment. The lower limit of 
small farmer should be the farming family who has sufficient resources to 
produce just enough for its own subsistence. This may include production of 
an occasional surplus in order to generate the cash, or to barter, for 
products not produced on the family farm. Defining the upper limit of 
"smallness" is more difficult. There is enough diversity among rural 
conditions to make it impossible to determine in general terms an upper limit 
to the definition of "small farmer", i.e. an upper limit to the type of 
farmer that should benefit substantially from rural develo§~ent in Latin 
America. However, following the reasoning of Morss, et. al. the "largest" 
small farmer can be defined relative to the "smallest" small farmer. The 
largest farmers still eligible to be included would be those whose production 
techniques do not differ principally from those used by the smallest farmer. 
A typical example where this condition applies is much of the highland areas 
under the integrated rural development programs in Colombia. In many parts of 
the areas under the project, farming is very intensive using multi-cropping 
systems on often very steep hill slopes, exclusively manually worked. This 
applies to small as well as to larger farms in these areas. The largest 
farmer included under this definition would face essentially the same risk as 





words, the willingness and ability to take chances with respect to 
agricultural development should be more or less the same for the entire class 
defined as "small". Finally, the largest "small" farmer should not cultivate 
significantly more land than the average farm in the area. 
11. It is our experience that the definition of small farmer is more 
difficult on paper than his, or her, identification is in the field. There is 
a certain kinship, a certain class identification, among those farmers who 
manage to subsist fairly well. This class tends to define itself and its 
members. It automatically excludes the very poor, who may work as 
sharecroppers or as seasonal workers on the small farmer's property. On the 
other hand, those belonging to the small farmer's class are not considered 
peers by larger land holders in the same area, i.e. by those whose holdings 
are substantially larger than the average around them. 
12. The extensive literature on small farmers offers some extreme 
positions on whether the small farmer acts economically rational or not. The 
views range from seeing small farmers as fatalistic, favoring luck over 
knowledge and as being subject to severe community pressures against 
innovation, to the view that the attitude of traditional producers towards 
production, and particularly changes 4 )in production can be explained 
satisfactorily by profitability alone. A more temperate view holds that 
small farmers are rational, but fear innovations because of the high risks 
they usually entail for a subsistence farmer. They are generally more 
knowledgable than external experts about the reality of their existence. 
Proponents of this view often contend that the real problem lies in the 
nature of modern technology and in the institutions promoting it rather than 
with the small farmer, as the new technology makes the farmer highly 
vulnerable and dependent on fluctuating markets and on 5 ~nstitutions 
controlled by non-farmers and not accountable in case of failure. 
13. It would appear that the latter view is the most realistic. Small 
farmers in any specific area have usually survived there for generations and 
have accumulated a rather solid body of - maybe instinctive - knowledge about 
the possibilities, limits and risks of cultivation in the particular region. 
Living relatively close to the subsistence level, the risk of experiments for 
them is very large it can easily spell starvation if things go wrong. This 
element is often overlooked when schemes are promoted which seem to involve 
fairly reasonable risks compared to the expected returns. One such case, in 
~h_ich risks were actually calculated is the Caqueza project in Co~. This 
project, aP early integrated rural development pilot project in~amarc~, 
initially assumed that low corn yields found in the area were due to a lack 
of knowledge about modern production techniques on the part of the farmer. 
However, after two years of on-farm experimental work, in which the farmers 
cooperated and in which it was shown that the new techniques could more than 
double their corn yields, farmers by and large still refused to adopt the new 
technology. Further analysis of production data showed that the recommended 
technology required tripling the traditional value of inputs, with nearly all 
of this increase in the form of cash outlays at the time of field preparation 
and seeding. Furthermore, project personnel calculated that the increase in 
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cash cost, associated with the recommended new production technology, was not 
offset by a commensurate return. Each dollar invested in the inputs under the 
new technology returned only $2.44, while each dollar of invested inputs 
under the old technology, i.e. for seeds, fertilizer and pesticides returned 
$3.75. Still, increased cash requirements and reduced returns for each dollar 
spent appeared to be insufficient reason for the almost total rejection of 
the new technology. After al 1, it could also be calculated that counter 
balancing the diminished returns to cash were increases in land returns by 
155%, increases to labor by 73% and increases in returns to total investment 
by 13%. Furthermore, production per hectare increased by somewhat over 200% 
and net returns rose by 253% under the new technology. On balance then the 
technology offered was clearly profitable. Subsequently, a production risk 
calculation showed that the risk to be incurred by the farmer in terms of 
dollars per hectare was three times as high for the recommended new 
technology as it was under traditional production methodology. In spite of 
the substantially higher net returns of the new technology, the risk per 
dollar net return was still 50% higher under the new technology than it used 
to be. It was cone luded that the farmer's percept ion of risk was an 
important, and maybe the decisive factor in his decision of whether to adopt 
or not to adopt the new technology. 
14. Another factor that influences small farmers' attitude towards 
changes, such as suggested new production approaches, are group and community 
pressures. Small farmer communities often face distinct socio-cultural 
inhibitions against personal accumulation of wealth; they may be subjec~ to 
income leve 11 ing mechanisms such as re 1 igious and extended family 
obligations. This can strengthen their determination to remain at the 
subsistence level of the community rather than rise above it. The previously 
mentioned study by Morss, et. al. suggests that such local sanctions against 
innovation or accumulation have been important in a number of rural 
development projects, as have social, including family, obligations, and 
strong preference for leisure. Thus, the small farmers' willingness to adopt 
recommendations for new production techniques depends not only on his 
estimates of possible risks, but also on complex, subjective considerations, 
resulting from the socio-cultural climate in which he lives. 
15. The small farmer in most Latin American countries is particularly 
vulnerable with respect to marketing his excess production. Marketing 
cooperatives are still rare, particularly among small farmers. Examples 
abound, where either unscrupulous management or strong differences of opinion 
among members led to premature abandonment of cooperatives. As a reJult, most 
small farmers depend upon the itinerant trucker merchant ("rescatista") to 
sell their marketable surplus as well as to buy production inputs and 
household goods. It would be wrong to assume that the trucker merchant system 
is monopolistic, high cost and inefficient. To the contrary, it is often 
difficult to see how any other system could collect products for a market 
from widely scattered small producers with a poor or non-existent feeder road 
system and totally inadequate public transportation. It is often argued, 
particularly by those who advocate low food prices for poor urban consumers 
that the profit margins of intermediary traders are excessive. This is 
l - 7 -unlikely, because in most areas there is sufficient competition within the system to prevent monopoly pricing. Nevertheless, better price tnformation 
system strengthen the bargaining hand of the small farmer vis-a-vis the 
trucker merchant and could result in an overall decrease in profit margins of 
the latter. 
16. There 1s often a paternalistic relationship betwe!n the small 
farmer and the trucker merchant who buys up his occasional surplus production 
and supplies him with his occasional requirements for inputs and household 
goods. This paternalistic relationship works both ways. The trucker merchant 
depends to a certain extent on the small farmer as a source for products to 
be sold. The small farmer depends upon the trucker merchant in times of 
distress, particularly as a source of credit. It is a relationship that is 
similar to that between a tenant farmer or sharecropper and the land owner, 
his "patron". As a matter of fact, in Brazilian rural development projects in 
the northeast where the project entity, a public sector institution, had 
acquired land from large land holders, this same ins ti tut ion was then 
expected by the small farmers to assume the old paternalistic role 0f the 
patron as part of its responsibility as a land owner. 
17. Sudden changes in existing production and marketing patterns can 
lead to precarious situations. A number of rural development projects, 
notably those in Colombia, have been quite successful in increasing 
production of the small farmer population in their areas. However, this 
created over-supply and actual inability to sell the increased production in 
some instances. In most of these cases, public sector institutions engaged in 
marketing functions have been unable to find outlets for the surplus 
production of the small farmers of these areas. 
18. The small farmers' excess production that goes to market 
in the form of food for direct consumption. These are precisely 
items whose prices are often controlled by governments in order 
inflation down and in order to appease urban cons11mers. This puts 







19. Finally, while agricultural production is emphasized as the main 
source of small farmers' income in monetary terms and in kind, the value of 
their agricultural production is typically only somewhat over 50% of the 
total income of the average poor rural family in Latin America. The remainder 
is derived from other activities of various members of the family, such as 
trade and wage labor. If an integrated rural development project results in 
overall increased economic activity, the smallholder family not onlv benefits 
directly through increased production of its own, but also indirectly through 
increased income from its non-agricultural activities. 
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2. A Brief History 
20. Efforts at rural development are not new. An early international 
rural development exercise, and one that can be seen as the predecessor of 
current programs, was community development. Its decade of growth and 
prominence were the SO's, although the origin of the term can be traced to 
the 30's when it was used to define community participation in municipal 
planning in the United States. In 1948 the term community development was 
first used officially in relation with rural development efforts, in what 
latter came to be called developing countries, by the British Colonial 
Office. Community development as proposed then was intended to help the 
British Colonies in Africa to prepare for independence by improving the 
territories' economy and by strengthening local government. Upon British 
initiative a number of fairly modest national community development efforts 
were launched in British territories in Africa ahout 1950. The first large 
community development program was initiated in India in 1952 with support 
from the Ford Foundation and the United States Foreign Economic Assistance 
Agency. Soon thereafter the concept was accepted by a number of countries 
worldwide, as well as by the United Nations system. Primarily as a result of 
promotion and financial support by the United States, community development 
experienced phenomenal growth in the decade of the SO's. 
21. However, the varied experiences which led to the formulation of 
the concept of community development were related more to social goals 
functions and to political objectives than they were to economic development. 
Hence, the prevailing ideology underlying the concept and approach of 
community development was biased towards social welfare and politics, with 
matters of economic development and growth having secondary priority. The 
strong support for the community development concept in the SO's by the 
United States was rooted in the international political situation of that 
era. Essentially, community development was seen by its advocates as the 
free world's response to totalitarianism. A central theme in the cold war era 
of the SO's was that the free world, and in particular its developing 
nations, faced a double threat from international communism with military 
agression, and the possibility of internal subversion through communist 
inspired agrarian movements. It was then still believed that military and 
economic assistance would be sufficient to counter these threats. The 
community development concept was seen, both by th2 United States and the 
United Nations as a democratic means to bring about economic, social and 
political development. The long term objective of community development was 
to build stable, democratic nations. With this background and origin, 
community development was described as organization, education and social 
action in, for and by the community. It was designed to encourage self-help 
efforts to raise standards of living and to create self-reliant communities 
with an assured sense of social and political responsibility. The development 
of infrastructure and social services and P.ven the increase in production, 
i.e. economic development, were seen as somewhat incidental to the basic 
political motive of community development. Community development thus, as far 
as the developing countries were concerned, was of alien origin, and was to 
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further objectives that, at best, were not directly related to their day to 
day problems. Furthermore, it was political i:l an imposed way, it did not 
plan for revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic order. 
22. Mostly through massive support by the United States and later on a 
somewhat more modest scale by the United Nations, the community development 
movement saw some spectacular growth in the early SO's. By 1960 more than 60 
nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America had initiated national community 
development programs. India's much vaunted community development program 
launched in 1952, gave the movement an added legitimacy. Actually, until 
about the mid-SO's the Indian program served as a prototype for national 
programs in other Asian countries. Where national community development 
efforts were being implemented, usually a large new bureaucracy was 
established to administer the program and to coordinate its components, 
executed by various technical ministries and regional offices. At the field 
level, the community development activities were usually initiated by posting 
a specially trained civil servant, the "multi-purpose village level worker" 
into a community or village. These village level workers were generally 
secondary school graduates with several months of pre-service training in a 
community development institute. He, or she, was supposed to guide and assist 
villagers in identifying their needs, and translating those needs into action 
programs. For doing that the village level worker was· supposed to have skills 
in a variety of subjects ranging from village organization to technical 
matters of agriculture and the supply of health services. These generalists 
were supposed to be assisted by specialists from central offices. 
23. There were very limited and sporadic efforts made to recognize the 
stratification of most rural communities and the resultant different 
interests ranging from those of the landless laborer to those of the 
commercial farmer. The village level worker often identified easiest with the 
local elite and thus alienated the majority of the population. Consequently, 
there was little attention given to assuring that benefits from community 
development programs actually acrued to the rural poor. Realizing this, the 
majority of the rural poor did not respond to the community development 
approach. 
24. Compounding this problem was the widespread internal conflict and 
animosity within the major United States agencies that supported development 
and provided technical services. Conflicts, which permeated the foreign aid 
agencies were essentially ideological battles pitting generalists against 
specialists, social scientists against te:hnocrats. Finally, by the early 
60's, these bureaucratic battles were won by the bureaucratically better 
entrenched technical services' personnel who were less abstract, and some 
would say more practical, in their perceptions of economic development. As a 
corollary of this, community development agencies in developing countries 
were merged into long established ministries of agriculture or internal 
affairs, if not totally abolished. 
25. 
battle, 
Probably because of the nature 
the criticism most often heard, 
of the victors in this bureaucratic 














development movement lS that its programs were inefficient in reaching 
economic goals. This criticism is voiced in spite of the fact that economic 
goals never had priority with the movement, since the evolution of the 
community development movement went from social welfare and public works to 
cooperatives, to organizing local government and finally to some technical 
support for agriculture. 
26. By the early 60's a number of large community development programs 
were being discontinued, including the well known Indian program. It is fair 
to say that by 1965 the community development movement had ended. The two 
ma1n reasons for the rapid decline of the movement appear to be the sharp 
reduction of interest in the topic in the United States, and diminishing 
financial support for it, and the realization of leaders in pr inc i pal 
developing countries that community development failed to achieve stated 
objectives. A fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of community 
development as a concept of rural development was that it did not, and was 
not intended to change Lhe basic structural barriers to a general 
acceleration of economic growth since it did not promote growth among the 
lower levels of society. It also remained an alien movement in most 
developing countries, directed and financed by foreigners. 
27. We have described the community development movement, its growth 
and decline in some detail because of the striking parallel between this 
concept and the concept of integrated rural development, which we will 
discuss in the following chapter. The era of community development was' 
followed, in Latin America, by a period of institutionalized agrarian reform. 
Land reform, thP large scale exchange of ownership of land between different 
social classes, hds a long history in Latin America. Early attempts at land 
reform were the result of severe social inequities and came about after 
violent revolutionary action outside the institutional framework of the state 
and society. This was generally true of revolutionary land ~eform movements 
up to the early 60's. The land reform movements of 1917 in Mexico are 
probably Lhe best known of this era of land reform. 
28. By the early 60's, governments throughout Latin America felt 
increasing pressure to increase production and agricultural exports in order 
to meet food requirements of the growing urban populations on the one hand 
and to meet foreign exchange requirements for industrial development on the 
other. As a result, land reform movements were institutionalized as a means 
to rationalize and improve agricultural production. This new motivation for 
land reform was supported by secondary motivations such as the Cuban 
Revolution, which increased the fears of extremist agrarian movements in many 
countries, by a desire to stem the flow of rural poor to the cities, and by 
the political pressures that originated from the Punta del Este Charter of 
the Organization of American States in 1961. Based on the ideas of Raul 
Prebisch the Punta del Este conference established a development policy for 
agriculture based on a combination of agrarian reform and support for 
technological improvements. In most Latin American countries the 
institutionalized agrarian reform of the 60's was accompa ied by the 
formation of a number of public sector institutions, to deal with and to 
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assist the newly landed farmers. 
29. Redistributive land reforms in general have been most successful 
if they were exercised against the remnants of feudalism. They have been less 
successful if they were promoted against large land holdings which were 
either under-utilized or condemned because size limits were imposed on land 
ownership. The former type of land reform, directed against outdated social 
structures could generally find broad political support. The latter, directed 
against sometimes strong opposition of the landed elite has generally been 
less successful in redistributing land from large land holders to small and 
medium scale rural farmers. Land reform is often seen as a pre-condition for 
effective rural development since increases in production require land 
ownership by the rural poor which is assumed to be the only means to provide 
a sufficient motivation to increase agricultural production. 
30. With the possible exception of some Central American countries and 
parts of Brazil, elimination of estates as a justification for agricultural 
reform has been exhausted in Latin America. Thus, agrarian reform based on 
transfer of land ownership that aroused little political opposition was 
finished by the end of the sixties. Further agrarian reform would have 
implied redistribution of land ownership away from increasingly strong 
sectors of society. This did not happen, and as a result, by the early 70's 
the agrarian reform movements 1n most Latin American countries had 
essentially come to a halt. From then on attention became focused on the 
concept of integrated rural development as a means to foster economic growth 
among the rural poor and a way to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
the fruits of economic development. 
3. The Institutions 
31. Public sector institutions engaged in rural development work both 
at the international and national levels are mostly staffed with planning and 
evaluation personnel who are trained primarily in economic analysis. These 
economic (and financial) analysts are supported by technical specialists, 
mostly agronomists and agricultural subsector specialists. The distinction 
between agricultural development and rural development is often unclear for 
these specialists who work on both types of projects. 
32. Local implementing agencies often are staffed, at least at the 
decision making level, by persons with administrative and professional 
experience in other institutions of the public sector. Because of the nature 
of the work undertaken, the staff of agencies involved in rural development 
tends to be from ministries of agriculture, agrarian banks, or agrarian 
reform institutions. Many people at the decision making level in such Latin 
American institutions have been educated in either Europe or the United 
States. Functional key personnel such as those dealing with agricultural 
extension, technical assistance, and agricultural credit are often only 
accustomed to work with medium and large scale farming. Policies and 
operational methods of many institution~ in Latin America were developed in 
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Europe and in the United States by similar institutions which, however, work 
for a different clientele. Principles and methodologies employed there were 
designed for the economic and social reality of the countries concerned. For 
instance, agricultural extension, technical assistance or credit as supplied 
to the highly technified and well capitalized producer of commodities in the 
mid-western part of the United States are vastly different from the methods 
that should be employed to supply the same goods and services to a 
smallholder in Colombia operating a multi-crop production system producing 
partially for his own subsistence and partially for an uncertain home market. 
Thus, a problem faced by the practitioners of rural development is that 
national institutions often have neither the personnel and the operational 
methods for the real task at hand, nor the inclination to adapt their 
methodologies to the needs of the small farmer. Local institutions often 
continue to promote unsuitable technologies such as mechanized mono-cropping 
systems with capital intensive use of inputs developed for extensive 
commercial agriculture, instead of trying to develop systems to enhance the 
efficiency of the traditional multi-cropping systems that use a minimum of 
purchased inputs and employ a maximum of family labor. Only recently and 
sporadically are public sector institutions in Latin American countries 
coming to realize that technical assistance and supply of credit should be 
specific to the demands of the small rural farmer clientele. 
33. Hence, it is gradually recognized that redirection of funds for 
development towards the rural poor in new style projects will require changes 
in the evaluation and operational capacity of donor as well as natiqnal 
implementing organizations. These institutions must be better geared to 
respond to local needs while building local social and technical capacity. 
Unfortunately, many institutions both international and national, are under 
pressure not to effect these necessary changes. Most institutions have to 
meet short term goals and pressures for immediate results are very strong. 
Timing and amount of funds committed for disbursement are used as internal 
yardsticks to judge professional performance. Such emphasis on short term 
results makes it difficult to adapt evaluation and implementation procedures 
to local requirements, and often prevents the institution from moving beyond 
an ad hoc relief and welfare approach to poverty. A corollary is the bias 
toward project as against program funding. Projects can be clearly 
circumscribed, they are by nature bound to specific deadlines for 
implementation. They have expected start-up costs and emphasize technical 
facilities and equipment over the development and funding of capacities to 
sustain the operation and to maintain it after the project has disbursed its 
funds. By the nature of the institutions, and the way they operate, their 
professionals are not rewarded for being responsive to local conditions nor 
for contributing toward the development of local institutional capacities. 
Personal initiative of competent and dedicated staff of these organizations 
occasionally produces efforts in that direction, but they remain fragmented 
and individual and are, as yet, not institutionalized. 
34. The emphasis on short term results, on meeting deadlines, on 
disbursement of funds, leads to a strategic approach of institution building 
that is equally short term and is often meant to serve mainly the direct 
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interests of a specific project. These interests are then equated with the 
interests of the main institutions supporting the project, rather than with 
the project and its beneficiaries proper. As a result, special project units 
are established, using special incentives to lure personnel away from the 
more permanent institutions of the public sector, undermining the latter's 
potential for sustained long term action. Pressures to move large amounts of 
money put emphasis on projects and project components that are capital 
intensive. The administrative overhead, in terms of professional time to be 
spent per dollar disbursed can thus be minimized. Effective work with the 
rural poor, though, would require a much higher ratio of staff to dollars 
disbursed and obtaining achievements takes much longer than experience with 
capital development projects would suggest. 
35. The large international donor agencies, in line with commercial 
practices, emphasize the "sales function" of their professional staff. As a 
consequence, the largest portion of operational budgets go to project 
identification, preparation and appraisal; to the efforts necessary to making 
the loan. Resources spent on project supervision and evaluation are 
notoriously limited and are under constant pressure to be reduced even 
further. This tendency is against the expressed wish of many field personnel, 
who welcome the multiple and broad based experience of most staff members of 
large international organizations, as well as their political neutrality in 
the country concerned. They appreciate the continuity that international 
agency personnel can bring to public sector institutions that have a high 
turnover of personnel. But again, it is most often because of personal 
initiative by dedicated and competent individual staff that the consistent 
support is given. This type of more intensive effort is not 
institutionalized, and is in effect continuously threatened to be diminished, 
mainly for reasons of cost. Institution building results cannot be quantified 
and easily shown as "output". 
36. There are large numbers of non-governmental agencies engaged in 
one or another aspect of rural development. Often, these organizations are 
based on personal initiative, drive and ambition of a charismatic leader who 
ts following his, or her, own vision of human development. Sometimes these 
organizations are established by other agencies or institutions such as 
churches, unions, and even political parties. Generally, the non-governmental 
organizations are small and their impact is limited both geographically as 
well as substantively. For that reason and for reasons of questioned 
effectiveness, non-governmental organizations are often dismissed as 
inefficient agents for rural development by the larger public sector 
institutions. However, given the immensity of the problem of rural 
underdevelopment, and the relatively limited impact that the massive effort 
of international agencies ;rnd national public sector institutions so far have 
achieved, it does not appear justified to omit any possible resource in 
mounting efforts at integrated rural development. Many non-governmental 
private agencies engaged in rural development in Latin America receive 
international support from large donor organizations with social and 
developmental philosophies similar to those of the particular organizations 
supported. With respect to rural development, relief and welfare 
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organizations with religious backgrounds and politically oriented 
institutions left of center, mostly from European origin, are the main 
institutional supporters of private efforts at rural development in Latin 
America. The type of rural development activity in which the non-governmental 
organizations are engaged is more oriented toward community development and 
to a mediator role between the rural poor and the services of the public 
sector than is the case for most large scale rural development projects 
supported by international donors and the main national public institutions. 
One of the reasons for this somewhat different emphasis is the origin of many 
of the non-governmental agencies, in relief and welfare work, before their 
relatively recent reorientation towards productive efforts as a basis for 
rural development. Thus, although both public and non-governmental 
institutions see rural development as a combination of production related 
activity and relief, the public sector institutions, today, tend to emphasize 




C. INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
37. The discussion of rural development contained in this chapter is 
sub-divided into two parts : the first deals with the concept and major 
issues, the second with observing integrated rural development projects and 
interviewing both project personnel and clientele in Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Mexico. The synthesis at the end of this chapter leads to the 
suggestions made subsequently in the last chapter of the report. 
1. The Concept 
38. The concept of integrated rural development is often considered 
vague, particularly in academic literature, either because the philosophy is 
considered unclear, or because the concept is considered too confused to 
serve as a practical strategic tool. Field experience shows, however, that 
the practical application of the concept is less vague than it is often 
considered to be. Most practitioners use the term "integrated" as describing 
the fact that this type of rural development projects tries to integrate a 
number of otherwise unrelated components, each of them addressing one aspect 
of rural underdevelopment. It is generally agreed that the various components 
of the projects can be sub-divided into three main categories : components 
related to agricultural production, components related to social services, 
and infrastructural components. Among the first category, those directly 
related to agricultural production are agricultural credit, extension and 
technical assistance, input supply, and marketing assistance. The most 
frequent social components are education and health. Among infrastructure 
components, road construction tends to predominate, followed by the 
construction of potable water supply systems, irrigation works and rural 
electrification. 
39. By definition then, integrated rural development projects are 
those that try to bring a basket of goods and services, consisting of 
production, social and infrastructure components to poor rural areas. Not 
only the operational implications of the concept appear to be fairly clear to 
its field practitioners, but the reasons for integrating a number of 
otherwise unrelated components appear to be agreed upon. Often, the 
justifications advanced for including social components are based on moral 
convictions, i.e. that the rural poor have an innate right to social benefits 
such as health and education, partly because they are supposed to be 
available to poor urban dwellers. For other practitioners the inclusion of 
social components in rural development projects is justified if these 
components contribute to the effectiveness of production related components, 
as e.g. when a healthier farmer is able to work harder and hence produce 
more, or when a better educated farmer ts able to absorb more fully the 
benefits of new technology. Finally, there are those who do not see a 
justification for the complexity entailed in combining a number of unrelated 
components into one project. Mostly this view can be found among the 
traditional practitioners of agricultural development, i.e. among those who 
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do not distinguish between rural and agricultural development. 
40. The most temperate view of integrated rural development, and a 
consensus that can be reached with most practitioners is based upon seeing 
components as complementary to the basic objective of a project. It is 
generally agreed that the basic objective of rural development projects is to 
bring about an increase in production and productivity of the small farmer 
rather than welfare. It can then further be agreed that other components be 
brought into integrated rural development projects only if and when needed to 
support the major objective. But often project design simply follows a 
blueprint approach. Overzealous project designers include the largest 
possible number of components, and their implementation is fixed with time 
frames and deadlines, based on scant information about realities in the 
project area. Typically, agricultural credit and technical assistance are 
found as production components; health and education as social components; 
and road construction as an infrastructure component. Projects designed with 
such a standard set of components, coupled with rigid implementation and 
disbursement schedules, lack the flexibility necessary to fit the 
complementary components to the local situation. 
41. However, the less rigid and least bureaucratic of international 
organizations allow project design and implementation timing to be adjusted 
during the life of the project, based on its particular requirements. As a 
matter of fact, the majority of projects require such adjustments in their 
original design. Many projects are extended beyond the usual five year 
implementation period. These actions are usually taken to adapt the reality 
of project implementation to project design, i.e. to increase complementarity 
between components to reach an optimum combination of project activities. 
42. Most integrated rural development projects rely on existing 
sectoral agencies of the public sector to implement the various project 
components. The ministry of agriculture will be responsible for technical 
assistance and extension, the ministry of health for the health component, 
public works iOr road construction, etc. Usually, there 1s a project 
directorate responsible for day to day management of the project and, 
particularly, for the coordination between the various sectoral agencies. 
Difficulties associated with these coordination activities have become the 
best known, and most widely commented on management problem of integrated 
rural development projects. 
2. Issues 
43. The following are the major issues identified in discussions with 
project personnel, with beneficiaries and with other practitioners of 
integrated rural development. They are either related to the projects proper 




IRD, Does It Work? - The answer to this loaded question 1s 
yes. Integrated rural development appears to work but often not 




implementation. It does not produce quick results. Underperfonnance with 
respect to meeting deadlines, pace of disbursement of funds, and problems 
with project management have led to many frustrations for those responsible 
for project design and supervision. Much of this frustration is related to 
both the in~5itutions promoting the projects and the concept of the projects 
themselves. 
45. The complexity and the required technical sophistication of 
project design effectively exclude the target population from participation 
in project formulation. Thus, technocratic outsiders are making decisions 
about problems and their solutions. The resulting project is usually in line 
with prevailing national policies and project objectives are couched in terms 
of national development and production goals, contributions to export 
potential and the like. The requirement of bankability leads to stereotyped 
project formulation, anticipating what financing institutions want to see, by 
personnel trained in standard evaluation procedures by the same banking 
institution. This procedure atrophies the effort of project evaluation as 
well as the generation of creative ideas and unusual solutions. On the 
contrary, preparation/appraisal reports tend to become rigid implementation 
manuals. 
46. The dichotomy between project design and the reality of 
implementation is quite obvious in most projects. Uncertainties, absence of 
real knowledge about the area targeted, and the inexperience of the proj~ct 
personnel almost invariably lead to an initial period of a few years when 
tangible achievements are minimal. In those projects that ultimately can be 
considered successful, this initial period is used, in essence, by well 
motivated and dedicated project personnel as the real project preparation 
stage, in the sense that during this initial stage of project formulation, 
decisions can be made about what can and should be done in terms of project 
components in the particular area. This initial period is used to establish a 
rapport between the project personnel and the intended beneficiaries, which 
may lead to a certain level of beneficiary participation. 
47. The fact that time tables, deadlines and implementation 
expectations are often unrealistic, is recognized by some of the larger donor 
organizations whose supervisory personnel shows flexibility and willingness 
to adapt the project's planning to the realities of implementation. Funds are 
shifted between components, deadlines for certain components are extended, 
the inability to implement certain components 1s accepted, and often, 
projects are extended beyond the usual five year implementation period. 
However, there is a gap between these lessons from the field and project 
evaluation and approval procedures. There is a certain inertia in 
institutions to adapt themselves to the operational requirements of a new 
concept. As a result, influential members of the institutions blame the 
concept of integrated rural development for many of the frustrations that 
actually originate in their own institution's slowness of adaptation. 
48. b. Beneficiary Participation - The client~le of an integrated 









also in some decisions about and within the project. In the early stages of a 
project, however, there is usually little or no dialogue between project 
personnel and the intended beneficiaries. Project personnel, new to the area, 
know neither the social structure nor the politics of the society it has to 
deal with. The inhabitants of the area tend to regard these new arrivals in 
the light of their previous experience with public sector personnel, i.e. the 
police, the tax collector, and, in some countries, a local politician. Under 
such conditions meaningful beneficiary participation in project evaluation 
and design is difficult to establish. A second reason why extensive 
representative participation does not take place is related to the structure 
of rural society. Rural society is stratified with very poor layers such as 
laborers or sharecroppers, intermediate layers such as small land owners and 
tradesmen, and elites, such as large land owners or village notables. It is 
unrealistic to expect within a rural project sudden democratic decision 
making by a heterogeneous population which normally does not do that. 
Finally, universal representative beneficiary participation conflict with the 
motivations of the bureaucracy of some donor agencies. Committing money for 
disbursement is the key to their career and full participation by project 
beneficiaries would typically imply that the project would be implemented at 
the people's pace and scale, because project personnel would have to struggle 
with the population's learning processes. As a result, project design would 
have to be more conservative, project implementation schedules would have to 
be lengthened and discounted cost benefit analysis would come out much less 
favorable than if stricter controls of a project are assumed. 
49. Basically, integrated rural development projects are service 
delivery efforts, and beneficiary participation normally is limited to 
decisions about how to do things and to sharing in the benefits of the 
project. Decisio~about what to do are mostly made by project staff, who are 
responsible for the money-~pent. This separation of responsibility between 
the project personnel who decide essentially about what to do, and the 
beneficiaries who participate in how to do it is not really an unrealistic or 
unfair separation of responsibilities. After all, in most deprived rural 
areas it is quite easy to see what can be done: in essence anything that 
would contribute to economic and social well being of the population and to 
an equitable distribution of the fruits of development. Usually, a number of 
ideas and pet projects have been around for a long time. Thus, drawing up a 
list of actions that could be taken is easy. The problem is to establish 
priorities, given the financial constraints faced by the project. Project 
personnel, not directly involved with political considerations in the area 
can by and large be considered better placed to decide on political and 
economic trade-offs. But participation by the population in how to do things 
is important for two reasons. First, it will bring to the project the 
particular expertise and knowledge of the rural population with respect to 
general conditions and natural phenomena in the area. Second, decisions about 
how to implement certain project components may generate enough popular 
interest and a sense of participation to induce long term involvement 
necessary for the maintenance of works and for the continuation of progress 
achieved. 
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50. c. Coordination of Project Components - Problems with the 
coordination of activities of the various sectoral agencies participating in 
a project have plagued almost all integrated rural development projects. When 
discussing coordination problems, reference is mostly made to horizontal 
coordination, i.e. integration of usually independent services in order to 
secure a unity of purpose and joint action. Management problems arise because 
separate budgets are involved and bureaucratic power struggles arise as the 
various institutions mobilize their political backers 5~ win jurisdictional 
and legal arguments. As Judith Tendler has pointed out these institutions 
act rationally from their perspective. Tendler distinguishes between strong 
and weak institutions in general, and with respect to rural development in 
particular. Strong institutions are those that generate revenue or have 
strong supporters lobbying for their interests, such as construction 
companies who support the interests of public sector institutions responsible 
for rural road construction. Strong institutions also can often garner a 
strong political constituency in the form of influencial elites in the area. 
Weaker institutions on the other hand are those that do not have their own 
revenue base, strong supporters or strong constituents. Institutions 
supplying rural health and education are typically weaker than institutions 
supplying production related services, such as the ministry of agriculture or 
the agricultural bank. Strong agencies will want to play a central role in 
the project, and will often have enough political backing to obtain that 
role. Weaker agencies, perceiving their subordination to the stronger 
institutions, will be disinclined to participate in the project. They will 
prefer to concentrate their effort on activities that are completely within 
their control. This has been typically the case with the health components in 
integrated rural development projects. 
51. Problems of vertical coordination, i.e. intra-organizational 
integration and problems of integration of a project with national policies 
are much less frequently discussed. Integrated rural development can of 
course be more successfully implemented the fewer the coordination problems 
and the stronger the national commitment to this type of development effort. 
Project implementation will be facilitated when national development policies 
articulate the necessity to coordinate efforts, including a requirement for 
the various institutions to collaborate in the effort. Also, projects will 
run more smoothly when there is an appropriate organization within ministries 
to support integrated rural development at the field level. 
52. The history of integrated rural development in Colombia provides a 
good example of the importance of top level commitment to a rural development 
policy. The Colombian integrated rural development program started with 
modest pilot scale projects in the early 70's. By 1975, the results of these 
pilot projects had become sufficiently known and appreciated for the newly 
elected President Lopez Michelsen to give it his strong personal backing. At 
that point, the concept of integrated rural development was made part of 
national development policy; major international organizations, the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and AID were invited to cooperate, 
while the president extended substantial personal efforts to develop a 
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nation-wide program. Recognizing the potential problems of coordination 
between the various agencies that were supposed to cooperate in this national 
effort, Lopez Michelsen personally secured their collaboration. 
53. Three factors should be kept in mind in designing and implementing 
integrated rural development projects. First, the more a project is perceived 
as being strictly local, the less opposition it will create at the national 
headquarters level of major institutions. This factor suggests 
decentralization of programs, i.e. the transfer of certain powers and 
functions to local authorities and the selection of projects for fairly small 
areas. Second, coordination of efforts between personnel of sectorally 
different institutions is usually better at the operational level 10 the 
field. Inevitably, personnel of such institutions working in the same 
geographic area will be in frequent contact with each other. Unless there are 
strong personal dislikes, this personnel will discuss common problems 
encountered in their respective work and find ways to accommodate each other. 
Higher echelons in the institutional bureaucracy will increasingly have 
other, and often conflicting interests and coordination efforts will be 
influenced more by unrelated issues. Third, the role of overall coordinator, 
and sometimes mediator, is best played by an institution which does not have 
a direct functional responsibility. A staff type agency, such as a national 
planning office or a development ministry are better equipped to perform the 
coordinating role than, for instance, the ministry of agriculture or a 
ministry of public works. A staff type agency is particularly appropriate if 
it has budgetary responsibilities, such as national planning offices often 
have. The power of the purse is a very strong motivator to enlist 
col labor at ion. 
54. The attempt to solve the coordination problem by creating entirely 
new autonomous implementation units has not been very successful. The idea to 
create a new unit for project implementation was the logical consequence of 
the frustration of early project designers and supervisors. Their experience 
lead them to regard existing institutions as inefficient, technically 
incompetent, understaffed and philosophically conservative with respect to 
the ideas behind the new rural projects. Thus, they saw clear administrative 
advantages in establishing a brand new unit. This was particularly so if they 
could find like-minded local professionals to manage and staff such a unit. 
However, experience has shown that these new administrative units operate 
only as long as they have the financial and administrative backing from the 
international agency, through the project under their responsibility. Almost 
nowhere have these new administrative units been able to survice in the local 
political and bureaucratic establishment. As a result, these project units 
were disbanded after the project was completed, or when disbursements 
stopped. 
55. The best place for the coordination unit is in an independent, 
existing, government agency at the highest possible level. Colombia has done 
that from the inception of its nation-wide program for integrated rural 
development, by plaB~ng the directorate for this development in the national 
planning department • Ecuador has recently established a "super" ministry 
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responsible for all of the country's 17 integrated rural development projects 
in its current five year development plan in order to have a non-sectoral 
agency responsible for coordination of its integrated rural development 
program. However, the disadvantage of this new ministry is its newness; it is 
not part of the bureaucratic establishment of the country, and does not have 
any particular clout, other than that resulting from the channeling of 
finances for the various projects. 
56. d. Impact and Clientele - Integrated rural development is 
targeted on a clientele called "rural poor", which is very ill-defined. The 
lack of definition of "rural poor" has been exacerbated by the need to focus 
projects on farmers who have a production potential, because integrated rural 
development is supposed to be development, and not welfare. Thus, many 
analysts failed to recognize the complexity of the structure of rural 
society, the target clientele. Subsequently, and as a corollary, they often 
fail to recognize that only a fraction of the population has production 
potential, in the sense desired for integrated rural development projects. 
The twin results of a vague definition of the client have been a very limited 
impact of integrated rural development projects, as compared with the efforts 
extended, and a bias with respect to benefits extended, i.e. towards farmers 
with highest production potential. By definition, the latter tend to be those 
who were somewhat better off from the beginning. For instance, national 
Brazilian statistics indicate that the country's entire POLONORDESTE program, 
the major development program in the Northeastern part of Brazil, has reached 
not more t~jn approximately 100,000 poor rural families directly in more than 
10 years. The same source estimates that the area covered by the 
POLONORDESTE program contains approximately three million rural poor 
families. Consequently, the direct program reached approximately 3% of the 
rural poor. Even if one assumes that there ts a multiple of indirect 
beneficiaries, total coverage is modest. 
57. Focusing exclusively on those who have a production potential 
excludes landless laborers, and in effect, most sharecroppers. Although the 
latter are often included as potential beneficiaries of agricultural credit 
under integrated rural development projects, societal and institutional 
constraints may prevent their participation. For instance, under the 
Colombian Integrated Rural Development Program, sharecroppers are 
specifically included as potential beneficiaries of agricultural credit. 
However, the program's administrator, the agricultural bank, requires a land 
lease document as proof of a sharecropper's production intentions. In the 
period of a~rarian reform, in the 60's, such land lease documents were often 
used by sharecroppers to claim title to the land worked on. As a result, 
written proof of sharecropping contracts to-day is extremely difficult to 
obtain from a Colombian land owner. Consequently, most sharecroppers are 
excluded from agricultural credit, one of the main benefits under the 
integrated rural development project. Since other benefits such as home 
improvement loans and loans to extend rural electrification to a property, 
are tied to production credit, sharecroppers under the Colombian program are 
effectively excluded from the direct benefits of the entire program. In 




40% of agricultrual labor is landless. These portions of the rural poor 
remain excluded from the direct benefits of integrated rural development 
projects, since they have no production potential, although they benefit 
indirectly from such components as health, education, construction of rural 
roads, and from secondary effects such as an increased demand for labor, 
coupled with higher wages. Also, a sharecropper who works under an agreement 
to obtain 50% of production, will see his share increase in line with total 
production increases brought about by the project. As a matter of fact, the 
indirect benefits of integrated rural development projects for those at the 
lower levels of the rural society provide a strong argument to include social 
and infrastructural components in rural development projects. It is precisely 
these components that benefit the poorest of that society. 
58. e. Size of Project Area - Many integrated rural development 
projects are large, covering vast, varied, and heterogeneous areas. 
Population, both in type and density, as well as agricultural and other 
activities can vary considerably from one area of the project to the next. 
Field experience suggests that it is more effective to limit a project to a 
general farming district that is homogeneous as far as its type of population 
and agricultural production potential is concerned, i.e., project boundaries 
should be based on ecological or economic conditions rather than on 
administrative divisions. In functionally or socially homogeneous areas, 
problems tend to be similar in the entire area, and the same number and type 
of components can be brought to bear in an integrated rural development 
effort. In fact, many nationwide projects tend to get divided into area 
specific sub-projects over time. The Colombian integrated rural development 
program distinguishes internally between, for instance, the project parts in 
Cundinamarca or in Antioquia. Actually, there is so little interchange 
between the various sub-projects under the nationwide program that they 
function as individual and independent projects. 
59. f. Monitoring ara)Evaluation - Following definitions in a 
recent World Bank publication monitoring is here defined as the provision 
and use of information to enable management to assess progress of 
implementation and to take timely decisions to make sure that progress is 
maintained according to schedule. Evaluation is defined as the process that 
draws on the same data, generated by the monitoring system, to help explain 
trends, effects and impact of the project. 
60. Monitoring, evaluation and interchange of ideas between projects 
are generally weak in Latin American integrated rural development projects. 
There are surprisingly few publications relating objectively the experiences 
of integrated rural development. And even those publications that are 
available, repeatedly mention that cost figures, production data and other 
quantitative information are not available. This leads to the conclusion not 
only that monitoring and evaluation are not reported, but that there is also 
a lack of systematic documentation, collection of data, etc. 
61. It is not surpr1s1ng that evaluation and monitoring are not done 
systematically, since they are highly political and may affect future funding 




and employment prospects of personnel engaged in these activities as well as 
of those being monitored and evaluated. More generally, there is no tradition 
in Latin American societies of objective reporting that could underpin 
systematic monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation is more of a public 
relations effort than an information gathering exercise. As a result, little 
is known about the objective successes and failures of projects and little 
agreement can be reached in this respect with regard to specific projects. 
What some call successes, others will call failures, both opinions based on 
subjective and intuitive interpretations of actual or imagined events. Human 
development efforts such as rural development are particularly prone to such 
confusions about what constitutes success or failure since many intangible 
benefits and costs can be counted and interpreted quite differently, 
following personal, subjective viewpoints. 
3. Field Experiences 
62. The following sections relate field experience in four countries, 
highlighting different approaches to defining and implementing integrated 
rural development projects. These observations are based on visits which 
focussed on discussions with both clients/beneficiaries and by interviews of 
institutional staff, politicians, etc. both at the local and national 
(capital city) level. 
a. Brazil 
63. Integrated rural development projects can be found ln different 
parts of Brazil; in the northeast, in the state of Minas Gerais, ln the 
frontier areas of the northwest and in the state of Paran~. The best known 
and still largest program of integrated rural development projects is located 
in the Northeastern part of the country, called POLONORDESTE. As of the 
middle of 1982, the POLONORDESTE program comprised 43 different integrated 
rural development projects covering a geographical area corresponding to 
slightly more than half of the northeastern part of Brazil and concentrating 
a variety of investments and services in geographic areas that are selected 
largely on the basis of their agricultural potential. 
64. An overriding impression of the Brazilian experience is that it is 
not a program at all. Rather, Brazil has a large number of projects that are 
unrelated, without systematic communication or exchange of experience beween 
them. There are several reasons for this fragmented development. First, the 
Brazilian integrated rural development projects are identified, organized, 
and actually implementt~) by the states. Although the development agency of 
the Northeast, SUDENE , is supposed to play a coordinating role, in effect 
that role is very limited. The second reason is related to the origin and 
method of financing. Project funds, particularly for the Northeastern 
projects depend on yearly central government budgets. Experience over the 
last 10 years has shown that such funding varies substantially from year to 
year, while the way in which it is made available to the operational level is 
rather complicated. In the Northeast, for instance, resources for production 
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related components are channeled through the Ministry of Agriculture, which 
makes them available to its Delegates in each state. The extent of 
cooperation by the Delegates of the Ministry of Agriculture in the integrated 
rural development projects in their state depends entirely upon the goodwill 
of the Delegate proper. Resources for social components are channeled through 
the Ministry of the Interior. This ministry, in turn, makes the funds 
available to the finance secretariat of the state in question, which then 
turns funds over to the particular project. The project directorate is 
responsible for administrating the funds for the various components under the 
project. 
65. Administrative units established specifically for the operation 
and management of projects often have no legal status and their personnel is 
delegated to them from a variety of other institutions in the public sector. 
Administrative procedures are cumbersome and dedication of such personnel to 
work in the integrated rural development project is sometimes questionable. 
For instance, the funds for the payroll of one of the largest and oldest 
project management units, in the state of Bahia, have to be distributed to 
the various institutions from which its personnel originates, which use these 
funds to pay the salaries. As a result, there is much confusion, delays in 
payment and dissatisfaction among the personnel. The administrative 
establishment of the individual states tends to ignore the projects when they 
are not directly involved and funding comes from Brasilia. As a result, state 
funds that otherwise would have gone into areas where integrated rural 
development projects are operating, often go to other areas in the st~te. 
Moreover, once disbursement stops, projects tend to peter out. 
66. However, there are exceptions, as in the state of Minas Gerais. 
That state deals directly with international organizations, such as the World 
Bank, and funds major parts of its integrated rural development programs from 
state resources. As one practitioner observed: "in the Northeast you deal 
with projects in poor areas in poor states, in Minas Gerais you deal with 
projects in poor areas in a rich state." Differences between management and 
administration of projects in the Northeast and in Minas Gerais are in 
consequence quite large and fundamental. In Minas Gerais there is a much 
stronger commitment among the local political and administrative 
establishment with respect to integrated rural development. As a matter of 
fact, in the 1982 elections for governors, all three candidates in the state 
of Minas Gerais pledged their support for the integrated rural development 
programs of the state. There are also differences at the operational level 
between the projects in Minas Gerais and in the Northeast, differences that 
may relate to the different administrative structures as well as to the 
conditions in the areas. By and large, the personnel of projects in the 
Northeast would like to see the projects have fewer components, in order to 
be less complicated to implement. In Minas Gerais, on the other hand, the 
higher echelons of the integrated rural development program administration 
would like to increase the number of components available for any one 
project. Personnel in Minas Gerais appears to be gravitating to a notion of a 
state-wide program to support a large number of small, area-specific, 
integrated rural development projects. The overall program should have a 
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maximum number of potential components available to serve the specific needs 
of any particular project. 
67. An occasional complaint is that project areas are chosen mainly 
for political reasons, rather than for developmental potential, and if the 
developmental potential is considered, it is judged more on technical 
grounds, i.e. with respect to agricultural production potential, than it is 
on social grounds. These criticisms reflect the problems of an approach that 
seeks to combine economic and social objectives. A more frequent complaint 
comes from project personnel in a number of states: that the projects are too 
large, and hence too heterogeneous with respect to population, physical 
structure, land holding, climate, and agricultural production. They would 
like to see smaller projects, but have not yet arrived at the notion of a 
programatic approach supporting a number of smaller, area defined, 
sub-projects. 
68. In spite of the political, administrative and budgetary problems 
the actual development of many projects in Brazil is impressive. A main 
reason is the dedication of personnel in charge of field operations. Mostly, 
these are young graduates from local colleges, socially conscious men and 
women who have found a constructive way to vent frustrations with their 
society and yet make a contribution to it. These young people realize at the 
start that they do not know very much about the task at hand or about the 
people they are supposed to work with. So they go out and try to learn. 
Generally, teams of up to 10 project workers wi 11 spend at least a month· 
living and working among the target population, collecting sociological 
information and beginning to build a bridge between themselves and the rural 
families. The information gathered during these initial exercises is used to 
gain a sociological insight into the area they deal with and, particularly, 
to identify possible associations or groups that either have a natural 
cohesion or that could be formed. 
69. However, what these young project workers have in enthusiasm and 
dedication, they often lack in practical experience. This is particularly 
noticeable in such components as, for instance, extension and technical 
assistance to agriculture. Given their natural inclination, and sometimes 
their educational background in the social sciences, they emphasize community 
development. This lead to organization and increased social awareness among 
the target populations and also to a certain measure of beneficiary 
participation. As such, this type of project personnel and the way they 
operate are quite appropriate and beneficial for the first phase of an 
integrated rural development project, i.e. the phase of learning and 
developing a rapport between the project personnel and the target population. 
However, the subsequent phases of tangible production achievements tend to be 
rather weak. As a matter of fact, project personnel complain about the 
complexity of having too many components to be integrated in these projects 
and, what they call "extension work" tends to relate more to social, 
community development than to agricultural production. Furthermore, this 
emphasis on the societal aspects of development leads to a neglect of other, 
somewhat more remote and technical aspects such as the introduction of more 
- 26 -
appropriate technologies, construction of bio-gas plants, the use of solar 
energy, simple post harvest processing techniques to reduce spoilage, or 
aspects of storage and marketing. Project personnel often appears to be 
ignorant about technical aspects of rural life, particularly about those that 
are not usually found in their immediate surroundings. Hence, the lack of 
tangible, physical achievements in those projects may we 11 become 
increasingly frustrating, unless efforts are made to upgrade the technical 
capabilities of project implementation personnel. 
70. Recurring operational problems are related to the erratic 
availability of agricultural credit, which reflects the financial budgetary 
problems mentioned above. Availability of credit is most often cited by the 
small farmer himself as the major benefit accruing from the integrated rural 
development project. Thus, it is most detrimental for overall project success 
that credit availability at, for instance, the Bank of Brazil's local office 
is unpredictable and haphazard. A variety of reasons are usually given for 
the frequent lack of funds, depending on who one talks to. Some blame local 
branch managers of the banks as not being sympathetic to the project, or to 
the plight of the small farmer. Others contend that central authorities have 
not made funds available to the local level for onlending to small farmers, 
etc. Both observations probably apply to the situation, although to a degree 
varying from region to region. 
71. Other problems arise fairly often from land tenure arrangements 
and marketing bottlenecks. Since secure land ownership is the major 
precondition for obtaining credit from commercial sources, the sometimes 
vague tenure/ownership arrangements in rural areas have created problems when 
ownership was not "regularized", i.e. when farmers either did not have a 
written title to their land or, if they had a title it was not registered. 
Therefore, several projects (Rio Grande Do Norte, Paran.4) have separate "land 
titling regulations" components. With regard to marketing, efforts to improve 
the situation for small farmers in project areas have been ineffective, 
mainly because marketing was left to public sector institutions which are not 
well equipped to perform such functions, especially if they are established 
in competition with, or even to replace, traditional middlemen. Bureaucratic 
procedures are not easily adapted to dealing in mostly perishable goods which 
have to be bought, transported and sold in a short time and at a profit. 
72. Finally, there are a number of private projects that merit 
attention. The largest and oldest private rural development project in Brazil 
is a 60 year old project in the Northern part of the state of Paran.4. It has 
developed over 1.3 million hectares of virgin land, founded 6 major cities 
and 57 minor ones, sold approximately 50,000 farm properties, with an average 
size of about 30 hectares, ranging from 12 to 73 hectares to small farmers, 
and sold over 75,000 urban residential plots. The total population of the 
project's area is now several million. 
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73. Early attempts at development of the Northern areas of Paran~ i.e. 
around 1910, were based on a model that had been successful in the 
northeastern part of the state of Sio Paulo and in parts of the state of 
Minas Gerais. This was based on opening large tracks of land for plantations 
growing coffee. The early settlers in Northern ParanA realized that they 
needed more financial assistance in order to be able to extend transportation 
infrastructure, particularly railroads, to the area, and so to relieve their 
relative isolation. One of their efforts to attract additional investments 
into the area was to contact a British technical mission visiting Brazil in 
the early twenties. This mission was looking for lands to establish cotton 
cultivation, similar to the then very successful cotton growing undertaken by 
the Sudan Syndicate. Expected high fertility, low land prices and the 
expectation of rapid appreciation in price of the land because of the 
construction of a railroad, led to the purchase in 1925 of more than 1 
million hectares in the Northern part of the state of Paran~ by British 
investory. The original intention, though, to grow cotton, was a complete 
fiasco for a variety of technical reasons. The company had to abandon efforts 
in that direction and decided instead to attempt colonization of the land 
acquired. As a first step the company bought, in 1928, the railroad company 
Slo Paulo-ParanA. Also, in preparation for subsequent land sales, the company 
went to great lengths to assure correct and unassailable title to the lands 
acquired. It went so far as to pay several times for certain tracts of land 
to various interests that claimed ownership. In retrospect, the firm title to 
the lands acquired by the company and subsequently sold to small holders has 
proven to be one of the cornerstones of their successful development. 
74. The British company's development philosophy was radically 
different from the large plantation-style development practiced in that part 
of Brazil at the time. Its plans were based on concurrent urban and rural 
development and on linking the area with major domestic and export markets. 
With respect to the latter, the purchase of the railroad from Slo Paulo, and 
its gradual extension into the project area was a crucial factor. The 
company's basic development plan for the undulating terrain was to build 
roads over the crests of the hills, with the properties, like fishbones from 
a central spine, extending downwards along the gently sloping terrain towards 
the rivers in the valleys. Concurrent urban and rural development was 
achieved by planning major cities at roughly every 100 kilometers on the main 
penetration roads and minor towns at intervals of 10 to 15 kilometers. The 
unit size of rural properties to be sold was kept small intentionally, in 
order to achieve a high density rural population, able to support and use the 
growing transport and urban infrastructure. A green belt was conserved around 
cities as well as around towns, in order to settle small producers of 
horticultural products, chickens and eggs, to supply the city and town 
populations with their daily needs. The average rural plot sold was a narrow 
strip of land of approximately 30 hectares, extending from the road running 
along the crest of the terrain to the river at the bottom of the valley. At 
the higher elevations, close to the road, coffee was planted. This is 
generally the area least affected by frost. The farmer's residence, 




parts of the property, close to the river. Water was obtained either from 
tube wells or from the river. In the early 30's, the period of the company's 
major expansion, 30 hectares of land in that part of Brazil was sufficient 
for a small farmer family to be entirely independent. The reason was the 
existence of one secure cash crop, coffee. Throughout the 30's and the 40's, 
Brazil's federal policy with respect to coffee prices and support for coffee 
was crucial for the development of many colonization projects. 
75. The price of the land must have been affordable to a large 
segment of the Brazilian and foreign migrants that moved into the area, given 
the briskness of sales during the initial period of major expansion. 
According to personnel of the still existing development company CMNP 
(Companhia Melhoramentos Norte do ParanA), at least 50% of the ultimate land 
buyers started out as rural laborers, saving to buy their plot. Currently 
land is resold, often for the third or the fourth time, at prices of 
approximately US$1,000 per hectare. 
76. The company has always done everything necessary to support its 
one and only objective: sell land. Nevertheless, the combined actions taken 
by the company add up to what today might be called an integrated rural 
development project. The company also built and operated hotels, saw mills, 
brick making plants, etc. at the places of intended ·urban settlements. It 
built the complete water supply systems for most of its cities; it donated 
land and even building materials for churches, hospitals and government 
offices, but it never maintained for its own exploitation any of ~he 
auxiliary services that were established as an aid to land sales in the first 
place. The company never found it necessary to supply social or even 
production related services on its own account: health, education, 
agricultural extension, etc., since the public sector supplied those services 
from the moment they were required. For instance, MaringA, a major city in 
the heart of the company's area, and the current location of the company's 
headquarters, was incorporated as a municipality only 4 years after the first 
house was built, i.e. in 1947. From that moment on it was eligible for the 
usual state and federal support to municipalities and was also able to 
develop its own tax base. Its current population is well over 300,000. 
77. The CMNP has been a fully Brazilian owned company since its 
acquisition in 1944 from the original British interests. Most of its 500 
share holders are company employees. Its current executive field director, 
headquartered in MaringA, was hired by the company as a railroad engineer in 
1932. In 1975, the company had 22 senior personnel with more than 30 years of 
service. Its total staff currently numbers approximately 1,500. Realizing 
that the company finally would run out of land to sell, it was decided, about 
10 to 15 years ago, to diversify into other ·activities. As a result, the 
company now owns and operates 17 farms in ParanA and in the state of S~o 
Paulo. The company has the largest cattle herd in the state of ParanA and is 
an important producer of one of the states current major cash crops, 
soybeans. Furthermore, the company has diversified into a number of 
industrial ventures. Moreover, CMNP has been looking actively into the 
possibility of acquiring a large tract of land at today's frontier, in the 
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state of Matto Grosso, to continue its original activity, land development. 
78. Criticisms heard today about the type of development such as the 
one pioneered by the CMNP, and later copied by a number of other developers, 
is that the properties sold by the company are really too small. Furthermore, 
the high level of sub-division has led to erosion, and to pollution of the 
rivers along which the settlements have been made. The counter argument of 
company personnel is that the original plan and philosophy of the development 
were based on economic conditions of the twenties. In particular, coffee was 
then the most profitable crop and the clients could afford only relatively 
small areas of land. In other words, the type of development was dictated by 
the reality of economics of the time and by the type of client catered to. 
However, now conditions have changed. Coffee is no longer as profitable in 
this area as it used to be. Through erosion and through lack of maintenance 
of fertility, the land has become gradually poorer. Erosion and pollution 
problems, as well as the gradual deterioration of soil fertility may be 
blamed partially on a lack of continued involvement by the company and in 
part upon a lack of vigorous enforcement of existing laws by the public 
sector. For instance, all title deeds contained a covenant that 10% of the 
land of each lot had to be kept in woodlands. This restriction, meant to 
combat erosion, was never enforced, either by the company or by public sector 
authorities. Pertinent farmer training and well focused extension work might 
have helped to maintain soil fertility by different agricultural practices 
and by correct application of fertilizer. 
79. Current developments on these tracts of land after a generation of 
farming has taken place, are three-fold. First, there is a tendency to 
aggregate adjacent plots. Farmers sell off to their neighbors and move onto 
lands further inland, particularly in the Matto Grosso. With the money 
obtained from selling their plot in northern Paran~, they can buy a 
substantially larger area in current frontier developments. Second, the type 
of products grown on the best lands are changing. Instead of coffee, one can 
see increasingly wheat, soybeans, some other beans, and even castor beans. 
The third type of development is that the poorer lands are gradually taken 
out of intensive farming and put into extensive livestock production. Thus, 
on the one hand, it would appear that the original small holder development 
of CMNP is gradually evolving into an area of medium to large scale 
properties, because it is suffering from a deterioration in quality due to 
erosion and pollution, and therefore shifting gradually from intensive 
farming to extensive cattle production. On the other hand, this development 
managed to ~pen up more than a million hectares of virgin land, settled about 
50,000 small holders, and was instrumental in the development of an entire 
urban base with various industries, without any public sector subsidy. 
Also by Judith Tendler 
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This volume was inspired by the spate of official evaluations of 
development assistance programs commissioned in the late nineteen-
sixties.1 The reports echoed, in milder form, much of the criticism 
directed at development assistance for some time by aid receivers and 
others. 2 I agreed with most of the criticisms, which are summarized 
below. Yet the remedies proposed by official and nonofficial com-
mentators reflected a perception of the world of development assis-
tance that was, to my mind, incomplete. Certain problems seemed to 
go unnoticed. Some organizational features were judged undesirable 
which, in my view, seemed desirable. Many of the proposed changes 
seemed certain not to produce the desired results. What seemed 
missing, in brief, was a sense of the organizational setting in which 
assistance decisions took place~lwant8cft08;Je~-~rtE .. ediS~Or;-;f 
development assistance by"fooking at theO~gani~tT;n from.inside its 
own walls, to show how.the cirg·anization~I ~nvironment h~"~on­
tributed to the outcomes described i~~i~i~Y and _trno7tidal re-
ports. 
Most of the criticism of development assistance can be summed up -1t 
in ~categ~~i-;;;;·(ii .. assistancidoo 'O'ften. fakes ihe form oT~'iill"eces­
sarily l~rge capital projects, overly intensive in equipment and 
.foreign exchange; (2) the technology of such projects has often been 
too sophisticated to be absorbed by developing-country institutions; 
(3) the design and execution of financed projects has too often coin-




cided with the interests of developed-country firms in the business of 
exporting consulting services and equipment; (4) in the case of U.S. 
bilateral aid, legislative and administrative requirements have been 
imposed which make the program look more like an attempt to sub-
sidize U.S. exports than an effort to assist less-developed countries to 
grow; (5) the "ugly American" 3 type of professional is a final con-
tributor to the problem, because of his tendency to think that his 
country's way of doing things is best. These problems have long been 
more vigorously described by some aided countries as donor-country 
hypocrisy, export dumping, "gravy trains" for donor-country con-
sUTting and exporting forms. imperialism. or neocolonialism. 
Bas~d ~f1 .. thes~ dL?gnoses, it is usually prescribed (1) that a larger 
share of development assistance be channeled through multilateral 
institutions in order to cleanse it of the political and business inter-
ferences of a bilateral program; (2) that liberalization of donor-
country trade policy be considered essential to any aid program 
promoting growth in the less-developed world; (3) that donor-
country institutions make diligent attempts to learn how to simplify 
technology; ( 4) that procedures for evaluating a proposed project be 
streamlined and improved in order to select projects and project 
designs better suited to the priorities and resources of the aided 
country; (5) that better technicians be hired, and that aid-giving 
institutions train them in the special techniques of development 
assistance; and lastly (6) that developed-country technicians attempt 
to be less "ugly." 
What distinguishes my study from the above discussions is my 
pdrtr1rya+ufth!f0rganizatfonal environment as playing a central role 
in determining the content of development assistance programs. I see 
organizational factors as responsible for outcomes that are usually 
considered the result of other things - policy directives, political 
pressures. employee training, project analysis techniques. Other dis-
cussions, for example, explain how better analytical techniques im-
prove t,he quality of project selection. This study, in contrast, focuses 
on th{overriding influence exerted on project selection by the way in 
which organizational output gets defined. Whereas other studies 
focus on the constraining effect of policies imposed by the legislative 
and executive branches, this study looks at the way in which the 
: organization adapts to such constraints and how this adaptation gets 
incorporated into organizational behavior. Whereas other studies 
stress the problem of insensitive technicians and the need to recruit 
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and train better ones, this study explores how the organizational 
environment itself attracts the insensitive technician. Whereas other 
studies question the political motives behinq development assis-
tance, this study explores the possibility thaf genuine motives get 
crossed up by the needs of the organization to gain control over its 
environment. This study, in short, analyzes assistance programs in 
terms of the deterministic nature of their task, task environment.and 
- -· .. .. . ---·-· --·-~-
organizational design. 4 It attempts to find the organizational rational-
ity that lurks behind much of the behavior of development assistance 
organizations. 
The difficulty of tracing today's development assistance problems 
back to these organizational factors explains to a certain extent why 
critics have singled out other, more visible causes: bureaucratic inef-
ficiency, pressure by developed-country manufacturers with equip-
ment to sell, political payoffs, underdeveloped-country irrationality, 
technical competence, or masked neocolonialist motives. Most such 
explanations, unlike those relating to the organizational setting, 
point to highly visible groups who have been known to behave on 
other occasions in the criticized way. These explanations fit in with 
theories, accepted in one quarter or another, about how certain types 
of groups or countries behave. I do not deny the value of these 
explanations, but suggest that they have been hit upon first because 
they are more visible and correspond to existing analytical ap~ 
proaches to organizational and political behavior. ! 
Some of the problems outlined above belong solely to the U.S.! 
bilateral program and its executor, the.Age-~cy for Internati~·nal be-; 
velc:iQment (AID). The attempt to explain AID's p~oblems~'ft~-~"'Zenters \ 
on th~ ;-~bje~ti~nDnhat aiencytOthe p'ressures. (;f p~'ivat~-~terest ': 
groups and to poaching by other ioveriiment entities. Most-public ! 
sector entities, however, are subject to some form of external buffet- !. 
ing, so that this explanation does not tell us enough about this par-
ticular organization. One wants to know more about how the organi-
zation dealt with such assaults - in short, how it coped with the/ 
normal pressures of the bureaucratic scene. 5 / 
Equally fragmentary is the finding that AID's bureaucracy was 
insensitive, overlarge, and un~~tive. That is how burea{icr~cies 
often turn out to be. 6 Indeed, when adaptive and innovative behavior 
d~es occur in an organization, it is often analyzed in terms of the 
organizational characteristics that enable the entity to overcome the 
lethargy and resistance to change that is inherent in any bureaucra-
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cy. 7 One wants to know, then, how and why the innovators and 
risk-takers in AID were kept from playing their role. Did the agency's 
environment spurn them? If not, there is even more reason to be 
curious about why the forces of lethargy and resistance prevailed. 
AID started out with some characteristics unusual for a public 
sector-Eureaiicracy. This.endowment, unnoted by evaluators, seemed 
particulaily ·suited to a ta;k like-development assistance - a task that 
was far outside the range of the typical functions performed by most 
public sector bureaucracies. In fact, the U.S. organization may have 
started out better fit for the ta'SK ·at hand than the less-mali_gned 
multilateral agencie_~ - the Int~rnational Bank for Reconstruction 
and D~v~I~pment (IBRD). the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and regional banks such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). The disappointing performance of the U.S. agenc;y, in 
sum, was particularly interest\n&: g{ven the fact that it had .started 
with a better than even orga11izational chance for success. 
In observing AID from within, one is taken with the intricacies of a 
bilateral foreign aid organization subject to the slings and arrows of 
the rest of the government to which it belongs. Only after a time does 
'- ;: it become apparent that many of the more important "bilaterally-
~:. caused" problems of U.S. foreign aid are prevalent in the multilateral 
organizations as well. This is surprising not only because the prob-
lems seem such an obvious result of bilateralism but because "mul-
tilateralization" has been proposed for some time as one of the most 
potent methods for improving the quality of U.S. foreign assistance. It 
is supposed to rescue the donor organization from the undermining 
influences of U.S. political and national security goals, U.S. business 
pressure on the design of projects and decisions, and congressional 
hostility to foreign aid. Yet, if a certain type of problem behavior is 
found in a!ly assistance organization, regardless of its remoteness 
from national entanglements, then the vaunted multilateralization 
does not necessarily make inroads on some of the criticized problems. 
_ The intent of this inquiry, then, is twofold: to explore the unique 
' character of the Agency for International Development as a public 
sector organization, and to analyze certain problems which, although 
most visible in the highly bilateral context of one particular agency, 
turn out to afflict other types of development assistance organizations 
as well. The first three chapters concentrate on the bilateral AID. The 
next three extend the discussion to phenomena pervading both bilat-
eral and multilateral organizations. The IBRD, or World Bank, has 
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become the most significant lender of development assistance funds 
in the nineteen-seventies, and the IDB is the largest and oldest of the 
regional development banks. Though of lesser significance, the 
UNDP is brought into the discussion partly because of the excellent 
description of its organizational environment in the Jackson Report, 
revealing that it was characterized by some of the same organizational 
problems that occurred in IBRD, IDB, and AID. Though the UNDP 
differs from these other organizations because it specializes in tech-
nical assistance and feasibility studies, it plays an important role as 
supplier offinanceable projects to these organizations and, despite its 
differentness, has experienced remarkably similar organizational 
problems. 
The IDB is a unique hybrid of multilateralism, bilateralism, and 
regionalism. Unlike the IBRD, it is staffed in large part by recipient-
country technicians, which introduces politics into decisionmaking 
in a way that is distinct from both AID and IBRD. Unlike AID, 
moreover, the IDB's contributors are multinational, although all are 
within the Western hemisphere. Since its largest contributor is the 
United States, moreover, the organization is subject to AID-like bilat-
eral forces; but these for.ces are much less intense and determining 
than those involving AID. 
The differences between IDB, IBRD, and UNDP - and the way 
these differences relate to t1le'ir1unding" arra.i-igements - are dis-
cussed at length in the literature. 8 I treat all three organizations as 
"multilateral" - even though their differences may describe them 
better than their shared multilateralism - because I am interested in 
certain behaviors usually considered bilateral. At the same time, I 
point out their differences to show that certain organizational traits 
occur across a quite varied array of institutions dealing with de-
velopment assistance. 
A good part of the thinking in this book grew out of my association 
with the Latin America program of AID, particularly in Brazil, in the 
late nineteen-sixties. Much of the illustrative material reflects that 
association. The book, however, is not about AID's Latin America 
program. It is an attempt to say something general about development 
assistance organizations, based on a learning that could only have 
taken place through close involvement with one part of a large or-
ganization. During and after my AID-Latin America years, I had con-
siderable exposure to AID programs in other regions, and to other 
assistance organizations, which provided an opportunity to check my 
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perceptions. Where possible, I have incorporated supporting material 
from the literature of these other programs and places, though I have 
not attempted to prove my analysis with systematic data from other 
countries and other organizations. I have enlisted my experience to 
concretize and enrich the argument and to lead the reader up to 
propositions that might otherwise seem preposterous. 
Since my original experience with AID, its appropriations and 
personnel have been on the wane, while the IBRD has moved in the 
opposite direction. Between 1967 and 1974, the IBRD's loan commit-
ments quadrupled, rising from $1.1 billion to $4.3 billion. During the 
same period, the funds appropriated for U.S. foreign aid declined by 
20 percent, from $2.1 billion to $1. 7 billion. Correspondingly, AID cut 
its personnel by half, from 17,600 direct-hire Americans and foreign 
nationals in 1968 to 9,400 in 1974. At the same time, the IBRD more 
than doubled its professional staff, from 734 to 1,752.9 As a result of 
these transitions, the discussion of AID in the following three chap-
ters may be more relevant to the IBRD than would have been the case 
some years ago. At the same time that AID starts to retreat from its 
decentralized system of resident field missions, for example, the 
once-centralized IBRD begins to look with more favor on the idea of 
establishing such missions. Other changes have been taking place in 
development assistance organizations - whether they are waxing or 
,_ waning - such as the new concern with employment generation and 
income distribution. I have discussed these processes of change in the 
text wherever they enhance or modify my original argument. 
Finally, most of the decisionmaking discussed in the book refers to 
project lending - though program lending receives explicit attention 
on pages 96 and 97. The IDB does not make program loans, and most 
IBRD activity is concentrated in project lending, with less than 5 
percent of its 1974 commitments in program loans. 10 Though pro-
gram lending has accounted for as much as 50 percent of AID's 
development lending, its share has decreased since 1969 to less than 
10 percent of the proposed budget for fiscal year 1975. Sector loans 
have also become important in AID, accounting for 50 percent of the 
program in 1974 and 90 percent in 1975. 11 Although this approach 
represents a significant attempt to plan at sector rather. than project 
levels, the sector loan is, to a certain extent, no more than a new way of 
grouping individual projects for presentation purposes. In that sector 
loans consist of a package of discrete projects, then, what is said here 
about project lending applies to sector lending as well. Similarly, 
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technical assistance activities are relevant to my discussion in that 
they are often directed toward generating applications for project 
financing. I concentrate on project lending, therefore, because it ac-
counts for the major part of resources committed and a more than 
proportionate number of personnel. As a result, the project loan has 
had much more influence than the program loan in structuring the 
environment of development assistance organizations. 
Chapter Two 
THE TASK AND THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL FIT 
The U.S. foreign aid agency was a quite special case of public sector 
bureaucracy. It had a decentralized structure and small familylike 
field missions, in combination with a remarkably present-oriented 
1 personnel system. All this contributed to an organizational environ-
ment that permitted considerable mobility, informality of communi-
cation and decisionmaking, and easy access to the top. This type of 
environment, in turn, was suited to organizational tasks which, like 
development assistance, tend to require a more than average amount 
of adaptive and innovative behavior. Certain features of AID's struc-
ture and personnel policies, then, seemed to have endowed it with a 
high probability of success. This unusual combination of organiza-
tional characteristics, along with an equally unusual task, has not 
attracted the attention of the analysts of organizations and bureau-
cratic behavior. 
Although the agency's organizational environment was more con-
ducive than most to adaptation and innovation, criticism of its per-
formance has often focused on its unadaptive and uninnovati ve be-
havTof.The reason the agency's performance fell short of its seeming 
fitness for the task is the subject of the next three chapters. This 
chapter describes the special nature of the demands made by the 
development assistance task on a public sector institution and the 
almost inadvertent aptness for that task of AID's organizational 
design. 
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ThE NATURE OF THE TASK 
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the work of a 
foreign aid agency is its differentness frg_~ that of.othf!r g_overnment 
bureaucracies operating abroad. ()_f o_th~r_m()[lt:JY~SPJJildlug-bureauc­
racies at home. Like other public works entities, for example, AID has 
to spend money on highways and housing. But the typical highway or 
low-income housing project it finances will turn out wrong if done 
"by the book." The highway will fall apart long before the end of its 
service life because of lack of maintenance and vehicle load control 
practices in the aid-recipient country. Poor people may move into the 
housing project only at gunpoint, because that way of living seems so 
alien. Yet the foreign aid agency is held accountable if the highway 
falls apart or if the hotising pr~ject r~mains unoccupied. At the same 
time, the agency may be just as censured for using proc~dures that 
strayed, in the interest of innovation, from standard technical norms. 
Although the uniqueness of the foreign aid agency's task has been 
recognized and UllderStOOd,t the. Qfganuational en vifonm.ent . that I 
such a task requires has never been specified. Nor has it been under-
stood how the organization's inability--to provide such an environ-
ment can contribute just as much to its ineffectiveness as can the 
pressures of outside interest groups, the insensitivity of the ethno-
centric technician, and the restrictiveness of the legislature. When a 
task is different from most, and relatively new, there will be little 
technique to deal with it. The literature on the subject will be limited, 
the accumulated experience within government will be sparse, and 
the capacity of other government entities to carry out their normal 
watchdog functions will be meagerly developed. The routine re-
sponse as a form of bureaucratic action will not work as well as in 
most large organizations. Familiar problem-solving techniques and 
activities will often be insufficient to carry out the task. The problem 
may require not only untried techniques of solution, but may first 
have to be sought out and defined-a kind of searching that is alien to 
much professional training in the developed world. 2 The task of 
development assistance, then, involves not only "doing." An essen-
tial portion of it has to do with learning. 3 
· Because of the peculiar nature of the development assistance task, 
tb.ewritten word'\vnrnave special importance within the organiza-· 
ti~r°i~-Written chronicles of the agency's experience and analysis of 
what has been done will be needed much more than in a home-based 
\..t-> 
-+ \)" 
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bureaucracy, where sure prescriptions for well-defined problems 
abound and where a general literature on how things work is usually 
available. Hence the agency's own writing will be an important 
medium through which a body of knowledge will be built up con-
cerning the task at hand - knowledge that will help the organization 
to be less dependent on the erratic appearance of individual innova-
tion. 
The special character of the foreign aid agency's task requires that 
the organization have the proper atmosphere for groping without too 
much idea of what willrCsult~ f_CJ_r straying!ram-frfed ifrid true solu-
tions. and for struggling to escape from customary ways of thinking 
about things. The agency will need a number of bureaucrats with a 
penchant for this type of behavior; and an organizational environ-
ment will have to exist to which such types are attracted, in which 
they can make cohesive and informal groups. and in which they are 
able to gain power. 
Although all this may seem obvious, its practical implications are 
direet1y contrary to the argument used to justify the responsibility of 
developed countries to aid the less-developed world. For I have been 
saying that the atmosphere of a development assistance agency has 
much in common with that of a less-developed country starting out 
on the path of development: wide gaps in experience and knowledge 
of the problems confronted and a corresponding maze of bureaucratic 
procedures that seem to provide an essential protection to the 
bureaucrat from the uncertainty and opaqueness of the world about 
him. Making things even more difficult for the assistance technician 
or administrator than for his recipient-country counterpart is the fact 
that the former lacks the native person's feel for what will work and 
what will not. Regardless of such difficulties. however_. development 
assistance was established on the premise that the developed world 
possessed both the talent and the capital for helping backward coun-
tries to develop. Development know-how was spoken about as if it 
were like capital - a stock of goods capable of being transferred from 
its owners to the less privileged. 4 But development knowledge is not 
simply a stock with transferable properties. The peculiar nature of the 
development task makes knowledge a product of the transfer experi-
ence itself.. 
This augmented definition of development assistance - where the 
transferred resource is both input and output of the transfer process 
-- makes it difficult to provide as clear a rationale for the assistance as 
-- - - - -
.. .. .. 
- -
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underlies the commitment to transfer capital. For knowledge that is 
still to be learned cannot, by definition, be more abundant in one part 
of the world than in another. 5 The difficulty of reconciling the 
rationale for development assistance with the need of the assistance 
organization for learning space can perhaps be attributed to the fact 
that our culture "does not contain concepts for simultaneously think-
ing about rationality and indeterminateness. "6 In practical terms, 
this difficulty has constituted a significant impediment to allowing 
these organizations to grope as much as they needed to. In order to 
maintain credibility with Congress, public watchdog entlties~a-nd 
in vest ors (in the case of the inultilatercil . banks)' th~ orgariiZation 
could not admit that it often had to thrash around fo~ ~~Tutions. 
Conversely, the pat technical solution was often slapped on a problem 
that might require another, less charted approach-sometimes in an 
inadvertent retreat from the uncertainty of less tried and true 
techniques. 7 
A result of the difficulty of accepting and putting into practice the 
augmented definition of development assistance is that when prob-
lems arise, they are attributed to the wrong causes -causes that fit the 
knowledge-as-stock definition of assistance. If an attempt to transfer a 
stock of knowledge to the underdeveloped world does not work well, 
the problem is said to result from imperfections in the transfer 
mechanism - inadequately trained technicians, counterproductive 
bureaucratic procedures, the impingement of forces from without -
rather than from an organizational environment that does not gener-
ate its share of the skill to be transferred. 
As a result of th~s narrow definition of knowledgi:_ 4~nsJ~r. the 
recommendations that accompany the evaluations of development 
assistance seem to be founded on an unlimited faith in the ability of 
developed-country man to cope with less-developed-country prob-
lems - a faith that is very much a result of the analysis of the failure. 
That is, put developed-country man in a streamlined organization, 
remove counterproductive outside pressures and legislative con-
straints, train him to be less ethnocentric, improve the techniques he 
must use. give him intense training in these techniques -and he and 
his organization will be much better fit to carry out the task at hand. If, 
however, a good part of the task is learning and adapting, then a good 
part of the burden rests on the organization and not the individual: he 
will not be better at development, no matter what his training, unless 
the organization is set up in a way that requires learning as an output. 
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The rationale behind development assistance, in sum, causes donor 
} 
organizations to surround themselves with a protective aura of tech-
nical competence - an aura which must be maintained if they are to 
survive in their institutional world. This makes it difficult to generate 
the experimental environment necessary for their work. It also tends 
to result in placing the blame for failure on the wrong thing. 
THE 0RGANIZ:\TIONAL FIT 
The literature of organizations has shown that a certain type of 
organizational structure has been most conducive to the accom-
plishment of a task like development assistance, where "problems 
and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and 
distributed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierar-
chy."8 The organizational structure indicated is decentralized, with 
superior-subordinate demarcations blurred: access to supeiiors easy. 
and considerable responsibility assumed by subordinates. The envi-
ronment of AID fits this organizational description well. The agency's 
\.~ geographical cil.Si)ersion and small field missions required a decen-
~ 
·..,,j tralized structure with considerable delegation of responsibility. Cer-
tain personnel policies had the same effect. although they were de-
signed, as will be seen, with other purposes in mind. 
The blurring of hierarchical lines in AID was partly a result of 
gaping -vacuums of knowledge- and power at various points in the 
organization. To a considerable extent, the agency was peopled with 
organizational types who were self-effacing, back-stepping, and 
apologetic. One did not often hear an AID professional express pride 
at working for the agency or speak contemptuoc;::;iy of other federal 
bureaucracies. (Perhaps the latter is a better measure of an organiza-
tion's self-confidence.) Professionals at the !BRO, in contrast, would 
regularly exhibit amused scorn for the technical competence of their 
AID or IDB counterparts. Budget Bureau technicians, too, displayed 
an elitist self-confidence in their organization and a disdain for the 
abilities of the government entities they were overseeing. In AID, it 
was common for some of the brightest and most successful profes-
sionals and administrators to let it be thought that they were looking 
for positions elsewhere, even when they were making no serious 
efforts to leave. They thus managed to withhold their respect from the 
agency while continuing to work for it. A good part of the characteris-
tic AID humility expressed itself in relation to Congress, particularly 
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at low levels of the organization and early stages of project design. At 
such points, a new idea was more frequently scrapped with "what 
would Congress say?" - than adopted with the attitude of "how 
could we get this one around Congress?" 
The new recruit to the agency was often surprised to sit down at his 
first meetings and discover people who were not intrigued \vith the 
process of economic development, who were ground down and 
exhausted by their bouts with developing-country environments, and 
who were not curious about the inner workings of their organization's 
successes and failures. They seemed to find a certain degree of com-
fort and enjoyment in each other's company, engaging in a kind of 
friendly griping about the "beneficiary" and his world. The in-
novator, in turn, was accepted almost with relief by his peers and 
superiors, since he could often produce what they could not. His job 
description, salary grade, or administrative rank did not matter. His 
intrusions into the territory of others would often be requested; or he 
would, on his own, step into the vacuum left by tired or frightened 
colleagues. 9 What was unique to AID was not a more than proportion-
ate share of the latter bureaucratic type but rather an extremely chal-
lenging and frustrating task environment. The faces of AID probably 
looked 3.bout the same as those of any large, home-based federal 
bureaucracy. It was the world they had to work with that made them 
timid. 
The agency's decentralized structure and dispersion abroad i.n 
independent, familylike country missions also contributed to the 
unusual fluidity of vertical and horizontal movement "Yit~i~ th~ 
organization. It was not simply a matter of the smallness of the 
organizational subunits. Their location in a foreign country - often 
looked upon by the staff as an alien environment - meant that the 
work unit doubled as a kind of social unit. This contributed to a more 
casual atmosphere at work, which, in turn, facilitated accessibility. 10 
The informality was not necessarily a sole function of decentraliza-
tion into small independent units. Similar dispersion abroad, in the 
embassies of the State Department, produced just the opposite result: 
an even more hierarchical environment than in the headquarters 
organization in Washington. 11 It was the combination of decentraliza-
tion with other factors, discussed below, that seems to have produced 
the less hierarchical result in the case of AID. 
The system of decentralized country missions increased the oppor-
tunities for a staff member's mobility not only because of the small, 
\ "' ~-
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familylike nature of the individual unit. Equally important was the 
possibility of moving from one mission to the other. The agency's 
encouragement of such rotation through its designation of two-year 
"tours of duty" made it possible for the staff member who could not 
get what he wanted in his own mission to try his fortunes in another 
- thereby increasing his expectation of possible promotion or reas-
signment as a reward for his efforts. The constant rotation between 
missions meant that positions were always being vacated and 
chances were always occurring to move up. Hence the high rate of 
inter-mission and field-Washington mobility removed one disadvan-
tage of the small unit - the difficulty of moving upward, or even 
sideward, because of the smallness of the organization. 
The high incidence of rotation in AID and the State Department has 
usually been noted because of its unfavorable side: moving people 
from one place to another just as they are getting to know a country -
or, perhaps more accurate for AID, allowing them to move. As seen 
above, however, the rotations that occurred in the agency were not all 
that arbitrary and Clisa(lvantageous. 12 The employee himself had con-
siderable interest in moving about, and the most successful ones were 
usually entreated by the country mission to renew their tours rather 
than rotate. An important aspect of rotation, then, was that it counter-
balanced the tendency of a large public sector bureaucracy to offer 
little hope for rapid recognition and promotion. 
Also contributing to the possibilities for action and power by the 
interested AID innovator was the uniquely present-oriented cast of 
the agency's personnel system. The legislative authority for AID's 
foreign service personnel system (Sec. 625[d) of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961 as amended) - as well as that of its predecessor 
agencies - was based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946 as amended. 
AID was enabled by the legislation to employ most of its professional 
American personnel for overseas service under a rubric little used 
until recently by the State Department's Foreign Service - namely, 
the Foreign Service Reserve (FSR). This category had been designed 
to give the State Department and pre-AID entities the authority to hire 
professionals "on a temporary basis ... with such specialized skills as 
may from time to time be required" (Sec. 401[3] of FSA of 1946). The 
time limit imposed on such employment was two non-consecutive 
five-year periods (Sec. 522). In AID's case, however, the time period 
was "the duration of operations" of the agency (Sec. 625[d) of FAA of 
1961). In effect. this allowed the agency to employ people indefinitely 
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without giving them the normal employment security accorded Civil 
Service employees (e.g., seniority rights and veteran's preference 
during times of personnel reorganizations or reductions), Foreign 
Service Officers, or even the FSR officers of the State Department. 13 
Moreover, unlike the Foreign Service Officer, the FSR officer was not 
required to take rigorous entrance exams. 
The orientation of the foreign aid bureaucracy was exactly opposite 
to that of the career Foreign Service of the State Department. Because 
the same type of criticism has often been leveled at the two groups, as 
if they were one, it is useful to clarify this significant difference in 
their organizational environment. Unlike AID, the State Department's 
Foreign Service is imbued with the atmosphere of an elite career 
service. 14 As one would expect in such a service, criticism and inno-
vational behavior suffer because of the young officer's long-run in-
terest in advancing his career. 15 Entry is limited by a tough written 
and oral exam. A perio of initial work well below the level of the 
young officer's interests, aspirations, and talents is the usual rule. The 
initial apprenticeship period is tolerable to the recruit presumably 
because his career promises a future of power, prestige, and adventure 
- and because his acceptance into this elite corps confers immediate 
prestige on him in the eyes of the outside world. 16 
AID and its predecessors, in contrast, have always been much less 
future-oriented employers, even in comparison to federal bureauc-
racies without a career orientation like that of the Foreign Service. 
AID was created in 1962 in order to, among other things, put together 
under one roof some of the previously dispersed foreign assistance 
activities of the government - the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration, the Development Loan Fund, the Food for Peace Pro-
gram, and the local currency-lending activities of the Export-Import 
Bank. The agency's attitudes about personnel corresponded to the 
manner in which it had committed itself to development assistance-
as if it were a task like the Marshall Plan, something that could be 
terminated with success in a five- or ten-year period. "I don't think it 
will happen for 10, 15, 20 years perhaps," said the agency's adminis-
trator in 1963, in response to a question about whether the program 
would terminate after some specified period. "But it certainly will 
terminate in many places before then, and it may terminate com-
pletely before then. The personnel system that is used must be com-
patible with the possibility of terminating any part or all of the 
program which may not last too long." 17 Of course, the placing of a 
16 INSIDE FOREIGN AID 
terminal date on the assistance commitment may have been more a 
political maneuver on the part of aid proponents than a realistic 
assessment of what would happen. Aid proponents were said to have 
calculated that Congress would never authorize the funds unless it 
was promised that the program would eventually come to an end. 
sooner rather than later. 18 Whatever the case may have been, it was 
always clear to the agency that its existence would come into question 
by Congress as soon as the end of that temporary period came near. 
The agency, then. could not honestly promise a long-term career to 
its job applicants. Unlike the State Department, it was not interested 
in entrance exams. \Vhereas the separateness of the State Depart-
ment's Foreign Service personnel system was meant to serve the 
purpose of creating an elite career corps, the reasons for a separate 
foreign aid personnel system were just the opposite: to be able to get 
already trained and experienced people fast and at the same time be 
free of the Civil-Service-type employment obligations to them. 19 
In 1963, more than half of the agency's overseas staff (1800 out of 
'-"' 3300 Foreign Service Reserve positions) had limited-tenure ap-i:, pointments. meaning that they would gain tenure after an initial trial 
period of arbitrary length only with the agency's specific approval.2° 
Moreover, almost half of the agency's American personnel abroad in 
1968 were not direct-hire; they were either on loan from other gov-
ernment agencies or on contract - and hence were employed for 
limited periods of time. Finally, the agency did not request authority 
to include its personnel in a career system until 1966 because, accord-
ing to its own rationale, it was engaged in a temporary task. 21 All this 
seems rather unusual behavior for a public sector bureaucracy which 
has been criticized for having been ossified and unadaptive. 
The career horizon of the foreign aid employer and employee, then, 
was atypically short. People were expected to perform immediately 
and be rewarded immediately. In contrast to the Foreign Service, 
there was no time for, or value placed upon, rising up from the bottom 
and getting one's experience that way. The employee expected his job 
to bestow on him immediately the responsibility and discretion that 
his experience merited. People tended to find their levels on their 
own - without as much resorting to formal reassignments, promo-
tion, reorganizations, or job redefinitions as in other federal bureauc-
racies. Those \\'ho could not cope gravitated toward more secure 
"paper-pushing" functions, and those who were interested "took 
over" very soon after entering. The unusually short-term career hori-
THE TASK AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL FIT 17 
zon of the agency and its employees meant that the fear of stepping 
out ofline, and of what it would do to one's career, did not pervade the 
organization the way it did the Foreign Service. At the least, such fear 
was not a constraining element for those who were interested in 
experimenting or changing existing practices. 
The re la ti ve absence of hierarchy and excessive preoccupation 
with promotion in AID must have had a positive effect on the agency's 
ability to carry out its task. Its overseas technicians, that is, could 
perform best if they got out into the culture of the country where they 
worked and got to know its people. If they were preoccupied with 
rising up in the ranks, however, they would consider it important to 
spend more time with those who would help their ascendancy moves 
- i.e., other Americans. The type of activity that led to promotion in 
the more rank-oriented Foreign Service of the State Department, as 
one observer has pointed out, had little to do with the ability to speak 
foreign languages and develop social relations with host country 
nationals, or with the knowledge of foreign cultures and political 
patterns. Specifically, "the important social contacts for the Ameri-
can diplomat who wishes to rise in the hierarchy are those with other 
Americans, both important American visitors and members of the 
American missions. Too much association with natives is likely to 
involve some slighting of this relationship to other Americans, and is, 
consequently, likely to retard promotion." 22 AID's fluid environment 
and ease of promotion, in contrast, must have been an important 
liberating factor, in the sense. that overseas employees would not be 
sacrificing so much in terms of career opportunity by spending time 
with the people of their host country. 
AID appeared to be unique, then, in setting the scene for a dedi-
cateO.riSK-·cnurtfhg corps of technicians Clever e'no~gh t~ -pur-sue 'tlie 
gOiiTs.6f their organization and at the same time defend it frnm attemp-
ted incursions from the outside. The organization was fitted ~u't ~ith '; 
some atypical charaderistics, which seemed, almost fortuitously, just 
what was needed for the atypical task at hand. This potenfiarfor 
healthiness in the. AID .environment -stands out even more clearly 
when contrasted with the analyses of lack-of-innovation problenis in 
the future-oriented ranks of the State Department. 23 
The State Department, interestingly, resorted more and more to the 
reserve category originally used mainly by AID and predecessors, 
rather than the more elitist career-oriented Foreign Service Officer 
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new FSO and FSR appointments, and 38 percent in 1961; 24 in 1968. 
FSR's were 36 percent of the total number of FSO and FSR staff 
members. The Herter Report stated that the FSR category had become 
"the primary vehicle for obtaining needed skills at intermediate and 
higher professional levels in the State Deparment." 25 Indeed, recent 
evaluations of the State Department's Foreign Service recommended 
that some of its "creativity" problems be remedied by modifying the 
recruitment system in a way that made it look more like AID's tempo-
rary foreign service. The State Department Task Force on the Stimula-
tion of Creativity recommended that the department allow officers "to 
be released for up to 4 years to pursue brief careers elsewhere in 
government and in other professions ... with provision to return to 
the Service without prejudice to their careers." 26 An article in the 
journal of the Foreign Service Officer's Association recommended the 
end of the FSO career service and its replacement with the recruit-
ment of experienced professionals.27 In sum, the State Department's 
elite Foreign Service, in attempting to deal with its own lack of 
innovation and adaptiveness, was advocating personnel changes 
which would make the service more like the non-elitist AID. 28 
Although I have characterized the agency's present-oriented per-
sonnel system as desirable, most of the attention focused on this 
system was of a critical nature. As early as 1962, for example, a report 
on foreign affairs personnel concluded that "the failure to establish a 
recognized career service and professional status for persons engaged 
in foreign assistance work" was the main cause of difficulty in recruit-
ing high quality personnel.29 In 1965, the Foreign Service Journal 
editorialized: "If there is one agency in the foreign affairs field in 
which greater administrative flexibility, unity and order in personnel 
matters are required, it is certainly AID. Many officers are on limited 
FSR appointment. No permanent appointments to AID's career ser-
vice have been made since 1961. There is a hodge-podge of personnel 
systems with FSO, FSR, FSR (limited), AD (Administratively Deter-
mined), and Ci vii Service ratings, derived from a variety of legislative 
sources." 30 In 1968, a report commissioned by the American Foreign 
Service Association said that the major contribution.of "the able and 
dedicated staff of AID and its predecessor agencies" to American 
foreign policy was "all the more significant" because this personnel 
"has been denied coverage under a stable personnel system." 31 In 
1969 the agency was complaining to the Congress that its lack of a 
career system and its temporary status were obstacles to recruit-
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ment. 32 The agency's rate of turnover was said to be higher than that of 
other government agencies -25 percent as compared to 20 percent-
and this allegedly reflected the general level of employment inse-
curity.33 
The Agency's temporary status was criticized for its effect not only 
on staff recruitment and morale but also on the organization's ability 
to carry out its unique task. "It is perhaps inescapable," said the report 
of a congressional committee evaluating AID personnel administra-
tion and operations. "that the hasty manner in which it was necessary 
for this country to organize and staff the successive foreign assistance 
programs and to continue changing programs and key personnel to 
meet changing conditions, would eventually create a large, amor-
phous, unstable agency, which would provide one of the most serious 
handicaps in carrying out the complex foreign assistance pro-
grams."34 Likewise, an ex-member of the Nine Wise Men, President 
Kennedy's ad hoc advisory committee on Latin American policy, 
recounted that the Alliance for Progress operated "as if it were likely 
to go out of business at any moment. ... As a result ... it functions 
like a disorganized ministry in a poor and backward country." 35 The 
author goes on to say that this problem resulted in a lack of the use of 
modern management and policy tools and a "shoving into the 
background" of the problems of information and research. 
The short-term career horizon, then. may not have had as posi_tive 
an effect as I have described. It may actually have caused the kind of 
job insecurity that prevents the development of adaptive, innovative 
behavior- and it may explain to a certain extent why the agency was 
not blessed with more of such behavior. Security is necessary to 
ensure the potential experimenter that he can take unpopular stands, 
sometimes fail. and go out on a limb without losing his io?. Just as 
important. such security facilitates the formation of informal groups 
within the organization, for employees feel less need to compete-with 
their colleagues "when promotions and dismissals depend on 
explicit and openly announced standards." 36 
Piecemeal organizational approaches and frequent changes, how-
ever, do not necessarily bring on the type of inadequate performance 
that AID critics have described. After all. stable and long-lived gov-
ernment bureaucracies with secure personnel systems have been 
criticized for the same lack of adaptive behavior and experience, but 
the shortcomings have been attributed in these cases to excessive 
security and stability. The rigidity of the Foreign Service, in the works 
'-""' 
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cited above, is seen as a consequence of the fact that it is an age-old 
entrenched organization, insulated from the forces of change by the 
timelessness of its values and career system. 
An example of the potentially positive results of organizational 
newness and insecurity is the Latin American experience with au-
tonomous state companies - the so-called mixed companies. The 
evolution of this particular organizational form in the public sector 
has in many cases constituted a significant breakthrough for govern-
ment action in developing countries. The mixed company successes, 
however, were based on the same organizational characteristics 
which were considered to have caused the problems of AID. That is, 
the successful mixed companies frequently started out without much 
structure or security, made up of the better personnel of the govern-
ment ministries from which they had broken away. Their ability to 
free themselves of particularly cumbersome civil service and pro-
curement procedures was of major importance, especially in that this 
allowed rapid hiring and the paying of attractive salaries. The success 
of these new organizations, then, was their very newness, their man-
ning by persons who had previously worked in the same branch of the 
public sector, and their breaking away from the more constraining 
aspects of government bureaucracy. 
Although the analogy between the mixed company and AID is not 
completely fitting, it at least shows that we cannot accept "organiza-
tional disorder" and "temporariness" as "obvious" explanations for 
the problems of AID. Indeed, one of the reports that criticized the 
impermanent nature of AID's personnel system suggested elsewhere 
that career stability was probably not a desirable feature for the per-
sonnel system of an organization carrying out a task like development 
assistance: 
The requirements of AID's program preclude a permanent career service 
because the needs for specialized personnel abroad change every year. 
Better personnel will be obtained by hiring persons for temporary tours of 
duty. They will be forced to identify with their profession .... The decisive 
reason not to include these specialists in an AID career system is that, in the 
main, the career contexts and career loyalties of the best professionals lie with 
their professions and the whole range of activities with which those profes-
sions are associated. An association with AID, even if it could be made 
permanent. would not attract very many of the best professionals to spend 
most of their working lives overseas. far from their professional colleagues 
and the stimulus of professional association. 37 
In addition, it seems that the insecurity of the AID personnel system 
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as it existed on paper had not been reflected in the amount of firing 
and "removal of deadwood" that one would expect. The Herter Re-
port suggested that the temporary "reserve" designation of AID 
foreign service officers was really "a misnomer in terms of its origi-
nally intended use as a temporary hiring device" because Foreign 
Service Reserve appointments in AID could be made for the duration 
of the agency's operations. In the State Department, in contrast, such 
appointments were limited to a given period of time. Hence, "a 
substantial portion of AID's Reserve officers have been with the 
Agency and its predecessors for many years .... Clearly, the Agency 
has a substantial nucleus of what amount to career personnel even in 
the absence of a formally constituted career service."38 
Any government job offers what might be called informal security 
- as opposed to the formal security of being a member of a particular 
federal bureaucracy. The civil servant who distinguishes himself in a 
government job automatically becomes highly eligible in the eyes of 
other government entities. He is noticed and may receive job offers 
from these entities, especially if his work involves contact with them. 
Thus, if his agency is on the wane, this type of person is usually in an 
excellent position to find a good place in another government bureau. 
Some agencies are looked upon by ambitious young professionals as a 
way to establish their reputations for future opportunities in the 
political, business, or government world. AID in particular was con-
sidered this way, especially by lawyers, partly because of the high 
possibilities for mobility described above. 39 
Finally, the AID environment was an insecure one only in relation 
to other Civil Service departments. With respect to the private sector, 
the AID employee was still considerably more secure. There was a 
significant difference, moreover, between the reaction of the ambi-
tious or competent bureaucrat and that of the less competent one to 
threatened personnel reductions. The latter lived through such 
periods with great fear, much talk of what would happen, and re-
sentment at the insecurity of the work environment. The former, in 
contrast, would sometimes even welcome the rumors of personnel 
reduction because of the opportunity "to get rid of deadwood," or 
they would pay the rumors little heed, secure in the knowledge that 
they would not be touched. Or, when the program was threatened 
with complete demise, they would joke about the fact that the only 
result would be "a changing of acronyms" for the agency- and that 
they expected to take the same place in the newly-initialed entity, 
~ 
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whatever form it might take. 40 
In conclusion, one has to look beyond the obvious explanation of 
chaos and insecurity in order to find the reasons for AID's problems. 
Chaos and insecurity may have been an integral part of an organiza-
tional environment that was better equipped than most for coping 
with the job of development assistance. 
Chapter Three 
THE MISFIT 
Certain development assistance problems are commonly explained 
in terms of the ethnocentricity of the developed-world technician, his 
insensitivity to other cultures, and his inability to meet the challenge 
of new situations. This chapter, in contrast, shows that AID's structure 
and task environment made it almost inevitable that certain problems 
usually attributed to individuals or a culture would have surfaced in 
any case as organizational phenomena. The task at hand required an 
organizational environment tha.t could produce learning; the organi-
zational level at which learning behavior was required was much 
lower, or at different points, than in a more typical government 
bureaucracy; and the type of person recruited for these positions was 
no different from those recruited for similar-level and similar-
function positions in a home-based bureaucracy, where routine be-
havior at these levels is more functional. 
BOTIOMHEA VINESS 
AID differed from home-based government bureaucracies in that a 
major input into the program had to come from those outside it: either 
the recipient governments or other local borrower groups. This cru-
cial beneficiary input into the production of development assistance 
was made at the organization's far-flung outposts - the country 
missions - rather than in conjunction with headquarters personnel 
in Washington. Recipient-country technicians, in short, usually 
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IDENTIFICATION AND DESIGN OF PRTA/i: SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES AND APPROACHES 
TASK 
QUESTIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 
I. Ex.a..ine Co .. itaent and Achieve Consensus on Goals: 
A. Identify Need 
Diagnose need for institutional TA 
Assess appropriateness of technology and 
institutional design under consideration 
Assess short- and long-term development 
objectives for the sector or entity 
Is additional external TA needed? 
Are there related training needs? 
- Recipient and aid agency (or project designers) should jointly 
engage in thorough diagnosis of need in order to achieve 
consensus that a problem exists and that TA is the best vay to 
address it. 
- How much can be done by local staff? Designers should be aware 
of the interrelationship between project design choices 
(including proposed pace of implementation) and TA required for 
their implementation and use. What are the implications of the 
project investment for the use of humn, physical. and financial 
resources over the short and long term? 
- What is the human resource development strategy for the sector? 
- Is the goal to develop national capabilities in all areas of 
management or to develop "management autonomy"? 
- Should training be provided for the entity only, or the sector as 
a 1oihole? 
- What are the linkages with larger mndates (e.g •• women in 
development, environment, energy)? 
- Can local skills be tapped from the public or private sector? 
Repatriated from abroad? 
- Is PRTA duplicating efforts of other multi or bilateral groups? 
Is the TA staff already present in the country lot'orking in the 
same area? Have results of PRTA in previous projects in the 
sector or subsector been taken into account? 
- Can TA and training needs be assessed concurrently? Should 
training be financed in advance of project execution? 
I 
°' OD I 
B. Exaaine Feasibility of the Proposed Assistance 
Assess state of the art and 
knowledge or expertise available to meet 
the TA need 
Assess the availability of local skills and 
resources to prepare TA proposals and to 
manage the assistance, both substantively 
and administratively 
Assess the feasibility of achieving TA 
goals in a single project 
Assess internal and external factors likely 
to have an impact on TA activities 
... ,'. ,1~; " .• :· ,:1~ .,, \ '''\ ' 
Annex 1 
Page 2 of 7 
- Can TA .needs be met in terms of the state of the art and the 
expertise available, the organizational and political environlm!nt 
in which TA will be implemented, and the time frame and cost of 
the present project? If expertise is not available "off the 
shelf" (e.g., in institutional areas) should TA be provided in 
the form of "action research"? 
- When such skills are not available, would recipient staff benefit 
from training in how to design and mana~e the assistance? Should 
aid agency staff themselves assist, or arrange for other 
preparatory assistance? 
- Would the success of TA be enhanced by planning the TA task.a as 
sequential parts of a development program, perhaps over a series 
of projects? 
- Considering the organizational, legal, political, financial and 
other factors that may affect the success of PR.TA should 
designers attempt to use these factors for the project's benefit, 
find ways to minimize their possible negative impact, or adjust 
TA goals to more realistically reflect the environment? 
I 
°' \D I 
C. Achieve Consensus and Commitment About TA Need and Goals 
Verify clarity of TA objectives and 
agreement of key stakeholders to such 
objectives 
- State goals (criteria for success) in measurable terms (such as 
targets for training), to clarify what is expected of TA 
activities, as well as to help 11110nitor their implementation. 
- Seek balance between assistance for physical investimrnt and for 
institutional or policy improvements. 
- Verify that recipient's staff concerned with the TA at the 
political and technical levels perceive it as directly lir*ed to 
project, sector, or country objectives; do not feel threatened by 
the TA; and are prepared to commit staff and other resources 
toward its implementation. 
- Cross-cultural sensitivity may be required in order to understan:I 
how a recipient manifests commitment and what approaches or 
methods are lll)St appropriate in seeking coosensus. 
Verify absence of other obstacles to TA 
Reinforce COllllitment 
II. Design of the Services 
A. Teras of Reference {TOR) 
Specify PRTA tasks in Terms of Reference 
(TOil) 
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- Is there agreement on the cost of TA? Can it be lowered 1 
- Is the recipient willing to borrow for TA? Verify that no grant 
funds are available from other agencies. 
- Ia there agreement on the use of national, rather than expatriate 
consultants, where appropriate? 
- Provide recipient with access to experience of m>re advanced 
developing countries. 
- Verify that needs for TA were kept to the ainiaua compatible with 
project objectives. 
- Ensure that TA delivery systeas other than the hiring of 
long-tena experts will be considered during TA design. 
- Ensure that the aid agency and recipient are prepared to mdify 
the TA assignment in the light of iaplementation experience. 
- In su11, ensure that TA is identified and designed in a spirit of 
partnership and that TA is part of an institution-building and 
hu1111n resource strategy, allowing the recipient to learn by 
doing. 
- TOR should clearly specify their objectives, desired outcomes, 
the task to be performed, its time fra11e and cost, am the 
reporting requirements. However, TOR should not be overly 
detailed, especially in the c:ase of institutional and policy 
studies, and may need to be phased, so as to allow consultants to 
prepare m>re detailed proposals once in the field. Verifiable 
interim outputs may be desirable. 
- Well-prepared TOR are flexible am negotiable, within reason. 
- Specify assistance needed to help recipient launch i•pleentat ion 
of study or policy recommemationa. 
- TOR should indicate the organizational entity to lilich the 
expatriate staff should be assigned, to whoa they should report 
and to whee they should have access, and how auc:h authority 
should be conveyed to them. The effectiveness of these 
arrangements will ultimately depend on local •nagelllll!nt and the 





Define role/vrlte TOil for both eJCpatriate 
and national staff 
Specl.fy TA model and deli -.ery mode 
a. Sources and Choice of £xpertise 
Identify potenUal suppliers of TA 
SpecJ.fy individual -rsus fir. 
Local "Versus foreign specialists 
C • Training Design 
Design PK'IA and training in concert 
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- This emurea that both foreign and local personnel will have 
aeaningful assignments and a clear uodemtancling of their 
responsibilities. · 
- Tiil shouid indicate which model(•) of TA la appropriate for the 
tasks: (1) perfon.er or substitute; (2) prescriptive; (3) 
counterpart-adviser; (4) collaborati"Ve. Aleo, what mode or 
combination at mdes of deli very is preferable: long~em or 
short~ena specialists or a c011blnation of b~h, passibly in 
association with a training specialist, and te- of eJCpatriate 
and national specialists; coaching by ·dsiting• experts or a 
panel of experts; or a •twinning• arrangeaent. 
- TA suppliers include expatriate and local individuals and 
consulting firms, U.R. agencies, IC;Os and wlunteer 
organizations, bilateral&, private -nufacturers, siailar 
operating entities, universities, trade and professional 
organizatioos. 
- ls iodirldual comultant or co1111ulting fira preferable? 
Individuals aay be preferable for lonaer tera adrlaory poaitlons 
or when -nagement TA is required. Firms are preferable men 
complementary skills are required, becked up by professional and 
achainistrathe support from headquarters. 
- The choice of expatriate, local, or joint "Venture expertise 
depends, in part, on the technology to be used in the parent 
project and how much adaptation is required to local 
circm1&tances. Other consicleratiooil include the uraency with 
which the recipient wishes the project· to be iaplemented, the 
developaent strategy, the availability of local talent, and the 
relative level of local "Versus expatriate salaries. 
- Transfer of skills and technology can be mre effective if it is 
planned and iapleaented as an integral part of the project and 
other training efforts in the sector or country. 
- If training can begin before the project starts, local staff are 
in a better position to make the m>st effective use of TA 
personnel once they ar.rhe in the field. 







Choose a training strategy 
Ensure vays for trainees to use oev skills 
III. Adainistrative Design and Implementation 
A. Make Logistical and Adllinistrative Arrangements 
Specify administrative responsibilities 
- - - - - - - - -
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- Call on a training or institutional specialist to design the 
training coaponents as vell as institutional measures to retain 
trained staff. 
- Chances of successful skills transfer are better with an 
explicit, separately budgeted, training coaponent, vith tvo 
exceptions: (i) success has been achieved vi th engineering 
consultants training in contract and construction 1anagement; and 
(ii) skills are successfully transferred when nationala have 
priaary or substantive responsibility for task achievement. 
- If contract is expected to be ghen to a single firm. that haa 
proved effective both as consultant and trainer, be sure to all<Jll 
enough time and financial resources to enable success at both 
tasks. 
- Training strategies include: 
(a) '"Sandwich'" training vith on-the-job vork. 
(b) Train on the job first, identify stars, send thea for 
further training, build a cadre. 
(c) Send trainees to· a job overseas, e.g., under a tvinni~ 
arrangement. 
(d) Use short-term. experts as coaches to train. 
(e) Arrange study tours abroad. 
- Training can be tailor-aade or a standard prograa, a one-time or 
periodic activity, fonaal or non foraal, on the .)>b, in-house, 
in-region, or overseas. 
- Ensure support of trainees' 1anagers by involving the• in 
beginning and ending training sessions or setting up special 
workshops or sellinars for them. Follo.i up trainees after 
coapletion of training; incorporate training aaterials into 
ope rational 1anuals. 
- Select implementing agency and assess whether same agency should 








Ensure that professional aspects of TA 
process are aanaged 
B. Provide for Periodic Evaluation 
C. Arrange11ents for Staff and Trainee Selection 
Select local staff 
Select expatriate staff 
'·"'.' :'(';J.;!"'151~~'-
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- To meet professional and personal needs of expatriates and their 
families {housing, offices, and equipment), ensure that 
beneficiary agency can provide adequate support, otherwise 
strengthen agency's capacity or shift responsibility to 
consulting fira or other TA supplier. 
- Specify recipient'• contribution (financial or in kind) to the TA 
assignment. 
- Specify arrangements for briefing, supervising, and backstopping 
the TA team, and its coordination with other apncies. 
- Promote continuity of staff from design to illplementation, or at 
least access of designers and iapleaenters to each other. 
- Make arrangements for pr011pt review of TA staff reports, 
especially Inception Report, tilhich may redefine TA needs and TOI. 
and require early action. 
- Schedule periodic joint evaluation aaong aid agency, TA 
recipient, and consultants to allow changes in assignment over 
time on the basis of implementation experience (flexibility to 
adjust TOR aay be more significant for iDBtitutional than for 
engineering TA, although in the latter case scheduling •Y have 
to be adjusted or even the scope of vorlt as condit ioDB chanp). 
- Assess availability of appropriate local staff at an early stage• 
- Local consultants may be used where iaple•nting apncy staff are 
not available. 
- In some cases, it aay be desirable for foreign coosultant to help 
establish selection criteria and to assist in local staff 
selection, especially for training. 
- Staff self-selection can enhance the chances of havi111 mtivated 
staff. Special incentives aay aometi.es be necessary, hovewr. 
- Key characteristics of effective local •nager (and staff) 
include c~tment to the project, effecthe use of coosultanta, 
good working relations with authorities. 
- Verify that recipient has pnerally accepted and eound selection 




Decide what selection criteria are most 
essential in achieving the particular PRTA 
task 
D. Hake Arrangements for TA Follow-up 
Annex l 
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- Consider advantages of large versus small firm, U.N. organization 
versus individual contracts, the impact on TA staff DDrale of j:>b 
security upon completion of assignment, etc. 
- Ensure that if several groups of expatriates from different 
organizations are engaged, their conditions of employment are 
comparable. 
- Individual qualities to consider in selection of expatriates 
include: technical competence; understanding of aid agency and 
recipient procedures and policies; and a range of personality 
characteristics (adaptability, dedication, flexibility, patience, 
tact, empathy, political sensitivity, and cross-cultural 
communication skills including linguistic ability). Training 
skills may also be a criterion. 
- Psychological testing, interviews, or short-ter11l initial 
appointments are ways to improve the matching of foreign and 
local staff. 
- Create local permanent positions to replace expatriates. Arra~e 
for decisions to be taken about policy recommendations and assign 
responsibility for implementation. Retain consultants for 








The participants will: 
1. Outline the factors affecting the establishment of trust. 
2. Evaluate the characteristics of an outsider who is trusted. 
3. Assess how well this class is establishing trust. 
Activities 
1. Discussion of factors affecting the establishment of trust 
(1 hour) 
a) feelings about homework assignment. 
b) list factors on newsprint. 
2. Break (15 min) 
3. Midterm evaluation 
a) Triads (30 min) 
Tasks - Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this 
course so far. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of 
the facilitator. What affect has the establishment of 
trust had on the success and failure of this class so 
far? 
b) Large group discussion (30 min) 
What have we done in this class to enhance or inhibit 
trust among ourselves? 
4. Handout Homework #6 - Managing Rural Development. (10 min) 
No class at scheduled time next week. On following Saturday 
will have all day class, 8-5 p.m. 
HOMEWORK 6 
MANAGING RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Read: 
1. Heaver, Bureaucratic Policies and Incentives in the 
Management of Rural Development. 
2. Korten, pp.53-162. 
3. Chambers, pp.140-167. 
4. Hyden, pp.182-205. 
5. Moris, pp.116-125. 
No class at regular time next week. Week from this Saturday we 
will play The Green Revolution Game from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. at the 
Fine Arts Center, Room 
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SUMMARY 
Neglect of the _ _!'1_anagement Factor 
Pollr public sector management is recognized as a key constraint on 








It ill hard to separate the results of poor management 
from the many problems in poor countries which are beyond 
manl\~<'rs' control. 
Mana~~ment research has concentrated on the upper levels of 
bur<'nucracies, rather than the middle and junior officials 
who Actually implement projects in the field. It thus does 
not mt•t"t the practical needs of managers or advisers. 
Hahltll of thought and appraisal techniques have not changed 
to m<'<'t the needs of the 1970s generation of management-
intttmd ve rural development projects. 
Prof~s$ional bias encourages the wrong diagnosis of across-
thr-ho~rd organization and management problems as special-
izrd. technical, sectoral problems. 
FunJln~ agencies have little access to key management pro-
cc~~r~ in implementing organizations, and hence to the causes 
rathrr than the symptoms of poor management. 
The ~~~ess problem is compounded by the political sensitiv-
itv 0f management issues, especially the controversial 
qu~$ti0n of who has control of scarce resources for what 
en"~~· 
Why Emphasire In~entives and Politics? 
Tw0 a.tJor approaches to management improvement have been through 
the structur~l r~form of organizations, and management training. However, 
structural r~f''nl is often short-circuited by the workings of the informal 
management s,~tMl, and then results in no more than symbolic action. Manage-
ment trainin..~ is often not adapted to the environment of third world 
bureaucracies· ~n incentives approach to management complements existing 
structural an-J training approaches. It is also more fundamental, in that 
the pattern 0 ~ :u~entives and motives within the bureaucracy ultimately 
determines ~~:~r new structures and newly trained managers will be used to 




Four models of organizational processes are examined: rational, 
bureaucratic, garbage can and political. It is suggested that current 
management approaches imply that implementing agencies work primarily accord-
ing to a mixture of bureaucratic and garbage can processes, to which a 
rationalist response would make sense. In reality, the political model is 
often more appropriate. The apparently unplanned, haphazard outcomes of much 
bureaucratic activity in fact suit important political interest groups, and 
are hence not as random as they seem. Rationalist solutions will therefore 
fail if they do not take account of political processes with their own 
rationality, and the incentive systems these imply. 
Bureaucracy as Politics 
The official goals of poverty-oriented development are 
multi-purpose and qualitative. Lack of goal clarity and difficulties in 
measuring achievement allow the pursuit of informal political goals within 
development bureaucracies. Informal personalist management systems also 
imply a looser structure and hence greater scope for playing politics in the 
implementation process. But the prevalence of politics and conflict, per-
sonalism and patronage are insufficient to explain why even winners in the 
struggle for resources and power are often consistently bad performers in the 
field. Seen from within, the bureaucratic picture is of interest groups in 
conflict. Seen from below--the viewpoint of the poor--it is one of 
coalition: a coalition of indifference to their needs. Conflict occurs 
primarily over the allocation of resources: but there is little perceived 
political advantage in using resources to maximum developmental effect once 
secured. The poor do not have the political voice to disturb this coalition. 
As a result, resources enter the bureaucratic system, but do not "trickle 
down" to the intended beneficiaries. 
Perpetuation of many of the ''problems" of bureaucracy--centralism, 
departmentalism, duplication, and sometimes red tape in decision-making--is 
often in the interest of the key political game-players adept at handling the 
system. "Rationalist" administrative innovation tends to destroy the infor-
mal management systems fundamental to the existing balance of power, and will 
therefore be resisted. The implications for an incentives approach to 
management are extremely significant. New programs and projects must take 
account of bureaucratic politics, and provide an incentive, in terms of a 
perceived personal advantage, for bureaucrats at each level and in every 
department involved. This implies the addition of a new dimension to project 
design: the assessment of motivation and incentives within implementing 
agencies, and systematic attention to the kind of incentive patterns which 







Recognizing Political Rationality 
One basic assumption, implicit in the idea of bureaucracy as 
politics, underlies the assessment of incentives--that individuals at all 
levels in the organization are for the most part behaving rationally from 
their own standpoint. Expectations of bureaucracy often implicitly accept 
that its definitive qualities are apathy and ignorance--Koestler's simplistic 
but revealing definition of bureaucracy, which he sees as the polar opposite 
of the meritocracy, defined as intelligence plus effort. The contrasting 
approach put forward here is that implementing organizations contain large 
reserves of intelligence and effort if appropriately stimulated: but that 
this stimulus is often missing, and/or these reserves are often concentrated 
in pursuit of unofficial goals which may not match those of funding agencies. 
It is not rational for individuals or organizations to exert themselves in a 
particular direction when there is insufficient incentive to do so: and it 
can therefore very well be argued that the logical result in many bureau-
cracies is often a combination of Koestler's two definitions--a situation 
where it is intelligent to be apathetic in pursuit of development goals. In 
the discussion of bureaucracy as politics, an informal decision-rule for 
civil servants was implied: "What political gain will implementing this 
policy bring me?" Following from the above assumption about rationality a 
parallel question needs to be asked by evaluators. The question the conven-
tional evaluator has asked when examining progress in the field is "What has 
gone wrong here?" The basic question proposed in contrast is "What are the 
influences on the officials involved which make this result/action/non-action 
rational from their own point of view?" I.e., not "What makes this wrong?" 
but "What makes this right?" This is the question that is basic to the 
assessment of incentives. Asking this question directs attention to manage-
ment and motivational root causes, while asking "What has gone wrong?" is 
more likely to direct attention to problem symptoms. 
This notion of bureaucratic rationality must be distinguished from 
both "imperious" and "bounded" notions of rationality. This is clearly not 
the objective rationality of Pfeffer's first model (Table 1, page 11), since 
the political model of bureaucracy implies behavior which is often not in the 
rational interest of development goals. But nor is this merely bounded 
rationality, which still assumes that the individual is attempting to behave 
in some objectively or ultimately rational manner, but is constrained from 
doing so because of his imperfect knowledge and the bounds of his analytical 
ability. In contrast, bureaucratic behavior is often based on rational 
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self-interest, an approach to managerial behavior which in itself is no new 
one. It is implied in Herbert Simon's classic "Administrative Behavior" 
(Simon, 1962: 243): "This is the basic task of administration--to provide 
each 'operative' employee with an environment of decision of such a kind that 
behavior which is rational from the standpoint of this environment is also 
rational from the standpoint of the group values and the group situation." 
It has been specifically applied to rural development by Chambers (1974), 
for example: 
Often, however, an examination of the work environment, 
perceptions and expectations of field staff will show, not 
that they are willfully negligent, but that they are reacting 
rationally to a situation in which it is not clear what is 
expected of them but in which it is clear that the exercise 
of initiative in development matt-;rs is at least as likely to 
be penalized as deviant behavior as rewarded for being good 
work (p. 23), and (p. 61): What does emerge, however, is that 
much of the inactivity and low work output can be understood 
as a rational response to a combination of terms of service, 
living conditions, working conditions and supervision. 
Neither penalties nor rewards provide strong incentives for 
better performance. In these circumstances, the potential 
abilities of staff lie largely dormant, a latent but 
unrealized resource. Staff could work eight hours a day 
instead of five. They could visit more than just the 
progressive elite of farmers. They could cover villages 
and farmers more distant from the places where they live. 
That they do not do these things is largely because they 
are rational. The question is how to change their work 
environment so that it becomes equally rational for them 
to work harder and better. 
What is now needed is formal recognition of the importance of rational 
self-interest as defined by the patterns of incentives within recipient 
organizations. The effects of this incentive climate on individuals must be 
seen in proper perspective. Few officials are Machiavellian intriguers 
seeking all the time for their own advancement. Most are more reactive than 
proactive in their attitudes, and some are plain lazy and will be unrespon-
sive even to a custom-designed incentive system. The following three 
bureaucratic types give a rough sense of the spectrum in the average 
implementing agency: 
1. The Political Gamesman: The idea of tile gamesman is taken 
from Maccoby's well-known analysis of top corporate leaders 
(Mac co by, 1976). His book is subtitled "Winning and Losing 
the Career Game", and this approach--to career as a game 
to be won--is the key to the bureaucratic gamesman. As 
a skilled politician, he will be highly sensitive to the 
informal goals and priorities of the bureaucracy, to the 
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sources of power, and to the key officials and politicians 
who are now or will become powerful. He will seek to advance 
his career by selling politically appealing projects to 
superiors and by implementing them in ways which take 
account of informal priorities (the case study below gives 
an example of this). He will ensure that the incentive 
systems controlling those below him reflect the informal 
goals that are in his career interest to pursue. 
2. The Entrepreneur: The approach of the entrepreneurial 
bureaucrat can be described as follows: "Bureaucrats invest 
their energies where there is the greatest prospect of 
return. Developing country bureaucrats in particular are 
constantly making calculations because they have so many 
alternative investment options both in terms of their daily 
work (what meetings to skip, etc.) and in terms of their 
medium-term career (which project is likely to mutate into 
a corporation)" (John Howell, pers. comm.). The entre-
preneur bureaucrat has some of the characteristics of the 
political gamesman. He has a career plan, and decides 
his priorities on the basis of his medium term interest. 
But he is reactive within a framework of investment 
options, responsive to rather than creating possibilities 
for advancement (the gamesman is more likely to propose 
the project which later mutates into a corporation). The 
entrepreneur's choice of priorities will affect the 
incentives of those below him; but he is as much a 
responder to incentives as he is an incentive-setter. 
3. The Incentive-Follower: The majority of lower-level 
officials are incentive-followers only. They are the 
field staff described by Chambers, and in head office 
they are the yes-men clients of political patrons. 
Incentive-followers are almost entirely reactive 
responders: they have little concept of control over 
their careers and may perhaps best be described not 
as recognizing and reacting to positive incentives, 
but as following the "line of least resistance" within 
a given incentive pattern. 
These categories are arbitrary in that all officials are to some 
extent incentive-followers (the gamesman's reactions to superiors and to a 
constraining environment) and all to an extent incentive-setters (the exten-
sion officer's effects on the motivation of client farmers). All are acting 
in their rational self-interest given their career goals and limitations. 
But it is important, among these rational actors, to distinguish those who 
are acting mainly as incentive-setters, since it is they who will control 
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attitudes and behavior in the organization, and ultimately the effectiveness 
of implementation. 
Key Interest Groups and Incentive-Setters 
The assessment of incentives within implementing agencies can 
validly concentrate on a small number of key groups or individuals and on 
an examination of how far their motives and aims conflict with those of other 
key groups, and those of project originators. 
At the lower levels of organizations, interest groups are likely 
to be large--for example, the entire field officer contingent at a particular 
level of the extension service hierarchy. The entire group is likely to 
share similar problems and incentives, just as will the entire group of their 
immediate superiors. Groups will have different interests according to 
department and function, as well as according to their position in the 
hierarchy: extension officers will have very different ~roblems and inter-
ests from those of water bailiffs, while water bailiffs are likely to form a 
different interest group from that of, say, the irrigation engineers control-
ling them. The organization charts of the various departments involved may 
thus be broken down very quickly into a series of groups which a priori may 
be expected to have common internal interests and to be to some extent in 
conflict with superior, subordinate or coordinating groups. Higher up in the 
hierarchy, groups give way to individual managers with particular personal 
interests. These groups may be cut across, or individuals may be united, by 
other groupings, based not upon departmental, hierarchical or personal inter-
est, but on professional loyalty (e.g., engineers versus planners), race or 
age (which may determine attitudes to or possibilities for career develop-
ment). When these groups are superimposed upon those derived direct from the 
organization chart, the picture becomes more complicated: but it still does 
not take account of the interest groups created by the informal management 
systems of a political bureaucracy. Superimposed again must be patron-client 
interest groups, which clearly will cut across horizontal hierarchical group-
ings, and are equally unlikely to be synonymous with formal departmental 
groups. It begins to seem as if there are more intersecting, shifting coali-
tions in the organization than there are individuals. 
In practice, however, the large number of groups that a sociologist 
might isolate can be reduced to a few key groups and individuals whose 
strategic placing gives them control over project performance. Given that 
bureaucracies are basically authoritarian, the interests of more senior 
individuals and groups tend to determine the incentives of those below. 
Analysis should therefore start with the individuals near the head of the 
organization, whose attitudes will tend to dictate the incentive system for 
subordinates. If they share the aims of the project originators, attention 
can be turned to those next in the hierarchy, with the aim of determining 
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where conflicts in motivation occur which break the chain of common inter-
est--for it will be at these points that commitment and cooperation will be 
lost, and the "trickle down" effect will become apparent. 
The search for key interest groups and incentive-setters cannot, 
however, be confined to the formal hierarchy. Those in a position to control 
incentives are those who have power. Those with power, as the political 
approach to bureaucracy suggests, are those who control resources: and the 
control of key resources is far from limited to those with greatest formal 
authority. Starting-points for finding the incentive-setters would include 
answers to the following questions: 
1. Who controls agendas. The obvious controllers of the 
organizational agenda are the planners who formally set 
priorities in conjunction with top management. But those 
with control over the agenda of important meetings and 
committees or with the ear of top (formal) managers can 
exert tremendous influence in seeing that certain 
decisions/problems are confronted and others not. 
2. Who controls the budget process, central to the 
distribution of resources. 
3. Who controls the procurement of physical resources. 
Given that the actual budget is seldom sufficient for 
all required resources, the process of equipment and 
supply procurement gives scope for favoring particular 
goals/activities. 
4. Who controls the procurement and distribution of human 
resources. The quality of staff assigned to different 
activities can determine success or failure. So also 
can the informal applications of formal policy with 
regard to promotion, postings, housing, pay and 
allowances, and in-service training. 
S. ilhich departments and interest groups actually~ the 
most/finest resources and most favorable treatment. 
These may be the informal powers behind the thrones 
of the budget, procurement, personnel and planning 
processes. 
6. Who is irreplaceable. Individuals who are irreplaceable 
have power. They may have technical expertise that is 
essential to the organization. They may simply be the 
relative of someone important outside the organization. 
They may have knowledge of complex bureaucratic proce-
dures or special contacts in other departments such as 
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the Ministry of Finance: such "fixers" are crucial for 
ensuring the steady supply of resources--including 
the key resource of cooperation from coordinating 
departments. 
7. Who controls information. Information is perhaps the 
greatest single source of informal power. The selection 
and presentation of information largely determine 
planning and the control of agendas, and also the 
evaluation of performance (through selection among 
objective judgment criteria, or simply distortion of 
reports). Among key positions in the communications 
network are those responsible for reporting and liaison 
between head office and the field, and those responsible 
for communication and coordination with other agencies. 
Incentives, Priorities and Pressures 
Breaking the organization down into a relatively small number of 
key interest groups and incentive-setting officials is a somewhat crude 
simplification of a complex reality: but this is necessary, since appraisal 
must be rapid, and specific targets must be selected for assistance and 
intervention, if attempts are later to be made to influence incentives. 
Similarly, some systematic effort must be made to classify and interpret the 
complex and often conflicting incentives and pressures that determine the 
priorities of interest groups and individuals--whether gamesman, 
entrepreneurs or followers. It is suggested that incentives as they affect 
the individual or group can for practical purposes be simplified into four 
sets of conflicting or complementary factors, which may be termed internal 
priorities, official and unofficial pressures from superiors, and local 
pressures. 
Internal priorities may be defined as "intrinsic" motivation--that 
is, the attitude of the individual or group to his or their career. In the 
case of individual managers, personal levels of ambition may be important, as 
may personal values: in the case of both individuals and groups, attitudes 
towards work and career will be determined very largely by the personnel 
management and reward system. Factors include salary and allowance levels, 
opportunities for promotion and in-service training, questions of housing and 
posting. This is the area which has received most attention from field 
researchers, who have commented, for example, on the motivational implica-
tions of frequent personnel transfers in mid-project, and of alternative 
promotion systems based on merit, nepotism or length of service. It is an 
area of crucial importance, because it determines the basic attitudes and 
outlook of officials at all levels. 
37! 
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Official pressures from superiors tend to reflect the "party line", 
for example, the goals of the project or program as set out by the govern-
ment. It is important to determine how far these are clearly expressed to 
officers down the line and in the field. Junior officials and field officers 
frequently share a different conception of the project from those of the 
project originators, are unclear about their roles and goals, and hence 
inevitably poorly motivated. Second only to the clarity of the official line 
in importance is the way in which official pressure is exerted on subor-
dinates: the question of management style. Generalization is difficult, 
because different civil services and departments within them exhibit and 
indeed expect different types of managerial behavior. A cooperative manage-
ment style appropriate in a department characterized by informal relation-
ships would be interpreted merely as a sign of weak leadership in a depart-
ment or culture that expected and respected authority and instructions. 
There will also be a trade-off with the incentives provided by the personnel 
management system--staff motivated by good salaries and conditions may be 
prepared to tolerate more authoritarian management. However, more coopera-
tive management styles tend to encourage subordinates to share information 
and problems more frequently with their superiors--an important advantage in 
rural development, where "bottom-up" management is particularly important. 
The presentation of the official line is therefore as important as its con-
tent. 
Informal pressures from superiors are likely, in a political 
bureaucracy, to be as important as official ones, and it is these that have 
been seriously neglected. Informal pressures reflect the actual priorities 
of superiors, where these are not in agreement with official priorities. 
Subordinates are extremely sensitive to these informal pressures, since it is 
by their response to them that they are likely, de facto, to be judged by 
their superiors. In the case of a subordinate with a wide-ranging job 
description, the official line coming to him may be equal emphasis on his 
various areas of responsibility: but if it is in his superior's or the 
department's interest to pursue one area rather than another, the subordinate 
is likely to realize rather quickly what his best interests have become. For 
example, if a superior's aim is to demonstrate progress in a new extension 
campaign, and this can be presented in terms of the number of farm visits and 
farmers meetings held by junior officials, then the informal incentive for 
junior officials is to hold (or at least report) the largest possible number 
of meetings, irrespective of their effectiveness: though both superior and 
subordinate know that the official aim is to increase acreage of the new 
crop, this need not be their informal priority. Informal priorities will 
seldom be announced, but they are nevertheless effective as pressures on 
subordinates who are concerned with their political future in the organiza-
tion, or simply to keep in line with the boss. 
Local pressures include all those day-to-day pressures on the 
individual or group sterrnning not from their superiors, but from the execution 
of their job and their relationship with peers, subordinates and clients. 
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For example, an irrigation manager in the field will be subject to pressure 
from peers to cooperate and probably to conform, pressures from farmers 
(complaints, requests for advice), pressures from subordinates, and from the 
many routine administrative matters that de facto take up the majority of his 
time. He may therefore be subject to four types of influence: from his own 
career ambitions; the official project implementation line; informal depart-
mental priorities; and local pressures. Pressures from his superiors, 
reflecting the priorities of superiors and the pressures acting on them in 
turn, may be in conflict with local pressures, e.g., requiring attention to a 
strategic problem, rather than to clearing pressing and immediate tactical 
ones. Local pressures are neglected by evaluators, who, in short visits, and 
with counterpart officials taken off their normal duties to accompany them, 
concentrate on results in the field to the exclusion of getting a picture of 
daily workloads and problems. But the pressures and frustrations of an 
official's daily round inevitably bulk large in the trade-off he must make 
between conflicting pressures from different directions. 
In principle, therefore, the individual or group's behavior may 
be governed by incentive factors quite apart from the dictates of official 
project aims--internal priorities, local pressures, and informal pressures 
from superiors. Project goals will only be pursued: (a) where these are 
not in conflict with more important, i.e., more rewarding factors; (b) where 
project goals are in conflict with other interests, but official pressures 
are so strong that they cannot be ignored; or, (c) most effectively, where 
internal priorities and informal and official pressures coincide as far as 
possible with each other and with project goals. An incentives approach 
suggests that the main aim of project and donor management should be to 
create a situation (c) where there is a minimum conflict between these four 
factors. It follows that determining which are the key interest groups, and 
what are the key incentives and pressures affecting them, must become a major 
goal of organizational appraisal and implementation analysis. 
Case: Incentives in a Complex Project System 
This section illustrates the incentives approach in a brief 
analysis of implementation problems on a major irrigation/settlement scheme 
in South Asia. The project in question was managed on an integrated basis by 
a River Basin Development Board with wide powers, and assistance from major 
aid donors. A number of problems were apparent. Agricultural credit default 
rates were extremely high; equipment offered under project aid loans had not 
arrived; farmers were late in beginning cultivation operations at the start 
of the wet season; essential inputs such as fertilizer arrived late or in 
insufficient quantity; farmers were growing flooded paddy rice on porous soil 
instead of the subsidiary food crops recommended in the project plan; some 
farmers harvesting late had no time to thresh their crop before the land 
preparation period of the subsequent season; perhaps worst of all, irrigation 
water use was double the per acre allocation in the project plan, and hence 
water supply for the tail end of the Scheme still to be irrigated and settled 
1.·-;';. 
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was threatened. In addition, construction work in the latter area was hap-
hazardly planned, with priority often going to activities off the critical 
path. 
Most of these problems were linked in vicious circles. Farmers 
took longer than planned in land preparation because tractors available under 
the aid loan had not been procured and distributed. This meant that farmers 
kept paddy fields flooded for tillage after the peak period of rains, and 
hence used more irrigation water. Non-arrival of threshers under the aid 
loan meant that crops were often stacked after harvest until buffalo or 
tractor power became available for threshing. This increased grain wastage, 
and delayed the receipt of cash from the marketed surplus. This often meant 
default on agricultural loans, with the prospect that the use of modern 
inputs in the following season would be reduced. Delay in harvesting and 
threshing also meant a late start on land preparation in the next season, 
missing the peak period rains and thus continuing the vicious circle. These 
agricultural problems were, however, no more than symptoms of more fundamen-
tal planning and management deficiencies. Farmers were hampered by the 
absence of much of the government support designed into the early period of 
implementation. The Development Board was responsible for procuring tractors 
and threshers under the aid loan, and had not done so. Annual inputs were 
arriving late or not at all, again the Board's responsibility. Planned 
marketing services for the subsidiary food crops had not been organized, so 
that farmers had every incentive to grow their traditional flooded paddy crop 
on the porous soils, and hence vastly increase water consumption. Project 
management was in general inadequate. 
In turn, planning and management problems could be traced to root 
causes in the area of incentives. The assessment procedure suggests starting 
the examination of incentives at the top, even if it is problems in the field 
which are most apparent. The Chairman of the Board was an able political 
gamesman, who had been promoted to his current position after assuring a 
senior politician that a massive acceleration in the speed of implementation 
of the Scheme was feasible. The politician's personal support gave the 
Chairman exceptional power. But his political future now depended on meeting 
targets defined by himself and interested politicians in terms of acres 
irrigated and delivered ready for settlement. His personal incentive was 
therefore to concentrate on construction activity, since the measure of 
progress was acres delivered with irrigation infrastructure, rather than 
agricultural output, etc., in the irrigated areas. This was therefore the 
key divergence in incentive terms between informal and political goals. 
The Chairman was an engineer by profession and this, as commonly 
in irrigation projects, reinforced the bias towards construction. He sur-
rounded himself with a loyal and effective engineering and construction staff 
in head office, which was clearly the key professional interest group. Sig-
nificantly, the top managerial post in the area of settlement was filled and 
operated efficiently (perhaps because the arrival of settlers was part of the 
~7f 
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measure of progress), while the chief managerial post for agriculture was 
left vacant for over a year--a clear enough indicator of priorities. The 
Chairman and engineering staff controlled the flow of information to the 
Cabinet and overseeing agencies. Reports of progress in the field consis-
tently highlighted construction activity and downplayed agriculture and 
community development. The priority given to different forms of construction 
work reflected the Chairman's incentives. He concentrated on the building of 
irrigation infrastructure rather than Coop stores essential for community 
development purposes and the provision of agricultural inputs. Within the 
activity of irrigation development, he concentrated on jungle clearance and 
major canal construction rather than on minor canals and field channels. In 
line with the bias in measures of success, it was clear that work was con-
centrating on activities of high public visibility and concern. What had 
seemed haphazard planning from the perspective of official project goals was 
in fact perfectly rational given the incentives and pressures affecting the 
key interest group in the organization. 
The pattern of incentives developed consistently down the line. 
The acceleration of effort meant that officials were overworked in all sec-
tors, and therefore that they could not attend to all aspects of their formal 
job descriptions. Given the pressure to obtain bulldozers and other con-
struction equipment, it was rational for procurement officers in head office 
to concentrate on these at the expense of agricultural equipment. The over-
worked Project Manager in the field naturally took the line of least resis-
tance in concentrating on construction rather than agriculture and community 
development work. Personally enthusiastic agriculture officials had no 
support from head office and hence neither incentive nor ability to carry out 
their work according to the project plan. Coop officials responsible for 
procuring agricultural inputs could not plan requirements in advance, since 
they could not predict next season's cultivated acreage on the basis of the 
inflated targets for expansion of the irrigated area given them by the 
engineers. Water bailiffs attempting to reduce water issues faced political 
hostility (including telegrams to the local MP) from top-end farmers who 
stood to lose, and had no incentive to enforce restrictions, given the lack 
of support from top management. All were behaving rationally, but all fail-
ing by the standards of official project goals. 
The above incentives-oriented sketch of problems and problem causes 
in an integrated rural project illustrates a number of important principles. 
First, the fundamental importance of identifying the divergence between 
official project and informal political goals. Second, the fact that the 
organizational pattern of incentives was determined at a high level in head 
office, far from the resulting problems in the field. This underlines the 
importance of investigating incentives as they operate vertically through the 
hierarchy, and of concentrating on key incentive-setting individuals and 
interest groups. Third, the way in which the key interest group was able to 
pursue its informal goals through control over the setting of organizational 






that while political gamesmanship was evident at higher levels, no conspiracy 
theory or informal politicking is necessary to explain behavior at the level 
of incentive-followers in the field. Field staff could not have given weight 
to all official goals given the work pressures upon them. The informal 
priorities of superiors were translated into pressure for results in certain 
directions which could not be ignored, either in terms of rational 
self-interest or simply in terms of carrying out instructions. In 
general--and most importantly--officials in the implementing organization 
were not planning badly and deviating from official development goals through 
ignorance or incapacity: they were doing so because of the incentives and 
pressures acting upon them. 
The Practicalities of Assessment: When, By Whom, and How? 
Previous sections have developed a conceptual approach 
incentives, and have given a brief illustration of application. 
remainder of this chapter is concerned with the practicalities of 




When: Although the concern of this paper is with implementation, 
it is clear that the assessment of incentives must primarily take place 
during project preparation. This is because the assessment of political will 
to undertake the project should influence design, and may even raise ques-
tions as to whether it should go forward at all. It is also because the most 
effective way to influence incentives is to design measures to do so into the 
original project plan (Chapter Five). Systematic attention to assessing 
incentives would therefore require: 
1. A Reconnaissance Stage Report, assessing the general climate 
of incentives and pressures in the organization, and recom-
mending the broad form of project which might be roost or 
least appropriate and hence successful. 
2. A Feasibility-Stage Report: this should trace through the 
network of activities involved in implementation, stop at 
each critical action or assumption (e.g., about coordina-
tion), and assess whether the incentives exist for 
officials to act as planned. 
3. Feedback During Implementation: this is equally important, 
for two reasons. First, it may be hard to fully assess the 
incentive system· in the organization at the appraisal stage 
if it is not already undertaking projects closely comparable 
to that proposed. Second, inherent instability in the system, 
and the long implementation periods of rural projects, mean 
that incentives will inevitably change during implementation 
(sponsoring politicians may lose power, key officials may be 




offer greater bureaucratic rewards and hence change priori-
ties, etc.). 
By Whom: The use of a management or organization development 
specialist for this type of assessment has both good justification and disad-
vantages. On the positive side, it indicates recognition that management 
is an important subject area in its own right: since management problems are 
as (or more) likely to lead to project failure as any sectoral, technical 
problem, there is as much justification for a management specialist on the 
project appraisal team as there is for a soil scientist or economist. 
Second, it is justified because management as a specialist field requires 
assessment skills different from those of many sectoral experts. And the 
management specialist offers the advantage of organizational "systems vision" 
which does not see problem symptoms through the often distorting glasses of 
sectoral expertise. The disadvantages include the cost of adding yet another 
specialist to the appraisal team, and the fact that management specialists 
with experience of third world bureaucracies and rural development are anyway 
thin on the ground. Also, the management specialist is inevitably fairly 
"high profile." Despite his specialty (or because of the announcement of 
it), he may have more problems in gaining access to the informal management 
system than sector experts who are less suspected of the desire to probe into 
sensitive areas. Presentation as a planning expert may help to minimize the 
third problem. 
Two conclusions may be drawn: 
1. In general, the management challenges of development are 
still underestimated. In the case of large, integrated 
projects, this should be recognized, and management 
specialists included on appraisal teams as a matter of 
course. Large integrated projects are both the ones 
which can afford the extra professional costs, and the 
ones which imply greatest organizational expansion and 
interagency cooperation, and hence the greatest manage-
ment problems. 
2. The costs of appraisal may make a specialist management 
input impractical for smaller projects. The task can 
then either be given to one or more individuals or split 
among all members of a multidisciplinary team, each 
responsible for assessing incentives in his sector. 
The latter method has the advantage of encouraging 
each sector expert to take management factors into 
account when he plans his own aspects of the project: 
the result may be modified proposals at the technical 
level, with a better chance of implementation. On the 
other hand, given that the assessment task needs an 
integrated multisectoral view of the project, it can 
be useful to assign this to team members with this 
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overview--for example, an economist or the project 
leader. 
How: The need is to penetrate the formal bureaucracy and to assess 
its inform~priorities and processes. The two major practical obstacles 
to this are the questions of access and subjectivity. Senior officials of 
implementing agencies have every incentive to present and stress the excel-
lence of the formal system in order to secure resources: somehow, access to 
the informal management system must be gained. And once off the security of 
the Organization Chart, the assessor of incentives must often rely on per-
sonal, subjective judgment about what is significant. Given that appraisal 
time is limited and the ideal approach of participant observation unwelcome, 
there are in practice two major methods of applying the conceptual approach 
outlined above. The first is interviews with field staff, which are likely 
to reveal very different views of organizational resources, goals and 
priorities from those gained from senior officials in head office. The 
second is performance checking to test the consistency of officials' profes-
sions about priorities with action in the field. What has been done and what 
has been neglected, and the amount of time that has been put into different 
activities will reflect priorities and pressures if the rational bureaucrat 
approach is correct. The evidence of performance will provide valuable 
objective information on how informal pressures from above conflict with 
official ones. Analogous in economics to the idea of "revealed preference",, 
this extremely simple approach to evaluating what management has a real 
commitment to has not been available to the project evaluator who has assumed 
that if a non-action is not explicable by a skill or resource gap, then it is 
due to "bureaucratic inertia" or apathy. An approach which works back from 
the concrete evidence of achievement or non-achievement in the field to make 
inferences about motivation and incentives will tend to minimize the problem 
of subjectivity, whose biggest danger is the projection of the evaluator's 
own beliefs and assumptions onto the officials he is interviewing. 
Presenting the Results 
The results of an incentives assessment must be presented so as to 
maximize its usefulness. Full assessments cannot be presented in formal 
project documents, copies of which go to implementing organizations, since 
the procedure will be seen as potentially manipulative and unwelcome. On the 
other hand, the question of incentives cannot be ignored in appraisal docu-
ments, since one of the best methods of influencing incentives is itself to 
make the implementing agency formally aware that funding agencies care about 
incentives. The following compromises may be suggested for different situa-
tions: 
1. Where the pattern of incentives throws real doubt on the 
question of project viability, a full assessment report 
needs to be made in confidence to the funding agency. 
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2. Where there are divergences between formal and informal 
priorities, but the project appears viable if incentives 
can be influenced: 
a. Where the incentive problem is non-threatening, it 
should be dealt with fully in the appraisal document. 
An example would be where incentive problems primarily 
concern junior field staff with little political power, 
i.e., incentive-followers. Inclusion in the project 
document of a clear analysis of the problem and pro-
posals to counter it is useful, because this formally 
recognizes the incentive system as the root cause, 
and commits the implementing organization to action 
in this area. Since the incentive problems affecting 
field staff that deal directly with farmers are par-
ticularly important and generally non-threatening, 
assessment of these should be incorporated into agency 
appraisal guidelines as a matter of routine. 
b. Where incentives assessments are politically threaten-
ing, drawing attention to the~ill be counter-
productive. An example would be the situation in 
the case study above. In such cases, the value of 
assessment would be in designing appropriate measures 
to change incentives, and the inclusion of these 
measures at appropriate points of the project plan. 
In addition, a confidential assessment of the situa-
tion should be written for the funding agency, first 
so that potential implementation problems can be 
anticipated and watched for: second, so that agency 
officials are aware of the reasons for and importance 





Points of Entry 
The very idea of influencing incentives has overtones of manipula-
tion and conflict. Given that the aim is to minimize conflict that will 
impede implementation, the essential preliminary to considering points of 
entry at the implementation stage is serious consideration of "points of 
exit" at the planning stage: the use of an incentives assessment to avoid 
investment altogether in projects where real lack of recipient political 
commitment has been detected. However, funding agencies may not welcome the 
frank appraisal of political commitment which this implies. Aid agencies, in 
particular, accepters of gradualist change, have not cared to analyze too 
closely the degree of gradualism they are prepared to accept, the degree of 
compromise they are prepared to make in pursuit of their official goals. 
Realistic assessment of those projects which promise to be implementable if 
incentives can be favorably influenced involves facing this question of 
compromise squarely. The need to maintain legitimacy as a foreign agency 
rightly breeds caution about activism on sensitive issues. Such caution is 
quite wrongly likely to result in a negative attitude towards conscious 
attempts to influence incentives in implementing organizations, on the 
grounds that this could be interference of a political nature. It cannot be 
stressed too strongly that it is a non-issue to raise the question whether 
agencies should be involved in the sort of recipient bureaucratic political 
activity described in Chapter Three. It is a non-issue because agencies have 
no choice: they already are involved in the political game. The trickle 
down effect is already diverting resources to the benefit of the bureaucracy 
and the rural rich rather than the rural poor. If funding agencies choose to 
adopt a do-nothing strategy, this is effectively a political decision to 
accept the present position. If agencies are serious about their official 
goals, the question (to paraphrase Sapolsky, p. 17 above) is not whether they 
play politics, but how to be better at it than others. This is the question 
addressed in the remainder of this Chapter. 
There are two broad approaches to influencing incentives, concerned 
respectively with affecting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation--in the language of this paper the internal priorities that shape 
attitudes to work and career--is determined largely by financial rewards and 
the personnel management system. The fact that these are often outside the 
scope of agency influence does not diminish their importance. As Esman and 
Montgomery (1980: 208) point out, field staff should be rewarded for the 
extra effort needed to work with the hardest-to-reach, most marginal farmers. 
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Changing financial and benefit systems and the creation of national awards 
for success in poverty-reducing projects and programs could do muth to make 
the work of agricultural extension or bare-foot doctoring as prestigious and 
rewarding as careers in research or official medicine, and thus have tremen-
dous effects on performance in the field. At the project level, where direct 
influence over base salaries is seldom possible, funding agencies may never-
theless be able to influence material· incentives in a number of different 
ways. First, it may be possible to increase cash incentives other than 
salaries--for example, field and travel allowances. Second, non-cash 
material incentives such as better transport or housing may also be more open 
to negotiation, and equally effective motivators. Third, promotion, train-
ing, and the payment of annual bonuses can be linked much more directly to 
performance. Bottrall (1981: 118), in a detailed case study of irrigation 
project management, illustrates clearly the incentive effect of bonuses 
payable to field staff at the discretion of project management--an outcome 
facilitated by the unusual independence of the case project from the govern-
ment budget, due to revenues collected from farmers in payment for project 
services. 
The second broad approach to influencing incentives is concerned 
with extrinsic motivation, and it is this which has been least systematically 
considered elsewhere. Extrinsic motivation involves influencing the remain-
ing groups of incentives--official, informal, and local pressures and incen-
tives. The need is to find ways of reducing counter-productive informal 
political activity without creating unnecessary conflict, and without over-
stepping the funding agency's bounds of legitimacy. In the following sec-
tions, it is suggested that two broad points of entry minimize these dangers: 
approaches through planning and control, and approaches through feedback, 
monitoring and evaluation. The aim here is not to spell out the detail of 
planning and evaluation techniques whose principles are available elsewhere, 
but to show in particular how they can be used to influence incentives in a 
manner that is as depoliticized and non-threatening as possible. The con-
siderable scope of such "non-political" methods of entry for creating effec-
tive change in informal political priorities is discussed, and illustrated 
with a number of examples of success and failure from the field. The final 
section of the Chapter then considers the limitations of such indirect 
influence, and the need to complement this with direct influence through both 
encouragement and pressure. 
Depoliticized Entry: Planning 
Perfectly legitimate influence in the prima facie non-political 
area of planning can have direct impact on the much more obviously political 
area of control. The procedures of better planning can hardly be refused as 
unwelcome by implementing agencies, for they represent merely more efficient 
means of achieving project or program goals agreed to by both funding agency 




Goal Clarity: Effective goal-setting is the essence of planning. 
No official can be motivated to perform well unless he knows exactly what 
is expected of him. Clear job descriptions appear such basic tools that they 
may be assumed to exist, while attention goes to the fancier techniques of 
planning. Such job descriptions need not be the detailed exercise developd 
by western personnel managers. The essence is the clear definition of role 
and interactions, as found, for example, in the Training and Visit system of 
extension (see page 53 below). Only if individual roles are clear does a 
subordinate know what he needs to do so satisfy his superiors and win promo-
tion: only then does a supervisor have an adequate standard by which to 
judge subordinate performance. Clear job descriptions therefore act as both 
a positive incentive, and as a negative pressure discouraging movement away 
from the official project line. 
The task of writing job descriptions can be difficult, in that it 
involves disaggregating complex program goals into relatively simple "stand-
ard operating procedures" for individuals. It also usually involves making 
trade-offs between conflicting goals, which are seldom fully resolved, if at 
all, at the project formulation/funding stage. At the allocation stage, it 
is often politically wise to leave goals as all-embracing as possible, so 
that diverse interest groups may see themselves as benefitted, and hence 
support the allocation. (Whether or not this is desirable, it will continue 
to happen.) The task at the implementation stage is to see that choices 
between goals are faced at once, rather than left to be resolved by junior 
officials without sufficient power to counter local pressures. In par-
ticular, if choices about target groups are not made at this stage, the 
project is more likely to benefit influential interest groups than the poor: 
planning to avoid this outcome is considered further below. Senior manage-
ment must be involved in the vetting of all job descriptions, since this is 
in fact an important extension of policy-making. This also forces top 
managers to think realistically about the pressures on junior field 
staff whom they may meet rather infrequently. At the general bureaucratic-
political level, developing clear job descriptions is a way of clearly stat-
ing official priorities at all levels in the hierarchy, and a way of reducing 
the areas of vagueness which are necessary if managers are to pursue informal 
goals. It is small wonder, therefore, from a political point of view, that 
this important activity tends to be overlooked. 
Realistic Goal-Setting and Participation: It should be possible 
to carry out the job as described. Though this is one of the more obvious 
points to be made about planning workloads, it is almost universally true 
that field staff are so overloaded that they have no hope of carrying out 
their jobs effectively, even if it is clear what they are supposed to do. 
There are two common results. The first is apathy--the feeling that if a 
field worker is supposed to visit an impossible number of farmers each day, 
he can never work satisfactorily and might just as well give up and visit 
no farmers. The second reaction is to focus attention on those elements of 
the job which are either easiest to carry out or which there is most pressure 
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to attend to (through local or informal pressures from above), i.e., to 
follow the line of least resistance. Clearly, unrealistic job descriptions 
are likely to result in deviations from official goals. It is, however, 
quite rational for senior managers to design impossible jobs for their 
juniors. Quite often, over-ambitious project or program targets are set by 
politicians and must be at least formally acquiesced to. In situations of 
manpower and budget shortages, this necessarily means stretching field staff 
impossibly thin. Aid donors are often partly to blame for this, in at least 
three ways. First, they are predisposed in favor of bounded-site, 
resource-intensive projects which mop up an unfair share of the best staff 
and reduce availabilities elsewhere. Second, they (and recipient govern-
ments) are often tempted to expand existing successful projects by widening 
the duties of field staff. Third, development agencies with foreign exchange 
to sperid are often insufficiently willing to contribute local, recurrent 
funding for field staff essential to project success. 
Once again, setting realistic goals involves making uncomfortable 
choices about priorities. Donors and consultants here have an opportunity 
to be of political help to top implementing officials, who on their own can 
do nothing to moderate unrealistic targets set by politicians (for example, 
the disincentive effects of the totally unrealistic targets for rice produc-
tion in Indonesia between 1969 and 1974, set solely by Soeharto and an 
intimate circle of advisers, are considered in Hansen, 1971). Donors can 
legitimately insist on working out reasonable targets in conjunction with the 
implementing officials themselves. This is an activity where participative 
management is essential. The choice of goals may be a policy decision at a 
high level, but the realistic setting of quantitative targets can only be 
done in conjunction with implementing officials who are aware of constraints 
in the field. Such participative planning has the greatest possible incen-
tive benefits, since officials are likely to be committed to targets that 
they believe to be realistic and have helped set. For this reason, par-
ticipative goal-setting should be extended to the lowest levels of the 
hierarchy. Bottom-up rather than top-down targetry is not only realistic, 
but essential to motivation. More realistic goal-setting has important 
bureaucratic-political consequences too. Unrealistic targets encourage 
managers to focus on activities which are the most visible or the most 
measured, and general overload provides a smokescreen behind which informal 
goals can be given priority. Goals that are realistic as well as clear make 
deviation from the official line more obvious and less excusable. 
Planning Planning: Given that the sort of basic planning efforts 
described above will constrain informal political activity, they will not 
develop by themselves. It is, however, perfectly legitimate for funding 
agencies to assist in the institutionalization of planning by designing a 
Planning Unit into the structure of larger, integrated projects and programs. 
Its terms of reference need to be carefully drawn, however, if it is not to 
become a center of political conflict. Planning Units must, above all, avoid 
the centralization of detailed planning functions. They should have two 
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major roles. First, to be available to assist other departments in the 
development of their own planning capability. Second, to aggregate and 
coordinate the various detailed plans from departments into a macro-plan for 
the project or program. This involves checking the realism of departmental 
plans, making sure that such plans are mutually consistent, and where such 
plans involve reliance on other agencies or departments, ensuring that 
appropriate arrangements for coordination have been made. The Planning Unit 
should report only to the program chief or directing board, and should fur-
nish a realistic macro-plan, or a statement why present departmental plans 
are inadequate or inconsistent. It is then up to top management to instruct 
departments to improve or alter plans, or to make arrangements for coordina-
tion. Planning Units without executive power are essential if planning is to 
be as far as possible participative, aggregative and bottom-up. Lack of 
executive power minimizes the risk of a Planning Unit being seen as a politi-
cal threat by departments concerned with their own autonomy. Institutional-
ized planning may also appear threatening from the political point of view of 
a chief executive: its introduction during implementation may seem an unwel-
come restriction of his freedom of action in a personalist bureaucracy. 
Institutionalized planning must therefore be planned into the project at the 
design stage, as one of the quid pro quos of funding, presented as a means by 
which top management can increase its control of implementation activity. 
Planning Coordination: The cooperation of coordinating agencies 
is a key resource requirement for integrated rural projects. Once again, 
coordination is unlikely to be politically rational and practiced unless it 
is specifically planned for. Cooperation must be seen as a plus-sum game. 
All too often, where the achievements of the project go to the credit of the 
"major" implementing agency, cooperation is seen as a zero-sum game, in which 
the coordinating agency loses the resources (physical, staff, time, energy) 
put into the project, for a return which goes to another organization. Coor-
dinating agencies must be involved in all stages of the planning process, a 
key part of which must be the design of agreed mechanisms for ensuring con-
tinued coordination. Smith, Lethem and Thoolen (1980: 26) give a useful 
summary of such mechanisms ranging from "weak" to "strong". At the weak end 
of the spectrum, mechanisms include ad hoc meetings to coordinate as problems 
arise: midway they place measures such as participation in regular planning 
meetings and the development of liaison positions: at the strong end of the 
spectrum, written working agreements, full-time membership in committees, 
development of liaison groups, and participation in matrix structures (i.e., 
with dual reporting relationships). Regular planning meetings and the 
nomination of liaison officers are likely to be the necessary minimum in 
practice. The latter is an important means of reducing buck-passing and 
confusion, and should be introduced as a routine measure, since the liaison 
function need not be a full-time job for the individual involved. Members of 
the planning units of each agency are one logical choice for the liaison 
position, given their overall view of project activities, relative political 
independence, and access to top management. With regard to the stronger 
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measures put forward, written working agreements are a useful means of focus-
ing on goals, priorities and the distribution of responsibility, and provide 
an essential reference-point for the future. A number of other mechanisms 
are less desirable, in that coordination has costs as well as benefits: the 
time costs of committee membership and the political costs of attempting to 
form matrix structures, for example, may well be unacceptable. The exception 
is the creation of liaison groups, providing that these consist of members of 
the Evaluation (see page 47) and Planning Units of the respective agencies, 
and are thus a logical extension rather than a duplication of internal plan-
ning and monitoring efforts. The function of such groups is considered 
further below. 
Planning to Reach the Poor: Like coordination, benefitting the 
rural poor is a special problem in the context of a political bureaucracy. 
As Chapter Three noted, informal incentives at present make it rational for 
field staff to concentrate on larger, richer farmers who are more influential 
and easier to reach and deal with. Specific incentives and pressures must 
therefore be built into the project to make it rational for field staff to 
make efforts to reach the poor. The first essential is simply to specify 
the provision of benefits to poorer groups as a priority goal, if this is the 
official aim of the project. When goals are unclear, and trade-offs have 
not been resolved at the planning stage, field officers will usually be left 
with unranked, multiple goals: for example, in the case of an agricultural 
extension officer, increasing the acreage of a new crop, and raising the 
incomes of the least well off. Such lack of goal clarity is an effective 
incentive to concentrate on the richer rather than the poorer, given informal 
and local pressures. The second essential is again to make sure that targets 
are realistic. Project designers seldom take sufficient account of the 
greater efforts needed to contact and work with poor beneficiaries: elements 
of the project may need to be redesigned during implementation to take 
account of conservative attitudes to risk and innovation: and, even with the 
most appropriate of project designs, the discontinuance rate among poor 
beneficiaries will be higher than average. These and other factors will mean 
that the number of beneficiaries with which one field officer may hope to 
work may need to be reduced, and that slower progress (though in the right 
direction) must be expected and accepted. Only if field staff are set 
realistic goals will they treat poverty reduction as a challenge to be 
accepted rather than avoided. 
Fundamental to this type of clear, realistic goal-setting is the 
identification of the right target group of beneficiaries at the earliest 
possible stage. Political pressure to proceed with implementation and 
produce results often means that this most crucial part of the planning 
exercise is neglected. The ideally planned project will be based on a 
thorough socio-economic survey of existing conditions in the project area, as 
an essential starting-point for designing proposals which take account of 




surveys are not available, and there is pressure to proceed with implementa-
tion (the majority of projects), quicker-anddirtier methods of target group 
selection can be very effective (see, for example, Chambers, 1978: 11-14 for 
guidelines). These are simple enough to be applied by the village-level 
field staff who, in programs of wide coverage, may have to be responsible for 
the selection of beneficiaries/ contact farmers. Where this is the case, 
the Planning Unit must undertake a sample survey to determine whether such 
guidelines are actually being followed (see, for example, Cernea and Tepping, 
1977: 59). There is every incentive to skimp this part of the planning exer-
cise, on the part of politicians interested in the support of influential 
rural groups, on the part of top management wanting to proceed visibly with 
implementation, and on the part of field workers whose lives will be made 
easier if they can miss the poorest beneficiaries. Funding agencies can help 
here by allocating time and money in the project plan specifically for this 
purpose, by monitoring this stage of project activity more carefully than any 
other, and by offering technical assistance if necessary for the development 
of suitable guidelines and survey techniques. 
Planning During Implementation: A major mental reversal is begin-
ning to be made away from thinking of planning solely as the formal planning 
exercise before implementation. Equally important is effective on-going 
planning, adaptive to changing goals and constraints during implementation. 
Funding agency assistance in planning still tends to concentrate on the major 
project document needed for the allocation of funds. But it is just as 
legitimate for donors to offer assistance in on-going planning and manage-
ment. The potential political threat of such assistance may be defused by 
stressing its technical nature, as in the apparently neutral control tech-
nique of critical path analysis. Critical path analysis requires first the 
definition of the range of activities going to make up the project: then 
their arrangement into a network, showing sequences and interconnections: 
then the identification of the resource requirements over time for the 
various activities. Critical path analysis therefore implies: (a) having a 
clear idea of project goals; (b) placing importance on the need for coordina-
tion (through networks stressing the complementarity of activities); and (c) 
defining responsibility for different actions (necessary in the matching of 
human resource requirements and project activities). Such continuous plan-
ning techniques usefully assist in clarifying official goals at all levels, 
and reducing the areas of vagueness in which informal goals may be pursued. 
Depoliticized Entry: Feedback 
Management is frequently described as decision-making. This, 
of course, is correct. But the emphasis in such a view is often 
misplaced, focussing almost exclusively on choice. Choice, 
however, is only one step in the decision process. Prior to 
the exercise of choice, information about the environment and 
possible consequences of alternative actions must be acquired 
and processed. Once this is done, the choice is usually 
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obvious. Instead of describing management as decision-making, 
we could describe management as information gathering and be 
both consistent with the original position and possibly more 
descriptive of the actual emphasis of managers (Pfeffer and 
Salandk, 1978: 266). 
Effective monitoring and evaluation complement good planning partly 
through their indirect effects on the reward element necessary to motivation. 
Officials may have clear and realistic goals, but will have little incentive 
to work towards them if what they do is not seen to be done and appreciated. 
But the establishment of better information flows has still wider implica-
tions for better project management. As Pfeffer and Salancik point out, the 
predisposing nature and function of information flows is not sufficiently 
realized. The job of deciding what is reported is an extremely important and 
responsible one, because it will determine the view of the project held at 
the highest political levels. Better reporting systems in effect constantly 
confront the official proposals of the project originators with the informal 
interpretations of them by the executive. If the publicly exposed dis-
crepancy is too great, it becomes very hard for managers not to take action 
to correct it. Informal management systems can only flourish in areas where 
duties are vague and evaluation and inquiry not too closely pressed. If the 
political level is clear in its priorities, but has been misinterpreted by 
the executive, the political level has for the first time the right informa-
tion on which to base the right orders to exert corrective influence. If the 
political level is not clear in its commitment to all project goals, its 
position will at least become explicit for the first time. 
Monitoring should therefore have two major goals. The first is to 
provide information about progress without which on-going planning and con-
trol are not possible (for a thorough analysis of the use of information 
systems for control purposes, see Lawler and Rhode, 1976). This task is 
clearly basic to a view of management seen as an iterative process between 
planning and feedback. The second goal is to motivate managers and field 
staff. The ideal approaches for developing information systems to meet these 
two goals are somewhat in tension. The next two sections therefore discuss 
two major and potentially conflicting approaches, and ways in which these may 
be successfully implemented together. 
"Participative Monitoring": From an incentive standpoint, monitor-
ing must be seen as much for the benefit of the subordinate as for the supe-
rior. If realistic goals are set with the cooperation of subordinates, the 
aim should be a monitoring system by which subordinates can themselves 
measure their own progress towards their own mutually agreed goals. But the 
system cannot be solely under the control of field staff, or their incentive 
will instead be to misreport activities, for example by falsifying entries in 
their log of field visits. Systematic checks must therefore be made by 
superiors both to provide negative pressures against misreporting, and to 









is to develop monitoring systems which are objective and honest without the 
heavy (and demoralizing) hand of authoritarian supervision. Four suggestions 
can be made for procedures which will help to make performance checks posi-
tive rather than negative incentives. First, the bulk of routine monitoring 
should be carried out by field staff's own immediate superiors: the descent 
of specialist M/E staff from head office is hard to present as a supportive 
procedure. Second, superiors should never check performance by calling staff 
in for review, but should do so in the course of routine field visits when 
the superior may observe and participate in his subordinate's work. Perfor-
mance checking is more objective when carried out in the field. But from an 
incentives standpoint, the key thing is that the superior comes to the subor-
dinate, takes an interest in his work and problems, and resolves any dif-
ficult.ies and gives any advice he can. Performance is thus automatically 
evaluated in the course of discussion of the previous week or two weeks' 
work. Thirdly, peer participation should be built into the monitoring and 
management system. From the incentives standpoint, the institution of 
regular discussions of problems and achievements between a superior and all 
of his field staff in a local area has several positive effects. Sharing 
problems develops a sense of teamwork, and builds commitment. Peer group 
pressure is one of the strongest possible incentives for achieving conformity 
to norms. Providing challenging but realistic performance standards have 
been set in the planning process, this therefore reduces superiors' needs to 
act as controllers rather than consultants. Also, from a management stand-
point, regular interaction between field officers in direct contact with 
beneficiaries is in itself one of the most effective forms of implementation 
problem-solving, and will often be superior in realism and practicality to 
the contributions of superiors and planners in head office. A fourth crucial 
way to strengthen the effectiveness of participative monitoring is the invol-
vement of the beneficiary. Part of the superior's regular field visit should 
be spent in discussion with contact farmers or other beneficiaries, so that 
their satisfactions, dissatisfactions and suggestions for change are clearly 
registered. This emphasizes client orientation in general, and the fact that 
M/E in particular is not for the ultimate benefit of authority in the 
organization, but for the benefit of the farmers, etc., with whom staff are 
working. 
The Planning and Evaluation Unit: While "participative monitoring" 
is the best positive performance incentive, it must be complemented by inde-
pendent M/E on a sample basis conducted by an outside unit: without this, 
both senior and junior staff may find it in their joint interest to misreport 
progress up the line in their respective departments. This sort of "monitor-
ing of monitoring" must be carried out by an independent unit not politically 
beholden to the implementing department. Such a unit must have total control 
over the choice of indicators used in reporting, and complete freedom from 
censorship from above. Since the unit's first function is to provide objec-
tive checks on performance, this supervisory role has the potential for 
conflict with the more participatory monitoring developed_ with incentives in 
mind. Whether the P and E Unit is seen as authoritarian and heavy-handed or 
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helpful is a question of management style. As in the case of planning, the 
central monitoring unit must see its function equally as the provision of 
consultancy services for the development of M/E in individual departments, so 
that these may strengthen control of their activities. Again as in the case 
of planning, the central unit must not seek an executive role: its function 
is simply to report to top management, and to aggregate departmental progress 
into a picture of overall program-wide progress. It is in the P & E Unit 
that technical assistance is likely to be of greatest value. Though the 
training function of technical assistance is rightly stressed as of key 
importance, in practice one of the most valuable things that foreign experts 
do is to act as a channel of communication for junior or field officials who 
often have a very clear picture of problems and suggestions for solutions, 
but who are unheard (or who are constrained from speaking) because superiors' 
informal priorities are elsewhere. The sad fact of life is that many junior 
officials are competent, but are prevented from acting competently. This is 
a major reason for the often-noted fact of technical assistance not "training 
itself out of a job". Sector experts may make their counterparts more tech-
nically expert, but when they go home may well leave them at their former 
political disadvantage in the organization. Hence the value of non-sectoral 
technical assistance in setting up organization-wide (and hence more durable) 
feedback systems which will allow existing competence to be heard. 
Finally, with both politics and incentives in mind, M/E systems 
must be designed with the cooperation of the managers who will use them, or 
they will fail. As Deboeck and Kinsey point out (1980: 16): 
Managers will undoubtedly argue that unless a monitoring program 
has been approved from within, it is primarily motivated by the 
fact that it can be used as a lever in the form of criticism ••• 
Working against the monitoring unit doing a good job is the 
project manager's ignorance of what it can do for him. This may 
amount to a fear of the evaluation component of the unit. If 
such a fear exists in the project manager's mind, it will infect 
all the divisions of the project. In these circumstances, the 
monitoring unit can make a very limited contribution to the 
project's progress. 
What Should be Monitored? The information gathered by M/E units on 
rural projects to date has seldom been used effectively. This is generally 
because it has not been both relevant and timely. The need for timeliness 
together with the dictates of "information economics" (often also ignored) 
mean that M/E information must be quickly collected and simply digested (see 
particularly Chambers, 1978, 1 'Rural Poverty-Oriented Monitoring and Evalua-
tion. Simple is Optimal?"). The purpose here is not to deal in detail with 
the choice of indicators (treated elsewhere) but to note that simplicity--the 
optimal M/E requirement from a managerial standpoint--is also the ideal from 
an incentives standpoint. Present reporting requirements are often not only 
of very little benefit to management, but so lengthy that meeting them is a 
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significant "local pressure" on field staff, diverting them from actual 
implementation activity. A small number of indicators which are carefully 
chosen to directly reflect essential goals both reinforces the clarity of 
those goals, and gives staff confidence that good performance in pursuit of 
them will be clearly reflected to top management. At present, what is 
reported may not reflect ultimate goals, and success measures therefore 
reward behavior which may not contribute to ultimate goals. The lack of 
effective performance measures makes existing non-performance-related 
criteria for promotion (often based on education, training and seniority) 
almost inevitable. Technical assistance is likely to be important in the 
choice of M/E indicators, since the difficulty of choosing suitable measures 
varies in proportion to their simplicity. Western consultancy firms are 
gradually becoming more proficient in this area, and their presence can be 
politically effective in that they carry the weight of donor support behind 
them. But just because this political weight guarantees formal acceptance by 
the implementing agency, special care must be taken to develop M/E systems 
with the cooperation and support of implementing managers, if the result is 
to be effective rather than symbolic action. 
Some Examples of Failure and Success 
Agrarian Reform in Peru: McClintock (1980) discusses the agrarian 
reform in Peru carried out by the Velasco regime (1968-75), in a case which 
clearly illustrates the incentives consequences of lack of goal clarity. The 
military government was divided on most major policy issues, including that 
of land reform. Political pressure (in the form of peasant invasions) forced 
agreement on the principle of a massive redistribution program, which had by 
1976 affected 35 percent of agricultural land and 24 percent of farm 
families. Implementation problems arose in the setting up and running of the 
cooperatives that were to take over the redistributed land. These had their 
roots in the often intense conflicts over goal priorities: 
The conflicts within the military leadership about the desirable 
degree of redistribution and the desirable degree of state and/or 
technocratic influence upon the peasantry were evident in the many 
alterations and gaps in the agrarian reform law. Indeed, it is 
difficult to speak of "formulation" of agrarian reform "policy" 
at one time because so many key points of the 1969 Law were 
changed, and so many other critical issues were not discussed 
in the law. (McClintock, 1980: 72). 
As often, policy had to be framed vaguely in order to gain the formal support 
of different political interest groups for implementation. Implementing 
officials were left with unclear, conflicting and constantly changing goals. 
As a result, conflict within the military was reflected by a political split 
in the goals of the two (theoretically cooperating) implementing agencies. 
SINAMOS, the official reform organization, was primarily interested in 
redistribution and political participation for the poorest peasants excluded 
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from the cooperatives. The Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand, 
consistent with its technocratic outlook, was more interested in the produc-
tivity of the cooperatives. 
Ministry of Agriculture officials were concerned that peasants were 
insufficiently educated to cultivate their new holdings effectively, and 
feared a sharp fall in production which would discredit the entire agrarian 
reform program. Their reaction was to insist on official guidance, in the 
form of Ministry managers for each of the cooperatives. Peasants, on the 
other hand, having just escaped from the hands of hacienda-owner patrons, 
were determined not to fall into the hands of new bureaucratic patrons, and 
were not hesitant to exercise their right under the new law to fire managers 
they did not like, often within 24 hours of appointment. Peasants were also 
worried about the future political situation: the fact that a rightward 
swing might reinstate the hacienda-owners, and the fact that a leftward swing 
might mean the management of "their" cooperative as a state-run enterprise 
was a further disincentive to contribute. Significantly, "although this 
limited commitment to hard work and jnvestment in the enterprise was rational 
from the perspective of cooperative members, it was rarely seen in this light 
by ministry officials, who often regarded the peasants as lazy and ignorant." 
Given the extremely weak position of cooperative managers, and the rational 
attitudes of peasants, it was inevitable that cooperative development would 
fail. As would be expected, given the lack of effective pressures or incen-
tives from superiors, many managers took the line of least resistance in 
submitting to local pressures. In some cases, this meant resignation to 
impotence in preference to being fired: in others, this meant cooptation or 
corruption by richer peasants--an outcome encouraged by managers' small 
official incomes. 
Cooperatives in Zambia: In the Peruvian Cdse, political disunity 
and goal conflict were so great that implementation failure was inevitable. 
Quick (1980) discusses tl1e case of cooperative development in Zambia under 
a relatively united political leadership: a case in which the introduction 
of an effective M/E system could perhaps have led to a clearer definition 
of goals and more effective performance. 
No clear statement was ever provjded by Kaunda as to 
precisely what the immediate goals of cooperative policy were 
to be, and yet it was made abundantly clear in a variety of 
public speeches made by the president that the cooperatives 
were supposed to do a great deal and do it very quickly. 
During the early months of 1965, the president spoke frequently 
about the cooperative movement, and in these speecht:0s he 
articulated no fewer than ten specific goals that he expected 
the movement to achieve in the next few years. The cooperatives 
were expected to provide employment and stem the flow of 
population to the towns, increase the income of members, 





collective goods for the rural population, preserve the 
traditional values of the village community, increase 
political participation, strengthen procedures for the 
democratic control of elites, promote a sense of national 
identity, increase and diversify agricultural output, and 
develop a spirit of self-reliance in the local population. 
(Quick, 1980: 46). 
In this situation, cooperative department officials knew they had 
only one unambiguous goal: to create as many cooperatives as possible, fast. 
Since the number of new coop registrations was the visible symbol of progress 
reported to the president, officials had every incentive to enroll prospec-
tive cooperatives without checking members' experience and suitability, and 
consciously did so. Since the cooperative movement was a political priority, 
a large budget was available to the department, and the next unambiguous 
measure of activity became the granting of coop loans, statistics for which 
were politically impressive and easily produced. Officials therefore quite 
rationally granted seasonal and long term loans in large quantities, with no 
supervision of the use to which these loans were put. 
The interesting feature of this case is that although field staff 
had no official M/E requirements (and were not even required to visit "their" 
societies regularly), they became so concerned about waste that they sent 
regular reports of inefficiencies and problems back to head office, and 
actually requested closer supervision and a temporary moratorium on new 
registrations. There was no response from the department director until the 
spring of 1967, when the threat of a staff revolt forced him to halt 
registrations. Quick puts forward a number of (politically rational) causes 
of head office unresponsiveness. Kaunda had placed a politician in charge 
of the agency because of his distrust of the bureaucracy, and this 
politician, given the president's constant criticisms of caution in 
bureaucratic implementation, had no incentive to annoy his patron by con-
centrating on inefficiencies at the cost of expansion. In effect: 
The feedback of field staff was directed at goals that the 
department had not yet defined to be of central importance. 
The field staff was concerned about the inefficiency of the 
economic performance of local societies, and although this 
was a part of the formal goal structure of the agency, it was 
not a part of its operational goal structure. (Quick, 1980: 54) 
The lack of any outside criticism of departmental activities further 
facilitated the pursuit of informal priorities: 
In the case of the Department of Agriculture, a direct rival of 
the Department of Cooperatives for funds and prestige, bureaucratic 
jealousy resulted in a conscious withholding of critical informa-
tion on cooperatives. The agriculture field staff was discouraged 
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from reporting problems with cooperatives to the Department of 
Cooperatives so that the Department of Agriculture could slowly 
build up a case for the abolition of the whole cooperative movement. 
There was no effective external criticism of the department until 
after 1967, when a critical report by Rene Dumont coincided with a budget 
crisis, and provided the incentive for a radical review of expenditure. The 
resulting national productivity drive was an effective goal clarification for 
the department, and resulted in an immediate effort to improve M/E. 
Implementation subsequently became more efficient and effective, but the 
cooperative movement was never rescued: it was too late to attract back 
demoralized farmers (often the most skilled) who had earlier left the move-
ment, and at the same time political support dwindled, as politicians con-
cluded that the program was a failure best abandoned. The case clearly 
demonstrates the importance of assessing before implementation whether 
political goals are effectively developmental or symbolic, and the need to 
design planning and feedback mechanisms into the initial program plan if 
there is to be any hope of creating a climate of incentives favorable to 
project success. 
Rural Development in Malaysia: Esman (1972) discusses the interna-
tionally celebrated "Redhook and Operations Room" system of project monitor-
ing developed through the 1950s and 1960s in Malaysia. The system was the 
child of the dynamic Prime Minister, whose influence and commitment to 
development ensured its continued political feasibility. The system had two 
major incentive elements. First, the establishment of monitoring units at 
all levels of government, federal, state and district. Planning and monitor-
ing techniques centered on charting the progress of projects in red books and 
in visual displays, so that progress and lags in implementation could be seen 
at a glance by monitoring staff and senior visiting officials. Feedback was 
thus readily available, and provided the strongest possible performance 
incentive down the line. Second, the minister himself backed this formal 
system up with encouragement and rigorous checks which made it consistently 
clear to implementing officials that formal goals were the de facto political 
priority. His surprise visits to outlying operations rooms and to project 
sites to check progress against claimed results often resulted in 
well-publicized personal interventions, such as punishments for officials 
misrepresenting progress and promotion for the successful. 
The system's results in the field made it an internationally known 
success. Esman further documents, however, the way in which the system 
subsequently froze and lost its adaptability as officials became convinced 
of its perfection. The system was aimed almost entirely at certain types of 
minor rural construction projects and a~enities, such as mosques, wells and 
community halls which, however, did not always meet the production and wel-
fare needs of potential beneficiaries. The process of development came to be 
seen as the monitoring of progress on this limited variety of projects, and 






virtues of the "planning unit" approach, without the necessary complement 
of participative monitoring. As a result, it lacked the responsiveness to 
local needs implied in the balanced control-and-feedback approach to manage-
ment. Ultimately, M/E became an end in itself, with its own vested interest 
in survival unchanged. As a senior officer claimed: "The operations room is 
perfect, it is some of the people--the officers, politicians, farmers, who 
are at fault." 
The Training and Visit System of Extension: The successful Train-
ing and Visit (T and V) System of Agricultural Extension (Benor and Harrison, 
1977) illustrates the incentives effects of planning, monitoring and evalua-
tion at the more detailed procedural level. Some of the features of the 







Clear and realistic goals: 
Administrative control of the VEW (Village Extension Worker) 
and other field staff is handled solely by the agriculture 
department. VEWs are concerned only with extension, and no 
other developmental activity. 
There is concentration of effort on the few most important 
crops in the local area. For these few crops, there is 
concentration on the few practices which bring the best 
economic results. 
Each VEW attends a weekly or fortnightly training session 
which is devoted almost entirely to the agricultural 
operations and problems faced by farmers in the next week 
or fortnight. VEWs can therefore be confident that their 
advice will be relevant and timely, and they are not 
overburdened with more information than they can absorb 
and communicate effectively. 
The entire extension organization is built up on the 
basis of the number of farmers that one VEW can handle 
under local conditions, and the number of VEWs an 
Extension Officer (AEO) can handle (usually not more 
than eight). This ensures realism in extension workers' 
goals, and is expressive of the system's bottom-up 
planning orientation. 
Coordination: 
Representatives from coordinating input supply, etc., 
agencies attend VEW training sessions on a regular basis. 
This both builds their understanding of the system (and 
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hence the effectiveness of their planning), and provides 
a regular opportunity for extension staff to report and 
resolve problems in their areas. 
Monitoring and evaluation: 
6. Monitoring of progress is carried out by AEOs in the course 
of visits to field sessions in which they will participate. 
VEWs' field logs are inspected and signed, and progress and 
problems discussed. The VEW's diary shows the names of 
attending farmers, practices taught, and problems encountered. 
7. The self-evaluation built into the system is complemented by 
regular monitoring by superiors. Given the realistic nature 
of goals, monitoring "is relatively simple: farmers can 
be asked if they know the name of their VEW, the day of 
his visit, and three or four of the recommendations made 
that fortnight or even during the whole season. If the 
farmers know these and results can also be seen in the 
fields, then the extension personnel are doing their 
main job." 
Adaptability/Responsiveness: 
8. The fact that training is carried out each week or fortnight 
means that VEWs can report and get advice on farmers' problems 
immediately. It also means that the latest research findings 
can be disseminated straight away. 
9. Regular training sessions in groups give VEWs the opportunity 
to discuss and resolve among each other common problems 
encountered with farmers. 
The interaction of detailed procedures for planning, control and 
feedback has produced effective incentives for farmers and field staff and 
impressive results in implementation. The system combines clear and realis-
tic goal-setting, close supervision, and a broad framework of "standard 
operating procedures" with built-in "organic" planning and feedback 
mechanisms that emphasize adaptability to client requirements. Speed in 
communication, upwards, downwards and sideways, is a key feature of the 
system, made possible by the regular training sessions, and limited VEW 
goals. Concentrating on realistic priority goals and a small number of 
contact farmers has meant visible changes in cultivation techniques after 
only a few months of operation, leading to the spontaneous spread of new 
practices. 
Settlement in South Asia: The case project described in Chapter 
Four illustrates the rise and fall of a Planning and Evaluation Unit. The 
·' :· 
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original project design included such a unit in the head office of the 
Development Board, with funding under the aid loan for a foreign Implementa-
tion Adviser to work directly with the Chairman. The Chairman carefully 
defined the Unit's role as that of a non-executive mirror of progress, 
reporting solely to him. The Unit began its work by developing a monitoring 
system for construction progress in the field, which it displayed in visual 
form on map-folders of the project area, redrawn monthly and circulated to 
senior staff. For the first time, managers had a coherent picture of what 
was happening in the field, and the Chairman welcomed this additional tool 
for control, and asked the Unit to extend its activities to a full critical 
path analysis of the 100,000 acres of the Scheme currently in development. 
As the monitoring system for construction progress became an operational 
routine, the Unit turned its attention to progress in the agricultural and 
connnunity development sectors, and began to include rough proxy indicators 
for these in the monthly reports. These quickly began to show the imbalances 
in development. The absence of any significant acreage under the subsidiary 
food crops was a pointer to the vicious circle of marketing, water management 
and other problems. The very slow progress in the construction of 
multi-purpose cooperative stores--used as a rough proxy for attention to 
agricultural and community development matters--was also evident. 
After three or four months of routine operation, the existence of 
the progress reports became more widely known, and politicians and 
Cabinet-level officials asked for copies. For the first time, uncensored 
information began to feed back to levels above the Development Board. The 
map form of presentation made it easy to compare progress month by month, 
and a rough extrapolation of current progress strengthened growing doubts 
about the Chairman's ability to meet his promised targets. From this point, 
the Chairman's attitude to the Unit became ambivalent. Previously, its 
feedback had come to him alone, and strengthened his control over the con-
struction operation. Now the mirror was beginning to reflect the Board's 
implementation weaknesses as well as its strengths to higher authority. 
Ambivalence turned to hostility as a result of two specific developments. 
First, a senior politician asked the P and E Unit directly for a forecast of 
progress over the next six months. The Unit's planning work was now suffi-
ciently far advanced for it to give rough optimistic and pessimistic 
forecasts which clearly indicated that targets were unattainable. Second, a 
routine donor agency review mission was taken on a tour of the project area 
by Unit staff, at the Chairman's request. The tour comprised a fair sample 
of project activity, and alerted donors to some of the imbalances in develop-
ment, and the poor quality of some irrigation construction work. The Chair-
man now saw the P and E Unit as a direct threat to his control, and reacted 
swiftly. On the grounds that the Unit's "disclosures" to the donor had been 
a personal embarassment to him, he had the P and E Unit manager transferred. 
In an outward show of response to the donor's requests to develop more 
balanced implementation based on "better" planning, the Chairman. suggested 
that the Implementation Adviser move to a small office directly off the 
Chairman's so as to have his personal ear. The adviser rightly saw this as a 
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move instead to keep him under the Chairman's eye, and to remove him from the 
mainstream of information in the P and E Unit. He declined to move. 
Finally, the Chairman replaced the P and E manager with a loyal engineer from 
his own staff. Somewhat symbolically, the direct connecting-door between the 
Chairman's office and the P and E Unit was for the first time unlocked. 
The Essential Complement: Reinforcing Political Commitment 
Planning and feedback techniques have tremendous under-exploited 
scope for reducing counter-productive informal political activity, and making 
official goals the rational ones to pursue. One value of such techniques is 
that they are presentable as technical help rather than political interven-
tion, and therefore allow influence with a minimum of conflict. Their 
depoliticized nature is, however, their potential weakness as well as their 
strength (as the last case example shows), in that their institution and 
success rest ultimately on the political sanction of top management. The 
examples in the previous section illustrate clearly the importance of politi-
cal commitment as the necessary precondition of incentives-oriented planning 
and feedback. In the Peruvian case, political support only really coalesced 
around the somewhat negative goal of defusing the political threat of peasant 
invasions. There was never agreement about positive policies for improving 
peasant welfare beyond redistribution, and hence the prospects of implementa-
tion of any coherent plan were small. In the Zambian case, support for 
cooperative development seems to have been commitment more to a political 
idea or symbol than to a serious development effort. The Malaysian case 
illustrates the positive effects of clear goals and clearly expressed politi-
cal support. Part of the success of the "red book" system was due undoub-
tedly to the monitoring techniques employed. But the incentive to apply 
these techniques rigorously was supplied by the constant encouragement and 
pressure of the Deputy Prime Minister. As a former civil servant, he clearly 
understood that formal support at the time of institution of a new plan was 
not enough: and that it was necessary to follow this up with constant proof 
throughout the implementation process that officially declared goals were 
consistently the actual political priority. The South Asian settlement 
project case illustrates the potential weakness of the planning/feedback 
approach. To be successful as management and incentives tools, Planning and 
Evaluation Units must be non-executive and hence, on their own, politically 
weak. Their viability is therefore totally dependent on the political sup-
port of top management. If planning and feedback techniques come to be seen 
as a threat, they can no longer successfully be presented as non-political, 
and will only be acceptable in a watered-down and unobtrusive form which will 
marginally affect project performance. The fundamental criticism of the 
"procedural" approach to the management of rural programs, such as that 
developed most fully and effectively by Chambers and Belshaw in Kenya, is 
the assumption that top management will see it as profitable to use the new 
procedures in a positive fashion. If they do not, reasons can always be 
found why they are too cumbersome and impractical to use at all, or they will 
be used partially and hence (by official criteria) ineffectively. 
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Some significant conclusions for funding agencies can be drawn. 
Since the scope for agency intervention in the field of management and 
motivation is anyway limited--for example, the chances of significantly 
altering the personnel management and reward system are often nil--the agency 
must operate forcefully and effectively in those areas where it has 
legitimate access and influence. Yet "technical" help in the field of plan-
ning, monitoring and evaluation can often be circumvented if it is politi-
cally unwelcome. The agency can only counter this by facing the political 
question directly, and attempting to influence the attitudes and priorities 
of managers at the top. There are both positive and negative approaches. 
Encouragement: Funding agencies could "sell" official goals to 
project managements much more forcefully than is the case at present. If 
agencies really believe in their priorities, they could be much clearer in 
the definition of the type of policy they support, and could institute more 
frequent reviews at the highest level of progress in their programs. In the 
case of very large integrated programs or projects, it should be possible for 
high-level representatives of the funding agency to meet with the recipient 
project director and his minister on a regular basis to review progress and 
problems. To the extent that budget/donor agency and politican begin to 
demonstrate a cooperative commitment to improvement, senior project manage-
ment would begin to get the message that the official line is the real 
priority--and hence have every incentive, if they value their own advance-
ment, to bring their informal priorities into line with official goals. 
Though the official line could be much more energetically sold by funding 
agencies at all levels (and especially in the field), it is at the highest 
(and most sensitive) levels that the effort must be concentrated if it is to 
be effective. 
This principle could be followed in practice by using the results 
of incentives assessments and political analysis of bureaucracy to anticipate 
problems in particular areas. An incentives assessment at the project 
appraisal stage should indicate those points where official and informal 
goals are most likely to diverge and commitment to be lost. These are points 
on which project review should concentrate. Such problem areas may reflect 
incentives and pressures affecting groups and individuals that are peculiar 
to the project--such as the informal pressures on the Chairman in the settle-
ment project case. But there are also problem areas, given the common incen-
tives towards departmental autonomy and growth and the bureaucratic "coali-
tion of indifference", which are likely to arise in all development projects: 
the special problems of coordination and reaching the poorest, for example. 
If funding agencies stress from the start that these are priorities, and 
constantly reiterate their priority, implementing organizations will have 
more incentive to follow suit. The presentation of a strong official line at 
the outset of a program is the best means of avoiding conflict later, when 
ceding to external agency pressure to revert to formal project goals may 
involve loss of face on the part of project management--again as in the 
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settlement project case. Funding agencies must show at the outset and con-
stantly throughout implementation that they are more than symbolically com-
mitted to their goals. 
Pressure: In those frequent cases where the priorities of both 
politicians and incentive-setting civil servants are influenced in some 
degree by an informal coalition of indifference to the rural poor, the 
limitations of a positive approach used on its own are clear. Agencies must 
apply carrot and stick--encouragement and pressure. It is commonly argued 
that the power of funding agencies is extremely limited because it rests 
primarily on the all-or-nothing sanction of withdrawing financial support--an 
extreme measure which agencies are naturally reluctant to employ. Neverthe-
less, there is a great deal of unexploited scope in the possibilities of 
conditionality. At the project level, this should mean more sequential 
development, with funding first of a pilot project and then of successive 
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MANAGING FOR SOLUTIONS 
1. Write: 
In 3-5 pages discuss the factors you must consider in 
managing the solution or processes involved in your rural 
develpment case. Draw on your experience today and the 





The participants will: 
1. Understand the multitude of relationships that rural 
development workers must strengthen and manipulate. 
2. Develop guidelines for managing relationships. 
3. Discuss incentives for effective rural development from the 
perspective of different "players." 
Activities 
1. Discussion of homework and simulation exercise (40 min) 
a) What were the most difficult aspects of the simulation 
from a programmatic point of view? 
b) Whose role did you perceive as the most difficult? 
c) How would you have approached this role? 
2. Triads to develop guidelines for approaching management 
problems (40 min) 
3. Break (10 min) 
4. Lecture by Robert Chambers (or someone else with extensive 
management experience in rural development (40 min) 
Management strategies for Outsiders 
S. Discussion with Robert Chambers 
6. Handout Homework 8 - Organizing Management 
(40 min) 
(10 min) 
(There will probably be a reception if Dr. Chambers does 
participate in this session.) 
Materials 
1. Cups and water. 





1. Korten, People-Centered Development, 171-188. 
2. BRAC, "Unraveling Networks of Corruption." 
3. Johnston, "Redesigning Rural Development." 
4. Chambers, pp.168-190. 
5. Moris, 67-98. 
6. Shah, "Fatima the Spinner and the Tent." 
2. Write: 
In 3 to 5 pages describe the appropriate management strategy 
for your case, elaborating on what factors you had to take 
into consideration to make your choice. What considerations 
would you make given Fatima's experience? 
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Unraveling Networks of Corruption1 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
In July 1'179 BRAC became concerned about the effects of a major 
drought in certain parts of Bangladesh and anticipated that, by September, 
serious food shortages might develop. To address this need, an emergen-
cy relief program was organized in three different areas of the country. 
The strategy called for organizing groups of landless people in each village, 
encouraging them to start collective agricultural activities, using their own 
resources initially and then expanding to more ambitious efforts using 
food-for-work grains supplied through BRAC to compensate participants. 
In addition the landless groups were assisted in obtaining use rights to 
land on a collective basis through private lease and share cropping ar-
rangements and through obtaining rights to cultivate public lands. 
Through this involvement with the landless poor, BRAC staff became 
familiar with their situation and problems. Gradually they became aware 
that large scale government relief operations were going on that, if suc-
cessful, would have made BRAC's work largely unnecessary. But rather 
than reaching the people for whom they were intended, these resources 
were being controlled and enjoyed by a small number of powerful men 
who had good connections with local government officials. It also became 
evident that a similar pattern prevailed in the fields other than relief opera-
tion, for example in the use of public forest lands. Although the poor were 
not allowed to gather small bundles of fire wood, several rich and power-
ful men were making large profits from the illegal cutting and sale of the 
timber. Combinations of economic power and threats or actual force were 
being used to gain control over a variety of both public and private 
resources. But more was involved than the economic power, followings 
of violent and nonviolent supporters, and official positions of a few in-





136 Mobilizing Resources 
of local power was the complex net of co-operative connections linking 
them into a seemingly irresistable network of corruption. 
Tune after time we found the landless people with whom we were 
working caught up helplessly in the mesh of this invisible network, only 
partially understanding it, and feeling powerless in dealing with it. As 
a result of the participatory research effort described here, they came to 
better understand the sources of the disparities in power between 
themselves and this power elite. 2 They became increasingly aware of the 
extent of the benefits intended for them: food-for-work, rations, educa-
tion, etc., that were not getting th.rough-being instead "caught in the net:' 
This growth in understanding spurred their efforts to organize themselves 
as a means of breaking its power and restoring their own means of 
livelihood. This was the genesis of this participatory research effort. 
Our methodology was simple and can be repeated by any field worker 
who can read, write, and do simple arithmetic. Our main information 
sources were the landless people of each village, though the power elites 
also supplied us with considerable information about themselves and each 
other. Later, we obtained help from government officials, who gave up 
substantial time to clarify various points for us. 
We started by carefully recording all the examples of oppressive, ex-
ploitative and illegal activities we could find. The search required little 
effort. The landless and the poor who were the principal victims came 
to us. As our study continued, their interest and analytical capacity in-
creased to the point where they brought us pens and paper, insisting that 
we record everything. No individual incident we recorded was news to 
them. But generally they were not fully aware of the systemic patterns, 
illuminated by the recording process, that linked individual actors and 
incidents across villages. 
Through interviews with government officials at union and thana levels, 
we were able find out the amounts and intended uses of program resources 
put into the area by the government and the intended outcomes of im-
portant public policies. These were then systematically checked against 
what we knew was actually happening. fur example, we obtained exact 
details of food-for-work allocations, and worked with the landless to check 
them against the work done and the grain actually distributed. By the 
act of recording and discussing the oppressive activities we demonstrated 
that when one person adds his knowledge to that of others and then 
engages in analyzing and calculating everything, it is possible to see the 
situation dearly for the first time-and then to see the possibilities for 
change. This contributed to a new consciousness and militancy among 
those who were working with us. As a consequence they have started 
taking collective action on certain issues and have achieved limited success. 
After checking all details with at least four separate sources (sometimes 
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up to fifty), we plotted all the connections involved in each incident to 
build up a picture of the network involved. Our charts were constantly 
altered and improved as our knowledge increased. Ultimately we were 
able to identify each of the key power brokers and their main followers. 
A profile was prepared on each covering their background, political and 
business activities, landholding and so on. By this point we limited our 
study to a cluster of ten villages in two unions. For each of these villages 
we prepared a simple village profile showing its main characteristics. 
One important insight of the study is the importance of going beyond 
single village studies to understand how the critical linkages of the power 
structure extend across villages and into the different levels of government. 
However, in the interests of brevity and simplicity we limit ourselves here 
to reporting the data from just two villages, addressing the linkages bet-
ween them and into union and thana levels of government. 3 
The two villages on which we report here we have chosen to call Adan-
para and Kathidanga, located on either side of the border between two 
unions. Both are within four miles of the Indian border and three to four 
miles from the local thana headquarters. The area is generally hilly and 
40 to 50 percent of the land belongs to the furest Department. About 30 
to 35 percent of the land in the region is still forested. Interspersed among 
the forest lands are many areas suitable for cultivation of paddy and cer-
tain winter crops. 
It is normally a rice surplus area and also exports large amounts of 
timber and firewood to local towns and to Dhaka. Most of the people are 
involved in agriculture as farmers and laborers, or woodcutters-either 
individually or as part of larger operations. A significant number are engag-
ed in trade, smuggling, and theft. 
Until the 1940's the area was mainly inhabited by tribal people known 
as Adivasis. Changes began coming rapidly during the 1965 war as 
refugees from India poured into the area and many of the Adivasis 
emigrated to India. This process was given further impetus by the libera-
tion war of 1971 and by the abortive rebellion of the "Kader Bahini" in 
1976. Thus, unlike some other parts of Bangladesh, kinship relations 
among the Muslim households are not yet well developed and many of 
the power holders have only recently gained this status. This accounts 
in part for the high degree of lawlessness found in the area. 
THE POWER HOLDERS OF KATHIDANGA AND ADANPARA 
These two villages are adjacent to one another and their power holders 
are linked in several ways, as we will elaborate later. 4 
Kathidanga Village 
Kathidanga, with a population of 750, is much smaller than any of 
its immediate neighboring villages. Of its 119 households, 6.7 percent pro-
J,: 
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duce a surplus on their own lands beyond subsistence needs, 16.0 per-
cent are self-sufficient, 24.4 percent are marginal (meaning their land is 
insufficient to provide for their subsistence), and 52. 9 percent are landless. 
Its main power holders are as follows. 
Nazmul, age 55 who comes from an adjacent thana and fought in the 
British Indian Army in Burma. He arrived in 1950, the first outside settler 
in this Adivasi village, and worked as a day laborer until he was able to 
occupy five acres of Adivasi land in 1%4. When the communal riot occur-
red in 1964, he occupied an additional 1.5 acres of government (khas) land 
and sold off the cows and G.I. sheets belonging to the Adivasis who had 
fled to India. With this money he bought five acres more. 
Since that time he has been heavily involved in money lending as his 
main occupation. During 1971 he was again involved, with many other 
people, in looting the possessions such as copper and brass utensils, 
wooden door frames and other household goods of Adivasis who fled 
to India. Now he has ten acres. The main clients of his money-lending 
business are Adivasis and he maintains good relations with several Adivasi 
leaders by offering them hospitality and gifts even as he takes advantage 
of the weaker members of their community. 
Farid, age 50 came in 1967 from an adjacent thana and married into 
the same family as Nazmul. At that time he occupied one acre of khas 
land and started engaging in money lending activities. Like Nazmul he 
does not engage in politics or other activities but concentrates on making 
profits through money lending. His daughter is married to the son of 
Kamal Member who resides in Adanpara. Now he has eighteen acres. 
Matin Master, age 3S5 came from an adjacent thana, where he still had 
land, with his family in 1976. After arriving in Kathidanga he bought four 
acres from refugees. He is a high school graduate and a teacher at the 
Kathidanga government primary school. He is also the Secretary of the 
union branch of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which was the party 
in power at the time of the study, and maintained good connections with 
the local Member of Parliament, the Chairman of the Sundorganj Union 
Council, a former Minister of the Cabinet, the President of the local 
organization of the (BNP), the Secretary of the Thana Teachers' Associa-
tion, and the President of the Central Teachers' Associations in Dhaka. 
Idris Master, age 35 arrived after 1%4 from an adjacent thana and mar-
ried a local girl. He received one acre as a gift from his father-in-law and 
bought another acre from Selim Commander. He is a gambler and has 
since lost all but one half acres in gambling. Previously he was a teacher 
in Adanpara primary school, but the school has been closed since it was 
damaged in 1977 by a cyclone. He contested the last Union Council elec-
tion and lost. Even so he remains active politically and is powerful because 
of a close connection with Matin Master. 
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Mostafa arrived with his father from an adjacent thana after the com-
munal riots of 1964. At that time his father bought six acres. Mostafa ob-
tained two of these and latter bought an additional acre. Formerly he 
belonged to a violent gang led by his uncle and another leader, now both 
dead. The gang also included his brother-in-law, now also dead, and a 
cousin. Mohiuddin, a faction leader in nearby Taluqkandi Village, was 
another leader of the gang until he was elected in 1977 to the Shantigarh 
Union Council. After his election, Mohiuddin formed his own gang and 
in the winter of 1978 killed Mostafa's brother-in-law in a land dispute. The 
next day Mostafa's cousin and another relative killed Mohiuddin's father. 
In late 1979 the relative joined Mohiuddin's group and, at Mohiuddin's 
instigation, killed Mostafa's cousin. With the death of his relatives, Mostafa 
became the leader of the original gang. There is a case pending against 
him for robbery on which his family has already spent Tk. 25,000 in bnbes 
and other expenses. 
Humayun comes from a notorious family of thieves that has lived in 
the region for two generations. Following the family profession, he has 
been in jail once and has two cases pending agianst him. He maintains 
close links with Mohiuddin, Salehuddin, and Kamal. He has married twice 
and divorced his first wife. His present wife was previously Salehuddin's 
third wife. He has a daughter, a son, and no land. 
Factions. There are two main factions in Kathidanga Village. The first 
consists of persons from nearby villages, fifty households led by Mostafa, 
Martin Master, and Idris, but controlled from outside by Mizan, former 
Chairman of the Sundorganj Union Council. The second, less dominant 
group consists of forty-five households of refugees from India. 
Adanapara Village 
Adanpara is a larger village to the north of I<atidanga that dominates 
the surrounding villages. It has a market and a population of 2,700 per-
sons in 448 households. Of these households, 3Z7 are setlers and 121 
Adivasis. Broken down by landholdings, 2.2 percent are surplus, 5.8 per-
cent self-sufficient, 30.8 percent marginal and 61.2 percent landless. Before 
1950 there were no settlers. The major influx began after 1964. The main 
leaders and power holders are as follows. 
Huda Master, age 60 came to the village from another part of the same 
District in the early 1950's and acquired five acres of khas land, of which 
he still has two. For about ten years he forcibly occupied khas and Adivasi 
land, which he in tum allocated to people coming from his former village. 
There were about 100 such families who came and received his "help and 
patronage" in return for money and services. Many of these people, 
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destitue. Of the 100 such families, only about twenty remain, the others 
having moved elsewhere. Income from these activities allowed Huda to 
employ several people and to buy a number of houses, including one that 
is quite large, plus a shop and various luxuries such as expensive furniture. 
He also involved in the timber and leaf businesses, 6 and in various 
types of forgery and other deceptions. In 19'71 the local people tried to 
get him involved in incidents that would get him put behind bars or kill-
ed. Even so, his good education has given him prestige and helped him 
in his activities. He is the retired headmaster of Motihar primary school 
and the father-in-law of Kamal Member. 
Kamal Member, age 45 arrived in 1960 from an adjacent thana and mar-
ried Huda Master's daughter as his second wife. His eldest son married 
the daughter of Farid from Kathidanga. When he first arrived in the village, 
he took employment as a laborer for Manzur Sarkar, later becoming a 
supervisor for Manzur and running off with about Tk. 10,000-a part of 
which Manzur has since recovered. Soon after he arrived he forcibly occu-
pied two acres of land and has since increased his holdings to seven acres. 
More recently he has become heavily involved in leaf and timber 
businesses, which are the basis of his present wealth. He was closely con-
nected with the former Union Council Chairman and, 1977, ran against 
Taher Company for a position on the Union Council, but lost. After Taher 
was killed by the Kader Bahini, Kamal obtained the seat in a by-election, 
mainly through the support of Manzur Sarkar. He is now close to Mohiud-
din and other Union Council Members and has good connections with 
the local Member of Parliament, Matin Master, the local forester, the 
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR, the border patrol), and the police. He is the 
Secretary of the Adanpara Primary School Committee and is a member 
of various other committees including the Madrassa Committee. His 
brother, Salehuddin's status as a freedom fighter had been helpful to him 
at various points in his career, until Salehuddin caused a clash with the 
local landless people (described at the end of this report), which Kamal 
has since been trying to settle without success. 
Salehuddin, age 36, the younger brother of Kamal Member, arrived in 
1960 and obtained two acres of land. He has had five wives and many 
mistresses. Through his elder brother he is well connected with Mohiud-
din and many others, and works closely with Latif. During the day he 
spends most of his time drinking and gambling. At night he steals cows 
and other things with the help of several colleagues within the region and 
from across the border. There are eleven cases and three warrants against 
him now. He has been severely beaten by the Police and members of the 
Bangladesh Rifles in the market and has been sent to jail several times, 
but usually manages to escape through payment of liberal bribes. In 1971 
he was a "freedom fighter'' 7 and extracted several thousand taka from the 
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poor, as well as from Razakars, 8 like Selim Commander of Taluqkandi 
Village (who was himself actively engaged in land grabbing), continuing 
these activities until 1973. 
Hafiz, age 55 came from Assam in 1964 and obtained an allocation of 
9 acres, 3 acres each for himself and his two sons. Ex-Union Council 
Member Lutfur from nearby Motihar Village helped him get the additional 
land for his sons, as well as money for three ploughs and three bundles 
of G.I. sheets. He assumed leadership of the refugees in the area. He has 
continued to be active in land grabbing schemes, as will be detailed later. 
He left the area for a year in 19'76, but returned to continue his profession 
of land grabbing and resale with the help of Lutfur. 
He works closely with Latif, his nephew, and has close connections 
with Salehuddin and Kamal Member as well as with Humayun of 
Kathidanga Village. He was involved with the leaf business for two years 
as a sub-agent. He has been married six times since divorcing two of his 
wives. Two current wives are engaged in collecting firewood from the forest 
and the other two live with their respective sons, Latif and Mofiz. Latif 
is the son of Hafiz's elder brother, but after his brother's death Hafiz mar-
ried the brother's wife, so Latif is both his nephew and step-son. 
Latif, age 35 came to the area with his uncle Hafiz and lived with him 
for five years until he married the first of his two wives. When Latif set 
up a separate household, Hafiz gave him three acres and he bought four 
acres of illegally occupied land from Hafiz. He has since sold off all ex-
cept 3.5 acres. Latif is a heavy drinker and is closely connected with 
Salehuddin, Humayun, Kamal Member, Lutfur ex-Member from Motihar 
Village, and Mohiuddin Member of Taluqkandi Village. Also, he is a 
member of the Village Defense Force (VDF). He currently has six cases 
against him: two for robbery, others for highway robbery, attempted 
murder, illegal occupation of temple land, and the attempted abduction 
of two young women. 
Mahfuz, age 36 arrived in 1960 from another part of the District and 
occupied five acres of khas land. In 1962 his father came and bought three 
acres. He has since bought seven acres more. In 19'71 he was a freedom 
fighter and terrorized many people including Selim Commander from 
whom he extracted Tk. 900. He extracted Tl<. 1,000 from another influen-
tial person and other amounts from less important people. Now he is the 
Secretry of Adanpara (west) primary school and has unsuccessfully cam-
paigned for a seat on the Union Council. He is now trying to get the sup-
port of the local landless people to run for the Union Council in the next 
election. He was involved in the leaf business and has spent six months 
in jail. He used to drink, but currently does not. 
Taher Company (now dead) was orginally from Comilla where in his 






conviction and started a business there, hence his title. In 1964 he came 
to Adanpara as a refugee and occupied a huge area of land temporarily 
abandoned by the Adivasis. By obtaining false refugee cards he got extra 
land allocated to him and bought a house at the thana headquarters. Later 
much of this land was reoccupied by the Adivasis and allocated to other 
refugees by the Border Magistrate. 
He was deeply involved in the leaf business and bought nine acres 
out of the profits. As a rich and intelligent person he was often asked to 
give judgement at salish 9 and was very influential. Kamal called him his 
godfather-in-law, a fictitious relationship, to get his patronage. In 1977 he 
ran for a Union Council seat and won by spending Tk. 10,000 to bribe 
election officials. But when Kamal Member and Salehuddin found out 
on election night they got angry and said that Taher Company's days were 
numbered. 
In the same year he was shot. He survived for a few hours, during 
which he told his relatives that he knew who was responsible, but for 
the safety of his family would not reveal their names. His relatives even-
tually learned the identity of the killers and were preparing to file a case 
when Kamal reached a settlement with them. 10 The following year Kamal 
was elected to the Union Council in the by-election. 
Manzur Sarkar, age 72 is the biggest landowner in the area, with a total 
of 150 acres divided between several individual plots. During the British 
rule his family were talukas. He is influential throughout the thana and 
plays a ''kingmaker" role during elections. He was previously involved 
in the timber business in a big way and was once a member of the Union 
Council in the adjacent union, when his uncle was Chairman. He was 
recently the major force enabling Kamal to become a member of the local 
Union Council. Now he is more or less retired from business and politics 
and has become "respectable." 
Factions. There are three major groupings in Adanpara. The first is 
led by Kamal Member and consists of his own group of forty households 
and a group of twenty-five mainly Garo households, as well as Hafiz's 
small kinship group of five households, and ten households from the east 
para (neighborhood). Second is a looser grouping under several small 
leaders including three groups of twenty, fifteen, and thirty-seven 
households each, plus a group of sixty-nine Adivasi households. Forcer-
tain purposes the Adivasi groups all unite under the leadership of a Garo 
Catholic with good connections in the Catholic Mission. Although the 
first faction is much smaller than the second, its tighter organization, the 
ruthlessness of its members, and its good connections make it the more 
powerful and successful. 
LAND 
The history of the area during past twenty years has been a continuing 
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process of land occupation, primarily of Adivasi lands by Muslim 
refugees-actual or self-proclaimed. The land grabbing reached its peak 
in 1964-65 and 1971, when communal riots and wars forced many Adivasis 
to flee temporarily to India. At these times men like Selim Commander, 
Mohiuddin Member, Huda Master, Lutfur ex-Member and Mizan ex-
Chairman were able to grab lands on a large scale and build up their pre-
sent wealth and power, while Nazmul laid the basis for his money-lending 
business. This process is still going on and every year at transplanting 
and harvest times new disputes arise. 
Oearly what has been involved has not been a simple matter of larger 
numbers of settlers arriving over the years and each occupying some land 
for himself. The large number of landless in the area itself refutes this 
theory. And the Adivasis have rarely sold productive land voluntarily in 
this area. In fact, the land occupation has been the work of a small number 
of men who, seizing a tragic opportunity, have used violence, trickery, 
deceit, bribery, and the forgery of official documents to expand their power 
and wealth and finance their vices. 
As of 1976-77, with the Kader Bahini rebellion still going on, a new 
wave of land grabbing was underway. For the most part, the men who 
had assumed the lead in earlier episodes were now playing a more "respec-
table" role, providing protection, encouragement, and finance to a younger 
and more active generation-with notable exceptions such as Mohiuddin 
Member and Selim Commander who were still active. 
Much land has already changed hands. The action, however, is shif-
ting away from villages like Kathidanga, where 100 percent of the land 
has changed hands during this period, to villages like Adanpara and 
Motihar where land remains that has not yet been captured by the net. 
The methods of operation are illustrated in numerous examples including 
the following cases from Adanapara, for which we have detailed data sup-
ported by land documents and case numbers, as well as direct personal 
observation. 
Recently Hafiz and his nephew Latif have been the most active in land 
grabbing in this village. In 1967 they forcibly occupied eight acres belong-
ing to a KDch, member of the scheduled or untouchable caste who over 
two years filed nine cases against them and others in the Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate's Court. They were all arrested but released after seven days 
on bail while the case continued. When their conviction became immi-
nent, they approached the Union Chairman who threatened the Koch, 
pressuring him to come to a compromise. As a result he kept 4.25 acres 
and Hafiz got 3.75. At this point the Chairman brought his influence to 
bear in the Court, reporting that Hafiz had never occupied any land. fur 
his services in the case he received Tk. 1,000 from a grateful Hafiz. At 
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two more Koch for which he has been able to obtain ownership documents 
from the Revenue Department. 
In lgJl a coalition of Selim Commander and Hafiz, with the support 
of Kamal Member, Lutfur ex-Member and others from outside occupied 
100 to 200 acres of land belonging to Adivasis who had temporarily fled 
to India. Much of this land was registered in the names of relatives who 
had since died. Since there are no proper birth and death registers in the 
area, the occupiers were able to maintain that the actual owners were not 
dead, but still in India and therefore the land was "enemy property." Any 
complaints from the owners to the Court were referred to the Officer-in-
Charge of Police, who had been bribed by the group and simply ignored 
the instructions of the court to investigate. Much of this land was sold 
to new arrivals. Some was recovered by its owners. Hafiz kept three acres 
of temple land and one acre of private land obtained in this way. Latif 
retained three acres. 
The enemy property ordinance; which figures centrally in much land 
grabbing, was passed after the 1%5 war and was intended to be used to 
confiscate the property of those who had defected to India and make it 
available for settling refugees from India on a lease basis from the govern-
ment, though often in practice it was opened for occupation. In 1967-69 
a census was carried out to find out who had permanently left the coun-
try for India and to confiscate their property. We were told by senior district 
level officials, however, that the census officials never went to the field, 
but rather sat in their offices and, whenever they saw land registered in 
the name of a person with a non-Muslim name, they classified it as enemy 
property. It was a system that easily lent itself to manipulation as it was 
a simple matter to get land so classified. One senior official of the land 
settlement operation told us that in checking through classifications in 
part of an adjacent thana, he had found that 75 percent of "enemy pro-
perty" classifications were false and that even some Muslim families had 
been included. 
A related problem was the difficulty facing the average person in fin-
ding out how a given piece of land was classified. A senior district officer 
told us the story of a man who came to the Magistrate's court appealing 
against an enemy property classification on thirteen small plots of land. 
It turned out that eleven of the plots were not in fact so classified. He 
had been deceived by the local registrar who used his control over the 
local records to pretend that large amounts of land had been so classified 
to extract bribes on the pretense of changing the records. The remaining 
two classifications were false and were overthrown. 
In contrast to the ease with which property can be incorrectly 
classified, getting a false classification corrected can be a difficult and ex-
pensive process. The owner usually has to go first to the Sub-divisional 
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Officer and the Additional Deputy Commissioner, and finally to the 
Ministry in Dhaka. Not the least of his problems is how to get inside the 
Ministry, which is inside a guarded secretariate building with restricted 
access. 
One measure intended to prevent much of this type of land grabbing 
is a ruling by the Border Magistrate that even the land allocated to refugees 
in the border area is given to them only on a one year share-cropping 
basis and does not become legally theirs even by continued occupation. 
This ruling is completely ignored and ineffective. 
In the face of the sophisticated system of corruption that has emerg-
ed to exploit the weaknesses in these systems, the ignorant and unorganiz-
ed people on the one side of it and the senior government officers on the 
other side seem almost helpless. 
CAPITAL 
The local power elites are also able to make effective use of their near 
monopoly control over liquid capital, lending it out at extremely high rates 
of interest. Although several of the prinicipal money lenders got their start 
by illegally occupying land and continue to use their power over debtors 
to increase their holdings at low cost, the two types of operation demand 
different styles, connections, and methods of operation. The case of Naz-
mul of Kathidanga Village, illustrates the methods of the money lender. 
Nazmul built up his initial capital by land grabbing and looting. In 
1966 he started lending money at the rate of 100 percent per crop season. 
There are two main crop seasons per year: spring and summer. In that 
year he lent one maund of paddy worth Tk. 20 to a Garo. The Garo was 
unable to repay at the end of the season, and Nazmul continued to ex-
tend the loan until W73. By that time the debt had grown to 16,384 maunds. 
Nazmul offered to accept Tk. 5000 in repayment and forget the rest. In 
1973 he received 0.50 acres of land worth Tk. 4, 980 as a final settlement. 
In 1972 he lent two rnaunds and Tk. 200 to another Garo, who returned 
Tk. 200 and five maunds after one season (the price at that time being 
Tk. 40-50/md.). Nazmul claimed Tk. 1800 more and his debtor had to give 
him the use of 0.50 acres for one year. That year the yield was fourteen 
maunds and the following year he received another four maunds. He still 
claimed Tk. 1200 more. Finally his debtor paid him another Tk. 100 after 
selling his cow and begged to be forgiven the rest. The matter was settl-
ed, and Nazmul's profit was approximately Tk. 2,300. His business has 
grown over the years. This year he expects to receive 145 maunds and 
has already recovered forty-five. 
A client of one large money lender was watching an eclipse of the 
moon with us one night. ''Do you know what's happened to the moon?" 
t: 
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he said as it began to disappear. "He took a one paisa loan from the 
sun ... :'11 
THE FORESf 
Govenment forest covers an area of about 8,000 acres, or half the total 
BRAC project area. Two thirds of this is still forested, though large timber 
merchants are cutting it off at a rapid rate with the unofficial co-operation 
of the forestry officers. Every year for three months from February to May, 
large numbers of trucks come to the area and carry away large sa/ trees 
[a valuable timber species) to the towns for sale, and small trees and bran-
ches to the local markets for firewood. Possibly no other activity 
demonstrates so dearly the imbalance of power as the way in which of-
ficials treat the commercial loggers on the one hand and the poor who 
cut headloads of wood to sell for survival on the other. 
The following is a description of one typical scheme for illegally 
harvesting trees from government land. 
Many Adivasis have plots of private registered land inside the govern-
ment forests which they do not use for agriculture because the soils are 
poor. Timber operators buy up these plots at Tk. 300 to 500 per acre and 
obtain permits from the District Forest Officer (DFO) to cut trees on this 
land. Though officially such permits are given free for cutting on private 
land, in fact they cost several thousand taka in bribes. Having obtained 
the permit, the operator then starts cutting down trees in the public forests 
adjacent to the plot. These are then carried to the plot and placed next 
to old stumps. The Forester is brought in to stamp the trees with a special 
hammer so they can be removed. A single stump may be "cut" in this 
manner as many as six or seven times. 
The price of timber in the sub-divisional town is at least Tk. 80 per 
cubic foot (dt.) and the transport cost is Tk. 1,000/truck. One truck can 
carry about 200 cft. and the cost of cutting 200 cft. on government land 
is Tk. 1,400. Therefore, the sale price per truck is Tk. 16,000 and the costs 
Tk. 2,400 excluding bribes. Firewood is sold locally with no transport cost 
at Tk. 2,000 to 2,500 per truck with a cutting cost of Tl<. 150. The profits 
are therefore Tk. 13,500 per truckload of timber and Tk. 2,IXXJ per truckload 
of firewood. Bribes may take as much as one third or even half this amount. 
The amounts of timber and firewood cut are about equal. In three forested 
unions, including the BRAC project area, in the winter season of 19'78-79 
about forty large contractors were operating for five months, each employ-
ing an average of 100 laborers a day. Actual shipment out of the area oc-
curs during a brief period at the end of the season. All trucks coming out 
of the area have to pass by the same point. A check revealed that at least 
twenty trucks passed that point each day for at least forty-five days, about 
half carrying timber and the other half firewood. 
I 
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These large and profitable operations are in stark contrast with the 
activities of landless and destitute families who spend all day cutting a 
headload of firewood, then carry it on their heads to the local market where 
it fetches Tk. 5. According to the Forest Department, this work is only 
legal if the wood is broken and collected with bare hands (not cut with 
an axe) and if a pemit application signed by the Union Council Chairman 
is submitted and a fee of Tk. 1.50 paid for each headload. Because of the 
difficulty of conforming to these regulations, no one does, and so poor 
people who have no other livelihood are often harassed by the local power 
elites as well as by police and forest officers. An example: 
On the 18th of September 1979 at 4:00 a.m. twenty-three landless 
laborers went from Adanpara toward the sub-divisional town carrying 
firewood they had cut the previous day. There was no work available and 
the condition of their families was serious. Some policemen returning from 
patrol caught them; three ran away and twenty were arrested. They had 
no money to pay a bribe and so were taken to the police station. Mizan, 
ex-Chairman of the Sundorganj Union Council and one of the area's ma-
jor timber operators, spends most of his time around thana headquarters 
and happened to be present at this time. He became involved and 
negotiated a rate of Tk. 5 per head for their release. Soon their friends 
and relatives and other members of the landless organization arrived. With 
them came Amin, a faction leader of Osmanpur Village and two-time un-
successful candidate for the Union Council. Amin was allowed entry into 
the police station to negotiate together wiht Mizan though the rest were 
refused. 
On his return he told the group that by now the rorest Department 
had become involved and so the price had gone up to Tk. 10 per head. 
They refused to pay and said they were prepared to take the case to higher 
levels if the prisoners were not released. By this stage the prisoners were 
hungry and the sentry who had given permission for food to be sent in 
now refused. Mizan and Amin interceded with the police and got per-
mission. After showing their sympathy in this way they gave the news 
that the Bangladesh Rifles had been informed by telephone and the rate 
had now gone up to Tk. 15 per head. The friends still refused to pay, 
however, and the police sent a man over to the rorestry office for 
co-ordination. 
Then Mizan, Amin, and the police began discussions with the 
prisoners inside and friends outside simultaneously. They hinted that the 
prisoners might be beaten, kept without food, and later sent to jail. Amin 
reminded the prisoners that their friends would find it very difficult to 
go to higher levels and offered to sign a bond for their release. Eventually 
they agreed and each had to sign two bonds, one admitting guilt and 





they paid. Out of the Tk. 400 collected, the police, BDR and furest Depart-
ment personnel each got 25 percent and the remainder was divided equally 
between Mizan and Amin. Although this was paid on the understanding 
that the case would be dropped, it has not been. 
Thus the power elites are not only able to defy laws protecting the 
forest with impunity for their personal profit, they are also able to use 
the same laws to exploit and harass the poor. 
FOOD 
Though our area is surplus in rice and exports substantial amounts, 
such a high proportion of the population is comprised of landless laborers 
that anything that reduces their employment opportunities results in much 
suffering. This happened in May/June 1979 when drought seriously af-
fected the spring rice crop and made weeding unnecessary, thus leaving 
most of the laborers unemployed and on the edge of starvation. This situa-
tion was repeated in September-October. In such circumstances the almost 
total control enjoyed by the power elite over government food supplies 
disbursed by the government under food-for-work and rations programs 
puts them in an extremely powerful position. 
Food-for-Work 
Normally during the winter season large amounts of wheat are made 
available all over Bangladesh to compensate laborers for the creation of 
rural infrastructure such as roads, canals, and embankments, and for the 
raising and leveling of land. The program is administered by the Union 
Councils under the supervision of the government. In 1979, because of 
the crisis caused by the drought, much of the wheat intended for use in 
the dry winter season was brought forward during the monsoon. 
In the four months August to November 1979, twenty-six schemes were 
sanctioned, and a total of 2, 100 maunds (mds) of wheat were disbursed 
by the Government for this program. 12 The twenty schemes we were able 
to check were allocated 1,825 mds. Of this, only 425 mds. 32 seers (srs.), 
23.9 percent of the total sanctioned, were really distributed. The remain-
ing 1,392 mds. 8 srs., with a market value of Tk. 139,200, "disappeared." 
According to Union Council members interviewed, 30 percent of the 
wheat for each scheme always goes for "expenses," transport costs and 
the shares of the various government officers. The transport cost is ac-
tually covered separately by the government and, from BRAC's own ex-
perience, should not in any event exceed 3 percent of the total. Several 
levels of government are involved, from the project implementation of-
ficer, who checks all movements and certifies completion, through the 
thana officer in charge of development, up to the sub-division. 
'; 
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In December 1979, a special scheme was sanctioned for raising and 
leveling the Adanpara primary school field. The school is not registered 
or even running though its teachers continue to draw rations. This was 
a special scheme transferred from some other allocation, and fifty mds. 
were sanctioned. It was implemented by Kamal Member, Matin Master, 
and Idris Master. Less than five mds. were really distributed. 
But the incident of the Adanpara primary school field had begun even 
earlier. In early October 1979 Matin Master told three marginal farmers 
that he had received a delivery order for 100 mds. wheat to repair the 
Adanpara school field, but needed money to transport it. After bargain-
ing, the farmers bought mds. in advance for Tk. 300. He shared the money 
with Idris Master and Kamal Member. When the wheat finally arrived 
three months later, he told them that since only fifty mds. had been sanc-
tioned and had gone on "expenses" he could not supply any. 
Control over food supplies is also an effective method of patronage. 
Food-for-work, for example, is usually given to the relatives and faction 
members of the council member. This also has the advantage of keeping 
the amount distributed as secret as possible. It can also be denied to any 
rivals or dissatisfied groups. fur example, once the landless people became 
organized and started demanding higher wages and other benefits, the 
Union Council denied them any further food-for-work allocations. 
RESISTANCE 
In recent years the landless poor and marginal farmers have been in-
creasingly successful in organizing themselves and in challenging some 
of the activities of the "net:' 
In Adanpara there are 4. 2 acres of temple land belonging to a Koch 
which had been claimed by Hafiz and his relatives and previously occupied 
by them. In 1979 the Koch made an arrangement to share this land with 
a landless group of seventy settlers and Adivasis. They all filed a case 
against the land grabbers, and because of their large number were able 
to transplant and harvest their crops successfully. 
On a much larger scale, the big land occupation operations started 
in 1976 in a nearby village by Kamal and others have been successfully 
countered. fur three years the occupiers were able to use about 100 acres 
belonging to all the Adivasis of the village. In 1979 when BRAC's food-
for-work program was beginning, the victims began to discuss how to 
recover their land. By transplanting time they had organized a strong group 
including almost all the landless settlers and Adivasis in the village and 
had established good contacts with similar groups in the surrounding 
villages and with the local Member of Parliament. At that time the central 
government was giving special attention to the Adivasis. After careful 
.s:::: 
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preparation, they transplanted and harvested in a large group of sixty peo-
ple and have reoccupied almost all the land, though there is a case filed 
against their leader. 
One of many reasons why organizing has worked to increase the 
power of these groups is that they have been able to agree not to hire out 
to work confiscated land for members of the net nor serve as their guards. 
When such agreements extend to neighboring villages, illegal land occupa-
tion becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. 
As the landless began to get organized and take action, members of 
the net began to strike back. During BRAC's food-for-work program, several 
women's groups were organized and started joint cultivation. Salehud-
din started bullying and threatening them when he was drunk. Their 
leader complained to the Union Council Member, who is Salehuddin's 
brother, but got no satisfaction and so contacted all the landless groups 
in the surrounding villages. They decided to organize a salish among 
themselves and summoned Salehuddin to attend. At the salish it became 
clear that he had been threatening many people with beating and murder 
if they spoke against him. Because of this, before taking the matter any 
further, the landless leaders reported these threats to the police, who were 
uncooperative. It was learned that they had just received a Tk. 500 bribe 
from Salehuddin in another case. 
One leader had been particularly active in the salish and had also 
played a central role in resisting the land-grabbing activities of Salehud-
din and friends. Two weeks after the salish they attacked him in the bazar 
at dusk. Though he was only slightly injured, another landless leader, 
Kazim, and a local rich man who had come out of the mosque to stop 
the fighting were wounded in the head and hand respectively. 
The landless people became angry, cutting up bamboo to make lath is 
(sticks) and discussed whether to go to Salehuddin's house to kill him. 
They decided against it. The victims went to the Sub-Division for treat-
ment and to the thana police station to file a case. Salehuddin also filed 
a counter-case against the landless leader, which was well received by the 
Officer-in-Charge (O.C.) of police because of their dose relationship. 
The following day, 600 men marched to the police station to request 
the O.C. to take action against Salehuddin, shouting the slogan: ''Build 
landless organization, stop robbery!" The O.C. met them on the road. He 
spoke nicely and sympathetically-not his common practice with the 
landless-and promised to investigate. They heeded his request that they 
return home. 
When the O.C. reached the police station he found 200 women, who 
had come by a different route, gathered there. He gave them promises 
as well and the following day came to investigate the case. 
Salehuddin disappeared for some time and his assistant Latif was 
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arrested. Salehuddin reappeared after his brother sold 0.5 acres, mortgaged 
0.5 acres and paid the O.C. Tk. 3000 to avoid arrest. He then tried to 
negotiate a settlement with the landless organization. 
Given an understanding of the local power structure, it no longer 
seems surprising that resources intended for "development" rarely reach 
the poor. The words and plans of central government mean little. The 
realities of power relationships at local levels determine what actually 
happened. 
AN UPDATE 
In early 1985, a little more than five years after the original study, a 
follow-up was carried out in the areas to assess the impact of efforts by 
the landless to shift the power balance in the two villages examined above. 
This follow-up revealed the substantial difficulties of the undertaking. The 
reader should bear in mind that, of the ten villages included in the original 
study, Kathidanga and Adan para were chosen for attention in this article 
specifically because it was here that the net was particularly well entren-
ched and powerful. It should also be kept in mind that the border area 
in which the original ten study villages was located is one of the more 
inaccessible in Bangladesh, and had more than the typical level of lawless 
activity. 
After reviewing developments in Kathidanda and Adanpara, we will 
look at a key indicator of the progress being made by the landless of the 
surrounding area and at some of the lessons which this experience 
generated for BRAC. 
Kathidanga Village 
In Kathidanga village the landless organization no longer exists and 
any impact it may have had on the village is difficult to detect. It was one 
of the earlier villages organized by BRAC and contributed important 
lessons which BRAC has since been careful to observe. When Kathidanga 
was being organized, BRAC had not yet instituted the practice of begin-
ning with a comprehensive village survey which, among other things, 
makes it possible for BRAC workers to specificially target the landless. 
Nor was it considered important at that time to restrict membership to 
the landless class. Consequently the organization had attracted members 
who were not identified with the interests of the landless and who assum-
ed a dominant role in the association. It also turned out that most of the 
landless in the village were refugees without established ties to the com-
munity. Unable to find employment there and having no real ties to the 
village, most had left the area by 1985. 
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holdings to twenty-two acres of land and 100 head of cattle through a con-
tinuation of his money lending and land grabbing activities. His three sons 
are active in smuggling and black market operations. Farid has had similar 
success with his money lending, increasing his holdings to twenty acres. 
His daughter has married one of Kamal Member's sons. Matin Master is 
still serving as a teacher in the local primary school and has engaged in 
some successful land transactions, but drinks heavily and has had to sell 
off almost all of his property to cover drinking expenses, retaining only 
a one-acre homestead plot. Idris Master, having lost his land in gambl-
ing, works as a share cropper in his father's village but still remains suffi-
ciently active politically to have been nominated to serve as a union council 
member. A string of additional cases were brought against him for theft 
following the case mentioned earlier, which had already cost him Tk. 25,CXXJ 
in bnbes and other expenses. To meet the expenses of these cases, he even-
tually was forced to sell off all his land and now lives in a deplorable finan-
cial condition. Humayun is still a prominent member of Mohiuddin's gang, 
maintaining good relations with Salehuddin and Kamal Member. 
Adanpara Village 
In Adanpara Village the landless organization survives as an impor-
tant force in the village, though it faces continuing and difficult obstacles 
including corruption among its own leadership. Kazim, secretary of the 
central committee of the landless organization, who had suffered head 
injuries in the 1CJ79 incident with Salehuddin, received Tk. 2,200 from the 
members of the organization to press their case with the district court. 
Some days later he demanded more money to spend on the case. As he 
refused to give the members an accounting for the previous money, his 
request was denied. It was later learned that he took another Tk. 2,000 
from the central committee's account, which he was only willing to say 
he had spent on the case. In the meantime, he convinced the organiza-
tion to compromise with Salehuddin on the case. He lost the support of 
the landless organization, but later won an election for Union Council 
membership with the support of elite factions which opposed the landless 
organization. 
Later another leader, Kalam Munsi, obtained a loan of Tk. 1,000 from 
the group to buy land for himself but later refused to repay the money 
or tum over the land. When the group was unsuccessful in reclaiming the 
money, it disbanded and most of its members joined another of the Adan-
para people's organizations. Still another leader gave over one acre of his 
land to the group for collective cultivation on the condition that they dean 
and level it. But after the work was done, he retained the land for himself 
and joined with Kazim in supporting political factions that opposed the 
people's organization. 
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As for the key figures mentioned in the earlier study, Huda Master 
involved himself as a member of the landless organization, consistently 
working against its interests until the members took a strong stand against 
him. His economic position and standing in the village subsequently 
deteriorated until he finally sold off his remaining property and returned 
to his home village where he passed away in 1982. 
After Kamal Member became a Union Council member his income 
increased rapidly during the first half of his term through a variety of ques-
tionable activities. In early 1983 the landless organization caught him red-
handed in collecting the grain from a Food for Work Project on which no 
work had been accomplished. They filed a case against him at both thana 
and sub-division levels, but no action was taken. So they took their case 
to the local Member of Parliament and with his help seized the wheat 
sanctioned for the scheme, completed the project, and distributed the 
wheat to the participants. Kamal's timber and leaf business started to 
decline. Blocked by the landless group from further illegal profiteering 
from his Union Council position he has turned to cattle stealing, with two 
cases being brought against him in the local thana during the past year. 
He still maintains good relations with the Bangladesh Rifles, Forestry, and 
Thana (Upazilla) officials. But in the last union council election he lost 
badly, receiving only eighty votes. 
Salehuddin, with the help of Kamal Member and the local UP Chair-
man who maintains frequent contact with the landless leaders, was final-
ly successful in negotiating an agreement with Kazim, the Secretary of 
the central commitee of the landless organization, and the case brought 
against him by the landless was finally withdrawn. He later begged par-
don for the incident from the landless people in a public gathering. He 
continues to serve as a member of Mohiuddin's gang, engages in cattle 
and timber theft, and does what he can to hinder the activities of the 
landless organization. He now has fifty acres of land. 
Hafiz lost all of his land in gambling and in paying expenses of 
disputes over land taken from the Adivasis. He is now a poor old man 
of no importance suffering from various untreated diseases. His nephew, 
Latif, continues to practice cattle theft and robbery as a member of Mohiud-
din' s gang. With the help of Mohiuddin's connections with local officials 
and some small bribes, he has been successful in getting the six cases that 
were pending against him dropped, though he spent a total of two years 
in jail from 1<J7'9-83. He serves as a member of the Village Defense Force 
and owns two acres of land. 
Mahfuz has increased his holdings to twelve acres. He has continued, 
without success, to win the support of the landless organization in bids 
for the union council. He remains an important social and political figure 
in the area. 
C: 
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Manzur Sarkar became a supporter of the landless organization, giv-
ing one acre of land to the Adanpara Landless Women's Organization for 
collective cultivation of cassava and giving support to the candidate spon-
sored by the landless organization for UP Chairman Candidate in the most 
recent election. He died in 1984, and his family continues to hold his 150 
acres of land. 
Union Council Elections 
As the members of landless organizations have become more politically 
aware, they have given increasing attention to winning representation on 
the local Union Councils. The Union Council elections held December 
1983 to January 1984 were contested by forty-two candidates from the 
landless groups. Ten of these were from the ten villages included in the 
original study, and the remaining thirty-two were from neighboring 
villages. Though none of the candidates from the ten villages won, twelve 
of the candidates from the neighboring villages did. Though this was on-
ly a minority of the landless candidates, the results were taken as an im-
portant victory by the landless who felt it marked a turning point in their 
endeavor to gain power. 
This focus on union-level elections has been accompanied by moves 
toward the formation by the landless of their own union-level federation 
of village level associations. So far two union-level committees have been 
formed by the landless, comprised of one representative from each of their 
village organizations. These committees meet once each month to discuss 
issues that affect their organizations and to seek common solutions. 
Among the accomplishments of these committees has been a successful 
effort to reorganize and reactivate the landless organization in one of the 
ten study villages which had run into difficulties. 
LESSONS 
BRAC has learned numerous lessons from this experience. First is the 
importance of beginning involvement in a village with a comprehensive 
survey that clearly identifies the target population and reveals the social 
structure of the village. Membership in landless organizations is then 
limited to those who are actually members of the landless class. Mass con-
frontation with elites is avoided whenever possible, attempting to resolve 
disputes by more tactful means. Efforts are made to develop broadly bas-
ed leadership to make it difficult for one person to assume a dominant 
role, which 'may be used to his personal benefit. From the very begin-
ning, attention is given to self-managed income and employment-
generating programs based on traditional skills and occupations. This con-
trasts with earlier BRAC programs that were oriented more to providing 
emergency relief to the poor and tended to create dependency. 
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And so the poor continue their struggle and BRAC continues to learn. 
There are no easy victories and each success is built on the learning from 
past failures. fur all the set-backs the landless of the area are making pro-
gress, no longer feeling they are simply at the mercy of corrupt elites, politi-
cians, and administrators. And as difficult as the organization-building 
process is, there is no evident alternative. If these people are to gain a 
decent livelihood and a respected place in the community, it must come 
through their own efforts and organization. Try as it has, it seems to be 
beyond the capacity of government or foreign aid agencies to achieve this 
for them. 
NOTES 
1. With the exception of countries and capital cities all names of individuals and places men-
tioned in this study have been fictionalized. Any similarities to names of actual persons and 
places are coincidential. 
2. \.A.le refer to "power" elites rather than simply elites because all members of the economic 
elite of the village are not members of this corrupt network. Many are indeed honest and 
civic minded individuals who themselves are subject to exploitation by the "net:' 
3. The union is the lowest political level of government and is comprised of several villages. 
The thana (recently named Upazilla), comprised of 5e\leral unions, is the lowest administrative 
level of government. 
4. The following report is written in the present tense to retain its sense of immediacy. The 
study [except for the update provided at the end] was, however, completed by the end of 
1979 and the statements made apply to that point in time. 
5. Titles are sometimes appended to the name in Bangladesh according to one's occupation. 
"Master" indicates a teacher. "Company" designates a businessman. "Member" is a member 
of the Union Council. "Chairman" is the Chairman of the Union Council-locally a power-
ful position. Member and Chairman may be prefaced by "ex~· indicating they no longer hold 
the position. 
6. This involves collection of a particular type of leaf from the forest which is used in mak-
ing the local cigarettes. Marketing of these leaves is controlled by a large, government licensed 
monopoly through local agents such as Huda Master. 
7. Some so called "freedom fighters" were little more than thugs who took advantage of 
the war to rob and pillage their neighbors in the name of a patriotic cause. 
8. Members of the local militia who fought with the Bangladesh army in the Liberation War 
with Pakistan. 
9. This is the village court which is formed by respected local residents to resolve a dispute. 
All the villagers gather to observe the proceedings. 
10. They concluded that the assassination was arranged by Salehuddin, the brother of Kamal, 
and carried out by members of the Kader Bahini, some of whom were friends of Salehuddin. 
11. A paisa is one-hundredth of a taka. 
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The Nature of Social Learning 
EDGAR S. DUNN, JR. 
The most striking thing about evolutionary history is that the operation 
ofphylogenesis in its generalizing mode created improvements in organism 
adaptability until it generated learning organisms. Thus, the behavioral 
reprogramming of organism behavior that is phylogenesis gradually evolved 
a program (genotype) that provided the organism with the power to repro-
gram itself-to act as a true learning system at the organism level. In the 
human species the learning organism reached the point where learning 
becomes largely socialized because the dominant aspect of the individual 
organism's learning environment is the presence of and the sharing with 
other learning organisms. 
In this way there emerged a process of social evolution distinct from 
biological evolution and a process of social learning distinct from a purely 
stochastic learning process. This process takes place at two levels-the level 
of the individual and the level of the group. 
The major elements in an individual's learning and personality forma-
tion are associated with his social environment. He learns by sharing in 
a range of acquired information through communication and social system 
participation. Individual behaviors form group clusters to exploit the 
behavioral amplification that specialization and exchange can afford. Thus, 
individual learning and behavior are shaped by the nature of the group 
activities in which the individual participates and through which he is 
molded, and which in turn, are frequently molded by him. 
Social learning also takes place at the level of the group, where the 
result is not the transformation of individual behavior but the transformation 
of group behavior. Either the collective membership of the group or some 
leadership elite undertakes to monitor the group behavior with reference 
to group goals. Serious deviations constitute problems which must be 
resolved through technological innovation and social reorganization. 
Social learning subsumes both social system learning and the socialized 
Excerpted from Edgar S_ Dunn, Jr., Economic and Social Dn·elopmenr: A Process of Social 
Learning (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Cni,·ersity Press, 1971), pp. 239-45. Published 
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learning of the individual. Its operation at the two levels is obviously inter-
related. Since the orientation of this book is a social science one, we have 
been predominantly concerned with the way in which the process works 
to transform social systems. The essence of what we have learned about 
the operation of the process is as follows. 
Social behavior is not identical wirh social learning. Two of the unique 
aspects of the human social process continue to operate in the absence of 
social learning. Behaviors directed to evaluating and organizing behavior 
are continuously employed in maintaining social processes that are homeo-
static in character. There they operate to modify the mix and flow of estab-
lished modes of behavior in response to established behavioral criteria 
associated with the monitoring of moderate environmental changes. 
Since social systems frequently encounter situations, in which such 
predetermined forms of adaptation are inadequate, rarely can they long 
escape the necessity for social learning. Then they must display the third 
unique component of the social process - behavior directed to changing 
behavior. In this learning process both behavior-evaluating behavior and 
behavior-organizing behavior continue to operate, but they become trans-
formed into aspects of behavior-changing behavior. They operate together 
to form a process of social learning. 
This we identify as a process of evolutionary experimentarion -a 
process that is different in important respects from the experimental process 
known to classical science. Social sysrem evolution is rhe resulr of a problem 
solving process that is an implicit if nor explicit form of hypothesis resting -
but is problem solving and testing of a different order. 
Classical experimental physical science takes place at two levels: analysis 
and sysrem design. At the level of analysis it is concerned with understanding 
the operation of deterministic physical systems from the posture of an 
external observer. It commonly rests hypotheses abour the narure of the 
system by observing the effect upon components of rhe sys rem of changes 
in exogenous parameters, usually under highly controlled condirions. In 
this way it seeks to identify laws or universal relationships. Ar the level 
of system design, these relationships or laws are applied to the design of 
deterministic systems like machine systems, creating artifacts that amplify 
human behavior. The design of these systems is engineered from the posture 
of an external manipulator. To the extent that the valuation process is 
involved, it is concerned only with instrumental values or efficiency criteria 
at the design stage. 
In social sysrems problem solving and hyporhesis testing rake on a differ-
ent character. The basic point of depanure is rhe fact rhat the social system 
experimenter is not exogenous to the system. He exists as an endogenous 
component of the system he is attempting to understand and transform. He 
is not dealing with the understanding and design of fully determinisric 
systems. He is immersed in rhe act of social system self-analysis and self-
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transformation. He is the agent of social learning-a purposive, self-actuating, 
but not fully deterministic process. He is not interested to the same degree 
in establishing universals because the social system which engages his activity 
is phenomenologically unique and both its structure and function are 
temporary in character. He is engaged, rather, in formulating and testing 
developmenral hypotheses. The developmental hypothesis is a presupposi-
tion rhar, if the organizarion and behavior of the social system were to be 
modified in a certain way, the goals ofrhe system would be more adequately 
realized. This developmental hyporhesis is not tested repeatedly under nearly 
identical or controlled conditions. Rather, it is tesred by the degree to which 
goal convergence is realized as a result of the experimental design. Problem 
solving- hyporhesis formulation and testing-is an iterative, sequential series 
of adaptarions of an adaprable, goal-seeking, self-activating system. It can 
be characterized as evolurionary experimentarion. 
This process calls into play the other two unique processes in its support. 
Because by irs nature social learning involves social reorganization, behavior-
organizing behavior is involved. We have seen that an organization is defined 
by a set of boundary condirions. These boundary conditions are a set of social 
sysrem goals and the controls imposed upon component systems to assure 
that their behavior supports the total system goals. Developmental 
hypotheses arise out of the anomalies of social organization when the social 
system controls do not adequately serve the social system goals. They are 
tested through social system reorganization designed to bring the system 
goals and controls into consonance. 
Evolutionary experimentation can be seen to exhibit both a normal and 
extraordinary mode. In normal problem solving the emphasis is upon the 
reorganization of the system controls. It involves the reorganization of 
subsystem boundaries under rhe control of the total system goals. It does 
not threaten the context of the system. As we have seen, this mode of problem 
solving is frequently inadequate. The developmental hypotheses and the 
associated subsystem reorganizations are not sufficient to bring about 
consonance of total system goals and controls. Thus, evolutionary experi-
mentation occasionally manifests itself as a paradigm shift or a displacement 
in the operating context of the total system. It comes to deal, not with the 
reorganization of controls, but with the reformulation of total system goals 
as well. 
This makes plain that behavior-evaluating behavior is also an essential 
servant of evolutionary experimentation. In the case of normal problem 
solving, attention is restricted to a consideration of the adequacy of instru-
mental goals and criteria. Subsystem goals may come under consideration 
because they are in conflict with the target goals of the total system. They 
are either placed under additional constraints by the reorganization of control 
subsystems or they are directly subjected to the reorganization of their own 
goals and controls. In this mode, however, even the revision of subsystem 
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goals is undertaken under the control of total system goals. In the case of 
evolutionary experimentation that is manifest as a paradigm shift, it is the 
target goals of the total system that are subject to revision. This makes plain 
that the social scientist concerned with developmental problems cannot 
abstract from normative or value-laden issues. The process of evolutionary 
experimentation is essentially a normative process; one of its consequences 
is the evolution of social values. 
Throughout social history the operation of this process of social learning 
has been hazardous and haphazard because its conduct has not been efficient 
and because it has been predominantly concerned with instrumental goals. 
In effect, the process of social learning has not understood itself sufficiently 
well to rationalize itself as an efficient process with a coherent purpose. 
Because the process has not been understood and consciously applied, 
social change has frequently been dominated by an attempt to implement 
change by processes incompatible with the reality of social evolution. Acting 
on the basis of inadequate paradigms and metaphors, we have been inclined 
to practice a form of social engineering. It is presupposed that the change 
agents can act as though they are external to the process and have the knowl-
edge and power to design a terminal state that will bring about consistent 
goals and controls in a deterministic fashion. Also acting on the basis of an 
inadequate paradigm of the social process, an attempt to freeze the social 
:::l status quo - to create and maintain static social system boundaries - is 
frequently evident. Both of these impractical modes are clearly impossible, 
but the attempt to impose them upon social change has a tendency to 
exacerbate the traumatic and unpredictable consequences of the process. 
The other part of the difficulty stems from the fact that social learning 
is being applied more efficiently in one of its modes than the other because 
it is only partly understood. The resulting disproportion has had serious 
social consequences. The conscious and efficient practice of physical science 
and the design of physical systems has been perfected to the point where 
normal social system problem solving is dominated by the reorganizations 
associated with new physical technology-the redesign of machine sub-
systems and their control. This has had the effect of accelerating the rate 
at which organizational crises occur - in particular, the rate of those that 
can only be resolved by paradigm shifts. This accelerated need for social 
reorganization is not matched by an appropriate understanding of social 
system learning. We do not yet see the implications of normal problem 
solving for the control of human subsystems (involving the consistency of 
individual and total system goals), nor do we see clearly how to engage 
purposively in the process of controlling paradigm shifts. This has led to 
an accelerating rate of painful, reactive, major social reorganizations. The 
revision of the target goals of social systems is as yet largely uncoordinated, 
fragmentary, and opportunistic. 
One concludes that amelioration of many of the world's worst social 
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ills, if not the long-run survival of the social process itself, must hinge upon 
our ability to make the practice of social learning more orderly and rational. 
First, we need to devote concentrated attention in social science to 
understanding the process. Second, at every stage and level of our under-
standing we need to apply what we know to conscious, orderly practice 
and control of the process. This implies that developmental hypotheses 
should be more objectively and consciously formulated by the group. The 
evolutionary experiment should be frankly conceived as an experiment and 
deliberately provided with information feedback that monitors goal con-
vergence and sets the stage for the next round of experimentation. The 
seductive appeal of utopian social engineering must be put aside. Third, 
we need to innovate organizational forms and procedures that efficiently 
integrate the goals and controls of social learning itself. Fourth, we need 
to acknowledge that this may require an over-arching social goal or value 
that serves as a final test for evolutionary experiments- that guides the 
formulation of developmental hypotheses and passes judgment upon 
paradigm shifts. 
We have suggested that this over-arching goal is the development of 
the growth motives of the human individual. If this suggests that, as a 
consequence, social evolution becomes teleological in a way not matched 
by cosmological or biological evolution, it should be pointed out that this 
is not a terminal state or a transcendent teleology of the kind associated 
with the orthogenetic fallacy; nor is it the conventional teleology of social 
action formed by the pursuit of instrumental goals and social maintenance. 
It is a process teleology. It suggests that human beings can establish the 
process of human development as the goal of the process of social evolution. 
Both the process and the goal are understood to be open to further trans-
formation as we advance in the practice and understanding of them. 
By asserting the normative priority of human development as our social 
goal, we add· to the internal consistency of the social learning paradigm 
as well as to the order of the process. It provides the interface between 
the social learning of the individual and social system learning. It is only 
through establishing such a priority that group behavior and individual 
behavior come to be mutually reinforcing in a nonstatic world. 
If this makes the social process and social science anthropocentric in 
character, no apology is necessary. To deny that this is appropriate would 
be to deny a fundamental aspect of human nature and the evolutionary 
process that formed it. The psychic orientation of man and his motivation 
to action is by nature anthropocentric just as that of the rat is rat-ocentric. 
Man happens to have the potential through social learning to create a 
controlled process that can support him in the realization and exercise of 
his highest human potential- perhaps even to enlarge that potential and 
the meaning and joy that accompanies its exercise. 
18 
Rural Development Programming: 
The Learning Process Approach 
DAVID c. KORTEN 
One of the clear lessons of the 1970s has been that effective participation 
of the rural poor in the development process is more easily mandated in 
programming documents than achieved in the real world of program imple-
mentation. It is not, however, a new lesson. In earlier decades, experience 
with cooperatives and rural development produced similarly disappointing 
results in the context of high expectations and good intentions. Generally 
the cooperatives proved to be creations of government operated under 
government management-which provided little market power, produced 
. .t_ few returns to members, and consequently enjoyed little or no popular 
s_, support. Similarly community development, when implemented on a large 
scale, ended up as little more than one more set of centrally formulated 
programs and targets implemented through conventional bureaucratic 
structures and largely unresponsive to local preferences and/or needs. 
In hindsight the results seem quite predictable. Yet in spite of the 
monotony with which the basic lessons thus learned have been repeated 
and the fairly substantial progress made in understanding the nature of 
the problem, it remains the rule rather than the exception to see in develop-
ment programming: a) reliance, even for the planning and implementation 
of "participative" development, on centralized bureaucratic organizations 
which have little capacity to respond to diverse community-defined needs 
or to build on community skills and values; b) inadequate investment in 
the difficult process of building community problem-solving capacity; 
c) inadequate attention to dealing with social diversity, especially highly 
stratified village social structures; and d) insufficient integration of the 
technical and social components of development action. 
From Rural Developmen1 Par11opa11on Re-i:iew 2 (11haca, N.Y.: Rural Development 
Comminee, Cornell l'niversity, Winier 1981), pp. 1-8. The research on which this paper 
is hased is documented 1n detail in a much longer version: "Community Organization and 
Rural Development: :\ Learning Process Aprroach," Pub/le Admln1S1ra11on RM·lcU", 
Sepiem~r-October, 1980 pp. 480-510. 
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Prominent among the barriers to effective participatory programs are 
pressures on development financing agencies to move too much money too 
quickly in time bounded, pre-planned projects in pursuit of short-term 
results; while the need is for a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-
based, capacity-building style of development effort for which both donors 
and recipient bureaucracies are ill-equipped. Pressures for immediate results 
measured by goods and services delivered drive out attention to building 
the capacity of the responsible institutions to provide these goods and 
services in ways which are responsive to local needs and build the local 
problem-solving capacity on which sustained development depends. Pro-
gramming procedures which demand detailed upfront planning coupled 
with rigorous adherence to fast-paced implementation schedules and pre-
planned specifications all but assure that the projects will be unresponsive 
to subsequent popular input-or even to a growing understanding of what 
the real problems are on the part of the project's professional staff. 
Three Asian Successes 
Are there options? Apparently so, as there are a number of successful 
experiences that provide exceptions to the more typical outcomes. These 
bear examination in a search for useful lessons. Three cases selected for 
examination for Asia share several common characteristics: a) involvement 
of rural people in their own advancement; b) greater than average success, 
with results that are not dependent on uniquely favorable settings; and c) 
a scale of operation that places them substantially beyond the pilot project 
stage. 
INDIAN NATIONAL DAIRY DEVELOPMENT BOARD 
India's National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), built up from the 
model of the Anand Milk Producers' Union, is frequently cited as an 
example of the potentials of cooperative organization in the Third World. 
By the end of 1976 it was comprised of 4,530 village cooperatives with 
a combined membership of2 million farmers. The cooperative collects milk 
from members at village collection points twice each day, transports and 
processes it, and markets the processed products in major urban centers. 
It is known for being efficient, free of corruption, and effective in providing 
major benefits to even the poorest members of the village communities it 
serves. 
But it did not begin with the NDDB operating a national-scale program. 
Its roots go back to the mid-forties when a group of dairy farmers grew 
tired of cooperating with the government-sponsored milk market program 
which offered them low and fluctuating prices. Boycotting the government 
program, they formed their own cooperative under the leadership of a 
farmer-member. By 1947 eight village cooperatives with 432 members had 
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formed a cooperative union. These were difficult times for the cooperative 
and in 1949 they called on the assistance of Verghese Kurien whom, it 
seems, destiny had brought to their village. Along with the farmers, Kurien 
learned how the problems of milk production and marketing within a village 
cooperative framework could be overcome. As they learned, other coopera-
tives were formed and brought within the organizational umbrella. Grad-
ually methods were refined, and the organization that was eventually to 
become the NDDB grew-from the bottom up-adding new layers and 
branches as it grew, always under the sustained leadership of Kurien. 
Appropriate management systems to meet the demands of the program were 
worked out through experience. The values of integrity, service, and com-
mitment to the poorest member-producers were deeply imbedded in its 
emerging structures. Management staff were hired fresh from school, trained 
through experience on the job, indoctrinated in the values of the program, 
and advanced rapidly as the program grew. 
BANGLADESH RURAL ADVANCEMENT COM!.\IITEE 
BRAC was formed in early 1972 under the leadership of Mr. F. H. Abed, 
~ a practicing accountant, as a modest relief effort to resettle refugees in the 
~ Sulla area of Northeast Bangladesh following the war of partition with 
Pakistan. Those involved soon learned that relief alone was not going to 
overcome the miserable conditions in which even the successfully resettled 
refugees were forced to live, and it was decided to reorient their efforts 
toward village-level development. 
A multi-sectoral program was evolved which included construction of 
community centers, functional education, agriculture, fisheries, coopera-
tives, health and family planning, and vocational training for women. In 
each sector early failures led to program modifications. For example the 
teaching methods and lesson plans of the functional education program 
were substantially revised to make them more relevant to village life. In 
the health program they turned to use of paramedics, with physicians re-
orienting their roles to be first trainers, second planners, and only lastly 
curers'. But close monitoring of the villages in which they were working 
revealed to BRAC staff that they still were not producing the results they 
wanted. Too few of its programs were addressing the needs of the landless. 
Conflicting interests of landed and landless made it nearly impossible to 
address the interests of each within a single village association. Each sectoral 
activity tended to operate independently of the others. Village activities 
remained overly dependent on the presence of BRAC staff The paramedics 
tended to concentrate on cures rather than prevention. The literacy program 
was not producing useable skills. 
BRAC programs had fallen into the patterns of most sectoralized gov-
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ernment sponsored rural development efforts-with similar results. Again 
a major review was undertaken to assimilate the lessons learned and evolve 
a change in strategy. The new strategy would concentrate entirely on the 
poorest 50% of the village population-defined operationally as those fami-
lies whose livelihoods depended in part on selling labor to third parties-
and program initiatives would come largely from the beneficiaries. When 
entering a new village, an initial survey identified members of the target 
group. Informal discussions at traditional gathering places served to identify 
the major concerns of this group and to single out those with leadership 
potential. Discussion groups grew until a village assembly of the poor 
became formalized. Leaders received training at a special BRAC center in 
organizing and consciousness-raising methods. 
To insure against dependence on BRAC and to discourage participation 
by those only interested in handouts, initial activities developed by the group 
had to be carried out exclusively with local resources. Only when the group 
had proven capable in mobilizing such resources were supplemental BRAC 
resources offered. Education provided literacy and numeracy skills, but was 
designed concurrently to raise consciousness of class exploitation and to 
build commitment to group action. The activities dealt with truly basic 
needs such as demands for a rightful share in government programs; bar-
gaining for improved wages, share cropping and landlease terms; and 
schemes to gain control over productive assets. Women's activities 
emphasized productive employment, often involving difficult physical work 
under a food-for-work program. All schemes were planned and implemented 
under the supervision of leaders from the target group. 
As the strongest possible indication that BRAC's new approach was 
indeed responding in an effective way to strongly felt needs, the program 
was being self-replicated by the villages themselves. As one village set out 
to organize another to protect its newly negotiated gains in wages and 
contract terms, the landless of other villages came from miles away asking 
organized villages to help them achieve the same. 
At about the time that BRAC moved from a sectoral to a more people-
centered approach, it also established a research unit to advance the under-
standing of its staff of rural poverty. Questions were addressed such as: 
Who controls what assets in the rural village and how? How are some 
families able to advance themselves while others become increasingly 
impoverished? What is the peasant's perception of famine and credit? 
Participatory research techniques such as the use of peasant panels to 
generate data on peasant perceptions of famine and credit proved highly 
effective. Researchers and field workers often exchanged roles or worked 
jointly to insure that research was fully integrated with operations. By 
January 1980, 378 BRAC staff were working with some 800 villages. 
' ~ 
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THAILAND'S CoMMUNITY-BASED FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 
As an official of Thailand's development planning agency responsible for 
observing government programs in action from 1965 to 1971, Mechai 
Veravaidya reached two conclusions: I) the government's development 
programs were largely failing because they were designed from the top 
down, involved no participation of the people, and seldom provided effective 
follow-up on completed projects; and 2) the few gains made were rapidly 
overtaken by Thailand's rapid population growth. Mechai left the planning 
agency in 1971 and began experimenting with the idea of bringing family 
planning closer to the people. He tried having a doctor offer family planning 
services in a local school. The people responded, but he could not get a 
second doctor interested. He tried using student recruiters to send potential 
acceptors to a clinic. The doctors liked this approach, but the people didn't. 
After a variety of failures he tried in 1974 a totally new approach which 
would not be dependent on physicians. Shopkeepers were recruited in each 
of five villages, given a supply of birth control pills, instructed in their 
use, and encouraged to sell them for a small commission. Good sales led 
to recruitment of seventy new distributors. Expansion continued thereafter 
and Mechai eventually set up a new organization specifically to service his 
distributors and expand the program. 
As the program expanded, Mechai became preoccupied with the design 
and operation of strong management systems consistent with the needs of 
the village-level operations. Continuous testing and revision resulted in 
important changes in supervisory, resupply, and reporting systems. New 
layers of management were added as required. As top management became 
further and further removed from field operations he instituted a require-
ment that each make periodic visits to the villages with local supervisors 
to keep them grounded in village reality. Finding donor-mandated statistical 
reporting systems cumbersome and oflittle utility, he drastically simplified 
reporting requirements to gather only the most basic of performance 
information, directly related to program operations. Color coded graphs 
and monthly staff meetings were mechanisms for encouraging staff to make 
regular use of this data. Unimpressed with the utility of conventional impact 
surveys which did not relate to administrative units and produced results 
only after the time for action had passed, he devised his own "mini-survey" 
method by which his supervisors gathered data from a sample of households 
each month, processed the data, and put it to immediate use. 
The Common Feature: A Learning Process 
The performance of a development program can be characterized as a 
function of the fit achieved between beneficiaries, program, and assisting 
organization. In more specific terms a given development program is likely 
to perform poorly in terms of advancing the well-being of a specific group 
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unless there is a close correspondence between: beneficiary needs and 
program output; program task requirements and the distinctive competence 
of the assisting organization; and the mechanisms for beneficiary demand 
expression and the decision processes of the assisting organization (see 
figure 1 ). 
The various programs examined in the cases above each found a partic-
ular solution to the requirement for fit appropriate to its time and circum-
stance. If we look to these experiences for a program or an organizational 
blueprint for replication elsewhere we are only likely to be disappointed. 
It is to the process of their development that we must look for the most 
useful lessons. The nature and significance of this process is best understood 
by contrasting it with a more conventional approach to development 
programming, understood as the "blueprint" approach. 
THE BLUEPRINT APPROACH 
This approach, with its emphasis on careful pre-planning, reflects the 
textbook version of how development programming is supposed to work_ 
Researchers are supposed to provide data from pilot projects and other 
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studies from which project designers will choose the most cost-effective 
designs for achieving given outcomes. Administrators of the implementing 
organizations are supposed to execute the project plan faithfully, much as 
a building contractor would follow construction blueprints, specifications, 
and schedules. Once implementation is complete an evaluation researcher 
is supposed to measure actual changes in the target population and report 
actual versus planned changes to the planners at the end of the project cycle 
so that blueprints can be revised. 
Its clear-cut order, allocation of funds for precisely-stated outcomes, 
reliance on "hard" data and expert ~udgment, and the clearly-stated imple-
mentation schedules make project justification easy in budget presentations. 
It is a programming approach quite appropriate to certain types of devel-
opment projects-most notably physical infrastructure projects-where the 
task and outcomes are defined, environment stable, and cost predictable. 
Unfortunately, however, in rural development the objectives are more often 
multiple, ill-defined, and subject to negotiated change; task requirements 
are unclear; environments are constantly changing; and costs are unpre-
dictable. Although knowledge is severely limited, the blueprint approach 
calls for behaving as if it were nearly perfect. Where there is need to build 
institutional capacity for sustained action on unfamiliar development prob-
lems, it assumes that development actions are terminal and that hastily 
assembled temporary organizations will suffice. Where the need is for a 
close integration of knowledge-building, decision-making, and action-taking 
roles, it sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional 
locations of the researcher, the planner and the administrator. 
Awareness is becoming widespread that the blueprint approach is an 
inadequate response to the rural development problem, but its assumptions 
and procedures continue to dominate most rural development program-
ming and to provide the core content of most training courses in develop-
ment management. This is unlikely to change until viable options are under-
stood and supported. 
THE LEARNING PROCESS APPROACH 
Examination of the three Asian success cases suggests that the blueprint 
approach never played more than an incidental role in their development. 
None was designed and implemented. Each emerged out of a long-term 
learning process in which villages and program personnel shared their 
knowledge and resources to create a fit between needs, actions, and the 
capacities of the assisting organization. Each had a leader who spent time 
in the villages with an idea, tried it, accepted and corrected his errors, and 
built a larger organization around the requirement of what he learned. 
In each instance the overall process can be broken down into three 
stages, each with its own unique learning requirement (see figure 2). The 
elements of each stage can be described roughly as follows: 
Figure 2 PROGRAM LEARNING CURVES 
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Stage 1: Learning to be effective. One or more teams of highly qualified 
personnel are sent to one or more villages which constitute their learning 
laboratory or pilot site. Here they develop a familiarity with the problem 
in question from the beneficiary's perspective and try out some promising 
approaches to addressing joinrly identified needs. They may be supported 
by a variety of external resource persons with expertise in the social, mana-
gerial, and related technical sciences. Errors will be common and the 
resource inputs required will be high relative to results. It is assumed that 
rapid adaptive action will be taken as errors in initial assumptions are 
identified. 
Stage 2: Learning to be efficient. As insights are gained into what to 
do, attention is redirected to learning how to do it more efficiently, elimi-
nating activities which are relatively nonproductive and working out simpli-
fied problem-solving routines for handling critical activities within the grasp 
of less skilled persons. New learning laboratory sites may be selectively 
established to test and further refine such methods-simultaneously giving 
additional personnel experience in their application. 
Stage 3: Learning to expand. Then attention is again redirected, this 
time to the phased development of a supporting organization geared to the 
requirements of carrying out the prescribed activities on a larger scale. It 
requires building into the organization the supporting skills, management 
systems, structures, and values. 
The three stages as represented here are a simplified abstraction of what 
in reality may be a very disorderly and largely intuitive process. Yet the 
abstraction helps to explicate an alternative to the blueprint approach to 
programming. 
A key point worth special note is that in the cases examined, there was 
no thought given to simply testing a program model in a pilot context and 
then leaving it to others to implement. To the contrary, each was distin-
guished by a substantial continuity of personnel. The people who had the 
experience of figuring out an original program design capable of doing the 
job were the same people who then built an organization around that model 
adapted to its requirements. 
THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
Any pre-planned intervention into a varied and constantly changing socio-
technical system inevitably will be in error by some margin; the outcome 
will nearly always deviate from the outcome intended. It is the response 
to this error that tells the true character of the organization and its 
leadership. 
In the self-deceiving organization those in authority treat error as syn-
onymous with failure and seek to place blame on some guilty party. In 
I 
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response, the organization's members become skilled in hiding such errors. 
Those in authority, thus removed from operating reality, are reassured that 
as a result of their "brilliant" leadership everything is going just as intended. 
They may impress the unwary visitors with their briefings on program 
accomplishments. But to more sophisticated observers the claim that a 
program addressed to the rural poor is working effectively exactly as orig-
inally planned is a sure indicator that mistakes are being hidden, that leader-
ship is ineffective, and that actual program operations are probably in a 
state of disarray which bears little resemblance to what has been described. 
In the defeated organization the source of error is assumed to stem from 
forces beyond the control of the organization's members. Thus while adverse 
factors may be discussed in rich detail, no action is taken. When individual 
members feel impotent and therefore refer all problems to their superiors 
for action, they render their superiors equally impotent, ultimately 
immobilizing the entire organization. 
In the learning organization error is treated as an essential source of 
information. Since some margin of error is treated as inevitable, particularly 
in the early stages of the learning process, it is viewed neither as a sign 
of failure, nor of environment perversity. Error is discussed candidly in 
such organizations, but in the context of lessons learned and corrective 
actions being attempted. There may be no surer indicator that an organi-
zation has effective leadership. 
NEW ROLE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES 
While the demand for greater sensitivity to the dynamics of social behavior 
in rural development programming is now notably high, the influence of 
the social sciences in programming decisions is notably low. Given the roles 
normally accepted by social scientists in relation to action programs, their 
limited influence is hardly surprising. In their role of summary evaluator 
they have mainly engaged in documenting failure long after the time for 
corrective action has passed. In doing social soundness assessments, they 
have most often been called in after the basic choices affecting project design 
have been made to certify that there will not be serious adverse social 
consequences. In testing the program concepts in pilot projects, they have 
been asked to certify program blueprints when in reality the results achieved 
will often reflect more the operational competence of the organization which 
has done the implementation than the specific validity of the program 
design. In carrying out baseline surveys there is seldom any real presumption 
that the data will be used as a substantive input to planning. More likely 
the survey was contracted only to meet a requirement set in some program-
ming document for baseline evaluation data. 
What is all too rare is for the social scientists to help an organization 
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normal part of its operating routine. What the case studies suggest as needed 
is a willingness to experiment with new research methods by researchers 
committed to providing action agency personnel with simple tools to facili-
tate their rapid collection and interpretation of social data directly relevant 
to action for which they are responsible. The task is to make a demystified 
social science available as every person's tool, turning agency personnel, 
and in some instances the villagers themselves, into more effective action 
researchers. 
This most often seems to involve disciplined observation, guided inter-
views and informant panels rather than formal surveys; emphasizing time-
liness over rigor; employing oral more than written communication; offering 
informed interpretation rather than extensive statistical analysis; making 
narrative rather than numerical presentations; and giving attention to the 
processes unfolding and to intermediate outcome data required for rapid 
adaptation, rather than dwelling on detailed assessment of"final" outcomes. 
Rather than provide the static profiles found in the typical socio-economic 
survey, it involves a quest to understand the dynamics of the socio-technical 
systems that govern village life, to provide a basis for operational-level 
predictions of the consequences of given development interventions. It 
means identifying target group members and behaviors in terms relevant 
to progrnm action rather than simply producing aggregated statistics. 
Application to an Established Bureaucracy 
The framework of the learning process approach can be applied in either 
of two ways. One is by building an entirely new program and organization-
from the bottom up-as illustrated in the three cases discussed earlier. The 
other is by introducing an analogue of this same process within an estab-
lished organization which seeks to build a new capacity for effective village-
level action. The methodologies for the latter application are presently being 
worked out by the Philippines' National Irrigation Administration (NIA) 
in an effort directed toward strengthening its capacity to work in effective 
support of small farmer owned and operated (communal) gravity-fed irrigation 
systems. 
Concerned that the communal irrigation system it was assisting often 
fell into disrepair and disuse soon after rehabilitation construction was 
completed, NIA officials concluded that attention was needed to strengthen 
the water user associations concurrently with work on physical construction. 
They first selected for special attention two systems scheduled for assistance. 
Since the NIA had no community organizers of its own, a number of ex-
perienced organizers were hired on a temporary basis to work with NIA 
engineers on these systems. The idea was to integrate the social and technical 
aspects of the work-developing the social and technical capacity of the 
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water user association through active involvement of its members in such 
activities as planning system layout, obtaining water rights and rights of 
way, organizing volunteer labor inputs to system construction, and exerting 
control over project expenditures. Known as the Laur Project, the experi-
ence established that such integration was at once important and difficult 
to achieve. 
In one community, local power struggles emerged which led to a two-
year postponement of construction plans. In the second community, a high 
level of cohesion greatly facilitated farmer involvement, but seldom in ways 
which made life easier for project staff. Delays resulted from farmer demands 
for scheduling and design changes. The use of volunteer labor posed unfa-
miliar problems of supervision worked out only through lengthy meetings. 
The engineers did not always welcome farmer interest in monitoring pur-
chases and limiting the staffs personal use of vehicles operated on gasoline 
charged to the farmers' loan account. Particularly tense was a conflict in 
judgment between farmers and engineers as to whether the materials chosen 
for dam construction would withstand the force of local floods. Farmers 
said no. Engineers said yes. (The farmers won a Pyrrhic victory when the 
dam, finally constructed to the engineers' specifications, washed out a few 
months after completion.) 
At this stage the pilot projects were a failure from the standpoint of 
any normal evaluation criteria. But it was quite evident to those involved 
that the weakness was not in the basic concept- it was in the as-yet-limited 
capacity of the NIA to make it work. And the experience provided extensive 
insights as to what was required to develop that capacity on both the tech-
nical and institutional sides. A major commitment to further learning was 
implied, involving major changes in the NIA's structure and operating 
procedures. 
A series of new pilot projects was initiated, the designs of which were 
carefully worked out to incorporate the lessons of the earlier Laur experi-
ence. New personnel were brought in and thoroughly trained in these 
lessons. A top-level national communal irrigation committee was established 
to coordinate the learning process under the leadership of NIA Assistant 
Administrator Benjamin Bagadion, a man with total dedication to the idea 
of independent farmer owned and operated irrigation systems. The com-
mittee included central level NIA officials, representatives of related action 
agencies, and senior members of collaborating academic and research 
institutions-each of whom had a major day-to-day commitment to the 
effort. A new social science research program supported by the Ford Found-
ation was introduced to build within the NIA the new skills, methods, and 
systems it would require for its new participative approach. Social scientists 
from the Institute of Philippine Culture developed guidelines for rapid 
collection and assessment by NIA field staff of"institutional profiles" which 
:1 
t{ 









~ ~ ~ 
J8 /SOCIAL LEARNING AND THE NATURE OF PLANNING 
contained social-institutional data critical to project selection and planning. 
They also observed field activities and produced monthly "process docu-
mentation" reports which provided non-evaluative narrative feedback on 
key process events. 
Concurrently, management experts from the Asian Institute of Manage-
ment assessed the fit between requirements of the new methods for assisting 
communals and the existing NIA management systems, advised on new 
management roles and procedures, assisted in planning the organizational 
change process, and coordinated workshops for NIA managers and engineers 
on the new methods. On the technical side, an agricultural engineering 
team from the International Rice Research Institute and the University 
of the Philippines at Los Banos was developing simplified methods for 
diagnosis and correction of common water management problems by farmers 
and NIA engineers, and designing water management systems suited to 
needs of small water user associations. 
Once the new methods for assisting the communal projects seemed to 
be proving more successful in the second round of pilot projects or learning 
laboratories, a second set of 12 sites was chosen, one in each region of the 
country, to test their broader application and to begin building the basis 
for the expansion stage. As of mid-1980 the NIA was perhaps half way 
through the learning process on which it had embarked three and a half 
years earlier. It was likely to be a total of seven or eight years before the 
new capacity would be in place throughout the agency. Such a lengthy 
undertaking does not fir well with normal donor programming cycles and 
requires uncommon commitment, patience, and continuity of leadership. 
Bur it may be exactly the type of undertaking in which any major agency 
concerned with being effective in assisting the rural poor must become 
engaged. 
Conclusion 
The programming methods which gained currency in the days of large-
scale capital infrastructure project construction continue to dominate devel-
opment action, even though they are manifestly inappropriate to the require· 
ments of new style programming. However, a basis can be found in current 
experience for the formulation of alternative and more appropriate pro-
gramming frameworks and methods based on a learning process approach 
which recognizes that in working with rural people, our knowledge of what 
is needed and our institutional capacity to do this are both limited. There 
should be no call for endless research. Bur neither should there be contin· 
uation of blind action based on inappropriate statements of the problem 
and ineffectual implementing organizations. The challenge is to integrate 
action-raking, knowledge-creation, and institution-building into a coherent 
learning process, as a number of relatively more successful development 
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Orpnizine the Rural Poor 
We have noted the tendency of development to be done to the poor, and we 
have emphasized the poor's failure to benefit from much of the doing. Of the 
remedies which have been proposed, none have been so hotly debated as those 
11 Frequent shifting of field staff, and the destructive effects this had on program cooti-
nuity, contributed irnporuntly to the incfl'eaivencss of development programs in Dharampur, 
where the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, carried out a major study (Gupta 1981). 
14 Thus, notwithstanding the IDllny substantive ditflCUlties of the community-«wJop-
ment ~ iu "failure• may have been u much a result of its not beins liven the time to 
ac:complish iu objectives u of any fundamental inability to do so (Uphotf, Cohen, and Goldsmith 
1979, p. 19). 
is See Lele (197S, p. 177) for a similar approach. 
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dealing with organization of the poor themselves." The basic notion is simple 
enough: link the poor into Brewster's •continually widening network of larger, 
specialized units of collection action," thus helping them better to solve local 
problems, to make demands on the broader system, and generally to become 
involved in the choice and execution of development programs. A great varie-
ty of organizational techniques have been adopted in pursuit of these goals. 
Interest-group organiz.ations have linlced the poor •horizontally" with other 
people to form units of collective action; cooperatives, self-help groups, politi-
cal unions, farmers' associations, and the li1ce are obvious examples. Numer-
ous '"vertically" linked organizations have tied poor people directly into the 
larger socioeconomic structure, with little emphasis on the fonnation of local 
groups: some agricultural extension efforts, health clinic and paramedic pro-
grams, and attempts to reach the poor with credit and market opportunities 
suggest the range of those vertically oriented activities. 
In this section, we adopt a broad view encompassing both styles of organiza-
tion and, indeed, including any linkage system in which poor people them-
selves constitute at least one end of the link." Our goal is to analyze the per-
fonnancc of past efforts to organize the rural poor, and from that analysis to 
shape practical guidelines for the design of more effective organiz.ation 
policies. 
The Social Context 
We have argued that the perspectives of academics, analysts, and planners 
arc often distorted by the presumption that they have a clean slate on which to 
write their policy recommendations. This is particularly evident in studies on 
organiz.ation of the rural poor: '"Thus, many scholars ... tend to treat the 
existing peasantries as some exotic social type characterised by a basic benevo-
lence and by being relatively undifferentiated. But these assumptions do not 
obtain in actuality. Socio-economic differentiation and kinship loyalties 
emerge into prominence among factors affecting differential participation by 
individuals in . . . organization" (Migot-Adholla, as quoted in Hunter 1971, 
pp. 2-3). In addition, even the least developed community is li1cely to possess 
1
• Tilia and the following section dn.w heavily on rea:nt worlc by Duid Konen. We are 
deeply indebted to him for his critical comments on our ideas and for let tin& us see a n urn ber of his 
unpublished papen. Amoncthe published worb we ha"W:dnawn upon are Konen (1979a, 1979c, 
1980a,and 1981). In retrospect, we wish that we had also drawn on Mancur Olson's ( 1971) lofic 
of Co/Jtttiw Action. It has much to say that is relevant to organization of the rural poor; our work 
is the poorer for not having utilized it. 
11 This is the criterion by which - "Cf'llln.le the !1Uhjcct matter oft hi.~ 50"1ion frnni that ".If 
the ICCtion on "Orp.ni.zing the Facilitaton~ (becinning on p. 199). The latter ICCl.ion deals with 
linlcasea relevant to the organization o( staff activities within the broader context of development 
administration. Ahhouch (it is hoped) thex staft' activities are uhimately concerned with reaching 
the poor, the orpnizationaJ problems of stalfm& and controlling a large marlcetinc board or 
extension tcrvice are radically different from those of mobilizing a score of peasants into "'recipro-
cally helpful behaviors.~ "The distinction blurs, of courx, at the interfac% where staff mceu the 
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some external linkages through the activities of priests, traders, tax collect on, 
or agents of civil administrations (Uphoff and Esman 1974). 
Efforts to organize the rural poor arc in reality efforts to reorganize, to 
create new patterns of linkage different from the old ones which already bind 
them. Effective policies for reorganization begin with a recognition of what the 
existing linkages are, and how they affect the well-being of the rural poor. We 
shall not attempt to review the extensive sociological and anthropological lit-
erature on the structure of rural communities." Restating some central themes 
of that literature will be appropriate, however, if for no other reason than that 
they are so commonly overlooked in efforts to formulate policy for rural 
organization. 
The phrase "traditional community structure" covers such a range of specif-
ic realities that we hesitate to use it even in the strategic context of the present 
essay. Nonetheless, for some common organizational features of rural com-
munities in the late~eveloping countries the term "traditional" remains a prac-
tical shorthand. The most important such feature for our present discussion is 
the dominance of immediate personal ties as a form of organizational linkage. 
Aid, protection, cooperation, and reciprocal obligations arc looked for pri-
marily within groups defined by extended family and kinship ties: Such groups 
arc eniercd by birth, and given up, if at all, only through drastic wrenching of 
the social fabric. They thus stand in radical contrast to "'modem" groups 
linked together through specific (but transient and limited) common interests. 
In the early da)'s of the cooperative and community-<ievclopment move-
ments, many argued that the traditional forms of cooperation could be 
smoothly taken over by cooperation within modem interest groups. Expe-
rience bas been unkind to this hope. A wide consensus has emerged that 
interest-group organization .. involves different kinds of action, for different 
purposes, by people in different relationships with each other, from the kinds 
of action, purpose and relationship enshrined in traditional co-operative activ-
ity. "19 The relevant questions for policy have become, When is a transition 
from traditional modes of organization desirable and feasible? and, How, and 
to what extent. is that transition to be aff ected1 
Such questions cannot be ans"WCrcd, however, without reference to a second 
important feature of rural organization: its socioeconomic differentiation. 
'"The rural poor" are not a homogeneous group. In this respect rural commun-
ities in the lat.c-<ieveloping world arc much lilc.e communities everywhere: a few 
individuals, by birth or Juel( or labor, are much better situated than anyone 
else. They have accumulated sufficient wealth, power, and skill that these re-
11 Brewster ( 1967) and Hunter (1969) provide useful reviews of that litenture. Sec abo 
Friedland (1969). Epstein (1973), Migdal (1974), Scott (1976),and Victor lkhendu's discussion of 
"Social Determinants ol Agricultural Cllan&c• in Anthony et al. (1979, chap. 6). 
19 Sec Hunter ( 1972, p. 193) summarizin1 papen by Hyden, Migot-Adbolla, and others 
in the Uppsala seminar on '"Cooperatives and Run! Development in East Africa•; Wldstnnd 
(1970); Oocombe (1971, pp. 161-98). 
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toUfCet feed on one another, creating more of each. Such privileged positions 
..,-ty always come to entail disproportionate ownership of land and other 
ICIJ"CC productive assets. Differentiation of a small group distinguished by 
accumulated assets virtually guarantees differentiation of a much larger group 
distinguished by the relative lade of such assets-in our case the small farmer 
and the landless laborers. Between these two extremes lie a variety of other 
tocioeconomic strata with a range of asseu, objectives, and organizational 
connections. The most significant for rural development are those with ties to 
viaorous outside structures, be they religious, economic, or political in charac-
ter (Hyden 1970, pp. 61-80). · 
The problem of elites. Traditional group structures and strong patterns 
of social differentiation often combine to create a system of orgattlzation dom-
inated by a few powerful local elites. The elites are linked to the poor through a 
variety of patronage/ dependency relationships. As we noted earlier, because 
of the traditional group attitudes ingrained in most members of the communi-
ty, people look for help to kinfolk, or at most to individuals whom they know 
personally. But the locally acknowledged stratification ensures that only indi-
viduals with wealth or contacts arc seen as able to offer such help, especially in 
situations dealing with the "outside ... The poor then tender support of various 
kinds in exchange for, and expectation of, such patronage. In general, the 
exchange reinforces the stratification on which it is based. Patronage further 
secures the privileged position of the elite, while the reciprocal dependency 
further undermines the position of the poor (Hunter 1969, pp. 38, 70). 
Viewed through the glasses of egalitarian ideology, the power oflocal elites 
appears to be just one more unmitigated evil visited on the long-5uffering rural 
poor. Such a perspective, however, is both narrow and distorted. The emer-
gence of a local elite can mean many things, among them the beginning of the 
rural community's ability to impose itself on the outside world. As we shall see 
later in this chapter, local elites arc also an important if imperfect source of 
hom~own., grass-roots leadership-a resource both scarce and invaluable 
for promoting the transition from traditional kin-group to modern intercst-
group forms of local organization. 
Political and entrepreneurial elites have performed similar linkage functions 
throughout Western history, as well as in many of the developing countries. 
That they have also, and simultaneously, exploited the people they were lead-
ing constitutes one of those moral ambiguities of action which malcc serious 
debate about organizational issues so difficult and so rare. 
About the exploitation itself there can be no question. The evidence from 
the developing countries is monotonous and depressing. Most attempts to 
organize the rural poor, if they surtive at all, are "captured .. by the local elites, 
who use them to enhance position, power, and wealth more effectively than 
before. This was the case in early efforts to build political organization at the 
local level (Leys 1971; Chambers 1974, p. 86). It is the fate of most functioning 
cooperatives (lnayatullah 1972; Hunter 1971, p. 2) and community--Oevcl-
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opment programs (Holdcroft 1978, p. 15). It almost certainly is the future o( 
most of today's New Directions programs, cast as they are in the old 
community-development mold (Kortcn 1980a, pp. 482-85). 
Experience with such exploitation has led prudent development workers to 
conclude that chances for effective local reorganization along interest-group 
lines will be greatly enhanced wherever social conditions provide a relatively 
unstratified population, a relatively equitable distribution of assets, or a means 
of holding elites at least partially accountable in their leadership. Th.is is un-
doubtedly true as far as it goes; impressive quantitative support is provided by 
the Asian survey data of Uphoff and Esman ( 1974). There has been a tenden-
cy, however, for some analysts to take the argument a step further. They then 
suggest that "deparochializ.ation" of the masses, radical land refonn, and pop-
ular control or removal of the local elite are necessary preconditions for effec-
tive rural reorganization. 
This is a very serious claim. A precondition. in common usage, is something 
you can't do anything about. Accepting the notion of preconditions therefore 
means abandoning as untouchable some of the most important goals of rural 
development, for instance, social modernization, increased equity, and greater 
popular control More precisely, it means declaring that these goals are things 
that incremental policies of local reorganization can't do anything about; it 
means admitting that people wishing to obtain them should consult revolu-
tionaries, not policymakers. As we argued in chapter l, revolution may indeed 
be necessary to improve conditions of the rural poor when social conditions 
render incremental improvements infeasible. The historical fact that revolu-
tions usually devastate the lives of many people (especially the poor), and that 
they seldom fulfill their promises, merely emphasizes the sadness and the se-
riousness of the choice. 
In this light, it seems to us that the responsibility of the analyst-indeed his 
greatest challenge-is to discover and promote programs of incremental im-
provements which are feasible, within the constraints of the social context that 
the poor actually face. In much of the developing world, this context does 
include tradition, stratification, and patronage-all of which indeed make it 
likely that most efforts to reorganize the poor will fail. But for analysts to 
demand a clean slate, uncluttered by such historical constraints, as a precondi-
tion for analysis is a failure of another sort, one which we arc tempted to call a 
f ailurc of nerve. 
Adopting a perspective that views considerations of social context as con-
.. ~traints on, rather than preconditions for, reorganization makes a great practi-
.,.. dll difference. Constraints, wc argued in chapter I, need not be taken as fixed 
but instead may be slowly relaxed through carefully implemented policies of 
reform and redesign. The relevant question for policymakers is how to do this 
gradual relaxing. In general, wc concur with those development workers who 
see this as a two-part problem. Fint, it is necessary to design local organiza-
tions that link rural poor people with one another and with the larger social 
169 Oreaniz.ation Proerams 
sr-tem- Second, it is necessary to design higher-order support organizations 
that protect the local groups, help them perform their problem-solving func-
tions, and integrate their needs with those of society at large. We discuss these 
two facets of the organiz.atio~esign problem in the remainder of this chapter. 
Participation As ln-wstmmt 
Why have efforts to reorganize the poor into nontraditional linkage pat-
terns so often failed to improve rural well-being? The vested interests of local 
elites doubtless constitute one reason. Another is the hostility or apathy to 
meaningful reorganization so often displayed by central government adminis-
trations. We argued in chapter I, however, that analysts commonly overrate 
the contribution of venality to policy failures and underrate the contribution 
of self-delusion. This is almost certainly true in the contemporary debate on 
rural reorganization. 
There have been numerous sincere efforts to discover more effective ways of 
organiring the rural poor. These, however, have produced an array of appar-
ently contradictory findings which may confuse policymakers as much as help 
them. Thus, some analysts conclude that a major obstacle to greater participa-
tion by the poor is the existence of strong, antiegalitarian local elites; others 
conclude that effective participation requires strong, grass-roots leadership, 
which when present at all usually emerges from the ranks of the elite. Some 
argue that the appropriate size of the "primary group" oflocal organization is 
the village or an even larger unit; others arc adamant that only small, relatively 
homogeneous and .. like-minded" groups work well in practice. Cogent anal-
yses arc advanced that the most successful local organizations serve multiple 
functions; yet single-industry institutions like the Indian National Dairy De-
velopment Board, the Kenya Tea Development Authority, and the Colombia 
Coffee Association arc widely acknowledged to be among the brightest 
achievements of developmenL Many stress that local groups need a multiplic-
ity of linkages with the larger socioeconomic system if they are to be effective; 
other respected students oflocal organization argue that the most important 
goals of local organization often arc achieved as soon as a small, primary 
grouping has been forged. Moreover, they argue, these primary achievements 
arc jeopardized by efforts to build larger, more efficient, more tightly inte-
grated structures. The list of apparent contradictions could be extended 
indefinitely. 
Planning parriciparion. The sad fact is that analysts, planners, and pol-
iticians simply do not know what kind of local organization is actually in the 
poor's interests. The delusion that sufficient cogitation can overcome this 
ignorance-that the "newest direction" will finally be the right direction-may 
be a greater obstacle than ignorance itself to designing better reorganization 
programs. 
The self-delusion of analysts and advisors manifests itself in many ways. 
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piofcssed form rather than their revealed function. Thus development 
planners continued to advocate cooperatives modeled on a strict English-
Scandinavian Rochdale pattern long after actual performance had demon-
strated that this was inappropriate for most developing countries. Why? Be-
cause everyone knew that the Rochdale plan was designed with the express 
intent of ensuring that maximum benefits would flow to coop members (Hun-
ter 1971) . 
The policy-analysis perspective discussed in chapter 1 suggests that where 
intellectual cogitation has proved delusory as a problem-resolving technique, 
greater provision should be made for social interaction-for acting out those 
parts o! the problem most resistant to thinking-through solutions. In parti.al-
lar, to avoid the pitfall of self-delusion the planner needs to supplement intel-
lectual cogitation with interactive signals or feedback through which he can 
learn when a program is actually benefiting the poor. Many interactive mech-
anisms suggest themselves once reorganization is perceived as a problem of 
choosing and learning rather than one of discovering and knowing.JI> We shall 
focus on one such mechanism. somewhat akin to the concept of induced insti-
tutional innovation developed by Davis, North, Haya.mi. and Ruttan.21 In· 
essence, we shall propose that the poor themselves signal what is in their inter-
ests, by means of their decision to invest their scarce resource of active partici-
pation in a particular local reorganization. Let us consider the implications of 
this shift in perspective. 
The term "participation" appears with great frequency, emotion, and loose-
ness in the development debate. This imprecision may have rhetorical value in 
certain political contexts, but for purposes of analysis it serves merely to cover 
up fuzzy or nonexistent thinking. We shall follow Uphoff and Esman ( 1974, p. 
81), using "participation" in its ex ante sense of"before-the-fact involvement in 
the choices and efforts producing benefits. '"2l When we intend the economists' 
ex post sense of after-the-fact distribution of benefits, we shall say so explicitly. 
Ex ante participation in effective organizations can greatly mcreasc the abil-
ity of the rural poor to solve local problems and to make demands on the larger 
social system. In many circumstances, participation in '"units of collective ac-
tion" may be poor people's only organizational alternative to continued de-
pendency on traditional or state patrons. In fact. a consensus approaching 
dogma has emerged throughout the development community that effective 
ll 'This is a thrnie that we will return to throughout the prc:sent chapter. bow to design 
orpnizations not as aruwcrs to problems of calculation and control but as means of learning. 
through interaction, how colkcti'l'C social action can be more effecti¥Cly promoted. 
21 A "theory of institutional innovation" is set for1h by Davis and North ( 1971). This is 
exp&ndcd and applied to the dC"l'Clopment context in Hayami and Rutt.an (1971), Ruttan (1978), 
and Hayami (1978). Most of this latter wort has emphasized the r.cdulological component of the 
innovation opportunity, wc stress the personal pcrspecti'l'C of the rural "investor.• The two views, 
wc believe, an: complementary. 
n Additional useful pcnpectivcs on the treatment of "participation• an: liven in 
Ownben (1974, pp. 84--88); Lodae (1970); and Huntington and Nelson (1976) . 
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participation by the poor is a siN qua non for development strategics seeking 
major improvements in rural 'NCO.being. 
7M co.rts of participation. Both political rhetoric and academic argu-
ments on development strategy have tended to treat participation in local or-
ganization as a free good, desirable in unlimited quantities. This is particuJarly 
evident in the credo of New Directions planning. one of the more recent 
schools to hold forth on the development stage. The World Bank's sector 
paper on rural development policy typifies the trend, unreservedly endorsing 
more "participation by the rural poor in the planning and implementation 
processes through loc::al government, project advisory committees, coopera-
tives and other forms of group organization" (World Bank 197S). Nor is the 
enthusiasm confined to official agencies with political clientele. A thoughtful 
academic review concludes that "participation should not be viewed as a sep-
arate program or sector for rural development, but rather as an a pp roach to be 
integrated as feasibk in all development activities" (Uphoff, Cohen, and 
Goldsmith 1979, p. 28; emphasis added). 
There is much to support in such sentiments. Nonetheless, the policy-
analysis perspective warm us that feasible panicipation is not ncccssarily use-
ful or desirable participation. Chambcn decries the pernicious influence of 
"'those who, for ideological reasons, or because they arc simple-minded, or 
more commonly from a combination of these causes, rcify 'the people' and 
'participation' and push them beyond the reach of empirical analysis" (1974, p. 
109). 
Whatever its cause, the '"more is better" view of participation flies in the face 
of both experience and common sense. Anyone who has been active in a local 
government council, a committee of concerned citizens, or a community 
cooperative knows a truth virtually ignored in the current development de-
bate: effective local organization is expensive to those who choose to partici-
pate in it. 
Concerting reciprocally helpful behaviors requires that individuals join to-
gether in social problem-solving efforts. Through some combination of intel-
lectual cogitation and social interaction, these individuals must perform all 
those tasks of c:akulation and control we discussed earlier. Linkages of under-
standing, mutual expectation, and trust must be built and nurtured. Goals 
must be agreed upon, conflicts settled, and tasks allocated, all within a shifting 
context of incomplete information, personal rivalries, and individual motiva-
tions. What~ ebe is involved, organization therefore requires substantial 
and continuing investments of time, energy, and personal freedom of action 
on the part of participants." This is surely one reason why, even in modernized 
n "TheR is nothing noYel about our emphasis on time: and energy u 11Cara: reaouroes (sec 
especially March and Oben [ 1976, p. 14 and passim] and also Becker ( 196SD. There lw, ho~. 
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Western societies with multiple opportunities for local organization, studies 
show that most people choose not to participate at all.l4 It should not be 
surprising to find even lower rates of participation within the traditional socie-
ties of the developing world . 
Tune, energy, and freedom from unproductive obligations are among the 
very few resources that the rural poor possess. The notion that investment of 
these scarce resources in local organization is always or often a rational choice 
reflects the same peculiar view of reality which can't understand why rural 
women don't spend more time at ho~nomics lectures. The behavior of 
the poor themselves suggests that they suffer from no such delusion. On the 
contrary, the actual choices that poor people make concerning which local 
organizations to participate in, and how much participation to offer them, 
have much the look of rational investment decisions. In short, poor people 
invest their participation when they believe it will secure them valuable bene-
fits not otherwise available at comparable cost, time, and risk. 
We shall sec that many of the historical failures and successes oflocal organ-
ization efforts begin to make sense, and many of the apparent contradictions 
mentioned earlier can be resolved. when viewed from this investment perspec-
tive. Moreover, the notion that the poor arc investing participation in organi-
zation suggests the relevance of questions familiar from capital-investment 
situations: What arc the opportunity costs of committing this scarce resource 
to a particular use? What risks do they run and what returns do they expect 
from the contemplated commitment? What other means do they have for 
achieving comparable returns? Above all, the investment perspective empha-
sizes that it is poor people themselves who make the investment choice, who 
decide whether a proposed program of local organization offers sufficient in-
centives to attract their personal resources of time, energy, and freedom of 
action away from other urgent and competing tasks. 
The poor as investors. Our perspective of participation as investment 
docs not .. rcify the people," nor is its admitted simplicity altogether simple-
minded. We do not assume that the poor make smart investments. We do not 
argue that participation is always in everyone's--0r even anyone's-best inter-
ests. We argue only that it is poor people's choices of which organizations they 
will participate in, not the analysts' discoveries of '"correct" organizational 
designs, which result in action on the social front. Moreover, though the 
choices made by the poor may not tum out well, they can be and arc made on 
the basis of available perceptions. The analysts' discoveries, in contrast, re-
quire data and understanding that do not exist now and arc unlikely to become 
"'·· ")o"lbc present infatuation with participation is ruch that many will doubt this statement 
Consider, however, that comparative studies show the United States to be among the most partic· 
ipatory of modernized societies (Abnond and Verb& 1965, chaps. 5, 10). Even in America, howev-
er, less than half the people bother to vocc in local elections, less than a third an: active in a !inglc 
organintion dealing with community problems, less than one in five has even contacted a local 
ao'YmUTICnt official about an issue, less than one in seven has ever formed a group to resolve a 
local problem (Verba and N"ic 1972, p. 31). 
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available in the foreseeable future. Moreover, what policymakers want-what 
they beli~ to be in the poor's interests, what they perceive as '"mcaningfuf' 
organiz.ation-is largely irrclevanL Participation is "owned" by the poor. Ex-
perience shows that the investment of effective participation caMot be com-
manded by policymakers but must in.stead be induced. The requirement of 
effective policymaking for local organizations is therefore not omniscience but 
entrepreneurship: the ability to recognize and design programs capable of mo-
bilizing participation; the ability to abandon as unviable and ill-advised pro-
grams unable to attract that invcstmcnL 
.. Entrepreneurial" policymalcing will be imperfect, like all its alternatives. 
But in a world of inevitable trial and error, it provides a relatively efficient way 
of learning when you have guessed wrong. As in the capital-investment ana-
log. the self-proclaimed (or self-deluded) "goodness" of the entrepreneur's 
proposal is immaterial. What counts is how attractive the proposal appears to 
the investors, and how able and willing they arc to mobilize sufficient resources 
for its effective support. 
We next propose some entrepreneurial guidelines for the design of local 
organiz.ations which should be better able to a~ct investment of participa-
tion from the rural poor. 
Attractiveness of &nefil.S 
One of the most obvious lessons of past experience is that the rural poor will 
invest active participation only in an organization that is responsive to their 
most intensclyfcltnccds(Hunter 1971). More specifically, they will invest only 
in organizations that offer highly desirable and tangible benefits not otherwise 
obtainable at similar cost. time, and risk. In part this is due to the opportunity 
costs of participation discussed earlier. In part it is because only such needs 
and benefits provide sufficient force to overcome the bonds and habits of 
traditional organization (Lodge 1970, pp. 146-47). 
Available evidence suggests that the .. needs" that most readily induce the 
active participation of the rural poor are related to production, in particular 
capital formation and income enhancemenL For example, the justifiably fa-
mous Anand Milk Producers' Union (later the Indian National Dairy Devel-
opment Board) grew from acute dissatisfaction of local producers with low 
and fluctuating prices off ercd by existing commercial markets (Korten I 980a ). 
Nonetheless, sufficiently urgent consumption-related needs can also serve 
the mobilization function. An excellent example is Thailand's Community 
Based Family Planning Cooperative, another of the successful organizations 
cited by K.orten ( l 980a). In this case, a ~ntrally organized operation identified 
a strongly felt need-the desire of rural women for a reliable means of birth 
control-and set out to help provide access to the required technology. Little 
"selling" of the benefits was necessary, though innovative means of enhancing 
the acceptability of those benefits obviously enhanced the program's success. 
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thousand villages were participating through the regular purchase and use of 
birth control pills. 
The requirement for intensely felt local needs to mobilize active participa-
tion is all the more evident when we consider the many experiments in organi-
zation where local perceptions of need (or changes in those perceptions) have 
been ignored. The latter situation occurred in many previously colonial coun-
tries during their time of independence. Active local groups had been organ-
ized around intensely felt needs to be rid of colonial administration. Once 
independence was obtained, participation in these groups waned or fractured 
into smaller conflicting factions built around new, less unifying priorities. 
Another example is the cooperatives that have failed to attract the active par-
ticipation of landless laborers or subsistence farmers because the services they 
offered were confined to production loans and marketing aid (Korten 1980a, 
p. 481). Many"cooperativcs" have not even pretended a concern with respond-
ing to local needs, scclcing instead to exercise control over distnoution and sale 
of goods and to promote government directives. The pitfalls of such organiu-
tional designs appear obvious but are nonetheless still widely ignored. K.orten 
summarizes a number of critical studies when he decries New Directions pro-
grams for their continued '"reliance for the planning and implementation of 
'participative' development on centralized bureaucratic organizations which 
have little capacity to respond to diverse community~efmed needs" ( l 980a, p. 
483). 
Ironically, a consequence of the emphasis in U.S. aid programs on New 
Directions and "basic human needs" has been a tendency to restrict allocations 
for irrigation, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure projects that often rank 
high among the felt needs of people in rural areas. Moreover, a very significant 
role oflocal organizations or other participatory mechanisms is to enable local 
groups to influence decisions about the design and location of roads, irrigation 
works, and other infrastructure projects in the light of local knowledge and 
priorities. 25 
Planning benefits. Many analysts have come to identify the problem of 
designing participative organizations in terms of "bottom-up" versus "top-
down" initiatives. Needless to say, •bottom-up" is good. reflecting the needs of 
the people, while "top-down" is bad, reflecting the needs of the bureaucrats. 
There is just enough truth in this view to ma.kc it rhetorically attractive. Once 
again, however, the willingness to let ideology masquerade as analysis has 
hindered rather than helped the policy debate. 
Organizing from below, as we shall sec later on, often results in both incffi-
.,,- Two "'<XDt papers by Tmdler are pertinent to ti- issues. One of the papen DO(eS 
that "New-Direct.ions critics ay that infrutnictute projects do not baYC a dirtct imJ*:t on the 
rural poor. in comparison to projects in the aius o{ rural health, nutrition and aJricu!turc• 
(Tendler 197%, p. v). The other paper emphasiza that an additional advantage of dcoentramrd 
manaaement of rural roads projects ia that it facilitates the adoption of labor-using comtructioCI 
method• (Tendkr rcma, pp. 42-59). 
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dmcicl and grave inequities; the organizers, after all, arc more likely to be the 
b;aJ elite than the poor. Conversely, initiatives from above have produced 
tome of the most successful and participative local organizations in develop-
lnCDl history. 
To return to a theme we broached at the beginning of this chapter, effective 
dcsip of organizations is more complex than the dichotomous isms of popu-
lar debate allow. The critical issue is not from where the initiative comes but 
whether it in fact promotes the "'fit" oflocally felt needs, available technology, 
and organizational means. Sometimes, as in our dairy ex.ample, that initiative 
will come from "below" as a spontaneous outpouring of realized need and 
recognized potential. Other times, as Chambers ( 1974) has emphasized, a 
c:ommunity-devclopment or other "'top-down" initiative will be required to 
help local groups identify and articulate their needs. 
Our earlier discussion of means-ends relationships in action programs puts 
this particular experience of development into a larger perspective. The "in-
tensely felt needs" we refer to in this chapter, like the general "'preferences" we 
rdcrrcd to in chapter I, arc not tangible and immutable entities waiting to 
serve as passive guides to action. Rather, they arc the product of a continuing 
interaction between what people believe they want and what they believe they 
can get. Belief and perception arc key elements here. The high-yield varieties of 
wheat and rice made available in the Green Revolution po'lll'Crfully altered 
farmers' perceptions of what they might get from research and from their 
fields. In this context, it has become fashionable among certain analyns to 
bemoan the conservatism of the rural poor and the aversity to risk of the 
peasant farmer. In other words, poor people have been known to act as though 
when things get worse you starve or lose your land or get shaken down by the 
big men. while when things get better it is only a matter of time until they get 
worse aga.in.26 It is in this context that the notion of .. an intensely felt need" 
must be perceived. lf the poor do not look on an organization proposal or a 
new technological gadget with great enthusiasm, their "conservatism" may 
well have some justification. At a minimum, it is a reality with which a success-
ful cff ort to induce the poor's participation must cope. The challenge of design-
ing local organization-from top or bottom-is to understand how risks and 
uncertainties color perceptions of needs and bow opportunities can be made 
more tangible. Thus we shall emphasize shortly the important role that con-
vincing and realistic demonstration projecu have to play in mobilizing partici-
pation in all manner oflocal organizations. More generally, the changing and 
relative nature of "intensely f cit needs" suggests that perceptions of feasibility 
as well as desirability arc relevant to the individual investing in participation. 
and therefore to the design of organizations seeking to call forth that participa-
» This view of life is not unique to poor people in today'1 deYelopin1 countries. Leys 
reminds m of Stendhal'1 view that an avmase Frenchman's hicrvchy of Deeds in the days before 
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tion from the rural poor. One of the most important of these feasibility con:rid· 
erations turns out to involve the creation of harmony concerning the objec-
tives the proposed organization will pursue. 
Harmony of Objectives 
Organizations of the rural poor promote collective social action by, among 
other things, surfacing and settling conflicts among potential participants. 
When this capability is lacking or underdeveloped, as is too often the case, 
"local organizations can become overpoliticizcd, immobilized by factionalism, 
with rural development objectives displaced by struggles for local power and 
control" (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 82). Our investment perspective empha· 
sizes the costs that the surfacing and settling of conflicts imposes on an organi-
zation's prospective participants: if too much conflict requires too much time, 
energy, or commitment to resolve, then active participation is unlikely to be 
mobilized. In this section. we argue that the rural poor arc more inclined to 
make sustained investments of participation in organizations that embody a 
relative harmony of objectives, that is, organizations in which most partici-
pants agree on what the organization should be doing. We focus on the specific 
choices of organization design which promote this harmony through effective 
and efficient resolution of potential conflicts. 
A first step towards understanding the nature of conflict and harmony in 
rural organizations is to recognize that different people have different needs 
and priorities. We noted earlier how often this truism is rejected by a rhetoric 
of development planning which portrays the rural poor as a homogeneous 
group with undifferentiated objectives. 21 Even within the broad socioeconom-
ic groups we described in our discussion of social conduct, however, the reality 
is that individual people will share some interests but not others. Two landless 
laborers, to take a common developing-world example, may agree on goals of 
land reform but support different political factions. Two small farmers may 
agree on matters of access to cn:dit but disagree over access to water because 
one has it and the other needs iL Two women may stand united on the need for 
markets in which to sell their household produce but, especially if they belong 
to different age groups, may have radically different views on the need for 
family-planning support. The list obviously could be continued. In general, 
any effort to link people into units of collective action will carry with it the 
· potential for conflict as individual members seek to bend the organization to 
their own interests and to resist the corresponding activities of other members. 
Choice of membership and function. Two design choices arc particu-
.,, 1' One o( the most important and obvious differenoca, ol ooune, is that between elites 
and none lites. We will def er considcratiQQ o( the role pla ycd by cli1cs in the creation and resolution 
of conflict until later (p. 193). This is not because we underestimate the significance of that role; 
rather, we wWi to cmphasin: that the problems and costs of conflict resolution must be borne by 
an orpniz.ation even when there are no elites com plicatina the local picture. 'The ubiquitous need 
to build harmony of objccti't'CI amona participants who dit!'cr in their interests, if not their socio-
economic status, is often overlooked when elites are viewed u the essence of the conflict problem. 
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larly important determinants of the kind and degree of conflict which actually 
arises over a particular organization's activities. The first is the choice of mem-
bership: Who will be included in, and who excluded from, the organization? 
The second is the choice of function: What benefits will be pursued by the 
organization, and what benefits will be left to other organizations or to indi-
vidual pursuit? These choices arc interrelated. Effective conflict resolution 
does not require that all members of a particular organization share a common 
view of what should be done in the world at large. Rather, members need only 
to reach reasonably harmonious agreement on who should do what within the 
limited range of activities which the organii.ation that links them chooses to 
pursue. If the who and the what of organization design arc carefully matched, 
the amount of conflict with which participants must contend can be kept with-
in tolerable bounds. This relationship is sketched as a hypothetical example in 
figure S.2, which can be used to follow the historical evidence that follows. 
Function (What is done) 
ii iii iv v 
.9-& A + + + + 
~c B + + + ~ .2 




Figure 5.2. Harmony of Objectives. 
Notr. This portrays the range of people (or of relatively homogeneous groups) present in a given 
community, and in range of activities, functions, or benctiu about which at least one of them feels 
sufficiently strongly to in¥CSt participation in an orpnization commincd to iu attainment. In a 
particular instance the "people,w who we have labeled w A, B, C, D, ... w might include (Jroups 
of) small farmcn, la.ndlcss laborers, local mcn:hants, unmarried women, and so on. 1bc "func-
tiom: which we haYC labeled "i., ii, iii, iv, v, ... w might include building a tubcwcll, providing 
family plannina servia:a, providina acc.ess to markets, and so fonh. In this simple illustration, the 
entries in the matrix indicate men:ly whether a particular pcnon (or group) does(+), or docs not 
(-),desire the benefits sought throuah a potential function sufficiently intensely to consider invest-
ing participation in an organization that adopted that function. A particular organization can be 
described (or designed) in terms of which rows and which columns-which members and which 
functiom-it includes. This in turn defines the organization in tcnns of which cells of the matrix it 
encompasses. Where functions and members are chosen so that all cells encompassed by the 
organization cor.uin M•w DW"lc.i, C'ICf)'Onc in the organization wanu it to do exactly the same 
things and total hannony over the organization's objectives will prevail. On the other hand, where 
functions and members arc chosen so that some cells encompassed by the organization contain M_M 
mark$. at least some members may be a.skcd to support the punuit of bcnctiu they do not particu-
larly desire. Other things being equal. we would expect the latter kind of organization to embody 
mon: conflict and less harmony oYCr iu objectives, to require more onerous investments in calcula-
tion and control ofiu collective actions, and to be a less effective mobi!Uer of sustained panicipa· 
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Conflict problems can arise, as we have said, when more diff crcnt kinds of 
people and more different kinds of functions arc encompassed within the same 
organization. Not surprisingly, organizations that arc succ:cssful in attracting 
the participation of the rural poor have often limited conflicts over objectives 
by limiting membership to relatively homogeneous groups sharing both com-
mon identity and common needs. 21 The limited internal conflict of such homo-
geneous groups was a key characteristic of the f cw successful organizations 
identified by a United Nations survey of cooperative cff orts in Asia (UN RISO 
1975; sec also Hunter 1978b, chap. 4). The Cornell Committee on Rural De-
velopment reached a similar conclusion from its broader survey of a variety of 
Asian organizations (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 68); evidence from East 
Africa points in the same direction (Hunter 1971, p. 10). 
A particularly illuminating example is that of the Bangladesh Rural Ad-
vancement Committee (BRAC).29 Initial attempts to include both the landed 
and the landless poor within one organiz.ation were counterproductive; efforts 
to create a single community center foundered on underlying factionalisms 
unperceived by program designers. Having learned from these mistakes, 
BRAC changed its approach and is now enjoying heightened suro:ss with 
organization policies which restrict membership to specific target groups de-
fined in terms of common nceds.lO 
Conflict can also be limited by restriction of the organization's functions to 
pursuit of a single, narrowly defined benefit This in fact has been the design 
strategy in some of the most spectacularly successful local organizations in the 
history of development: the single-industry, vertically integrated cooperatives. 
The Malaysian Rubber Association. the Kenya Tea Development Authority, 
the Colombia Coffee Association. and the Indian National Dairy Develop-
ment Board arc illustrative of the range of locations and activities to which the 
single-function design has been successfully applied. Significantly, Kortcn 
(1980a) points out in his analysis of the Indian dairy cooperatives that the 
membership of such organizations often includes individuals from different 
social (caste) and economic backgrounds who represent a variety of different, 
even conflicting interests. Their cooperative organization operates eff ectivcly 
precisely because members have agreed that it shall function only in pursuit of 
that one benefit they all desire (good, steady prices for their milk) and shall not 
attempt the difficult calculations and controls which would be required to 
resolve conflicts on other matters.11 The large single-industry organizations 
arc only the most obvious example of this phenomenon; as Hunter (1971) 
reminds us, there arc undoubtedly thousands of less well-known or unreport-
~ instances of a few community members banding together through infonnal 
ll In t.ablc S.2, this means confining membership to a single row, such a.s A. 
it This account o( BRAC is from K.orten ( 1980a). 
10 For example, thoee who seU their labor to third panies. 
JI Int.able S.2, an example o( such an organization would be one including groups A. B, 
and C in its membenh.i p, and function iii as its only activity. 
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bargaining to install a tubewell or to build a cattle dip, despite their inability to 
agree on a wider range of community issu~. 
Two caveats. Adopting a single function or a homogeneous member-
ship admittedly represents an extreme (and extremely successful) solution to 
the problem of harmonious organization design. Indeed, Uphoff and Esman 
conclude from their survey of Asian experiena: that the adoption of multiple 
functions often can help organizations '"to insure their viability and capacity to 
integrate diverse services" ( 1974, p. xix).ll Moreover, Uphoff and Esman sug-
gest that if circumstances temporarily stop the organization from performing 
one of these functions, it might persist by continuing to attract participation 
through its continuing performance of its other functions. These arguments do 
not necessarily conflict with our view of the irnportana: ofhannony in organi-
zational objectives. Again, it is not limitation of membership or function per sc 
which is needed to reduce conflict. What is needed is a '"fit" between the two 
that produces no more conflict than the organization is currently able to re-
solve in an efficient manner. 
Two caveats should be borne in mind when considering the evidence cited to 
demonstrate the feasibility of multiple-function organizations. First, on closer 
inspection many such organizations turn out to be composed of relatively 
small '"suborganizations" of restricted membership and function. It is within 
these latter classically harmonious designs that most of the actual collective 
activity takes place. To cite just one example, in the Sarvodaya Shramadana 
Movement of Sri Lanka, '"the pref erred village level organization includes 
individual groups for youth, mothers, farmers, children, pre-school, elders, 
and for persons with special education and skills" (Korten I 980a, p. 486). Only 
at higher levels-with access to professional administrative support for the 
required calculation and control-arc these groups integrated into a multiplc-
function, relatively open-membership organization. 
The second caveat is an essentially methodological one. Scholars who, like 
Uphoff and Esman, conduct large-scale, "cross-sectional" surveys necessarily 
sacrifice a temporal perspective on the dynamics of specific organizations for a 
comparative perspective on the many different kinds of organization that exist 
at the time of the survey. The two perspectives can be complementary. But it is 
important to realize that most of the organizations observed in a cross-
scctional analysis will be relatively mature and established ones rather than 
those that have lost (or are still fighting) their battles to attract and hold partic-
ipants. We will argue later on that many mature organizations have sensibly 
and naturally diversified their functional base after getting started and gaining 
experience from a narrow-and often single-function-beginning. In con-
trast, scholars who follow the birth, evolution, and survival or demise of par-
n In tcnns of table S.2, I.hey are suggesting that the individuals or groups rcpl"C$Cntcd by 
A ind C could build an organization around functions iii and iv without, in principle, producin& 
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ticular local organizations arc often able to identify the design features respon-
sible for early failures, which the cross-sectional-survey people hardly ever sec. 
There seems little doubt that one of the most common causes of such early 
demise is too much unresolved conflict caused by too many diff ercnt groups 
trying to accomplish too many different things under a single organizational 
roof. On the other hand, detailed studies which arc able to observe particular 
local organizations in their infancy are not likely to know what kind of func-
tional diversification is eventually undertaken by the f cw that grow to maturi-
ty. Those who study the evolutionary dynamics of particular organizations arc 
therefore least likely to observe the "facts" that the cross-sectional scholars arc 
most likely to observe, and vice versa. No wonder they seem to disagree. 
Common to both sorts of scholarship, however, is the basic finding that 
pursuit of multiple functions carries potential benefits and potential liabilities 
for an organization. Although historical experience with local organizations 
does not let us resolve the implied trade-off unambiguously, it strongly sug-
gests that the success of multiple-function organizations depends on their rela-
tive sophistication or experience in resolving conflict and on their ability to 
restrict membership sufficiently that the total conflict encompassed by the 
organization does not overly tax whatever conflict-resolving capability it has 
been able to build. 
The design of harmonious organizations. The view we have just ad-
vanced suggests that attempts to start local organizations that simultaneously 
encompass a broad base of membership and a wide variety of functions arc 
likely to fail. This expectation is confirmed by, and sheds light on, the pre-
viously mentioned failures of the community-development movement. Many 
factors were surely at work in this failure, but community development was 
precisely an attempt to build an organization that included all members of the 
community, and functioned in pursuit of all of their needs. It is hardly surpris-
ing that the organizations were unable to perform the monumental tasks of 
calculation and control which their choice of membership and function forced 
on them, or that so many of them disintegrated in the face of conflicts they 
were unable to resolve. That so much was expected of community-
development organizations and that so little time was allowed for them to 
build up the necessary organizational skills and attitudes no doubt also con-
tributed to the movement's dcmise.ll 
The need for time to learn conflict-resolving (and other) skills and attitudes 
is a theme which we will consider at the end of this chapter. The difficulty-the 
virtual impossibility-of moving the rural poor away from their traditional 
kin-group organizations by means of open membership, multiple-fun(.iion de-
signs is clearest, however, when we consider the history oflocal political organ-
" In fact, many of the activities ha....: continued with new labels. In the Philippines a 
Department of 1..ocal Go....:mment and Community Development continues to operate. In addi-
tion, many of the rural trainers and conununity orpnilcn who an: performing dTcaiYCly in other 
propms in the Philippines acquired their skills u <X>IM!unity-developmcnt field workers. 
·-
181 Orpnization Procnms 
izations in the developing world. Herc, the ideological commitment to open 
membership and comprehensive functions runs directly counter to the practi-
cal need for eff ectivc and efficient conflict resolution. Local political organiza-
tions did indeed enjoy a certain amount of success in the previously colonial 
devcloping countries during their transitions to independence. In these cases, 
howevcr, it was precisely because a single, univcnally desired function 1(rcplac-
ing foreign rule) temporarily dominated all others that the organizations could 
temporarily function.34 Typically, once this function was no longer necessary, 
its unifying influence dissipated, and the latent conflicts of an opcn-
membership, multiple-function organization began to surface. Factions broke 
away, ineffectiveness was rampant, and the local political organization de-
clined in importance as a technique of collective social action throughout 
much of the previously colonial developing world (Chambers 1974, pp. 
86-88)." 
Simplicity of Technique 
However harmonious the objectives of an organization. there remains the 
problem of designing means by which those objectives can be realized. Mane: 
saw this as a problem of taking '"from each according to his abilities" and 
giving "to each according to his needs." Others, from the author of Psalm 62 to 
Adam Smith to Mao Tse-tung, saw it in much the same way but substituted 
work for needs. 
Regardless of ideology, resolving questions of who gives and who gets what 
in a social group requires effective organizational tC(;hniques for calculation 
and control. The specific tC(;hniques employed may involve exchange, hier-
archy, polyarchy, or bargaining. combined to provide all manner of mixes of 
social interaction and intellectual cogitation. Once again. however, our per-
spective of participation as investment suggests that calculation and control-
whatever their form-will be more or less expensive activities for an organiza-
tion's membcn. We therefore expect-and find-that people arc more 
inclined to invest their participation in organizations with relatively simple 
demands for calculation and control. 
Two related features of organization militate against simplicity of calcula-
tion and control. The first and more obvious is large size: the more people 
l4 For example, function i in table S.2. 
» We shall have more to say on the reasons for this decline in subsequent sections. The 
Tanzanian ujamaa mo~nt is frequently cited as an exception or C'o'Cn a countcr-<:x.amplc to the 
kind o( ariumcnt we have advanced here. We hope this is true, though if so, it will be the c~tion 
which proYCS the rule. The planncn of ujamaa explicitly staked iu hopes for success on (I) an 
ability to redistribute ao:::css to basic resources and bcncfiu in such a way that all membcn of the 
village "family" do have identical interests and minimal occasion for conflict over the ujamaa'J 
objectives, and (2) a gradual process through which individual villa gen learn the admittedly difii-
cuh task:J of calculating and controlling communal activities in a manner satisfactory to all partic-
ipanu (Tanzania 1969). No one will disagree that achicving thc1c goals, if possible at all, has been 
an exceedingly difficult, time<onsuming. risky, and expensive endeavor. Whether ujamoa'J high-
ly politicized and ambitious ancmpt at reorganization has actually suco:<:dcd in bringing in-
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engaged in a social enterprise, the more complex is the problem of assigning, 
coordinating, monitoring. and legitimating their individual responsibilities 
and rewards. The second is what might be called .. communality": when partic-
ipants contribute their labor and other resources to a common productive 
activity, calculation and control are more complex than when each individ-
uars contribution is immediately and directly reflected in his own individual 
reward. Oiff erent techniques of organization impose different costs on, and 
yield different benefits to, participants as size and communality increase. The 
challenge for designers of reorganization programs is to design combinations 
of techniques which fit effectively with the size, communality, and other re-
quirements of a particular local situation. 
Small and selfish organizations. Calculation and control obviously 
pose their simplest demands within the simplest form of organization: the 
individual acting alone and in his own self-interest. Whole philosophies have 
been based on this theme, and some improvements in rural well-being can 
indeed be accomplished with such minimal formal organization. This, of 
course, is the great practical advantage of the family farm. We noted in chapter 
3 that because of the distinctive characteristics of the agricultural production 
process, hard work. initiative, and the .. on-the-spot supervisory decisions" so 
pervasive in farming are generally performed better when the farm unit's work 
force has a direct interest in the outcome. It has also been emphasized that in 
agriculture '"the small proprietary or family firm" tends to promote more effi-
cient and more rapid capital formation and technological change (Raup 1967, 
pp. '17J-n, 293-97). 
Frequently, however, the gadgets and activities that can improve the well-
being of the rural poor exhibit some degree of increasing returns to scale; 
agricultural research, crop processing. irrigation systems. and political power 
arc only a few of the benefits not accessible to the individual acting alone.36 The 
challenge of organization design is to balance the benefits that can be obtained 
through larger, more complicated organizations against the costs of calcula-
tion and control which such complexity tends to impose. 
Organizations comprising only a few members have in fact been reasonably 
successful when they have designed their function to require little communal 
activity. Joint use of a small tubewcll or a low-lift pump is a good ex.ample . 
Even in such cases, however, problems arise, especially with respect to ensur-
ing satisfactory maintenance. 
When participants' contributions and benefits talce on a significant com-
munal character, even small groups face serious problems in seeking to form 
aad sustain an effective organization. There are instances in which a few peo-
ple have organized for the communal purchase and use of a tractor, a boat, or 
» We do aot imply that potential benefits continue to increase with incrcasin& scale o( 
social entcrprilc; in most cues, theR ii in fact a size aboYC which further arowth yields little but 
trouble. This does aot chanae the fact that t.echnical and other facton militate in favor of aroup1 
Larrc enough to incur significant COits of calculation and control 
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a thresher and thereby radically improved their own well-being. Our impres-
sion, however, is that for every such success there have been many failurcs-
many instances in which the available techniques for calculating and control-
ling proved inadequate to the ta.sic at hand. This docs not suggest that small 
communal organizations should be discouraged in the future, but only that 
such organizations are in general marginally viable and more likely than not to 
fail. Less organizationally expensive means of improving rural well-being 
should also be considered. The emergence of commercial tractor contractors 
in many developing countries is a notable example of a simple commercial 
solution to sharing the use of a "lumpy" piece of equipmenL 
l.Arge and selfish organizations. Tractor contractors typically remain 
small, but frequently the commercial operations carried out by private firms 
are characterized by Significant economics of scale. We note shortly that largc-
scale public enterprises created to perform essentially commercial functions 
such as marketing of agricultural products or the distribution of credit or 
inputs commonly resort to a "multi-tier" form of organization. In many coun-
tries, however, this type of commercial operation is often performed by large 
private firms engaged in the marketing and processing of agricuhural products 
or the manufacture and distribution of fann inputs. In these instances, calcula-
tion and control arc accomplished by exchange techniques, specifically market 
and price mechanisms. The internal control and management of these private 
fmns is hierarchical, thus simplifying problems of coordination. Private 
profit-maximizing firms of this nature have significant advantages in being 
relatively flexible and capable of making decisions promptly in response to 
changing conditions affecting costs of inputs or product prices. 
In discussing the role of markets and prices in chapter 6, we note that the 
results obtained by relying on a market system as a means of calculation and 
control arc often criticized, especially in relation to the equity goal of social 
policy. A major justification offered for promoting some of the "multi-tier" 
cooperative and public organizations discussed in later sections is that they 
protect small farmers from exploitation by large private organizations. There 
are, however, some important practical arguments for utilizing the organiza-
tional capacity and technical and entrepreneurial skills that are often available 
in private firms. Even in late-<tcveloping countries, competition among private 
flnDS frequently limits their monopoly power. Lele reports, for example, that 
"most price exploitation that has been obsctved in Ethiopian markets is co-
vert. through false weights and measures, rather than overt"; and this implies 
that farmers "have the potential to enjoy real bargaining power" (1975, p. 
114).37 Therefore, the most appropriate government action may be to facilitate 
more effective performance of a market system and to reduce the scope for 
11 Lele ( 197-4, p. 0)) cites 15 marketing studies carried out in Africa, Asia, and utin 
America "which indic:a1.c th.at, contrary to general belief, the priva1.c marketing systems in L D. CJ 
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exploitation by measures such as the introduction of standard weights and 
measures, dissemination of adequate and reliable price inf onnation at all lev-
els of the marketing system, and improving means of communication and 
transportation. There are two cogent arguments for governments to empha-
size facilitative and regulatory actions rather than to attempt to replace private 
firms in carrying out essentially commercial operations. First, government 
organizations such as a grain marketing board tend to be relatively inefficient, 
in part because of the need for bureaucratic regulations to limit graft and 
corruption. Such regulations increase administrative costs and reduce flexibil-
ity. The second and more general argument is that in a situation in which 
administrative manpower is in short supply, government programs should be 
concentrated on those types of activities '"which are not likely to be undertaken 
without public intervention" (Lele 1975, p. 191). 
Most controversial of all is the role of large transnational (multinational) 
corporations (fNCs). Such corporations are, of course, very large. They pos-
sess significant economics of scale because of the resourCes that they can de-
vote to R&D, their market connections and experience in advertising and 
other techniques of market promotion, and their easy access to international 
capital markets. In the case of technologies that are inherently large-scale and 
complex, such as the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers, TNCs can play a very 
useful role in the design and construction of efficient, low<OSt plants. 3' Partic-
ularly in the case of a perishable commodity such as bananas, TNCs have been 
highly successful in organizing the assembly, packaging. transportation, mar-
keting, and quality<ontrol functions involved in exporting to overseas 
markets. (We defer consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of agri-
cultural exports for developing countries until chapter 6.) 
Several significant arguments against the role of TNCs need to be empha-
sized. Such fmns often transfer technologies that are inappropriate to the factor 
proportions prevailing in less developed countries. However, this is often in 
response to economic policies and price distortions which also encourage do-
mestic firms to choose inappropriately capital-intensive technologies. Perhaps 
equally important is the tendency on the part of a number of TN Cs to promote 
inappropriate products." Fmally, the sheer size and '"roultinationality" of 
many TNCs poses problems because of their economic and political power.40 
• It is noteworthy that in reoent years the People's Republic of Otloa has contracted 
with ~ral TNC, to build very large nitrogen-(ertiliz.cr factories to Ille advantage of the drunat-
ic cost-mJucing developments that have occurred since 1963, when the centrifugal compressor 
w.u introduced. There arc, of coune, instances in which companies h.avc persuaded governments 
to contract for the construction of relatively small, inefficient factories. For example, a SO-percent 
"Tubsidy on fertilizer in Tanzania simply offseu the high cost of producing fertilizer in the un=>-
nomic plant buih to supply the country's limited market for nitrogen fcrtili.z.er (lLO 1978, p. 70) . 
" A favorite example is the virtually worldwide spread of Coca Cola. The most unfortu-
nate ex.ample, however, is the vigorous promotion o( infant fonnulas for bottle-feeding, which has 
contributed to the decline of breast-feeding in many areas, with the adverse consequcnocs that we 
noted in chapter '4 • 
.., For more extended discussion of transnational corporations, see Vernon ( 1977) and 
Wand Strccten (1977). 
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l.Argt and communal organizations. What happens to local organiza-
tions which are not only large but also communal? We would expect such 
organizations to impose even higher cosu of calculation and control on poten-
tial participants and to run even higher risks of failure. From the few hard data 
available, this indeed seems to be the case. Uphoff and Esman, for example, 
point out that successful communal organizations in Asia comprise few 
enough people that an informal "bargaining" through shared knowledge of 
perfonnance and special circumstances suffices as a technique for calculation 
and control. Their survey data suggest that within groups of thirty to fifty 
families there is often an eff cctive trade-off between the increasing returns to 
scale of organized communal action and the rising costs of organization which 
larger groups entail (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 68). 
A similar result emerges from China's experiments with different scales of 
farm organization. Early efforts to build communal groups at the commune 
and brigade level experienced crippling problems of perf onnancc and incen-
tive. This experience Jed to the present, apparently more satisfactory design, in 
which production teams of thirty to forty families carry most of the burden of 
calculating and controlling who gets and gives whaL ••Above this scale, organ-
izational functions are carried out by more formal arrangements which do not 
impose direct costs on local participanu. 
Additional relevant evidence comes from a survey of successful irrigation 
communes in the Philippines conducted by de los Reyes and her colleagues 
(1979, as cited in Bagadion and Kortcn 1980). Communal organizations of 
water users have existed for centuries in the Philippines, uniting people in 
complex social functions which serve from less than ten to as many as four 
thousand hectares. Most organizations, however, cover an area of less than 
one hundred hectares and involve fewer than fifty families. The studies show 
that irrigation organizations in this small size range often prosper without 
much in the way of formal administrative structure; again. informal personal 
knowledge of individual performance and circumstance appears sufficient to 
perform the relatively simple tasks of calculation and control required. This 
was not the case for groups with an area of more than one hundred hectares or 
involving more than fifty families. These groups generally had to subdivide 
into smaller local groups and to develop formal hierarchical structures in order 
to perform their more complex tasks of calculation and control without im-
posing an unacceptable burden of organization on participanu.41 
The examples just cited suggest that one practical means of making and 
" For a masterful IQCOWll oC the !hooey and practkc o{ rwa.I orpniution by Chin .. ·s 
C-omm unist pany, sec SchunnaM ( 1968, chap. 7 and esp. pp. 471-92). For more rcc:ent summary 
ICICOUnts, ICC Tunmcr (1976). OUM (1978). ind Schno (1980). 
4l Of succcuful irrigation organizations covering more thao one hundred beet.arcs, 90 
pcromt haYC formal organization ltr\lcturcs and 60 pcroenl haYC abo subdivided into smaller 
lfOllps; oC organizations coYCring fewer than fifty beet.arcs, less than 25 pcroent have formal 
llNt'turea and less than S pcrocnt have subdivided (Bagadion and K0r1en 1980, table 2, citing de 
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keeping organizations attractive to potential investors is to keep them small 
This is not as academic a notion as it may at first appear. Hunter ( 1972), for 
example, argues that the greatest return to the poor on their participation 
investment often comes as a result of forming interest groups of a few cooper-
ating individuals, linked through informal bargaining procedures. Further in-
creases in size beyond the initial primary group often benefit leaders and ad-
ministrators performing support functions more than they benefit the poor 
themselves. 
It remains true, however, that technological or political factors often force 
an organization to grow beyond the size at which calculation and control can 
be handled by techniques relying on shared knowledge and bilateral bargain-
ing between individual participants. What design alternatives then remain? 
Design alternatives: polyarchy and hierarchy. One common response 
to this situation has been to adopt polyarchical techniques of organization. in 
which formal leadership by a few accountable individuals is used to simplify 
participants' problems of calculation and control. Though this approach has 
worked on a limited scale, we noted earlier that in much of the developing 
world, local political organizations have not provided a particularly cff cctive 
mearu of organizing the interests of the poor. Almost everywhere that local 
political organizations have survived, their original polyarchical relationships 
have drifted towards exchange, hierarchy, and thinly disguised recapitulation 
of the patronage/dependency design of traditional organization (Chambers 
1974, pp. 86-88). Such techniques work to the extent that relatively inexpen-
sive participation-for instance in the form of voting~ be exchanged for 
benefits desired by the individual participants, and available to the local elite. 
But the superficiality of the resulting "organization" is dearly revealed when 
the political leadership can no longer provide the accustomed benefits-
perhaps because a centrally administered aid program no longer provides the 
resources that had been used for this purpose. Tune after time, in country after 
country, as the dole dries up, the "participation" in the local organization 
disappears, leaving little but dependency in its walce. 
A more commonly effective design for large-scale enterprises invokes 
"multi-tier" organization (Uphoff and Esman 1974, p. 69; Korten 1979a). The 
lowest tier comprises the same like-minded groups of poor people to which we 
have been referring. These '"primary" groups are characterized by members' 
predominant commitment to activities other than organizing and by their con-
sequent preference for those techniques of calculation and control which entail 
a minimum investment of their time and effort: informal shared knowledge 
and bilateral bargaining. Above this primary level, one or more hierarchical 
tiers may be added to handle inter-group tasb of calculation and control. The 
design and management of these upper-tier organizations is discussed at 
length in the last section of this chapter (p. I 99ff.). The upper tiers are distin-
guished from the primary, or lowest, tier by their participants' commitment to 
careers as professional organizers and their (consequent?) preference for effi-
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cient and eff ectivc techniques of organizing large numbers of people. Hierar-
chical and, more rarely, political techniques arc their preferred means of calcu-
lation and control 
The problems of multi-tier support structures arc many, and we will discuss 
them in a moment. Nocetheless, multi-tier support structures can perform 
important functions, not the least of which is relieving participanu in the 
primary groups of the burden of directly negotiating responsibilities, righu, 
and obligations with all other members of the organization. When the multi-
ticr, hierarchical structure can also actually deliver attractive benefits to the 
primary-group members, and when it can achieve a suitable harmony of objec-
tives, it therefore has real attractions as a means of inducing participation of 
the poor in inherently large and potentially complex organizations. 
Design alternatives: limited communal obligations. The costs of partic-
ipation in local organization can be mitigated not only by limiting the size of 
the primary group but also by adopting functions and designs which reduce 
the amount of explicit calculation and control required for alloeating commu-
nal tasks and benefits. Once again, this is an area in which ideological.ly 
grounded sclf-<lelusion of advisors and planners has often clashed with the 
practical self-interest of the poor them.selves. Reporting on another aspect of 
the Philippine irrigation studies referred to earlier, Alfonso (1981) describes a 
typical example of such a futile misunderstanding. Engineers working with the 
local farmer group knew that one irrigation turnout from the main system per 
every forty to fifty hectares was the most efficient design in a resource-scarce 
world. They were therefore bewildered and unsympathetic to the "wasteful" 
farmers' demands for a much more expensive design providing one turnout 
per farmer. The engineers did not recognize that for the farmers the most 
significant costs were not those of construction. Rather they were the costs of 
calculation and control which would be incurred if each individual had to 
negotiate with one or two dozen neighbors over access to, and control of, a 
single communal turnout. Neither we nor Alfonso suggests whether the engi-
neers or the farmers arc right in this particular instance. Our general point is 
that the poor often attach great significance to limiting the communal content 
of local organizations. So long as advisors remain unaware of and insensitive 
to such concerns, they will continue to design technically efficient, elegant, and 
otherwise admirable organizations which fail to produce the anticipated bene-
fits because the poor inexplicably refuse to participate in them. 
It is worth pointing out that some of the most successful local organizations 
haw recognized the importan~ of limiting communal obligations. The coop-
eratives of the Indian National Dairy Development Board, to which we re-
ferred earlier, arc a case in point. In his summary of the conditions that led to 
the outstanding performan~ of this organization, Korten emphasizes that 
"the basic functions of the village milk cooperatives ... plac(e] few de-
mands . . . for communal labor, or for complex decisions that might favor 
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a number of the single-industry cooperatives we have mentioned elsewhere in 
this essay. 
The design feature that makes possible organization with limited communal 
obligation was spelled out long ago by Chayanov (1966) in his concept of 
'"vertical" cooperation: local outputs and needs arc handled by major com-
mercial (exchange) or administrative (hierarchical) organizations at a regional 
or higher level, without requiring any .. horizontal"' grouping of the poor with 
each othcr.'l Individual poor people thus can obtain many of the benefits of 
organization without incurring substantially more costs than they would by 
remaining in their tradition-bound, individualist state. 
Vertical organization of this extreme form is anathema to many advisors 
and policymalccrs. These people arc correct in recognizing that vertical organi-
zation docs little, at least in any direct way, to develop the indigenous problcm-
solving capabilities of the rural poor. They arc mistaken, however, in letting 
this lack of comprehensive intent blind them to the limited but important 
practical accomplishments of vertical organization. especially when it is em-
ployed in the context of a pluralistic approach to organizational design. 
Health-related activities such as malaria control arc buih on an essentially 
vertical pattern of organization, as arc the single-industry cooperatives noted 
above. Perhaps most impressive, however, is the performance of certain agri-
cultural extension efforts which we discussed in chapter 3. These efforts typi-
cally do not involve much in the way of horizontal organization and comrnu-
nal problem-solving." The essential need is for organizational techniques that 
tap the local knowledge, experience, and judgment of individual farmers in 
order to ensure that the technologies recommended by extension workers arc 
feasible and rewarding for those farmers, given the constraints and opportuni-
ties that they face. Equally important is that agricultural research workers 
should be linked with these information flows so that their decisions concern-
ing research priorities take account of conditions and perceptions at the farm 
level How such techniques can be structured and administered will be dis-
cussed below . 
In summarizing this argument, we must again emphasize that we have not 
recommended forsaking horizontally structured groups employing bargaining 
or polyarchical techniques in favor of organizations emphasizing vertically 
structured, hierarchical or exchange techniques. We have only suggested 
that-measured by poor people's willingness to invest participation rather 
than policymakers' preconceived biases-more local problem-solving obliga-
tions arc not always what the poor want; furthermore they arc sometimes not 
., In the terminology of figure j_ I, hierarchical and exchange techniques have been sub-
stituted for those ofbarpinin&- In the procesa, the individual poor people have lost their status u 
co-leaden. 
.. K.oncn (1981)argues that this is an interestiqupect olthe methodoloaY evolYCd in 
Guatemala for rnalcina ~hand extension more Uld'ul for small farmen, a methodoloaY 
wtuc:h we dilcusled in chap(Cr 3 (ICC Hildebrand 1976). 
f 
I 
, Ut Orpniz.ation Programs 
· ,_ what the poor need. Problem-solving is expensive to problem-solvers, 
9'o arc often acting with good appreciation of their own limited abilities for 
cakuJation and control when they opt for a smaller problem and simpler tech-
8qucs than their advisors might ha vc them adopt. The proper goal of analysis 
II to understand the trade-offs involved in this behavior, to articulate the alter-
Mtiw organizational techniques available, and so to help design pluralistic 
panmu of link.age which can better serve the needs of the rural poor. We next 
advance some thoughts on how such designs can be promoted. 
Guitk/ines for Design 
Our argument and evidence to this point arc summarized in figure S.3, 
which portrays the three design features that we have identified as major de-
terminants of local participation: attractiveness of benefits, harmony of ob-
jectives, and simplicity of technique. Each feature is shown as one axis of a 
three-dimensional volume. Note that each axis is oriented such that low values 
occur at the periphery of the figure, and high values towards the center. Within 
this volume, we have suggested relative .. locations" of some specific organiza-
I 
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tional programs which historically have been successful in attracting the par-
ticipation of the rural poor. The assigned locations arc highly impression-
istic-it is not by accident that no scales are given on the axes. 
It would be silly to take any such figure too literally: we intend only to 
suggest certain qualitative relationships between design and historical perfor-
mance in organizations of the rural poor. The figure reflects our finding that 
such organizations have tended to attract and retain active participation to the 
extent that they score .. high" on the three design features portrayed. Such 
organizations lie towards the figure's center. Conversely, the rural poor have 
generally been less willing to invest participation in organizations scoring low 
on these design features and therefore lying towards the periphery of the 
figure. 
Figure S.3 also reflects the limited trade-offs of organization design implicit 
in our argument. Organizations with sufficiently high ratings on any two of the 
three design features have often competed successfully for the poor's participa-
tion, even when their rating on the third was relatively low. We have not, 
however, found a single instance of sucoessfuJ participation in an organization 
that rated low on more than one of the design features.•' The implied con-
straint leads to the .. organizational opportunity'" surface we have sketched in 
the figure. Historically speaking, locations lying inside this surface have rep-
resented the most feasible designs for participatory local organization, in the 
narrow but operational sense that the rural poor have been more willing to 
invest participation in them. 
It remains to be seen whether the historical relationships suggested in figure 
S.3 can help to prescribe specific interventions for future programs of local 
reorganization. If they can, it will be by functioning not as a finished blueprint 
but rather as an incomplete guide to what must ultimately be an interactive 
process of trial-and~rror learning. Put somewhat differently, though our 
analysis docs not say how to build a particular organization in a specific con-
text, it may suggest some good ways to start the sequence of construction. 
Equally important, our analysis highlights some major pitfalls of past expe-
rience in a way that should help contemporary development workers to a void 
them. 
Local field studies. Our analysis suggests that the most important in-
terventions arc local field studies to support reorganization efforts. Effective 
designs for reorganization require intimate knowledge of certain local condi-
tions: what the poor want, where potential conflicts lie, and how much capaci-
ty for calculation and control exists. This knowledge cannot be deduced by 
planners, analysts, or ideologues sitting in central offices. Instead, it requires 
the creation of trained assessment teams and their placement in the local 
community. There they can tap .. common" knowledge and observe for them-
.s Such ocp.nilltio111 surely exist; we sugacst only that they are relatively rare and that 
their desicn is relatively rislcy . 
I 
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selves the particular circumstances which set the constraints and opportunities 
for specific organizational interventions. We will have more to say on the 
conduct and management of such field assessments below. Suffice it for the 
moment to note that neither the one-day, hit-and-run visits so popular with 
some development agencies nor the exquisitely detailed surveys of some aca-
demic analysts arc what is nceded.46 Later, we shall cite studies which lead us to 
suspect that a couple of weeks' work by an experienced team, focused on a few 
specific questions, will often be sufficient to get the interactive design process 
off to a good start. 
The first and most important job of the local field study is to identify one or 
more intensely felt local needs which can serve as the core of a reorganization 
program. Unless such a need is identified, the program will almost certainly 
fail to attract any meaningful participation from the local people. It cannot be 
overemphasized that local perceptions, not national priorities or overall effi-
ciencies, arc of ultimate importance here. Local desirability lies at the heart of 
organizational feasibility and thus is an essential component of any effective 
development program. Some development workers have recognized this ex-
plicity." More frequently, however, the debate on development priorities pro-
ceeds with blithe disregard for whether the programs that plannen seled arc 
programs in which the poor will participate. This sort of mismatch helps no 
one; and it is one of the reasons why we insist upon the interdependence of 
production. consumption. and organization programs throughout our discus-
sion of development strategies in chapter 6. 
The next important issue for study by the local field team concerns the 
interaction of benefits, membership, and organization function. The goal, we 
have argued, is to achieve sufficient harmony of objedivcs that the organiza-
tion can cope with its tasks of surfacing and settling conflicts. Although good 
sociological analysis probably can be of some help here, the chances of arriv-
ing at a .. correct" answer through cogitation alone arc bleak. We suspect that 
the best bet is for a reorganization program to start with a relatively narrow 
function and membership in order to maximize the chances that it will survive 
at all. If it does survive, additional functions and member groups can be added 
au necessary or appropriate. 
We are equally skeptical that even the best of field studies can identify in . 
advance the optimal means of calculation and control for a particular organi-
.. R=t dixussions o( "rapid rural appraisal" arc relevant (sec, for example, Chambc:n 
(1980]) . 
., Korten, fore:umple, advaDCCS the "radical proposition-that "having the local rcor~ 
idtntify a need around which popular interest can be aroused may be more important than sclect-
1111 a program that will dcliwr the most uniu of 1ervice at the lowat cost• (1979o, p. 27). And a 
foreign advisor working with the UNICEF Village Technology Unit in Kenya provides a rcfreah-
lna view: "Our approach to the seneration o( interest in technologies which may be appropriate for 
Ille at villasc kvel amongst very poor people, is bucd on the fact that wr do not know what is, or is 
DOt.. appropriate, and neither do our 1ovemmcnt counterperu. The only people who can really 
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zational situation. Our analysis has identified some of the factors that such a 
study might profitably consider, but a good deal of subsequent trial-and-error 
learning will almost certainly be necessary. Again, we will explore how this 
learning might be carried out and supported in a later section (beginning on p. 
199). Our general recommendation, however, is that a first attempt to redesign 
a traditional organization should begin with one of the simpler techniques we 
discussed in the last section. Communal efforts should generally be avoided, 
and the opportunities for shedding some of the required calculation and con-
trol onto existing commercial or support organizations should be seriously 
considered. 
Inadequacies of local participation. In the preceding pa~ we have 
discussed the design of basic starting points from which a trial..and-error pro-
cess of local reorganization might profitably begin. We have been reasonably 
explicit about what we think such designs will offer the rural poor. It remains 
to be equally explicit about what they will nol 
Nothing we have said in our discussion of local reorganization should be 
taken as an endorsement of the naive, ideologically distorted view that the 
poor are uniformly wise and goodly people, thwarted in their development 
efforts only by evil elites and callous bureaucrats. Rather, we believe that al-
though effective local participation is a necessary component of development 
organization, it is rarely sufficient to handle all the organizational tasks on 
which effective programs of social action depend. These tasks, to recapitulate 
our argument in the first section of th.is chapter, include choice, allocation, 
mobilization, distribution, and productive utilization of resoun:.cs. The di-
mensions oflocal organization's insufficiencies are well known, if for no other 
reason than that they have been displayed so frequently in past efforts at local 
reorganization. It should be sufficient to recall some of the most serio~ . 
An obvious problem is the inability of autonomous local groups to obtain 
high productivity from their local resources. The common sight of two cattle 
dips built next to each other by rival clans is representative of a great number 
of similarly inefficient practices (Oyugi 1973). 
An ability to mobilize local resources of knowledge, material, and labor has 
justifiably been hailed as one of the strong points of participative local organi-
zation. Even here, however, the frequent failure to link local resource mobili-
zation to a broader social perspective leads to wasted effort and disillusion-
ment. For example, local initiatives started under the ill-informed belief that 
the central government would supply operating budgets and staffing have left 
a trail of unused schools and clinic buildings throughout the developing world 
(Ownbers 1974, p. 102). 
A further shortcoming of local organization is its inability to cope with the 
tasks of resource distribution among competing objectives. A bias for short-
term programs over long-term progranu is understandable in rural communi-
ties, but it clearly blocks access to many important benefits. We mentioned 
earlier the predilection of local governments for consumption-oriented rather 
l. 
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than production-oriented programs (see also Chamben 1974, p. 86; Lele 197S, 
p. IS9). 
At a more fundamental Jevcl. the widespread advocacy of local autonomy 
has been counterproductive in terms oflocal groups' abilities to perform the 
organizational tasks of surfacing and acttling conflicts, signaling group 
choices. and aecuring allocation of resources appropriate to those c:hoices. 1be 
community~cvelopmcnt movement failed in part because it treated the tradi-
tional village as a self-contained development unit which would carry out most 
organizational tasks without the aid of external intervention (Heginbotham 
197S; Sussman 1980). We showed above why this rarely works, and outlined 
conditions under which smaller, more specialized local groups linked through 
broader support structures were more likely to perform the required tasks. 
In general. an informal group offering attractive benefits to a few like-
minded individuals is a good point from which to start a program for redesign-
ing local organizations. It is only a start, however, and a very imperfect one at 
that. To realize its potential-perhaps even to survive-the initial local group 
will almost always have to begin reaching out to form linkages with the broad-
er social system. There are dangers in such linkages, cspccia1ly if attempts are 
made to forge them too ambitiously or too soon. Nonethclcss, the dangers of 
punuing a mythical local autonomy are even greater, the goal is not isolation 
but rather an ability to build reciprocally helpful linkages with the national, 
regional. and local communities which form each local group's social envi-
ronment. The need for resolutely pursuing this goal is particularly clear when 
we consider the special design problems posed by rural elites. 
Coping with tM Elite 
Skilled assessment teams often will be able to identify more than one design 
around which a local reorganization program might be built. We have argued 
that one of the central failings of past efforts to build local organizations is that 
so frequently the design chosen is one which could be bent to the benefit of the 
relatively wcll-<>ft' local elite. There is no sure way to avoid such failures. None-
thelcss, a growing body of practical experience suggests that a few fundamen-
tal design choices each reflecting detailed knowledge of local circumstances 
can substantially improve the chances for success. We shall outline four such 
choices, proceeding from simpler to more complex organizational designs and 
following the general design f ramcwork we developed in figure S.2 • 
P03Sive exclusion. The most direct way 'to keep the local elite from 
taking over or unduly influencing an organization is to define the function of 
the organization in such a way that the elite do not want to participate at all. In 
our general discussion of harmony and conflict. we showed how choice of 
• Ditcuaions ,,.;th David Leonard baYi: contn'buted substantially to this section. 
lliroll&hout the remainder o( this llCCtion. we will frequently 111e the IUCll;inct term •elites• u an 
ldmittedly approximate shorthand for the more awkward but more incluaiYC phrue "rdatiYCly 
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organizational function can influence membership. A typical constructive use 
of this influence was gradually evolved by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAq, described earlier. By defining their organization's func-
tion in a manner that simultaneously required inputs of manual labor from 
participants and eliminated handouts to them. the BRAC organizers dis-
covered that they could lose the interest of the relatively wcll-<>ff villagers and 
restrict the willingness to invest active participation to their target group of the 
very poor (Kortcn I 980a, pp. 488-90). 
The benefits of this approach to organizational design are obvious. The 
potential disadvantages, however, arc not insignificant. First of all. restricting 
an organization to functions that arc not attractive to the local elite means 
forgoing a large number of functions that are attractive to the poor. In addi-
tion, as we have already pointed out (and will discuss in more detail below), 
local skills of leadership and management tend to reside disproportionately 
with the elite members of the community. A local organization explicitly cut-
ting itself off from those skills must either seek comparable skills from outside 
(for example, from a professionalized supporting organization, as was the case 
in BRAQ or adopt techniques oflin1cage which do not require them. As noted' 
earlier, one solution is to build around existing commercial institutions, if 
suitable ones exist. More likely, the solution will be to remain sufficiently small 
or noncommunal that informal bargaining techniques are sufficient for the 
required tasks of calculation and control This small-group solution should 
not be lightly dismissed. As Hunter has so frequently pointed out (1969, 1970, 
l 978a), such groups can accomplish many of the primary goals of local reor-
ganization. Moreover, they have frequently provided the initial experience in 
interest-group cooperation from which more ambitious programs later grow. 
Active exclusion. When the benefits of local organization desired by 
the poor arc also desired by the elite, several design alternatives remain. The 
most extreme is explicitly to exclude the elite from membership in the organi-
zation. But this is at best a rislcy choice. Competent, committed external or-
ganization will be required to support and protect the poor people's organiza-
tion if it is to have any chance of success. A good example of the potential and 
limitations of such a design is India's Small Fanner Development Administra-
tion as described by Hunter (1976). We discuss some of the substantial pro~ 
lems of organizing the required external support in a later section. Nothing we 
say there, however, gives us reason to believe that efforts to exclude the elite 
from organizational benefits which they strongly desire can be successful in 
any but the most exceptional circumstances. More often. if the interests of the 
poor arc to be protected, organization redesigners will have to look: beyond the 
choice of membership to the character of the benefits pursued and the choice 
of particular techniques for calculation and control. 
Willingly shared benefits. One class of organizational designs which 
has been particularly eff cctive in advancing the interests of the poor is that 
which pursues benefits that the elite desire for themselves but cannot-or do 
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not want to-keep the poor from sharing with them. Somewhat surprisingly, 
at least for those who see the world as a constant struggle between the haves 
and have-nots. a number of such benefits arc of great importance to poor 
people in the developing world. 
For one thing, elites have been known to be more altruistic than rapacious. 
Cynicism and habit should not blind social rcorganiz.en to the opportunities 
inherent in altruistic circumstances such as those exemplified by the previously 
mentioned Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka. In another 
group of programs accrual of benefits to the elite is in part contingent on the 
program's effectiveness in reaching the poor members of the community. San-
itation and immunization programs arc typical examples. Only slightly differ-
ent arc programs such as family planning, in which little is to be gained by the 
elite in denying or controlling access to an organization's benefits. 
Consumption-related benefits arc generally more likely than arc production-
oriented ones to be willingly shared by elites. Nonetheless, when productive 
benefits arc characterized by substantial externalities, the elite may not be able 
to limit use by the poor whether they want to or not. The road-building pro-
grams wc remarked on earlier provide one example of how production-related 
benefits with high externalities can be successfully pursued by organizations 
including both elite and poor segments of a rural community. 
Obviously, only a small proportion of the benefits desired by both poor and 
elite will be shared due to altruism, common interest, or externalities. But the 
few benefits which arc conducive to such willing sharing constitute an invalua-
ble resource for social reorganizers trying to design programs which will reach 
the poor in an elite-ridden world. 
Zero-sum contests. If some program benefits arc willingly shared by 
the elite and the poor, others arc essentially the prizes of a contest in which 
winners take from losers. Land, water, and local political power arc only the 
most obvious benefits which may be at stake in such "zero-sum" situations. 
Conditions precipitating hcad~n battles between the poor and the elite over 
these benefits arc not nearly so ubiquitous as some writers suggest. They arc 
nonetheless latent and significant in many rural-development situations. And 
the chances of the poor emerging as victors in such battles arc virtually nil. We 
therefore cannot overemphasize the desirability of discovering policies and 
organizational designs which mitigate the need for fighting them at all. One 
reason why wc have emphasized our preference for unimodal production pro-
grams is the organizational difficulty of securing benefits for the poor within 
the structure of directly conflicting interests so often encountered in bimodally 
Structured societies. 
Frequently, however, bimodal or other conflict-laden social structures will 
be the reality with which the social organizer must work. In some such cases it 
may be feasible to design an organization that provides alternative benefits 
more attractive for the elite, thus moving them out of competition with the 
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providing nonagricultural sources of income and status for the most well-to-
do and progressive members of rural communities, thus mitigating the contest 
for scarce land and related assets. Realistically speaking, however, in most 
cases of direct conflict between the poor and the elite, there arc few direct and 
effective cures to be had through mere tactical modifications of existing organ-
izational structures. The tricks we have suggested may be worth a try, but it 
would be naive to pretend that revolutionary change or strong and sustained 
intervention from outside will not usually be required before the poor have 
much hope of bettering their condition. 
Getting a fairer share. Between the extremes of willingly shared bene-
fits and zero-sum conflict, there exists a large, fertile, and relatively unexplored 
ground for innovative organizational designs which help the poor to obtain 
some share, if not always a fair share, of development's benefits. Herc we arc 
concerned with the variety of programs that arc capable of providing more 
benefits for everyone. The question is not whether the poor will receive any 
share of these benefits but rather how close they can come to receiving a fair 
share. How can specific techniques of organization be used to increase the 
magnitude of the benefits which the poor actually receive? Of the basic organi-
zational techniques which we discussed in the first section of this chapter,· 
bargaining is unlikely to play a dominant role in such designs: neither the size 
constraint nor the implicit requirement of negotiation among equals is likely to 
be met. Polyarchical techniques, in contrast, have often been applied to such 
situations. They have not met with outstanding success. In fact, experience 
suggests that it will usually be most useful to the poor if reorganization pro-
grams designed to effect immediate improvements in their well-being are kept 
entirely separate from local organizational structures dealing in political pow-
er. This is neither defeatism nor a contradiction in terms. First of all, political 
forms of organization are particularly ill-suited to attaining benefits for the 
rural poor. A principal goal of elective and even single-party political organi-
zations is to achieve as large a membership as possible. Typically, this is done 
by providing (or at least promising) something for everyone. Indeed, the very 
legitimacy of the political organization often rests on its commitment to open 
membership and its pledge to pursue the interests of all its members. As we 
argued earlier, however, this sort of open-membership, multiple-function de-
sign almost guarantees a dangerous amount of conflict over organizational 
goals. Moreover, where local political organizations have survived at all in the 
developing world, they have done so largely in terms of traditional patronage/ 
dependency linkages functioning to enhance the status of the local elite. New 
social functions, when ·added to such organizations, are likely either to threat-
en the status of the elite or to be taken over by them. In either case, the poor 
will fail to benefit. Lele ( 1974, p. 74) describes such a situation in the context of 
East African agricultural development. Pyle (1979, p. 17) provide3 a similar 
story from his work on Indian health programs. In the latter case, the popular 
village health workers were explicitly instructed to avoid any political involve-
ment because this might alienate an otherwise cooperative or indifferent elite. 
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Exchange techniques, especially when embodied in a well-developed com-
mercial structure which is relatively immune to the pressures oflocal elites, are 
often more effective than political organizations in promoting fairer shares for 
the poor. We noted in chapter 3, for example, that small farmers arc more 
likely to have access to credit and inputs if these benefits are provided at com-
petitive, market-clearing prices. When artificially low prices c:rcate an excess 
demand and ncc:essitate relianc:c on bureaucratic or political rationing. the 
local elites generally can be expected to capture a greater share of the benefits. 
How great that share will be may be influenced by auditing and other regu-
latory controls imposed through specific (and usually hierarchic:al) techniques 
of organization. In cases like that of the Indian dairy cooperatives, this control 
derives in part from a heavy relianc:c on publicly visible techniques of ex-
change: justic:c is seen to be done. Elsewhere, periodic: elect.ions may conc:civ-
ably keep elites accountable for their excesses. In general, however, the need is 
for what Dore ( 1971) has called '"institutionalized suspicion": a formal, proba-
bly hierarchical auditing system visibly insulated from the traditional kin and 
patronage obligations of the local community. Suc:h auditing systems cannot, 
of course, guarantee equitable distribution of bencfjts among poor and elite 
participants. To be even reasonably effective they require a truly extraordinary 
commitment of senior officials in supporting organizations. Nonetheless. it 
remains one of the truisms of development that in organizations of the sort we 
describe here, a failure to provide and to diligently pursue such institutional-
ized suspicion virtually guarantees that the poor will suffer. 
Pros~cts for progrtss. What can the poor realistically expect to gain 
from the various tc<:hnical reorganizations we have discussed here? Not every-
thing they need, not a fair share of benefits, and quite possibly nothing but 
increased exploitation. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the poor 
can and have extracted substantial improvements in their well-being from 
organizations that include members of the elite. 
By joining with the elite in local organizations such as those we have de-
scribed here, p<>Or people gain leadership talents and initiative which they 
would be less likely to find within their own ranks. They also gain the tangible 
benefits of effective organizations. Furthermore, the opportunity for some 
small amount of mutually beneficial interaction between diff crent strata of 
society is also an opportunity for initiating more ambitious organization-
building programs. 
The potential for coincident interests of poor and elite, and for beneficial 
interaction between them, seems to require that elite and poor members of the 
community both have aettSs to the resources or assets on which the functions 
of the organization arc based. This condition of common access has been 
identified as one of the key factors underlying the success of single-industry, 
vertically integrated organizations such as the Indian National Dairy Devel-
opment Board, described earlier. A similar case can be made for some of the 
more prosperous East African cooperatives described by Hyden ( 1970). More 
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bimodal approach to rural development. In contrast, failures of programs like 
the much-touted CADU Project. in Ethiopia, can be ascribed in large part to 
the mistake of trying to join landed elites and landless tenants together under 
an organizational design which can actually benefit only those with access to 
land .... The operative word is ac~u. As we noted in chapter 3, the patterns o( 
agricultural development in Japan and Taiwan were unimodal long before the 
post-World War II land reforms. But because landlords rented out their land 
in small operational uniu, tenants had access to land; owners and tenants had 
a shared interest in yield-increasing innovations even though a large fraction of 
the incremental output accrued to the landlord. It is therefore not surprising 
that the prewar agricultural associations in both countries functioned reason-
ably well even though typically they were dominated by elite landlords. 
Even when the poor have access to the basic resources required for partici-
pation in the benefiu of an organization, even when a credible auditing system 
exists, it remains true that the elite will more than li1cely sequester the greater 
share of an organization's benefits for themselves. 11tis is regrettable, unjwt, 
and inevitable. We believe, however, that it will be in poor people's best inter-
est to accept even substantial disparities in benefits. In order to get on with the 
urgent job of securing absolute improvements, even substantial disparities in 
benefits should not, in general. disqualify development programs which can 
secure absolute improvements in the well-being of the rural poor. One impor-
tant exception to this general recommendation has been pointed out to us by 
David Leonard. This exception applies under conditions where allowing a 
disproportionate share of benefits to accrue to the elite will increase their abili-
ty to exploit the poor in the future. It may be particularly relevant to programs 
dealing with agricultural and other productive enterprises. In such cases an 
incrcasc in the relative productivity of the elite could, unless otherwise con-
trolled., bring them into a position where they were increasingly able to pur-
chase the productive assets of the poor. If at all possible, social reorganizers 
should avoid designs with this sort of potential. 
In summary. We have argued that programs to reorganize the rural 
poor must be based upon intimate knowledge oflocal conditions obtained by 
firsthand, village-level assessments. Such assessments should seek to discover 
what benefits of organization arc desired by the poor, what sorts of potential 
conflict exist in the community, and what techniques and experience relevant 
to organiz.ation arc available. Knowledge of these facton as they pertain at a 
particular place and time should help substantially in identifying those initial 
interventions most li1cely to lead to a sequence of reorganization programs 
which actually benefit the poor. Other things being equal. it would sccm best to 
start with an intensely desired benefit which can be shared with (or is not 
desired by) the elite, a combination of membership criteria and organizational 
functions which assures a reasonable harmony of objectives among partici-
" Tbe CAD U (Oillalo Airicultural Development Unit) Project, its octensible 1oak. and 
itl aaual im i:-c:t an: di9cussed in Cobtn and Uphoff ( 1977). 
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pants, and a commitment to extremely simple techniques of calculation and 
control The evidence we have reviewed suggests that more difficuh or com-
plex organiL:ltions should be undertaken very cautiously-if at all-in the 
early stages of the reorganization effort. In particular, it seems unwise to pres-
sure small informal groups to include more rncmben or more functions, at 
least until they have evolved a substantial amount of confidence and expe-
rience. Even then, designers should always ask what interest of IM poor will be 
served by expanding a small organization and thereby incurring the risks of 
overextension and overexposure. 
Our analysis also suggests that soci.al-scrvice and productive programs 
should be separately pursued in the early stages of an organization's growth. 
The risks and liabilities of organizing productive functions are so different 
from, and generally so much greater than, those of organizing service activi-
ties, that combinations will succeed only rarely. It is much more likely that 
organimtionally feasible social-service programs will become the pawns and 
victims of a much rougher contest over control of productive activities. 
Finally, every effort should be made to separate all other organizational 
activities from those which unavoidably involve a conflict of interest between 
poor and elite. Such halting progress as can be made in social rcorganiL:ltion 
may even require a willingness to set aside irresolvable equity issues in order to 
get on with the many beneficial activities which can be pursued within the 
existing social context. Trite but true: the poor do not benefit when social 
reformers let an ideological or personal predilection for the best stand in the 
way of the good. 
In chapters 3 and 4 we considered some of the development initia · which 
a national or regional government might wish to pursue. So f · chapter S we 
have considered prospects for reorganizing the rural o better recognize 
and exploit their own opportunities for develop me . ere remains the prob-
lem of linking the two levels, of fusing nation ans and unique local oppor-
tunities into effective programs o/elopment. 
The Neetb for Facilit4#'6n 
The missing links~· · f ramcwork of development organization arc the 
"facilitator" people: administrators and field staff, managers and entrepre-
neurs who arc n · er villagers nor policymakers but nonetheless serve an 
essential orga · · tional function by facilitating reciprocally helpful interac-
tions bctw n those two groups. 
An ttempt to redesign t_tJduA~ions aed~organi 
za · ns m on an appreciation of their inherently schizoid nature. 
~ .......... tor organizations arc constantly and simultaneously called upon to 

















Fatima the Spinner and the Tent 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ONCE in a city in the Farthest West there lived a girl called Fatima. 
She was the daughter ofa prosperous spinner. One day her father 
said to her: 'Come, daughter; we are going on a journey, for I 
have business in the islands of the Middle Sea. Perhaps you may 
find some handsome youth in a good situation whom you could 
take as husband.' 
They set off and travelled from island to island, the father doing 
his trading while Fatima dreamt of the husband who might soon 
be hers. One day, however, they were on the way to Crete when a 
storm blew up, and the ship was wrecked. Fatima, only half-
conscious. was cast up on the seashore near Alexandria. Her father 
was dead, and she was utterly destitute. 
She could only remember dimly her life until then, for her ex-
perience of the shipwreck. and her exposure in the sea, had utterly 
exhausted her. 
While she was wandering on the sands, a family of cloth-makers 
found her. Although they were poor, they took her into their 
humble home and taught her their craft. Thus it was that she made 
a second life for herself, and within a year or two she was happy and 
reconciled to her lot. But one day, when she was on the seashore 
for some reason, a band of slave-traders landed and carried her, 
along with other captives. away with them. 
Although she bitterly lamented her lot. Fatima found no sym-
pathy from the slavers, who took her to Istanbul and sold her as 
a slave. 
Her world had collapsed for the second time. Now It chanced 
that there were few buyers at the market. One of them was a man 
who was looking for slaves to work In his woodyard, where hr-
made masts for ships. When he saw the dejection of the unfor-
tunate Fatima. he decided to buy her, thinking that In this way, at 
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least, he might be able to give her a slightly better life than if' she 
were bought by someone else. 
He took Fatima to his home, intending to make her a serving-
maid for his wife. When he arrived at the house, however, he 
found that he had lost all his money in a cargo which had been 
captured by pirates. He could not afford workers, so he, Fatima and 
his wife were left alone to work at the heavy labour of making masts. 
Fatima, grateful to her employer for rescuing her, worked so 
hard and so well that he gave her her freedom, and she became 
his trusted helper. Thus it was that she became comparatively 
happy in her third career. 
One day he said to her: 'Fatima, I want you to go with a cargo 
of ships' masts to Java, as my agent, and be sure that you sell them 
at a profit.' 
She set off. but when the ship was off the coast of Chinaa typhoon 
wrecked it, and Fatima found herself again cast up on the seashore 
of a strange land. Once again she wept bitterly, for she felt that 
nothing in her life was working in accordance with expectation. 
Whenever things seemed to be going well, something came and 
destroyed all her hopes. 
'Why is it', she cried out, for the third time, 'that whenever I try 
to do something it comes to grief? Why should so many unfortu-
nate things happen to me?' But there was no answer. So she picked 
herself up from the sand, and started to walk inland. 
Now it so happened that nobody in China had heard of Fatima, 
or knew anything about her troubles. But there was a legend that a 
certain stranger, a woman, would one day arrive there, and that 
she would be able to make a tent for the Emperor. And, since there 
was as yet nobody in China who could make tents, everyone 
looked upon the fulfilment of this prediction with the liveliest 
anticipation. 
In order to make sure that this stranger, when she arrived, would 
not be missed, successive Emperors of Chiita had followed the 
custom of sending heralds, once a year, to all the towns and vil-
lages of the land, asking for any foreign woman to be produced 
at Court. 
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TALES OF THE DERVISHES 
When Fatima stumbled into a town by the Chinese seashore, it 
was one such occasion. The people spoke to her through an inter-
preter, and explained that she would have to go to see the 
Emperor. 
'lady,' said the Emperor, when Fatima was brought before him, 
'an you make a tent?' 
1 think so,' said Fatima. 
She asked for rope, but there was none to be had. So, remem-
bering her time as a spinner, she collected Bax and made ropes. 
Then she asked for stout cloth, but the Chinese had none of the 
kind which she needed. So, drawing on her experience with the 
"Wea\'Cl'S of Alexandria, she made some stout tentcloth. Then she 
found that she needed tent-poles, but there were none in China. 
So Fatima. remembering how she had been trained by the wood-
fashioner of Istanbul, cunningly made stout tent-poles. When these 
were ready, she racked her brains for the memory of all the tents 
she had seen in her travels: and lo, a tent was made. 
When this wonder was revealed to the Emperor of China, he 
offered Fatima the fulfilment of any wish she cared to name. She 
chose to settle in China, where she married a handsome prince, 
and where she remained in happiness, surrounded by her children, 
until the end of her days. 
h was through these adventures that Fatima realized that what 
had appeared to be an unpleasant experience at the time, turned 
out to be an essential part of the making of her ultimate happiness. 
= 
Thi! story is well known in Greek folklore, many of whose 
contemporary motifs feature dervishes and their legends. The 
version cited here is at1. ibuted to the Sheikh Mohamed Jama-
ludin of .Adrianople. He founded the Jamalia Order ('The 
Beautiful'), and died in 17.50. 
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THUE was once a good man. He had spent his whole life In culti-
vating the qualities enjoined upon those who would reach Para-
dise. He gave freely to the poor. he loved his fellow creatures and he 
served them. Remembering the need to have patience, he endured 
great and unexpected hardships, often for the sake of others. He 
made journeys in search of knowledge. His humility and exemplary 
behaviour were such that his repute as a wise man and good citizen 
resounded from the East to the West, and from the North to the 
South. 
.All these qualities he did indeed exercise-when~ he remem-
bered to do so. But he had one shortcoming, and that was heed-
lessness. This tendency was not strong In him, and he considered 
that, balanced against the other thin~ which he did practise, It 
could only be regarded as a small fault. There were some poor 
people whom he did not help, because from time to time he was 
insensitive to their needs. Love and service, too, were sometimes 
forgotten when what he thought to be personal needs. or at least 
desires, welled up in him. 
He was fond of sleep; and sometimes when he was asleep, oppor-
tunities to seek knowledge, or to understand It, or to practise real 
humility, or to add to the sum total of good behaviour-such 
opportunities passed by. and they did not return. 
Just as the good qualities left their impress upon his essential self. 
so did the characteristic of heedlessness. 
And then he died. Finding himself beyond this life, and making 
his way towards the doors of the Walled Garden, the man paused. 
to examine his conscience. And he felt that his opportunity of 
entering the High Portals was enough. 
The gates, he saw, were shut; and then a voice addressed him, 





The participants will: 
1. Solidify their understanding of managing ambiguity. 
2. Discover the factors surrounding the issue of empowerment. 
3. Begin to grasp how they can empower and disempower themselves. 
Activities 
1. Read case, "The Road to Hell" and discuss in two groups. 
(90 min) 
a) What are the barriers present in this situation? 
b) How can they be overcome or can they be overcome? 
c) Who is to blame? 
d) What other issues are at risk? 
e) Relate issues in case to readings. 
2. Break (15 min) 
3. Triads - What are the characteristics of an "empowered 
person?" (30 min) 
4. Large Group Discussion of characteristics of empowerment and 
how they can be acquired for oneself. (35 min) 
5. Handout Homework 9 - Empowering Others. (10 min) 
Materials 
1. Cup and water. 
2. Copies of case. 
3. Flip Chart and newsprint. 
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John Baker. chief engineer of the Car-
ibbean Bauxite C:olllpany of Barracania 
in the West Indies, w;1s making his final 
preparations to leave the island. His pro-
motion to product ion manager of Ke so 
Mining Corporation near Winnipeg-one 
of Continental Ore's fast-expanding Can-
adian enterprises-had been announced 
a month before, and now everything had 
been tidied up except the last vital inter-
view with his successor, the able young 
Barr:.icanian, Matthew Rennalls. It was 
vital that this interview be a success and 
that Rennalls should leave his office up-
lifted and encouraged to face the chal-
lenge of his new job. A touch on the bell 
would have brought Rennalls into the 
room, but Baker delayed the moment 
and gazed thoughtfully through the win-
dow. considering just exactlv wh:.it he was 
going to say and, more particularly, how 
he was going to say it. 
!'his case wcis prep;irnl by Mr. Gareth Evans for 
Shell-BP of Nigeria, l.i111i1cd, as a basis for class 
discussion in an executive 1raining program, and is 
used with permission 
The Road to Hell 
John Baker, an English expatriate, was 
45 vears old and had served his 23 vcars 
\\ith Continental Ore in many different 
places: in the Far East, several countries 
of Africa, Europe, and for the last two 
years, in the West Indies. He hadn't 
cared much for his previous assignment 
in Hamburg and was delighted when the 
\Vest Indian appointment came through. 
Climate was not the only attraction. 
Baker had always preferred working 
overseas in what were termed the de-
veloping countries, because he felt he 
had an innate knack-better than most 
other expatriates working for Continental 
Ore--of knowing just how to get on with 
regional staff. Twenty-four hours in Bar-· 
racania, however, had made him realize 
that he \\'ould need all this "innate 
knack" if he was to deal effectiveh with 
the problems in this field that a~vaited 
him. 
At his first interview with Hutchins, 
the production manager, the whole prob-
lem of Rennalls and his future was dis-
cussed. There and then, it was made 
quite clear to Baker rhat one of his most 
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important usks would be the grooming 
of Rennalls ::is his successor. Hutchins 
poi11ted our that not only \vas Rennalls 
one ()f the brightest Barrac::rnian pros-
pects on the staff of C;.u-ibbe~m Bauxite-
at London L'niversirv. he had taken first-
class ho11ours in th.e B.Sc. Engineering 
Degree-but, being the son of the Minis-
ter of Finance and Economic Planning, 
he ~ilso had no small political pull. 
The comp;rny had been particularly 
ple;1sed when Rennalls decided to work 
tor them rather than for the government 
in which his father had such a prominent 
post. They ascribed his action to the 
effect of their vigorous and liberal re-
gionaliLation program, which ~ince the 
Second World War. had placed 18 Bar-
racanians at midmanagement levei and 
given Caribbean Bauxite a good lead in 
this respect over all other international 
concerns operating in lhrr;icania. The 
success of this timely regionalization pol-
icy had led to excellent relation3 with the 
government. And this relationship had 
been given an added importance when 
Barracania, three vcars later. became in-
ckpendent-an occasion that encouraged 
a critical and challenging attitude toward 
the role foreign i11terests would have to 
play in tl1e new Barracania. Hutchins had 
therdore little difficulty in convincing 
Baker that the successful career develop-
111e11 t or Rennalls was of the first impor-
tance. 
The interview with Hutchins was now 
two years past, and Baker, leaning back 
in his office chair, reviewed just how suc-
cessful he had been in the "grooming" of 
Re1rnalls. What aspects of the latter's 
character had helped ;rnd wh:1t had hin-
dered? What about his own ;,,_TsciL:tlitv: 
How h~td that helped or hin;lered? Ttic 
Iii 'it item to go on the credit side would, 
without question, be 1he ~•bilitv of Ren-
nalls to master the technical aspects of his 
joh. From the start, he had shown keen-
11ess and enthusiasm and had often im-
pn:ssed Baker with his abilit\· in tackling 
ne\v ~1ssignrnents and the constructive 
comments he invariably made in depart-
mental di~cussions. He was popular with 
all ranks of Barr~1crnia11 staff and had an 
ease of manner that stood him in good 
'.itead when dealing with his expatriate 
seniors. These were all assets, but what 
about the debit side? 
First and foremost, there was his racial 
consciousness. His four vears at London 
University had accentu;;ted this feeling 
and made him sensitive to anv sign of 
condescension on the part of expatriates. 
It may have been to give expression to 
this sentiment that, as soon as he re-
turned home from London, he threw 
himself into politics on behalf of the 
United Action Partv, which was later to 
win the preindepe;1de11ce elections and 
provide the cou11try with its first prime 
minister. 
The ambitions of Rennalls-and he 
certainly was ambitious-did not, how-
ever. lie in politics, for. staunch national-
ist that he was, he saw that he could 
serve himself and his country best-for 
was not bauxite re,;ponsible , for nearly 
half the value ,)r 8;11racania's export 
trade)-by putting his engineering talent 
to the best use possible. On this account, 
Hutchins found that he hatl an unexpect-
edly easy task in persu;1di11g Rennalls to 
give up his political work before entering 
the production depart111e11t as an assist-
ant engineer. 
It was, Baker knew, Rennalls's well-
repressed sense of r;1ce consoousness 
that had prevented their relationship 
from being as dose ;is it should have 
been. On the surface, nothing could have 
seemed more agreeable. Formality be-
tween the two men w;1s at a minimum; 
Haker was dclil!;hted to find th;tt his assis-
tant shared his own pcrnliar "shagg;, 
dog" sense uf humor, ,o that jokes were 
continually b:..:ing excln11gcd; thev enter-
tained each other ar their houses and 
often played tennis togl't her-and yet the 
b~1rrier remained ill\'i,ihlc, indefinable, 
but ever present. The existence of this 
"screen" between the111 w;1s ~1 con'itant 
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source of frmtr;11i()11 to Baker .. -,inn: it 
indic:ited a wcak11css he was 1,,,1th to ac-
cept. If he h;id hccn successful with all 
other nationalities, whv not l'>ith Ren-
nalls? ' 
But :it least he li;id m;maged to break 
through to Rc111i:ills more successfully 
than any other cxp;11riate had. In fact, it 
was the young B;11TaGmian's allittJde-
sometimes ovcrhe;1ring sometimes cvni-
cal-toward otl1c r con'1 pan y ex patri'.1tes 
that had been one uf the subjects Baker 
had raised last yc;tr when he discussed 
Rennalls's st;iff report with him. He 
knew, too, that he would have to raise 
the same subject again in the forthcom-
ing interview, bcc1use Jackson, the senior 
draftsman, had complained only vester-
day about Rennalls's 'rudeness. With this 
thought in mind, Baker leaned forward 
and spoke into the intercom. "Would you 
come in, Matt, please? I'd like a word 
with you," and later, "Do sit down." He 
offered the box. "Have a cigarelle ," 
paused while he held out his lighter, and 
then went on. 
"As you know, Matt, I'll be off to Can-
ada in a few dJys' time, and before I go, 
I thought it would he useful if we could 
have a final chat together. It is indeed 
with some deference that I suggest I can 
he of help. You will shortly be sitting in 
this chair doing the job I am now doing, 
but I, on the other hand, am ten years 
older, so perhaps you can accept the idea 
that I may be able to give you the benefit 
of my longer experience." 
Baker saw Rennalls stiffen slightly in 
his chair as he made this point, so he 
added in explanation, "You and I have 
attended enough company courses to re-
member those repeated requests by the 
personnel manager to tell people how 
they are getting oil as often as the conve-
nient moment ari,es, and not just the au-
tomatic once a year when, by regulation, 
staff reports havc to be discussed." 
Rennalls nodded his agreement, so 
B:iker \\Tilt ori. "I sh~tll always remember 
the !~1st joh performance dis~ussio11 I had 
\\·ith my previous boss back in Cermany. 
He used what he called the 'plus and 
minus' technique. His firm belief was tlur 
when a senior, bv discussion, seeks to im-
prove the work ()erformance of his staff. 
his prime objective should be to make 
sure that the latter leaves the interview 
encouraged and inspired to improve. 
Any criticism must, therefore. he con-
structive and helpful. He said that one 
very good way to encourage a man-and 
I fully agree with him-is to tell him 
about his good points-the plus factors-
as well as his weak ones-the minus fac-
tors; so I thought, Matt, it would be a 
good idea to run our discussion ;1long 
these lines." · 
Rennalls offered no comment, so 
Baker continued. "Let me say, therefore. 
right away, that as far as your own work 
performance is concerned, the plus far 
outweighs the minus. I have, for in-
stance, been :nost impressed with the way 
vou have adapted yuur considerable the-
oretical knowledge to master the practical 
techniques of your jol:r--that ingenious 
method you used to get air down to the 
fifth-shaft level is a sufficient case in 
point-and at departmental meetings, I 
have invariably found your comments 
well taken and helpful. In fact, you will 
be interested to know that only last week 
I reported to Mr. Hutchins 'that, from 
the technical point of view, he could not 
wish for a more able man to succeed to 
the position of chief engineer." 
"That's very good indeed of you, 
John," cut in Rennalls with a smile of 
thanks. ":Vty only worry now is how to 
live up to such a high recommendation." 
"Of that I am quite sure," returned 
Baker, '\:specially if nrn can overcome 
the minus factor, which I would like no1,· 
to discuss with you. It is one that I have 
talked about before. so I'll come straight 
to the point. I have noticed that you ;ire 
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111()IC friendlv and get on better with 
'"ur fellow B:1rr;1c111i:.111-; tlun \·ou do 
,, i1h Europeans. [n point of fact. I h.1d a 
11J111pLti11t onlv yesterdav frum \Ir. Jack-
· . .,11. who said \OU lud bce11 rude t() 
l11111-d11d not for the firq time eithn. 
"There is, :vlatt. l dlll sure. no need 
i.ilr 111c to tell vou huw necessary it will be 
to1· ~OU to get Oll \\ell with expatriates, 
h(·cwse until the com;nnv has trained up 
,11 !licicn r men of vou r ulibcr, Eu rope ans 
.11 e bound to o~cupy senior positions 
llt're in Barracania. All this is vital lO 
\•Jur future interests. so can I help you 
lli ~1ny \vay?" 
While Baker was speaking on this 
1hemc, Rennalls had sat tensed in his 
l h;iir, and it was some seconds before he 
replied ... It is quite extraordinary, isn't it, 
how one can convey an im pressi<.HJ to 
uthers so at variance with what one in-
1c11ds; I can only assure you once again 
1!iat my disputes with Jackson-and you 
ni;1v remember also Codson-have had 
11othing at all to do with the color of 
their skins. I promise you that if a Bar-
r:1cmi;m had hehaved in an equally pe-
n·mptory manner. I would have reacted 
in precisely the same way. And again, if I 
n1;iy· say it within these four walls, l am 
-,urc I am not the only one who has 
lo1111d J;1ckson and Codson difficult. I 
rnuld mention the names of several ex-
p;11 ri:1tes who have felt the same. 
l lowcver, I am re:dlv sorrv to have cre-
:1tcd this impression ;Jf nor' being able tu 
get on with Europeans; it is an entirely 
false one, and I quite realize that I must 
do all I can to correct it as quickly as 
possible. On your last point, regarding 
Europeans holding senior positions in the 
romp;my for some time to come, I quite 
;wccpt the situation. I !c.1ww that Car:li-
i>ean l~auxite-as thn i1:1ve been doing 
for 111;inv years nu\\'-\\'ill pr0111ote Bar-
r: 1c;i11 i:1 ns as soon ,\:; their experience 
11.1rr;111L'i i1. .\11d. finallv, I would like to 
assure you, .J1Jh11-an<t' my Lither think> 
thz'. ,;rn1c. too-·-th:1t. I am very happy in 
my work here and h!1pe t!J sL1y with the 
cump:rnv for many yl':trs to come." 
Rcnrulb li:1d spokc11 earnestly, and, al-
thow.;h not con vincl'd !iv wh:!l he h:1d 
hor;l, B:1kn did 1101 1hi11.k he could pur-
sue the m~1lter further except to say, "All 
right, \fatt, mv impression muv be wrong, 
but I would like to remind you about the 
truth of that old s;1yi11g, "\.Vhat is impor-
tanr is not what is true but what is be-
lie\'ed.' Let it rest at that." 
But suddenlv B:iker knew that he 
didn't want to "let it rest at that." He was 
disappointed once again at not being able 
to break through to Re1rnalls and having 
yet again to listen to his bland denial that 
there was any raci:d prejudice in his 
makeup. Baker, who had intended end-
ing the i11terview al this point, decided to 
try another tack. 
"To return for a 111ument to the 'plus 
and minus technique' I was telling you 
about just now, there is another plus fac-
tor I forgot to tnention. I would like to 
congratulate \<JU not only on the caliber 
of vour work hut also 011 the ability you 
have shown i1: OVL'l'to111ing a challenge 
that I, as a Eurnpe;111. have never had to 
meet. 
"Continental Ore is, as you know, a 
typicd commcrci;d enterprise-admit-
tedly a big one-which is a product of 
the economic and sm:i:tl environment of 
the Unitcu States ;ind Western Europe. 
My ;mcestors have ;di been brought up in 
this en\'ironrnent t'or the past two or 
three hundred ye:1rs, a11d I have, there-
fore. been able to live in a world in which 
commerce as we k1101' it today has been 
part and p;1rcel of 111y being. It has not 
been solllcthing rev!llutionary and new 
th<tt has suddenh entered my life. In 
vour case, the si:.u;1tirn1 is cliff~renl, be-
~ausc \'!lll and your forebears ha\'c had 
only s:'ime fifty ;H ~i:-:ty vears' experience 
of this commerci;d l'J1\·ironrnent. You 
ha\'e had to Lice till' ch;dle11gc of hridg-
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ing the g:ip lic111('('ll tiftv ;ind t110 or 
thrct: hundred yc;1r> ,\gain. '\Litt, let ine 
congr;1tuL1tt: you- .ind people like you-
once again ()ll !u1·ing .,() sue< essf1:lh· 
m·ercomc this p;111in1L1r hurdle. lt is fur 
this verv rcaso11 !11;11 I think the outlook 
for Bar'.raca11i;1--;111d particularly Lmb-
bean Bauxitc-i-; -.o bright." 
Rennails li:1d li-;tcncd i11te11tlv ;111d 
when B:1ke1 fini'>fwd. rq:!ied, "Wci'I. once 
ag;1in. John. l li;1·:l· lo th:mk you for what 
you have s;1id, :u1d for mv nart, I can 
only say that it i-; gr;1tifying' t(; know that 
my own personal effort has been so 
much appreciated. I hope that more peo-
ple will soon co111<· to thi11k as you do." 
There was a pause, and for a moment, 
Baker thought hopefully th;,it he was 
about to achicvt: his lonL; awaited "bre;1k-
through," but R<·11na!i~· merelv smiled 
back. The barrier remained unhrcachcd. 
There remained \umc f]\·e minutes 
cheerful co11ver\;11 ion about the contras! 
between the C11ililwan and C;rn:idian cli-
mate and whc1hcr the West Indies had 
any hope of be 1ti11g England in the fifth 
Test, before Baker drew the interview to 
a close. Although he was as far as ever 
from knowing the real Rennalls. he was 
nevertheless glad that the interview had 
run along in this friendly nnnner and, 
particularly. that it had erided on such a 
cheerful note. 
This feeling, ho1,·ever, lasted only until 
the following morning. Baker had some 
farewells to m;1kc, so he arrived at the 
office considerdlily later than usual. He 
h;id no sooner 'ial down at his desk than 
his secretarv walked into the room with a 
worried fr~wn 011 her Lice. Her words 
came fast. "When I arri1·ed this morninr.; 
I found Mr. Rcnr1~dls :d,·nch 1;;iiti11g z;t 
my door. He seemed \en ;m,~ry and ~old 
me in quite a peremptory rr1anner that 
he had a vital kt1cr 'O diudte \1·hich must 
he sent off with<i1l! ;mv debv. He was so 
worked up that he rnu,ldn't keep still ;tnd 
kept pacing ,dJ(1lJI the rcurn. which is 
most unlike him. l 1e \l'<rnldn't e\·en >•:;;it 
10 rc;1d \<.hat he h:id dict:1tcd . .Jtht o,igncd 
the p.ige 11here he ili(lught the k11e1 
\\uuld l'llCL It has been distributed. :111r! 
\l!llr copy is in your "in-tray.·· 
Ptu.zlcd and feeling 1 aguely u ncasy, 
lbkcr opened the "Confidential" en-
velope :md read the follcming letter: 
Fruil/: \ssi.;rant F.n.~inccr 
To: I he Chid Engtneer. C1ribhean lbt1x-
i1c l.irni1cd 
l·lth August 
.l.)SFSS.\fF,\'T OF f.\'TFHVIEW 
!IFFWl:F.X JIFSSHS. 8.·11\J:'H :1.\'D 
HF\',VllL5 
It has ;ilwavs been rnv practice to respccl 
the advice gin:n me !iv seniors, so ;1fter our 
i111crvieh·, I decided 10 give careful thought 
ortcc ag;1i11 to its main points and so make 
sure 1hat I had undcrslood all that had 
!wen said. :\s I promised roti at the time, I 
had every intention of putting your ;idvicc 
to the best effect. 
It was ''''' · therefore, until I had sat 
down quic::, in 111y holllt' yoterd<iy eve-
ning to co;;,ider the irnenicw objccti1TI~· 
th:ll its rn",.' purport became clear. 011lr 
1hcn did tlw lull enormity of what vou had 
said cL1wn , 111 me. The' more I 'thought 
:1hou1 it, rhe more convinced I was that I 
kid hit upon the real truth-and the more 
furious I bec1me. With a facilit)' in the 
English la11guage which I-a poor !3arrJG1-
11ia11-cannot hope to match, you had the 
audacit\' to insult me (and through me, 
even· Barracrnian lff>rth his salt) hv claim-
ing t'hat our kno\,·kdge of modern living 'is 
only a paltry fifty 1cars old whilst :ours 
goes back 200-300 yc;1rs .. \s if 1our rnale-
;-i;tlistic curnrncrcial e111·ironment' could pos-
sibl1· be cornp;ncd with the spiritual v:ilues 
of 11ur culture. I'll h:1ve '"u know that if 
!llllt h of wh.1t I saw in Lu11do11 is rcprcsen-
1_;1\iYe of \'O\lr il11lst ho;is1ed culture. I hupc 
fen·enth.' that it \\ill nel'er ClllllC to B:1r-
t·;1c111i:1.. 81 what ri'!:hi do 1·ou h;l\·c the 
cffro11lery 't" cundcs« end to us: . .\t he;irt. 
all you Europeans think us barbarians. or. 
;is :.-ou say· amo11gst : uurseh·cs. "·c are "jw;t 
down Crom the trees." 
Far into the night I discu.s.'1cd 1his rn:lllcr 
! i'.J The Road to Heil 
11i11i Ill)' f:1t!H:r, and he :, .1, di,gtblcd ,is I. 
Ile :1grces wirh me rh:lf :rny C<llnp:iny 
"lime senio1 staff think as IOU do is no 
pl.ice for am· Barracrni:rn prrn1d of !1is cul-
111rc .111d r:icc-so much fur :ill the com-
p:1111 .. (l:q>trap·· :wd 'pecious propaganda 
:1h<i111. region:1lization :ind Barracania for 
1 lic Barracanians. 
I feel aslurncd :111<1 l>clr:11cd. Please :ic-
cept this letter as Ill) rc.,igr;a1io11, which I 
;vish In liccome dln 111<· i111rnedi:1tely. 
cc P!"(Jd uctioll \Lui:1gc1 
\Ltn:1ging Dircrlor 
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Empowering Rural Communities 
Felipe B. Alfonso 
~ Development programs were criticized in the sixties and seventies for 
concentrating on increasing production but ignoring issues of equity. While 
they yielded dramatic short-term benefits, these appeared of dubious sus-
tainability. They transferred technologies and assistance resources to the 
poor, but made the poor more and more dependent on central bureau-
cracies for the satisfaction of their needs. These development programs 
have been labeled as production-centered. 
The growing disenchantment with production-centered strategies has 
gradually led to greater emphasis on "growth with equity" and on more 
people-centered processes. The underlying assumption behind this new 
thrust can be summerized by the ancient saying: "Give people fish, and 
they can eat that day. Teach people to fish, and they can eat for the rest 
of their lives." Advocates of this new strategy argue that development has 
to be self-sustaining and must necessarily be seen as a capacity-building 
process. 1 
Experience with the people-centered processes in development over 
the past decade has made it clear that bureaucracies must use new 
methods of intervention which allow client communities to build up their 
capacity to take care of themselves and to manage their resources. 2 The 
new strategy also requires that rural communities be mobilized to enable 
them to participate more meaningfully in their own development. 
This paper summarizes some of the major insights that the Rural 
Development Management Program (ROMP) group at the Asian Institute 
of Management (AIM) has learned about community mobilization. The 
concepts laid out in this paper, particularly on the objectives and the 
methods of mobilization, are based on a number of case studies and on 
actual involvement with development programs where mobilization of the 
communitv w;is a rn~ir~r cof'"'r"~nent. 
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The first part provides a summary of three case studies dealing with 
the mobilization of three rural communities undertaken by non-
governrnent organizations (NGO) in the Philippines. The second part iden-
tifies some general patterns emerging from the case studies. 
THREE CASE STUDIES 
Failures far outnumber the successes in attempts at mobilizing rural 
communities. The following case studies document relatively sucessful 
attempts at community mobilization. They also offer some interesting con-
trasts in the methods used to organize the target communities. 
Kagawasan3 
Sometime in lo/.74, three villages in the town of Kagawasan were 
threatened with eviction from the land they had farmed for five decades. 
The town mayor had informed them that the land would be used for a 
Boy Scout Jamboree site and the development of a watershed for the town's 
water system. Feeling that this was just a ploy by parties who wanted to 
acquire the land they were cultivating, the residents sought the help of 
the Roman Catholic priests in the town. The priests invited community 
organizers to come and help the residents of these three villages. 
After a series of meetings with the organizers, a group of residents 
decided to go to the provincial capital to obtain information on the status 
of their land. For many, it was the first time they had set foot in a govern-
ment office. They discovered that their land was classified as forest land 
and that only a presidential decree could change its classification. Short-
ly thereafter, 300 residents confronted the mayor and demanded that he 
stop harassing them with eviction threats. Susequently, the residents 
engaged in a number of activities to get their land reclassified and titled. 
Committees were formed which engaged the regional director of the 
Bureau of Forestry and other government officials in a series of confron-
tations. Although the people failed to obtain title to their land, they effec-
tively repelled efforts by the mayor and other entities to take the land from 
them. 
Many minor and major disputes arose among the people of Kagawasan 
over the four years that they worked on the land issues. One of the major 
disputes surfaced in the course of the survey of landholdings, undertaken 
as a first step in acquiring land under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of 
Forestry. Many of the traditional boundries, often consisting of bushes 
and trees, had disappeared. Rather than settling boundary problems in 
court, the people constituted a "Justice and Peace" committee, whose 
· ··sior: re n ted · ~ry 1 
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While the men focused on the land issues, the women were organiz-
ed for community activities. They obtained food from the Catholic Relief 
Services and distributed this among the schoolchildren. They formed 
health committees, underwent paramedic training, and arranged for the 
visits of the rural health doctors. They discovered that the rural health 
midwife was selling medicine that should have been dispensed free. They 
successfully demanded that she stop collecting payment and that she 
apologize to the community. The women refused the offer of higher 
authorities to transfer the midwife to another area. They feared that 
another community might not be able to prevent her from engaging in 
the same practice. 
They negotiated the tenure of a teacher critical to the area. They ob-
tained assistance from UNICEF and from the Catholic Bishop. The entire 
community put pressure on a bus company to give just compensation to 
the family of a teacher who had been killed in an accident involving one 
of the company's buses. 
_:: Organizing Process. The organizers in Kagawasan all had experience 
\..,'-l in organizing squatters in the urban areas in Manila to secure title to the 
lands they were occupying. The work in Kagawasan was their first attempt 
to organize rural groups. The original organizers were all college graduates, 
mostly from the Institute of Social Work and Community Development 
at the University of the Philippines. In the course of the organizing work 
in Kagawasan, thay trained other organizers. The majority of these trainees 
were also college graduates: 20-30% were college drop-outs. Most of them 
came from the neighboring municipalities and provinces. 
The organizing methods used in Kagawasan were based on the belief 
that the people could learn organization not by listening to lectures but 
by organizing. The basic aim was to give the people a voice and a sense 
of power so that they could interact with the rest of society on an equal 
basis. The organizers were reluctant to use economic issues as a starting 
point. Such issues, they felt, tended to be divisive and thus did not serve 
the objective of developing a sense of community and unity. 
The organizing process used in Kagawasan had a number of chara-
cteristics. First, the people were mobilized around "gut" issues, such as 
land rights. The organizers sought to move the people so they could begin 
acting on these issues. They assisted them in analyzing constraints against 
effective action and in developing strategies for reducing and elimnating 
those constraints. The first stage of the strategy was to obtain information 
as a group regarding, for instance, the status of their land. After each group 
mobilization, the organizers held reflection sessions during which the peo-
ple were asked to abstract lessons or principles from the action. The fun-
damental process used was a cycle of diagnosis and planning, mass educa-
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tion, and evaluation-reflection. Each of the mobilizations served as a lear-
ning process for the people. Through a series of mass actions, the com-
munity was expected to realize its own power. 
Second, the cycle of planning-action-reflection moved from simple to 
more complex tasks. In Kagawasan, the people started off with the sim-
ple task of gathering information before the more complex and risky task 
of confronting the mayor, the regional director of the Bureau of Lands, 
and other powerful elites, such as the owner of the bus company and, 
even, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the area. The women in the area mov-
ed from simple requests for medicine to developing an entire health system 
for the community. 
Third, the mobilization provoked a high degree of conflict and con-
frontation. The mobilizations were aimed at particular targets against 
whom the people were agitated to make demands. The demands were 
usually presented in an aggressive but legal manner. This resulted in tense 
encounters between the community representatives and the bureaucrat 
against whom the demands were being made. The director of the Bureau 
of Lands in the province, who had been avoiding a meeting with the com-
munity's delegation, one day found a group of over 100 persons headed 
for his office. When he tried to slip through the back door, he found 
another group there waiting. Though angry at this affront to his dignity, 
he eventually agreed to begin the proceedings for land reclassification. 
Finally, the organizers in Kagawasan did not limit themselves to the 
land issue. They assisted the community in pursuing other issues, such 
as health and education, which the people felt strongly about. The more 
issues there were, the greater the opportunity for mass actions and for 
the development of leaders within the community. 
The Kagawasan organizer served as a teacher-facilitator. Rather than 
classroom lectures on simulated problems, the organizers used live cases, 
where the stakes were high, and built the learning process around these 
problems. They mobilized people to plan, implement, evaluate, and reflect. 
They did not impose their views on the people, but neither were they 
passive spectators. Although they let people find their own direction, they 
initiated and led the entire process. 
Results. The people, due to legal constraints, did not acquire title to 
the land. on the other hand, they were not forced to leave their land-
holdings. When the organizers left the area at the end of four years, they 
estimated that 100 leaders had been developed within the community. 
No formal structures of organization were developed, but the people 
organized themselves into groups as issues that needed attention arose. 
The organizers did not initiate any economic activities, although subse-
quently, the people themselves started to organize consumer cooperatives 
to purchase supplies in bulk. They also got the National Grains Authority 
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to set up a buying station in the townsite so they could obtain better prices 
for their rice crops. 
Gatong4 
With a community of 183 families and a total population of 1,000, 
Gatong was the first target area in the Philippines of a United States-based 
Private \bluntary Organization, Indigenous Affairs Council (IAC). IAC 
sought to achieve the following objectives in Gatong: 
1) an increase in income and the improvement of the quality of life 
of the residents; 
2) the improvement of the health and education of the residents; and 
3) a widely-felt sense of identity and integrity among the communi-
ty residents. 
After the IAC was invited into Gatong, it conducted a five-day "con-
sult" to develop a comprehensive strategy for the community. A total of 
100 nonresident consultants were involved. Representing a wide spectrum 
of skills, experience, and expertise, they came from various locations of 
..t the Philippines and from ten other countries. From the community, 550 
-~were involved. During this period, the participants were grouped into ~ teams according to expertise and interest. Field data were gathered through 
interviews, and the data collected were later processed in workshops and 
plenary sessions. The consult had five tasks leading to five outputs. One 
day was spent on each of the following tasks: 
1) to ascertain the operating vision of the community, or its hopes and 
dreams for the future; 
2) to discern the community's underlying contradictions, which 
prevented the people from achieving their aspirations; 
3) to identify practical proposals, or the general areas to be taken up 
in order to eliminate the obstacles created by the underlying 
contradictions; 
4) to determine the tactical systems, or the concrete steps by which 
the practical proposals would be realized; 
5) to identify actuating programs, or the specific projects to allow the 
practical application of the tactical systems. 
Immediately after the consult, three general assemblies and several 
purok meetings (puroks are geographic divisions of the village) were held 
to discuss the consult's findings and recommendations and to develop 
strategies for implementing them. These area meetings were initiated and 
led by the ten full-time IAC staff. 
Following the ratification of the results of the consult, the communi-
ty proceeded to implement the projects under the leadership and guidance 
of the IAC staff. People interested in particular projects were organized 
into workino ~ur" ,..~lied ~ .. ;1'is. T~ ·--·widE ,. ctior --~ ~ coc " a-
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tion for the efforts of the various guilds, two commissions were establish-
ed, the Social Commission and the Economic Commission. The resources 
needed to implement the projects came from donations of funds and goods 
secured by the IAC from business establishments and foundations. 
During the third year of the project, the Gatong community, with the 
aid of the IAC, set up a corporate body called the Gatong Human Develop-
ment Association. While official membership was limited to village 
residents who were 16 years old and above, the organization included prac-
tically everybody in the community. The commissions were based on func-
tions or projects, while the puroks were residence-based. 
The IAC was in Gatong for a period of four years. After this period, 
the management of the development of the community was turned over 
to the community's corporate body. During the first two years, the IAC 
had ten full-time international staff in the project, mostly Americans. By 
1979, the number had risen to twenty-two, with the presence of other 
visiting foreign staff. The IAC used Gatong as a pilot and a training ground 
for other projects. By the time of the turnover, the staff had been reduced 
to an all-Filipino group of ten . 
Dwtnizing Process. The organizing process in Gatong was characterized 
by a very definite sequence of activities. It started off with the "consult;' 
which identified the different projects needed for the community's 
development. Once these were ratified by the general assembly, groups 
were assembled to implement the projects. All planning followed a pat-
tern determined by the IAC. It started with the identification of the "im-
plementaries," or the concrete steps to be taken in implementing the pro-
posals or bans. Once determined, these steps were placed on a daily, week-
1 y, monthly, or quarterly time-line or timetable. This was followed by the 
process called '1ay-outing," or the identification and assignment of peo-
ple who would execute the time-lined operational details. Finally, the time-
lined plans were posted in a conspicuous place in the community under 
the heading ''Victories:' This served not only as a guide to what was to 
be done, but, more importantly, challenged and pressured the communi-
ty or groups to actualize what it had proclaimed in public as a victory, 
even if it was merely a plan. This sequence of activities is often referred 
to in other management literature as programming. 
Second, formal training and seminars also held an important place 
in the IAC strategy. Projects that were activated required specific skills for 
which those who showed an interest were trained. Craft production and 
design skills were improved by the introduction of technical expertise. In 
order to insure the viability of projects, some guild members were taught 
bookkeeping and financial management. Even the social projects had 
educational components. Potential leaders were developed through inten-
sive seminars, and those which showed promise were further trained 
·' e IA~ ·thoc' ' y an ~ -- '- ilosc · '-
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A third characteristic of the IAC process was the direct attempt to 
change people's perceived inability to do anything about their own 
development. The IAC addressed this problem in a number of ways. At 
the start, projects that were visible, such as road-building and beautifica-
tion campaigns, were undertaken so people would feel that things were 
moving. This, in fact, motivated people to proceed with other projects. 
The IAC also integrated the use of rituals, symbols, and community sing-
ing into a lot of the community activites. For example, the week when 
they were moving a huge boulder was called the Week of the Great Rock. 
People were encouraged to write songs embodying their ideals, their 
hopes, and their vision. One original composition was their song entitl-
ed, "Gatong: Hope:' Another spoke of their roots and history. Mother's 
Day, trade fairs, a sports contest, cleanliness and beautificatiion campaigns, 
were elaborately celebrated. Gatong had a monthly raffle where the win-
ner's house received a facelift, which included minor repairs, painting, 
and a cleaning of the surroundings by the community. Different teams 
took turns doing volunteer work one day a week. During these days, they 
performed tasks, such as road repairs, that the community as a whole 
'" needed. ~ Throughout the organizing process in Gatong, the IAC played a domi-
V\ nant role. Prior to its phasing out, the ultimate decision-making rested 
on the IAC staff or on the leaders the IAC appointed. The IAC secured 
resources for the community but also excercised sole responsibility in 
allocating and accounting for these resources. The conflicts that arose 
regarding the allocation of resources were worked out by the IAC. Ultimate 
decision-making was transferred to local leaders only upon the turnover 
of the project and the total phase-out of the IAC from Gatong. 
Results. In the four years that the IAC was in Gatong, annual family 
income, based on three industries only, went up by 350%. Infant malnutri-
tion decreased from 85% to 24% and infant mortality also dropped 
significantly. The birth rate also decreased from 49 to 30, while elemen-
tary school enrollment increased from 10 to 116. A total of 19 infrastruc-
ture projects were completed. 
On the skills side, the IAC developed community skills functional for 
the implementation and management of economic projects. The formal 
and on-the-job training used heightened the people's skills to deal with 
the technical aspects of the projects chosen. The sequential steps followed 
in carrying out various activities also developed the skills required for pro-
gramming and implementing economic projects. These were further rein-
forced through the establishment of structures (commissions and guilds) 
supportive of continuing functions. All these, plus the rituals and sym-
bols integrated into their activities, resulted in a heightened sense 
of community identification and pride. 
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After the tum-over to local leaders, mismanagement and fraudulent 
practices became evident. For example, when the craft and guild manager 
failed to give the 20% contribution to the community funds out of the 
profits of the business, the others made no protest because they were afraid 
of the manager. 
San Miguel5 
Barrio San Miguel had a population of 3,000. Two hundred twenty-
four of San Miguel's 337 families derived thier income from rice farming. 
The average farm size was 2.5 hectares. Fishing, poultry, duck-raising, 
basket-weaving, swine-raising, and tricycle-driving provided other sources 
of income. Most of the farmers in the area were former Huks, members 
of a socialist/communist radical movement in the fifties. In 1967, they form-
ed themselves into the San Miguel Farmers' Association to confront a farm 
overseer. An irrigation pump, given by the government, had fallen into 
the hands of this overseer, who exacted exorbitant fees for its use and loan-
ed money at usurious interest. Nothing came out of the confrontation. 
In 1W2, after suffering from typhoons and rampaging floods, the 
leaders of the association sought the assistance of the Mother Rosa 
Memorial Foundation (MRMF). The MRMF was a foundation establish-
ed by friends and alumnae of a girls' college in Manila, run by a religious 
group. At the time, the MRMF was running a technical school in the town 
where San Miguel was located. 
The MRMF immediately took several steps to assist the community. 
It made arrangements so the farmers could get access to credit through 
a neighboring rural bank. A prominent businessman, who was a board 
member of MRMF, negotiated the purchase of the irrigation pump from 
the over5eer. He advanced the money for the purchase. The rural bank 
advanced the expenses for the rehabilitation and operation of the pump. 
The association operated the pump and charged fees among its members 
to defray expenses and to amortize the pump. The fees were, however, 
lower than those charged by the overseer. In 1975, the pump was replac-
ed by a larger one, secured from the National Irrigation Administration 
with the assistance of the MRMF. 
After the initial assistance given to San Miguel, the MRMF felt that 
it would be necessary to put together a more comprehensive development 
program, not only for San Miguel, but for all the fourteen villages in the 
town. Hence, it launched an integrated development program with six 
major concerns: community education, rice production and irrigation 
management, agribusiness development, health and nutrition, research 
and monitoring, and Christian formation. 
In 1<J76, another flash flood hit Luzon, leaving behind submerged rice 
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fields and damaged crops. Since the farmers of San Miguel anticipated 
that they would be unable to pay their Joans, they were certain that they 
would not be able to obtain additional loans from the rural bank for the 
subsequent cropping season. Accordingly, they again sought the assistance 
of the MRMF, which then approached some friends in the Philippine 
Business for Social Progress (PBSP). E.5tablished by the Philippine business 
community, the PBSP lent out funds for rural development. For four suc-
cessive years, the San Miguel Farmers' Association obtained production 
loans from PBSP. 
One of the conditions imposed by PBSP was the development by the 
MRMF of a community education program for San Miguel. The MRMF 
hired and fielded community organizers to organize the educational ac-
tivities before, during, and after the rice production cycle. Team-building 
sessions were conducted, as well as sessions on various topics like leader-
ship, financial management, water management, and rice production. A 
number of non-formal education activities were also undertaken. 
In 1979, the MRMF pulled out its community organizers and left 
behind a core of trained leaders and community organization volunteers 
who took on the task of further development in the area. 
~ Organizing Process. The organizing methods used in San Miguel con-
tained features noted in both I<agawasan and Gatong. MRMF focused on 
both long-term and short-term concerns. The short-term concerns were 
undertaken in the context of a framework for the comprehensive develop-
ment of the community. Its methods included non-formal, action-oriented 
processes, as well as formal training programs. The organizing strategy 
of MRMF had two major objectives. The first was the organization of viable, 
indigenous groups with attitudes and skills for planning, implementing, 
and evaluating socio-e:onomic activities. The second was the development 
of trained leaders with the capabilities for management and leadership 
responsibility on a self-reliant and sustained basis. Although MRMF had 
been helping San Miguel since 1972, it was not until 1976 that this focus-
ed strategy was evolved and implemeted. 
MRMF belived that there were six requirements for the development 
of viable and self-sustained communities: 
1) developing group building and basic communication skills to 
develop cohesive group identity; 
2) developing organizational objectives and structures; 
3) developing leadership; 
4) developing project development and management skills while pro-
jects were being implemented; 
5) developing group linkages, and the building of a council compos-
ed of different groups and organizations: and 
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6) developing volunteerism so that organizations produced their own 
indigenous para-professional workers, and the role of the com-
munity organizer became that of a consultant. 
At the start, a survey was used to determine the tasks the community 
had to address. The community organizers then proceeded to help the 
community develop the other skills it needed. The methods used included 
formal seminars covering a variety of subjects, focused mainly on technical 
and economic management skills. The attendance in most cases was 
limited to a few people. Apart from the formal training sessions, the com-
munity undertook a number of group activities on its own. Although it 
acted as broker for the community to gain access to resources, MRMF left 
it to the association to manage and administer these. For example, the 
production loans secured from PBSP were released to the association. The 
Finance Committee released the needed funds in staggered amounts to 
group leaders, who, in tum, distributed the money to their members. The 
farmers were also left very much to themselves to work out their conflicts. 
They disciplined erring members, ran sessions to reflect on their ex-
periences, and assessed the performance of their leaders. They even 
developed performance criteria for their leaders. When a member failed 
to pay his loan to the association, the association's board authorized 
the group to which he belonged to take over the management of his 
farm. 
Although the erring farmer continued to work on his farm, decisions 
on when to undertake farming activities, such as planting and harvesting, 
were made by the group. The association also decided how to dispose 
of the farmer's harvest. 
To insure continuity, MRMF assisted San Miguel in developing a struc-
ture for their association in 1976. The general assembly elected the officers 
who constituted the executive board. The chairman headed the executive 
board, while the rest of the officers headed the different committees. Com-
mittee members, ranging from three to five in number, were appointed 
by the committee chairman and approved by the board. The damayans, 
the smallest unit of the organization, consisted of five to six farmers till-
ing contiguous farms. These were established to ensure maximum par-
ticipation from members and to inculcate in the farmers the importance 
of collective undertaking and mutual assistance. A damayan leader was 
elected by the members. 
Aside from establishing a structure within San Miguel, the MRMF 
also federated it with other neighboring communities that were receiving 
help from the MRMF. \blunteer workers from within the community were 
also trained to take over many of the functions performed by the MRMF. 
When the MRMF pulled out its community workers in 1979, it left behind 
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Results. Average rice yield per hectare increased form 80-90 cavans to 
120-130 cavans. 6 Repayment of production loans from 1976 to 1981 was 
100%, except for the year 1979-80, when it was 75%. In the same period, 
the association generated savings of PlD,971.80. These came out of forc-
ed savings, patronage rebates from fertilizer and chemical purchases, and 
from commission fees charged to owners of threshing machines operating 
within the area. From these savings, the association bought a truck for 
hauling and a piece of land, where they planned to put up a warehouse 
and a rice mill. 
These gains invited the attention of "outsiders:' At times, the com-
munity succumbed to external threats. For example, the association ac-
ceded, because of fear, to a Barangay (Village) captain's demand for one-
third of the commission fee paid to the community funds by the thresher 
owners operating within San Miguel. 
\' CAPACITIES OF A SELF-RELIANT COMMUNITY 
-....) 
--" In none of the three communities did the NGO involved intend to 
stay permanently. Although they differed in their specific objectives and 
methods, each of them was mobilizing its target community to become 
self-reliant and self-sustaining. Self-reliance implies the freedom and the 
ability of a community to carry out activities needed for its growth and 
development. Mobilization can be viewed as a process for develping these 
skills and capacities. It will, therefore, be instructive to review the cases 
and see if the required skills for self-reliance were developed. 
As shown in Table l, the organizing effort in each of the cases cited 
had different specific objectives. In Kagawasan, the focus was to develop 
the community so it could demand its rights and defend them from en-
croachment by outsiders. By using mass mobilizations and an iterative 
cycle of planning-action-reflection, the organizers helped the community 
to develop a capacity for group decision-making and action. To implement 
its plans, the community had to mobilize the resources it needed. The 
interaction with external bodies, such as the government, provided am-
ple opportunities to develop negotiating skills. A felt sense of unity, rein-
forced by the ability of the members to manage their internal relations 
and conflicts, enhanced the ability of the community to act as a body. 
The organizing objectives in Gatong were quite different. Priority was 
placed on improving the economic well-being of the community and on 
improving the health and education of its members. In order to attain these 
objectives, the IAC relied heavily on project management. The organizers 
initiated numerous economic projects, both to generate income and to give 
the members of the community the opportunity to use these programm-
ing concepts in actual situations. To insure some continuity in the manage-
ment of these projects, they developed a formal organiz-
tional structure for the community. 
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TABLE 1 
Objectives Processes/ Methods Structures 
San Migud 
Integrated Team-building rormal association 
development of sessions with officers 
community rormal training & committees 
covering: Action reflection Damayans, 5-6 
agri-business 
Organization of farmers with con-
rice production 
groups with plan- tiguous farms 
irrigation 
ning and im- (self-managed & 
health & nutrilil'·' 
plementing skills mutual liability 
for ~onomic 
research & projects groups) 
monitoring Training of leaders 
Christian formation Articulated stages 
Education & train· for development 
ing of the of community 
community 
Kagawasan 
Obtain what is Planning· Ad-hoc depending 
due them and Action-Refl echon on needs e.g. 
protect their rights Mass committees. 
Give people a mobilizations Once function is 
voice and a sense rormation of fulfilled, commit· 
of power committees tee is disbanded 
To withstand ex-
temal pressures 
To give people a 
"voice" to de-
mand their rights 
To give people 
power to protect 




To increase in- rormal training rormal communi-
come and quality and seminars ty structure based 
of life On the job on functions and 
Improve health application residence 
and education Use of symbols 
To develop a rormation of 
sense of identity commissions 
and integrity as a Training of leaders 
community 
71 
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Organizers 
- Enablers Increased rice 
- Facilitators yields 
- Trainers Repayment of 
- Negotiators loans 
Savings 
S~: 
Ability to manage 
economic 
activities 
Ability to make 
decisions 
Ability to generate 
and manage 
resources 






- Enablers Protect right to 








Ability to make 
group decisions 
Ability to manage 
conflicts 
Ability to 
negotiate with ex· 
temal bodies 
Ability to mobilize 
resources 
Decision- Increased income 
makers Improved health 
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The San Miguel case showed features of the other two cases. While 
the organizers helped the community to improve its economic well-being, 
they also paid attention to enabling its members to manage their internal 
relations. furmal training sessions and "on the job" applications were used 
to impart technical and economic management skills for income-generating 
activities. In addition, team building and reflection sessions were employed 
to enable the members to make group decisions, manage conflict, and 
discipline themselves and their leaders. 
A review of the three cases shows that the organizers assisted each 
community to develop at least some of the skills needed for the primary 
objectives of the mobilization efforts. However, the results tend to show 
that each set of skills, though necessary, was not sufficient to enable a 
community to become self-reliant over a long period of time. A community 
which could combine all of the skills developed in each of the three com-
munities would have a good start towards self-reliance. It would be able 
to manage its internal affairs, its economic activities, and its relations with 
their external environment. Each of these sets of skills deserves fuller 
discussion. 
~ Organizational Management Skills 
~ This group of skills refers to the capacities required to manage the 
internal organizational relationships among the individual members of 
the community. The cases show that a community needs to do two things. 
The first is to develop unity and cohesion among the members. This 
follows from the very nature of rural groups. Controlling very little in the 
way of economic resources, their major advantage is their numbers. To 
capitalize on this advantage, they need to be able to act together as a group. 
To develop and enhance this unity, they need: 
-the ability to identify and establish the collective needs, objectives, 
and priorities; 
-the ability to arrive at group decisions; 
-the ability to plan and develop structures to achieve goals with 
reasonable means; 
-the ability to resolve internal conflicts. 
The development of these skills was apparent in the cases of 
Kagawasan and San Miguel, but we see very little evidence of them in 
the case of Gatong. 
The need for these skills is borne out by other experiences. UNICEF 
has for a long time promoted and supported popular participation in the 
areas of education, health, nutrition, and water supply and sanitation in 
underprivileged rural and urban settings. From these experiences, UNICEF 
has derived guidelines for its field workers. Two of these guidelines em-
phasize the development of the skills we haw' discussed: 
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-To help poor people go through the process of identifying their 
own priority concerns, organize for action around those concerns, 
and develop solutions to pre-identified problems. 
-To train members of existing groups-formal and non-formal-in 
the skills of simple problem identification, data collection, and 
analysis leading to their own project development, based on local 
resources or a combination of their own and outside assistance. 7 
Similarily, Goldsmith identifies participation in decision-making as 
one of the differentiating factors of the more prosperous and successful 
villages in Korea's Saemaul Undong Movement. 8 
The other major task for managing the internal relationships among 
the community members is to sustain and maintain the unity and cohe-
sion that has been established. Self-reliance implies a stability of relation-
ships over a long period. External change agents who organize and 
mobilize communities will need to leave at some point. The Gatong case 
demonstrates that unless those who are left behind are able to sustain 
the relationships that have been developed with the assistance of the 
organizers, the community will not be able to grow any further. In fact, 
it will quickly retrogress, and the initial benefits obtained will rapidly 
dissipate. Insuring the ability to carry on requires: 
-the ability to provide incentives for individual involvement and to 
monitor, control, and evaluate individual and group performance; 
-the ability to develop leaders who are responsive to community 
needs; 
-the ability to hold leaders accountable and to enforce discipline 
among members; 
-the ability to develop and modify structures to institutionalize rela-
tionships among the members; 
-the capacity for problem-solving. 
The rationale for these skills is quite self-evident. No organization can 
continue to exist without the support of its members. Hence, it will have 
to sustain the continuing involvement of its members by ensuring through 
its leaders that the organization is relevant to the satisfaction of members' 
needs. Furthermore, when deviations occur, mechanisms for dealing with 
erring members and leaders should be in place. Korten's review of member-
controlled cooperatives showed that the successful ones had "internal 
structures (that) allowed members to hold leaders accountable and en-
forced member discipline." 9 Leader control is a key concern because rural 
communities, no matter how poor, are generally not homogeneous. They 
are characterized by some kind of socio-economic differentiation. This has 
usually resulted in structures where a few elites tend to dominate others 
w' re d, :ient ·hem 
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The development of structures is also essential. In order to provide 
for the stability of the community, it is necessary to provide a framework 
and a tool for managing on-going relations and functions. Such a struc-
ture was missing in Kagawasan, since the organizers did not mobilize for 
a continuing function. It was a critical element in Gatong and San Miguel 
because economic activities need to be sustained over a long period. While 
structures provide some degree of stability, care must be exercised that 
they do not become permanent. As the community goes into new ven-
tures and activities, required changes in structures and processes need 
to be adopted. 
Problem-solving skills are also important. Sustained growth will de-
pend on the community's ability to cope with new situations. One of the 
insights emerging out of the development experiences of the past few 
decades is the inadequacy of the blueprint approach as a response to the 
needs of rural development. Such an approach is inflexible and is not able 
to respond to unanticipated developments and problems. Because develop-
ment is a dynamic process, one must be able to deal with unexpected out-
comes and difficulties. Social systems need to adapt to changing condi-
tions and requirements. As Dunn points out, "social system evolution is 
~ the result of a problem-solving process .. :'1° 
-lJ 
Economic Resources Management Skills 
The acquisition and management of economic resources are impor-
tant requirements for self-reliance. Communities need goods and services 
to feed their members and to sustain a rising standard of living. But the 
emphasis on the economic aspects of development should not lead to ig-
noring other sets of skills. We saw this in the case of Gatong where the 
thrust toward the attainment of economic benefits was so dominant that 
not enough attention was paid to the capacity for self-management and 
for dealing with external pressures. The same was true with the San 
Miguel case, though to a lesser extent. On the other hand, in Kagawasan 
there was a total absence of any organized effort to develop economic 
resources management skills. Although the organizers realized that these 
were needed, they preferred not t'J get involved with economic issues, 
partly because they felt that economic issues had a divisive effect, and 
partly because they did not possess the necessary skills to deal with them. 
The experiences of many development institutions and research and 
consulting organizations have amply demonstrated the necessity of 
developing economic resource management skills. Notable among these 
groups is Development Alternatives, Inc., which has been involved in 
various rural development programs funded by USAID. Summarizing their 
experiences, Honadle says: 11 
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In fact, it can be hypothesized that when dealing with non-dominant 
groups, an essential element of successful capacity-building is likely to be 
the acquisition of control over a central set of natural resources. Thus, 
capacity-building efforts, based only on providing social services or improv-
ing management practices and procedures, are unlikely to be sustainable. 
Success commonly requires a link to income-producing activity and suffi-
cient control over the disposition of that income. 
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Economic resources management skills, then, should enable the com-
munity to deal with two important issues: the acquisition and manage-
ment of resources, and the distribution of the benefits among the members 
of the community. 
Even the poorest among communities tend to have some form of in-
digenous resources. A sustained pattern of development will require a 
capacity to renew and multiply these resources. A community will have 
to balance the use of its resources to meet both its current needs and its 
needs for growth. To fulfill this function, the relevant skills are: 
-the ability to tap outside resources or support when local resources 
are insufficient to achieve targets and objectives; 
-the ability to generate economic benefits for the community; 
-the ability to sustain activities over the long term; 
-the ability to allocate resources according to set priorities; 
-the ability to maintain records and to keep track of resources. 
As seen from the San Miguel and Gatong cases, it is not enough to 
acquire resources, manage them, and generate benefits. The long-term 
viability of the community requires that it also deal with the issue of the 
distribution of these benefits. One of the constant disappointments with 
development programs is their inability to channel benefits to the poorer 
sectors of society. The differentiation that exists even in rural societies often 
results in structures that allow elites to capture the benefits from develop-
ment programs. What is needed is not equal but, rather, equitable distnbu-
tion of these benefits. This can further reinforce the cohesion built within 
the community and the continuing commitment of the members. The rele-
vant skills to fulfill this function are: 
-the ability to distribute economic benefits in a manner that is fair 
and equitable to all; 
-the ability to ensure a decent standard of living for the members 
of the community. 
Political Skills 
These skills refer to the capacity of an organization to deal with exter-
nal institutions and persons. A rural community cannot remain viable for 
long unless it is able to deal effectively with its environment. Economically, 
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the rural community usually does not have all the resources it needs to 
satisfy the needs of its members. Similarly, it needs external markets for 
the excess goods and services that it produces. Politically, many policies 
and actions of other institutions often threaten the freedom and the rights 
of communities to make decisions regarding their own development, as 
shown especially in the case of Kagawasan. The structure of society is such 
that the imbalance in resource bases of different groups has resulted in 
the emergence of local elites who have exploited the poor. Strong patterns 
of social differentiation have also resulted in structures that reinforce the 
dominance of a few powerful elites. Consequently, the poor are frequently 
inhibited from making decisions regarding their own development. 
In order to manage these relations with their respective environment, 
communities need to develop a sense of power to demand and protect 
their right to have a say in things that affect them. Due to lack of resources, 
they are often unable to influence events as individuals. What they need 
to do is to capitalize on their numbers by acting together as an organized 
unit. The establishment of an organization, however, does not in itself 
lead to the power to influence the course of events. Communities need 
to acquire skills to build coalitions with other groups with similar interests 
and to effectively negotiate with others. The set of skills needed to manage 
~ the environment includes: 
'1 
-the ability to negotiate with external groups; 
-the ability to establish external sources of power and support and 
to use these for the benefit of the community; 
-the ability to develop and build productive linkages with groups 
that share similar interests and objectives; 
-the ability to resolve conflicts with other groups, individuals or 
institutions; 
-the ability to protect community resources and gains from exter-
nal threats. 
Technical Skills 
Technical skills refer to those capacities needed in order to carry out 
certain activities, such as farming, stone-cutting, and the like. One class 
of technical skills relates to economic and other livelihood programs. These 
skills are not developed in a vacuum, but within the context of certain 
activities. In Kagawasan, the community needed reliable information on 
the applicable forestry laws and procedures in order to develop their 
strategy to address the land issue. Specific weaving and stone-cutting 
skills were essential ingredients for the success of the economic livelihood 
projects in Gatong. The repayment rates in San Miguel would have been 
very different if the farmers had not used the appropriate farming 
technoln\!it><; to c11ltivate th.,;,. rice f;,,1r1,. 
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There is another area of technical knowledge implied in the capacity-
building process. This area focuses more on the nature of the capacity-
building process itself. For example, knowledge of the nature, dynamics, 
and structure of groups is critical to enable the community to adjust its 
internal structure and relations to its evolving needs. Some knowledge 
about the dynamics of change is also going to be very useful. This 
knowledge may not initially reside in the community, but in order to 
develop self-reliance, a community needs to acquire the skill to search for 
such knowledge. Having acquired the knowledge, it must learn to use 
it. Knowledge in itself does not lead to action, and action is what leads 
to growth and development. 
Although we have dealt with each set of skills separately, in practice 
there is a lot of overlap among them. Not only are they very closely inter-
related, but they also mutually reinforce one another. Organizational 
management skills affect the community's ability to manage its economic 
resources, and the way economic activities are managed, in tum, can either 
reinforce or destroy the sense of cohesion and unity among the members. 
Similarly, political skills can enhance the ability to gain access to resources, 
while the extent of a community's resources has tremendous impact on 
its ability to influence outsiders and outside entities. 
PROCESS FOR MOBil..IZATION 
Starting Point 
Our discussion has shown that in order to be self-reliant, a community 
has to develop four sets of skills. Where does one start? Is there a natural 
starting point among the different capacities we have descnbed from which 
one can logically progress to develop the other elements of self-reliance? 
Theoretically, one can argue that a logical starting point is to develop 
the capacity to manage internal relations among the different members 
of the community. Unless they are able to act as a group, there is very 
little that they can do. In practice, however, the cases we examined in-
dicate different beginning points. The initial focus in Kagawasan was 
political. The first mobilizations were aimed at getting the government 
to recognize the rights of the people to secure title over the lands they 
were cultivating. The two other programs started off with addressing 
economic issues. In Gatong, efforts were concentrated on developing 
livelihood projects to generate resources for the sustenance of the com-
munity. The initial concern in San Miguel was the need for credit. What 
was common in the starting points of the three cases, however, was that 
they were all based on the "felt needs" of the people. This appears to be 
a most logical starting point because any attempt at organizing the rural 
poor must respond to their articulated concerns and problems. Their par-
ticipation involves investment of time and other resources and they must 
se- --- ~h jn----'-nent -- '-enef-'-' 
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Most mobilizations of rural communities involve the intervention of 
external change agents. From the start, it is therefore crucial to identify 
the real felt needs of the community and to insure that there is a fit be-
tween them and the capacities and mandate of the change agent. 
The cases show that felt needs can be established either through in-
formal or formal means. In Kagawasan, the primary method used was 
informal. As the organizers began to live in the community, they gathered 
information regarding prevailing power and leadership structures and the 
people's perception of their own problems. In Gatong, the organizers 
started off with a formal and elaborate five-day "consult." In San Miguel, 
a formal, but less structured, approach for assessing needs was used. The 
organizers conducted survey-feedback research by carrying out interviews 
among a sizeable sample of the community members. 
In addition to determining the felt needs of the community, it is im-
portant to ascertain that there is a fit between these felt needs and the 
mandate and the capacities of the change agent. Some change agents, like 
the private voluntary organizations in our cases, have very broad man-
12: dates so that they can deal with almost any community need. Others, like 
"""'-- government agencies, tend to have much narrower mandates. Should there 
- be a lack of fit between the mandate of the change agent and the felt needs 
of the community, there exists a real danger for the intervening agency 
"to force" its way through to the community. As a result, there will be 
a reduction, or even a total absence, of community participation. Another 
possible result of such a lack of congruence is that the change agent could 
unconsciously lead the community to address issues with which the 
change agent is more comfortable, but which may not be of great concern 
to the members of the community. 
In summary, there are three screens that finally determine the start-
ing point of mobilization: the community's felt needs, the mandate of the 
change agent, and the latter's capacity and skills. For a successful beginn-
ing, it is necessary to achieve a fit among these three. 
Progression from the Starting Point 
After a mobilization has gotten off to a successful start, what further direc-
tions should it take? An examination of the field data is again instructive. 
In both San Miguel and Gatong, the initial mobilization was around 
economic issues. As the communities managed their income-generating 
projects, certain powerful individuals became interested in taking advan-
tage of the benefits generated at the expense of the community members. 
When this became apparent, it was time to address the enhancement of 
the community's political skills and capacity to address the potential threat. 
In contrast, Kagawasan initially concentrated on developing political skills. 
The community's eventual felt need and interest in developing some 
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income-generating projects was the trigger for a greater emphasis on 
economic resources management skills. The evidence from the three 
cases seems to show that it will be difficult to pre-plan and predeter-
mine the exact time and direction of the required shift in focus from one 
set of capacities to another. What the change agent needs to be aware 
of is that there is more than one set of skills needed for self-reliance and 
that a shift of emphasis from one set of skills to another most likely 
needs to be accompanied by a change in the methods used for capacity-
building. 
Mobilization Methods 
The methods used to develop community capacities are described in 
the cases and are summarized in Table 1. The two principal methods us-
ed were the planning-action-reflection mode, or, simply, action-reflection 
and formal training. The former was the principal method used in 
Kagawasan, and the latter in Gatong. In San Miguel the organizers used 
a combination of both. 
Action-Reflection. The action-reflection method used in Kagawasan was 
very conflict-oriented. The people were mobilized against a common 
enemy, the regional director of the Bureau of Forestry. The underlying 
assumption is that people are more easily mobilized to unite themselves 
and to develop a sense of power in dealing with their environment when 
they have a common enemy. Hence, this method could be a powerful 
tool for developing political skills. However, there can be very serious 
consequences in the use of this method. The conflict-confrontation mode 
possess the characteristics of what management scientists call a "zero-
sum game." Game theory tells us that when a zero-sum game is played, 
the total value of the benefits is reduced. Furthermore, succeeding games 
tend to be zero-sum. Finally, zero-sum games lead to inflexibility in defin-
ing the problems that are the subject of the game. Development is not 
just transferring resources from one pocket to another. Development 
means insuring that the growth in the total amount of benefits is equitably 
distributed among the different segments of society. It requires continuous 
collaborative effort among different segments so that problems are 
creatively solved. 
There is another form of the action-reflection method-the negotia-
tion mode. This was used in the cornrnunals program of the National Ir-
rigation Administration of the Philippine government, discussed in 
Chapter 11 of this volume. Instead of focusing on a common enemy or 
oppressor, this process seeks to create a climate of cooperation so that the 
parties are able to combine their expertise and resources and channel them 
to the solution of community problems. The result is an enhanced capacity 
on the part not only of the community but also of the other agencies or 
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institutions that the community is negotiating with. The collaborative 
climate allows both to learn from each other. In the communals program 
of NIA, major decisions on the design of the system, for example, were 
the outcome of negotiations between the irrigators group and NIA 
technical staff. Each party learned from the other. The synergy resulted 
in more functional designs which each party working on its own could 
not have accomplished. This climate, however, presupposes a certain level 
of maturity of the parties involved. It assumes a focus on a common set 
of objectives. 
In choosing between the conflict-confrontation method and the 
negotiation mode, one needs to be reminded by the principal objective 
of mobilization. We can organize people to tackle specific issues and prob-
lems, such as land tenure or access to credit. We do this not only to achieve 
specific results on these issues, but also as part of a series of building 
blocks that will enhance community capacity to carry out functions that 
are essential to the community's survival and growth. The need for a con-
tinuing relationship and interaction between the community and its en-
vironment poses serious questions about the use of the conflict-
confrontation mode. This approach can do potentially long-term damage 
-4:::- to the relationship between the community and other elements in the en-
~ vironrnent. However, experience has shown that situations do exist where 
certain institutions and agencies cannot be "awakened" except though 
confrontation. Where the use of the confrontation method is deemed 
essential, the organizers and the community must keep in mind its poten-
tial risks so that these can be managed. 
Formal Training. A considerable amount of formal training was used 
in Gatong and San Miguel. This mode is functional for imparting 
knowledge and can build up a community's capacity for technical self-
reliance. To enhance its value, it is important to ensure that the subjects 
of the lectures are within the experience of the community. The addi-
tional formal training merely serves to sharpen the instinctive wisdom 
acquired by people through experience. One of the principal shortcom-
ings of formal training, however, is that knowledge does not necessarily 
lead to action. 
For sure, there are methods other than those that were used in the 
cases we discussed. One does not need to be married to a particular 
method to the exclusion of the others. What is critical is to ensure that 
the methods used are functional for the development of community 
capacities. The data from the three cases does seem to indicate that com-
munity capacities are enhanced more through action and active involve-
ment than through formal training, whose primary object is to pass on 
knowledge. Therefore, the emphasis on mobilization should be directed 
towards having t}w nP()ple thPrnSelvP<: 11ndert"I<<> the rP<11Jifed <'!rtivities. 
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This implies that the organizers or the change agents should be 
enablers rather than implementors. The function of the organizer is to 
develop community capacity. He manages the learning process rather 
than the outcome of the project. He leaves the latter task to the 
community. 
SUMMARY 
We have examined three cases where external change agents have 
tried to mobilize rural communities. Our discussion has focused on the 
major objective of mobilization-the building of community capacity to 
address its own needs. We have identified four sets of critical skills that 
a community must possess before it can become self-reliant. We also 
discussed some of the processes and methods used to develop these skills. 
However, we have tried to relate our discussion of the processes and 
methods to the development of the needed community capacities. There 
is at times a great temptation for one to be dogmatic about his methods. 
Ultimately, these methods will have to be judged on the basis of the ma-
jor objective of mobilization: Do they result in developing skills that em-
power rural communities to address their own needs? 
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Introduction 
There are two related crises in today's world. The first and 
most visible is the ~/etmronrnenf dills. The sec-
ond, more subtle but equally lethal, is hritnanlincf• ldlf.i.· 
tforuliips ·to ffS-:emmi~ .. ·mstitutions, ideas; as well as 
the relationships among the many individuals and groups 
that inhabit the globe. 
If both crises are not resolved, neither will be. Despite 
our faith in technology and our reliance on technological 
solutions, tfiere ae ncntt1 Jm~ -.O'futioils 10·DldfV'ftAt 
probletili ct>nfrontmg bllDWI beings. Furthermore, even 
those technical solutions that can be applied to environ-
mental problems can't be applied rationally until mankind 
transcends the intellectual limitations imposed by onr insti.. 
tutions, our philosophies, and our cultures. Compounding 
all of this is the reality of politics. 
Politics is a major part of life-beginning in the home 
and becoming more and more viSI"ble as power is manifest 
in the larger institutions on the local, national, and inter-
national levels. We should not be fooled by the fa~de of 
either politics or political institutions. What we are talking 
about b f>o\llet.and.ib uM!. 'Certainly there is more to life 
than either disguised or raw power; at least one hopes that 
in time the power motive will combine with more rational, 
more humane ways of proceeding. Apart from power, cul-
ture still plays a prominent viSl"ble role in the relations be-
tween Russians and the West, for example. Culture has 
always been an issue, not only between Europe and Russia. 
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but among the European states as well. The Germans, the 
French, the Italians, the Spanish, Portuguese, and English, 
as well as the Scandinavian and Balkan cultures, all have 
their own identity, language, systems of nonverbal com-
munication, material culture, history, and Way8 of doing 
things. The frequently heard argument that cultures are 
not unique is one of the irrationalities discussed in the 
chaptexs to follow. At this moment, Europe is prosperous, 
temporarily calm, and causing few problems. But what 
about the clash of cultures in the Middle East that 
threatens to involve all countries that are high consumers 
of oil? And what about the emergence of China and 
Japan? Any Westerner who was raised outside the Far East 
and claims he really understands and can communicate 
with either the Chinese or the Japanese is deluding him-
self.1 On the horizon are the multiple cultures of Africa 
and the emerging nations of Latin America demanding to 
be recognir.ed in their own right. In all these crises, the 
,.futurC 'dejkiads on man's being able to transcend the limits 
of individual cultures. To do so, however, he must first 
~ and accept the multiple hidden dimensions of 
, ~ri>as culture. because every culture has its own hid-
. den, unique form of unconscious culture. 
Exacerbating the world's political and cultural problems 
are environmental and economic crises. As Hardin2 showed 
with wisdom and insight in his article entitled, "The Trag-
edy of the Commons,, manlind cannot continue to in-
crease the consumption of the world's finite resources. The 
classical English pattern of using the vt1lage commons 
(that communally owned and used land which was availa-
ble for pasturing fnTvclte livestock) did not involve a con-
flict between public and private welfare "' Ion& as there 
was. fJriough Lmd. However, as herds increased, the over-
grazed land became less productive so that herdsmen had 
to increase their stocks in order to stay even, and thus the 
commons were destroyed. The tragedy was that profits ae-
crued to the opportunistic herdsmen who exploited the 
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commons the most. while losses were shared by all the 
users. Those who exercised restraint were doubly penalized. 
Not only did they suffer losses from the overgrazing of 
neighbors, but they were unable to exploit the market by 
means of their own production. 
Today;· the sea. the afr,:··ttre wataways;;,;tiMJ'earth, the 
land and what it produces ha1'e·afl ~'bif'.~ 
and all are being overused. It is clear that appeals to altm. 
ism are futile and in a sense foolhardy. Technology will not 
resolve this dilemma either because these are human prob-
lems. Hardin argues that the single-track, Newtonian 
approach will satisfy only the politicians and the big a. 
ploiten of the commons who stand to gain from over. 
simplification of issues. What is needed, he feels, is a more 
comprehensive, Darwinian (Dionysian) approach that can 
be used as a basis for cstabttlbhtt' i:-ioll•~~fff'Cf; 
and options. In a word. unless human beings can learn 
to pull together and regulate consumption and production 
patterns, they are headed for disaster. It is imposstble to 
cooperate or to do any of these things unless we know each 
other's ways of thinking. 
The answer lies not in restricting human endeavors, bat 
in evolving new alternatives, new possibilities, new dimen-
sions, new options, and new avenues for creative uses of 
human beings based on the recognition of the multiple 
and unusual talents so manifest in the diversity of the hu-
man race. 
This brings us to an important question that has grown 
in my mind throughout my lifetime. It has to do with 
our undedying attifudes't6w11rth:>tillt:h1t:s. I am not speak. 
ing of something superficial, which can be easily observed 
or experienced, but something deeper and more subtle than 
what appears on the surface. The question is: ~· "'* 
most f»oPl8 .o ~ hiltthin ~Why do 
they not make better use of their talents? It is as though 
we nurtured the child that is in all of us and, in being 
childish, were afraid of each other. This is not a simple 
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problem. and it may be worldwide. Certainly the human 
species has not begun to tap its potential and half suspect. 
ing this deficiency, we blame everyone and everything a-
c:ept the real culprit. 
We see evidence of mankind's disparaging itself in folk. 
lore. 1eligion, philmophies, institutions, as well as in daily 
life. It seems that these processes are not within the reach 
of conscious control but deep within us. Freud was so 
struck by the capacity of the human race to put itself down 
that he pooited a death instinct and built bis theories 
around the notion that the human species inevitably ad.. 
vane.cs at its own expense. Freud believed that the basic 
eneigies (the hbidinal forces) had to be repressed for peo.. 
pie to even live in groups, and that the hbidinal energy 
was "sublimated" into the creative, cooperative drives that 
produced modem institutions. For him, creativity was a 
by-product of the necessity for man to repress his human 
natnrc. Like all of us, Freud was a product of his times, 
which were chamcteriud by such thinking, and in the con-
text of the times much of Freud's thinking made sense. 
Nevertheless, the study of our past as well as our present 
fails to confirm Freud's view that humans advance and 
build institutions through a process of sublimation of sex.. 
nal energy. This book suggests another alternative, namely 
that once people began evolving their extensions, particu-
larly language. tools and institutions, they got caught in 
the web of what I term •ertenston tnmsfcmlce'" (Chap. 
ter 2). and as a consequence, they err in judgment and 
become alienated from and incapable of controlling the 
monsters they have created. In this sense, humans have 
advanced at the expense of that part of themselves that 
has been extended, and as a consequence ended up re-
pressing human nature in its many forms. Man's goal from 
this point should be to rediscover that lost, alienated natu-
ral self. 
Certainly, there are tremendous areas of conflict be-
tween Western man and his material, and nonmaterial ex. 
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tensions. The instruments we have created are like ill. 
fitting shoes. By creating extensions that don't fit or don't 
work, humans have failed to develop some of the most im. 
portant aspects of their own psychic and physical potential. 
According to some of the most distinguished and thought-
ful studenb of the mind, pmhaprtlle'moih1e.U&tmg and 
damaging thing that can happen- to: mmeono·»"to·fail to-
fulfill his potential. A kind of gnawing emptiness, long. 
ing, frustration, and displaced. anger overwhelms people 
when this occurs. Whether the anger is turned inward on 
the self, or outward toward others, dreadful destruction re. 
suits. We know that mankind has great talent; we see evi-
dence of it on all sides. Yet, how humans evolved with 
such an incredible reservoir of diverse talents is not com-
pletely understood. We haven't looked, poSSibly because 
we are not neatly enough in awe of omsehes, possibly be. 
cause we knciw so little and have nothing to measure our-
selves against. 
Part of the problem lies in the tension between creative-
ness and diversity and the rather specific limiting needs 
of institutions. Most cultures and the institutions they en.. 
gender are the result of having to evolve highly specialized 
solutions to rather specific problems. For example, in Eng. 
land during the early days of the Industrial Revolution,4 
when villagers and field hands were brought into the fac-
tories to work, the first generations of mill hands had 
not been conditioned to the factory whistle and linear. 
scheduled time. Like all preindustrial peoples, when they 
earned enough to pay off their debts and keep body and 
soul together for a while, they would quit and go home, 
much to the consternation of the factory owners. This situ. 
ation could have continued indefinitely if there bad not 
been a hidden trap-<:hildren. Not only were there no child 
labor laws then, but no one to care for the children at 
home; so the malleable children worked with their parents 
in the factory, and being young, they became imprinted 
by the whistle. When they grew up they brought up their 
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own children accordingly, thereby setting in motion a seri~ 
of events and ways of handling time which fit neither the 
psychic nor the physical needs of the workers. However, 
because the adaptation to the linear schedule had become 
intcmaltted and automatic, it was viewed as an asset and 
not a liability. It bas taken almost a century and a quarter 
to begin to work itself out. Today children are brought 
np on a different time system-one that is less obviously 
tied down in time and space, and to single institutions; 
there is also growing pressure to overcome monotony and 
the tempo oonJlicts between man and the machine. Be-
ca~·#'Jiinle'.pbt omaeha- in our 'own· zoo, we find it 
difficult to break out. Since pe0ple can't fight institutions 
on which their lives depend, the result is that first they 
unconsciously tum their anger inward then later outward. 
To continue our basic theme, manf ~a Jeme of 
1'Cith ir·dircctly·related to the n~ber of sitUations in 
ewbQ the1 are in control, which means that many people 
have problems with their self-image because they are clearly 
in control of so little.11 The ultimate in human degradation 
and the subservience of human needs to institutional forms 
is shown in Ken Kesey's8 novel, One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo'• Nest. Big Nurse in Kesey's book epitomizes all 
the anti-humanism and destructiveness, all the distortions 
of the communication process, all the violations of cultural 
norms that one finds in the bureaucracies that we have 
created. The book is an exquisitely apt metaphorical state-
ment of the powerlessness and lack of self-affirmation so 
common in our times. 
Powerlessness and laclc. of self-affirmation lead to aggres. 
lion, as repeatedly asserted by psychologists and psychia-
trists. Psychological powerlessness is the result of past 
events, but situational and cultural powerlessness are here 
and now. Blacb and other minorities rioted in :recent years 
because they saw themselves as powerless to make the sys-
tem work. There is no other way to explain the incredible 
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outburst of rage triggered by the assassination of Martin 
Luther King or the "incursion" into Cambodia. The 
groundwork ha~ been laid long before, but it was suddenly 
and oveiwhelmingly apparent to minority groups. 
Things are quieter in the ghettos now because the 
rhythm of black life is in a quiet phase-they are taking a 
breather. It is quieter on the campus since the winding 
down of the Vietnam War. But a major and continuing 
source of frustration exists because the many gifts and tal-
ents of women, blacks, Native Americans, Spanish-Ameri-
cans and others are not only unrecognized, but frequently 
denigrated by members of the dominant gronp. It is the 
corrosive daily frustration, the inability to communicate 
or to establish meaningful relationships that is so soul-
shrinking. 
The cultural and psychological insight that is important 
for us to accept is_ ~at,dcny:i,ug~ and'·tJ!ICi'lllJ g·thct 
effecb that it ean have· on hurmfu 'tllttib. &a~tllihll d6.: 
structive and potentially dmlger0us ·as ~ Cliril. We 
must come to terms with both. It is our powerlessness in 
the face of cnlture and the cnltural limitations placed on 
the development of self that result in aggression. Pamdox:i-
cally, the only way that we can escape the hidden co~ 
straints of covert culture is to involve ourselves actively and 
consciously in the very parts of life that we take most for 
granted. 
A ~ coltmal literacy mi>W:mebt that is not im-
posed, but which springs from within is called for. We 
can all benefit from a deeper knowledge of what an in-
credible organism we really are. We can grow, swell with 
pride, and breathe better for having so many remarkable 
talents. To do so, however, we mnst stop ranking both peo-
ple and talents and accept the fact that there are many 
roads to truth and no culture has a corner on the path 
or is better equipped than others to search for it. Further-
more, no man can tell another how to conduct that search. 
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Writing a book is a cooperative effort; while the author 
is ultimately responsible for the content, form, style, and 
organization of ideas, he depends upon the assistance of 
others, without which his task would be immeasurably 
lengthened. 
My first atlnowledgment, therefore, with thanks and ap-
preciation, is to Mildred Reed Hall. my friend, partner, 
and wife, whose faith in my work frequently kept me going 
in times of doubt or stress. Despite fulltime professional 
responstbilities, she made it possible for me to have time 
for writing by assuming burdens and shielding me from 
the demands of others. She has also read and criticized 
several versions of this book. For editorial assistance I am 
indebted to Roma McNickle, whose skiII and experience 
were extremely helpful. My first editor at Doubleday, Wil-
liam Whitehead, provided an extensive and thoughtful 
critique of the first draft. The second draft of the book 
was reviewed and strengthened by Elizabeth Knappman. 
To both these Doubleday editors I express my thanks. My 
agent, Robert Lescher, also contributed invaluable assist-
ance at many stages in the production of the manuscript. 
Special thanks go to tL ... following individuals who per-
formed innumerable tasb essential to publication: Cor-
nelia Lowndes, who deciphered my handwriting, typed sev-
eral versions of the manuscript, and contnbuted many 
helpful suggestions; Lane Ittelson and Cynthia Peters, who 
helped with library research, checking footnotes and bibli0-
graphic references; and Ellen McCoy Hall, who contnb-
oted many cogent comments on the manuscript at various 
stages. 
1. The Paradox of Culture 
Two widely divergent but interrelated experiences, psycho. 
analysis and work as an anthropologist, have led me to the 
belief that in his strivings for order, Western man has 
created chaos by denying that part of his self that inte-
grates while enshrining the parts that fragment experience. 
These examinations of man's psyche have also convinced 
me that: the natural act of thinking is greatly modified by 
culture; Western man uses only a smal1 fraction of his 
mental capabilities; there are many different and legiti-
mate ways of thinking; we in the West value one of these 
ways above all others-the one we call "logic," a linear sys-
tem that has been with us since Socrates. 
Western man sees his system ·of kigiC ai lfn<inym<>os 
with the truth. For him it is the only road to reality. Yet 
Freud educated us to the complexities of the psyche, help-
ing his readers to look at dreams as a legitimate mental 
process that exists quite apart from the linearity of man-
ifest thought. But his ideas were from the outset stren-
uously resisted, particularly by scientists and engineen, 
who were still wedded to a Newtonian model. When 
taken seriously, Freudian thinking shook the very founda-
tions of conventional thought. Freud's followers, particu-
larly Fromm and Jung, undeterred by popular stereotypes 
and the tremendous prestige of the physical sciences, 
added to his theories and bridged the gap between the lin-
ear world of logic and the integrative world of dreams.1 
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Knowing that the interpretation of dreams, myths, and 
acts is alvvays to some degree an individual matter,2 I can-
not help asking myself what a psychoanalytically sophiS-
ticated reader would add to my own interpretation of a se-
quence of events reported in the New York Times 
concerning a police dog sighted on Ruffle Bar, an uninhab-
ited island near New York.3 Visible only from a distance, 
the dog, nicknamed the King of Ruffle Bar, had sustained 
itself for an estimated twci years, was apparently in good 
health, and presumably would have survived in his semi-
wild state, barring accidents, for the rest of his natural life. 
However, some well-meaning soul heard about the dog 
and reported him to the American Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Animals, thereby setting the bureau-
cratic wheels in motion. Since the King could not be 
approached by people, a baited trap was set. According to 
the Times report: " ... every day, a police launch from 
Sheepshead Bay takes off for Ruffle Bar, the uninhabited 
swampy island of the dog. Every day, a police helicopter 
hovers for a half hour or more over Ruffie Bar." A radio re-
port of the broadcast at the time described how the heli-
copter harassed the dog in futile efforts to "catch" (sic) 
him (he refused to enter the trap) or at least to get a bet-
ter view of him. Police were quoted as saying the dog 
'1ooked in good shape." When questioned, representatives 
of the ASPCA said: "When we catch the dog, we will 
have it examined by a vet, and if it is in good health, we 
wlll find a happy home for it."4 (italics added) 
If this story had been a dream or a myth instead of a 
news report, there is little doubt as to its interpretation. 
Both the latent and the manifest content are quite clear, 
possibly explaining why this local news item was given na-
tional coverage. I find, as I go over the story, that free aS-
sociations come to mind on different levels. The story epit-
omizes the little man against the big bureaucracy. There 
is also a delusional side which cannot be overlooked. TI1e 
ASPCA became obsessed with capturing the dog. Once 
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triggered, the ASPCA involved the police with a remorse-
less, mindless persistence that is too terrifyingly charac-
teristic of bureaucracies once they are activated. Interest-
ingly enough, the police, having known about the dog for 
two years, had been content to leave him on the island. 
Emotionally, they sided with the King, even while carry-
ing out their orders. "Why don't they leave the dog 
alone?" said one policeman. Another observed, "The dog is 
as happy as a pig in a puddle."3 
The delusional aspects have to do with the institu-
tionalized necessity to control "everything," and the 
widely accepted notion that the bureaucrat knows what is 
best; never for a' moment does he doubt the ~of the 
bureancra:tic solution. It is also slightly insane, or at least 
indicative of our incapacity to order priorities with any 
common sense, to spend thousands of dollars for helicop-
ters, gasoline, and salaries for the sole purpose of bureau-
cratic neatness. 
Even more recently, a New York Times news iteme re-
ported a U. S. Park Police campaign to stamp out kite 
flying on the grounds of the Washington Monument. 
Their charter to harass the kite Biers lay in an old law 
written by Congress supposedly to keep the Wright 
brothers' planes from becoming fouled in kite strings. 
The psychoanalyst Laing is convinced that the Western 
world is mad.7 These stories of the dog and the kite Biers 
bolster Laing's view and symbolize man's plight as well as 
any recent events I know.s However, it is not man who is 
crazy so much as his institutions9 and those culture pat-
terns that determine his behavior. We in the West are 
alienated from ourselves and from nature. we,~1mder 
a nmnber of delusions~ one of which' ii tmt. life,..kes 
sense; i.e .. that We ate l'aDe. We persist in this View de-
spite massive evidence to the contrary. We live frag-
mented, compartmentalized lives in which contradictions 
are carefully sealed off from each other. We have been 
taught to think linearly rather than comprehensively,10 
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and we do this not through conscious design or because 
we are not intelligent or capable, but because of the way 
in vvhich ;deep cultmal undetetments structure life in sub-
tle .·but highly contistent wayS that are, not consciously 
~b:d; Like the invisible jet streams in the skies that 
detennine the course of a storm, these hidden currents 
shape our lives; yet their influence is only beginning to be 
identified. Given our linear, step..by...step, compart-
mentalized way of thinking,11 fostered by the schools and 
public media, it is impossible for our leaders to consider 
events comprehensively or to weigh priorities according to 
a system of common good, all of which can be placed like 
an unwanted waif on culture's doorstep. Yet, paradox-
ically, few anthropologists are in agreement as to what to 
include under the general rubric of culture. While it will 
be denied by some, much depends on the anthropologist's 
own culture, which exerts a deep and abiding influence 
not ouly over how anthropologists think but over where 
they draw the boundaries in such matters. Frequently, the 
greater portion of contemporary culture will be excluded 
or referred to as "mere convention." In a practical sense, 
the conventions of the field and what one's peers are study-
ing have more to do with what anthropologists define as 
culture than an appraisal of one's data might indicate. 
Like everyone else, anthropologists use models, and some 
models are more fashionable than others. Most of them 
are handed down and modified periodically. 
The reader may well ask, "What is a model?" or 
"What kind of models are you talking about?" While 
models and how man uses them are just beginning to be 
understood, oue thing is certain: many different models 
exist. Mechanical models, such as scale models of airplanes 
Bown in wind tunnels, show how machines and processes 
work. Models for making molds can reproduce everything 
from machines to copies of works of art. Life models help 
the artist fill in gaps in a faulty visual memory. Parents 
and teachers may be models for the young. 
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Scientists use theoretical models, often mathematical in 
nature. These are used to symbolically express certain qual-
ities, quantities, and relationships encountered in life. 
Econometricians, for example, use these models to investi-
gate how the more measurable aspects of the economic 
system operate. 
Anthropologists use predominantly non-mathematical 
theoretical models that are rooted in culture. Since culture 
is itself a series of situational models for behavior and 
thought, the models anthropologists use are frequently 
highly abstract versions of parts of models that make up 
the entire culture (kinship systems, for example). 
Man is the model-making organism par excellence. His 
earliest intellectual endeavors resulted in monuments that 
mystified and puzzled twentieth.century man ·until they 
were figured out. Stonehenge, for example, is a model of 
the solar system that enabled the early inhabitants of the 
Salisbury Plain to make accurate observations of celestial 
events and to keep track of the seasons, order their cere-
monial life, and even predict eclipses at a time when no 
one would have thought such refined calculations and ob-
servations were possible (fifteen hundred to two thousand 
years n.c.I). 
Grammars and writing systems are models of language. 
Any school child who has struggled to make sense of what 
he is taught knows that some fit reasonably well, others 
don't. Myths, philosophical systems, and science represent 
different types of models of what the social scientists call 
cognitr.:e systems. The purpose of the model '9:10'aaal>le 
the'.\m:r to do a better job in handl.mi the., TI ¢11(-cOm. 
plexity of life. By using models, we see and test how 
things work and can even predict how things will go in the 
future. The effectiveness of a model can be judged by how 
well it works, as well as how consistent it is as a mechani-
cal or philosophical system. People are very closely 
identified with their models, since they also form the basis 
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for behavior. Men have fought and died in the name of 
different models of nature. 
'''/ill• t:beoretieltl:'modelS are incomplete. By definition, 
they are abstractions and therefore leave things· out. What 
they leave out is as important as, if not more important 
than, what they do not, because it is what is left out that 
gives structure and form to the system. Models have a half 
life--'5ome are ephemeral, others last for centuries. There 
are highly explicit models, while others are so much a part 
of life as to be unavailable for analysis except under very 
special circumstances. 
In constructing their models of culture, most anthro. 
pologisb talce into account that there are different levels of 
behavior: overt and covert, implicit and explicit, things 
you talk about and things you do not. Also, that there is 
such a thing as the unconscious, although few are in 
agreement as to the degree to which the unconscious is 
influenced by culture. The psychologist Jung, for example, 
hypothecated a "collective" unconscious that was shared 
by all mankind (a concept many anthropologists might 
have trouble accepting). Paradoxically, studying the 
models that men create to explain nature tells you more 
about the men than about the part of nature being stud-
ied. In the West, people are more concerned with the con-
tent or meaning of the model than they are with how it is 
put together, is organized, or performs, and the purpose it 
is supposed to fulfill. 
Anthropologists have studied only those things people 
could or would talk to them about, with the result that 
many of the important things-Culture patterns that make 
life meaningful and really differentiate one group from 
another-have gone unnoticed or been unreported and 
brushed aside as trivial. If one were to use a linguistic 
analogy, it would be as though there were data on the vo-
cabulary of culture but very little on either the syntactic 
(grammar) or phonemic systems (alphabets are based on a 
phonemic analysis). It is not enough to say that the 
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French believe this and the Spanish believe that. Beliefs 
can change. Beneath the clearly perceived, highly explicit 
surface culture, there lies a whole other world, which 
when understood will ultimately radically change our view 
of human nature. Writing forty years ago, the linguist 
Sapir started the ball rolling by demonstrating that in lan-
guage (an important part of culture) man created an in-
strument thal: is quite different from what is commonly 
supposed. He states: 
The relation between language and experience is 
often misunderstood ... [it] ~;<lefines expe-
rience for us by reason of its formal completeness and 
because of our unconscious projection of its implicit 
expectations into the field of experience. .•• [L]an-
guage is much like a mathematical system, which 
... becomes elaborated into a self-eontained concep-
tual system which previsages all possible experience in 
accordance with certain accepted formal limita-
tions. . . . [ C]ategories such as number, gender, 
case, tense, mode, voice, "aspect" and a host of others 
. . . are not so much discovered in experience as im-
posed upon it .... (italics added) a 
Sapir's work, which predates McLuhan by thirty-five years, 
not only makes a stronger, more detailed case than McLu-
han that "the media is the message," but can be extended 
to include other cultural systems as well. In the process of 
evolving culture, the human species did much more than 
was at first supposed. 
The usefulness of Sapir's model was demonstrated in a 
practical way by Kluckhohn ancU.Alichton in their pioneer-
ing book The Navujo.a which illustrates the difficulties 
the verb.oriented Navajo children experienced when they 
attended white schools and were confronted by English-a 
loosely structured, adjective language. Kluckhohn and 
Leighton's basic point, however, was not only that 
differences in emphasis on adjectival and verbal forms 
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caused difficulty in school, but that the total orientation of 
the two languages was different, forcing the two groups to 
attend and fail to attend entirely different things in na-
tnre. Having lived and dealt with Navajos for a number of 
years, I have no doubt not only that they think very 
differently from the white man, but that much of this 
difference is at least initially traceable to their language. 
Working with other cultural systems, I have found evi-
dence that it is not just in language that one finds such 
constraints, but elsewhere as well, provided of course that 
one is fortunate enough to have studied cultures 
sufficiently different from one's own to bring its latent 
structures into focus. 
In considering the data presented in this book, it is im-
portant for the reader to come to grips with his own 
model of culture in its manifest as well as its latent forms, 
because my purpose is to raise some of the latent to con-
scious awareness and to give it form so that it can be dealt 
with. Technically, the model of culture on which my work 
is based is more inclusive than those of some of my col-
leagues. My emphasis is on the nonverbal, unstated realm 
of culture. While I do not exclude philosophical systems, 
religion, social organization, language, moral values, art, 
and material culture, l feel it is more important to look at 
the way things are actually put together than at theories. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of many differences in detail, 
anthropologists do agree on three characteristics of cul-
ture:-:;ft iS jbt &lmitc, but learned; tbe''Vflrious facets of cul-
tme.aie,.intt:nclated-vou touch a culture in one place and 
mrYthing else is aff~ted; it i; shated md in effect defines 
the boundaries of different groups. 
Culture is man's medium; there is not one aspect of 
human life that is not touched and altered by culture. 
This means personality, how people express themselves 
(including shows of emotion), the way they think, how 
they move, how problems are solved, how their cities are 
planned and laid out, how tr:rnsportation systems function 
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and are organized, as well as how economic and govern-
ment systems are put together and function. However, like 
the purloined letter, it is frequently the most obvious and 
taken-for-granted and therefore the least studied aspects of 
culture that influence behavior in the deepest and most 
subtle ways. 
As a case in point, let us examine how white Americans 
are captives of their own time and space systems-begin-
ning with time. American time is what I have termed 
"monochronic"; that is, Americans, when they are serious, 
orually prefer to do one thing at a time, and this requires 
some kind of scheduling. either implicit or explicit. Not all 
of us conform to monochronic norms. Nevertheless, there 
are social and other pressures that keep most Americans 
within the monochronic frame. However, when Americans 
interact with people of foreign cultures, the different time 
systems cause great difficulty. 
Monochronic time (M-time) and polychronic time 
(P-time) represent two variant solutions to the use of both 
time and space as organizing frames for activities. Space is 
included because the two systems (time and space) are 
functionally interrelated. M-time emphasiu:s schedules, 
segmentation, and promptness. P-time systems are charac-
terized by several things happening at once. They stress•ift:i 
volvement of people and completion of .hamactiODI rather 
than adherence to preset schedules. P-time is treated as 
much less tangible than M-time. P-time is apt to be con-
sidered a point rather than a ribbon or a road. and that 
point is sacred.a 
Americans overseas are psychologically stressed in many 
ways when confronted by P-time systtms<9*ti•ld ~in 
Latin America and the Middle East. In the markets and 
stores of Mediterranean countries, one is surrounded by 
other customers vying for the attention of a clerk. There is 
no order as to who is served next, 16 and to the northern 
European or American, confusion and clamor abound. In 
a different context, the same patterns apply within the 
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governmental bureaucracies of Mediterranean countries: A 
cabinet officer, for instance, may have a large reception 
area outside his private office. There are almost always 
small groups waiting in this area, and these groups are 
visited by government officials, who move around the 
room conferring with each. Much of their business is tranS-
acted in public instead of having a series of private meet-
ings in an inner office. Particularly distressing to Ameri-
cans is the way in which appointments are handled by 
polychronic people. Appointments just don't carry the 
same weight as they do in the United States. Things are 
constantly shifted around. Nothing seems solid or firm, 
particularly plans for the future, and there are always 
changes in the most important plans right up to the very 
last minute. 
In contrast, within the Western world, man finds little 
in life that is exempt from the iron hand of M-time. In 
fact, his social and business life, even his sex life. are apt 
to be completely time.dominated. Time is so thoroughly 
woven into the fabric of existence that we are hardly 
aware of the degree to which it determines and co-or-
dinates everything we do, including the molding of rela-
tions with others in many subtle ways. By scheduling, we 
compartmentalize; this makes it possible to concentrate on 
one thing at a time, but it also denies us context. Since 
scheduling by its very nature selects what will and will not 
be perceived and attended and permits only a limited 
number of events within a given period. what gets sched-
uled in or out constitutes a system for settim: priorities for 
both people and functions.16 Important things are taken 
op first and allotted the most time; unimportant things 
are left to last or omitted if time nms out.17 
Space and its handling also si~nal importance and 
priorities. The amount of space allocated and where a 
person is placed within an organization tell a lot about him 
and his relation to the organization. Equally significant is 
how he handles his time. In fact, discretion over schedul-
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ing-the option of determining when one W111 be in the 
office-indicates that one has arrived. The exceptions are 
salesmen, whose jobs demand that they be away from 
their desks, or those who hold unusual positions, for exam-
ple the city editor of a newspaper, whose job is inherently 
polychronic. The importance of place-where tlte activities 
are permitted to occur-has become so much a part of 
modem bureaucracy that some employees whose perform-
ance would be enormously enhanced if they could get 
away from their desks are seldom permitted to do so. For 
example, .American Foreign' ·SmW:e -~~>m;griert, to 
Latin r.America showd bC ·oat interac:ting :~~~ l<>aal 
people, ' but • because.·' of immutable . bUreaumtic0.tustom 
they can;t leave their desks: Cut off from the people with 
whom tltey should be establishing ties, how can they ever 
be effective? In another American-based bureaucracy, an 
important and famous research program was threatened 
because the space required for the experiments was greater 
than that appropriate to the rank of the investigator. 
Madi' Yes, completely mad; but bureaucratically vecy real. 
For M-time people reared in the northern European tra-
dition, time is linear and segmented like a road or a nb-
bon extending forward into the future and backward to 
the past. It is also tangible; they speak of it as being saved, 
spent, wasted, lost, made up, accelerated, slowed down, 
crawling, and running out. These metaphors should be 
taken very seriously, because they express the basic manner 
in which time is conceived as an unconscious determinant 
or frame on which everything else is bnilt. M-time sched-
uling is used as a classification system that orders life. 
With the exception of birth and death, all important ac:-
tivities are scheduled. It should be mentioned that with-
out schedules and something very much like the M-time 
system, it is doubtful if our industrial civilization could 
have developed as it has. There are other consequences, 
however. Monochronic time seals off one or two people 








20 BEYOND CULTURE 
person or, at most, two or three people. M-time in this 
sense is like a room with a closed door that ensures pri-
vacy. The only problem is that you must vacate the 
.. room" at the end of fifteen minutes or an hour, a day, or 
a week, depending on the schedule, and make way for the 
next one in line. Failure to make way by intruding on the 
time of the person waiting is egocentric, narcissistic, and 
bad manners. 
Monochronic time is arbitrary and imposed; that is, 
learned. Because it is so thoroughly learned and so thor-
oughly integrated into our culture, it is treated as though 
it were th,e only natural and '1ogical" way of organizing 
life. Yet it is not inherent in man's own rhythms and crea-
tive drives, nor is it existential in nature. Furthermore, or-
ganizatiom, particularly business and government bureau-
cracies, subordinate man to the organization, and they 
accomplish this mainly by the way they handle time-space 
systems. 
Everything in our lives must be fitted to the Procrus-
tean demands of the schedule. As any American can tell 
you, there are times when things are just beginning to 
develop in the desired way; yet they must be stopped to 
conform to a preset schedule. Example: research funds run 
out just as the results are beginning to be achieved. How 
often has the reader had the experience of realizing that 
he is pleasurably immersed in some creative activity, to-
tally unaware of time, solely conscious of the job at hand, 
only to be brought back to "reality" with the rude shock 
of realizing that other, preset, frequently inconsequential 
commibnents are bearing down on him? 
From this, we see that many Americans make the com-
mon mistake of associating the schedule with reality and 
one's self or the activity as somethin~ that is removed 
from life. M-time can alienate us from ourselves and deny 
us the experience of context in the wider sense. That is, 
M-time narrows one's view of events in much the same 
way as looking through a cardboard tube narrows vision, 
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and it influences subtly and in depth how we think-in 
segmented compartments. 
Possibly, this restriction of context explains in part the 
difficulty that American enterprises have in adapting to 
other time systems. An economist once told me that Es-
kimos working for a fish cannery in Alaska thought factory 
whistles were ridiculous. The idea that men would work or 
not work because of a whistle seemed to them sheer lu-
nacy. For the Eskimo, the tides determined what men did, 
how long they did it, and when they did it. Tide out 
meant one set of activities; tide in, another. This same 
man later worked in a large international agency and ob-
served in himself signs of stress resulting from futile at-
tempts to gear his own productivity, particularly its crea-
tive aspects, to a time schedule. Finally, convinced that it 
was impossible to schedule creativity, he gave up trying 
and compromised by adopting a schedule in which there 
were periods when he was tied to a desk and handled 
trivia, followed by other periods in which he worked 
around the clock. One wonders how many individuals who 
have been forced to adjust to eight-hour, nine.to.five 
schedules have sacrificed their creativity, and what the so-
cial and human cost of this sacrifice has been. 
Time and space are functions of each other. How can 
you meet a deadline if you are constantly interrupted, for 
example? How much you are interrupted depends on how 
available you are. And how available you are is a matter of 
how well you are screened from others. Also, how can a 
doctor listen deeply and carefully to a patient's account of 
his life without proper screening? It's impossible. I am re-
ferring here to ideal patterns. Many people have to put up 
with spaces that cripple them in the performance of their 
jobs. Some of this comes about because of the tight way in 
which space, as well as time, is locked into the bureau-
cratic ranking system. It is quite clear, for example, that 
case workers in welfare departments require the privacy of 
an office, yet the rank of their activity and the low status 
~ 
22 BEYOND CULTUR~ 
accorded the needy are such as to make an office bureau-
cratically unfeasible (offices are for "important" people). 
Incongruities of this type at all levels, where the require-
ment! of the activity call for one thing and the organi-
zational needs for something else, endow much of life 
with an Alice in Wonderland quality. 
It is in this respect that cultures also contrast with each 
other; polychronic people, such as the Arabs and the 
Turlcs, who are almost never alone, even in the home, 
make different uses of screening.18 They interact with sev-
eral people at once and are continually involved with each 
other. Scheduling is difficult if not impossible with P-tirne 
people unless they have mastered M-time technically as a 
very different system, one they do not confuse with their 
own but use when it is situationally appropriate, much as 
they use a foreign language. 
Theoretically, when considering social organir.ation, 
P-time systems should demand a much greater central-
ization of control and be characterized by a rather shallow 
or simple structure. This is because the top man deals con-
tinually with many people, most of whom stay informed 
as to what is happening: they are around in the same 
spaces, are brought up to be deeply involved with each 
other, and continually ask questions to stay informed. In 
these circumstances, delegation of authority and a build-
up in bureaucratic levels should not be required to handle 
high volumes of business. The principal shortcomings of 
P-type bureaucracies are that as functions increase, one 
would expect to find a proliferation of small bureaucracies 
as well as difficulty in handling the problems of outsiders. 
In fact, outsiders traveling or residing in Mediterranean 
countries find the bureaucracies unusually unresponsive. In 
polychronic countries, one has to be an insider or else have 
a "friend" who can make things happen. All bureaucracies 
are oriented inward, but P-type are especially so. 
There are also interesting points to be made concerning 
the act of administration as it is conceived in these two 
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settings. Administration and control of polychronic peo.. 
pies (in the Middle East and Latin America) is a matter 
of job analysis. Administration consists of taking each sub. 
ordinate's job and identifying the activities that go to 
make up the job. These are then named and frequently in-
dicated on the elaborate charts with checks that make it 
possible for the administrator to be sure that each fune-
tion has been performed. In this way, it is felt, absolute 
control is maintained over the individual. Yet,: how .and 
when each activity is actually attended to is up to the cur 
ployec. To schedule his activities for him would be consid-
ered a tyrannical violation of his individuality. 
In contrast, M-time people schedule the activity and 
leave the analysis of the parts of the job to the individual. 
A P-type analysis, even though technical by its very nature, 
keeps reminding the subordinate that his job is a system 
and is also part of a larger system. M-type people, by vir-
tue of compartmentalization, are less likely to see their ae-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~This~ 
not mean that they are unaware of the "organir.ation"-far 
from it; only that the job itself or even the goals of the or-
ganization are seldom seen in larger contexts. Again, plae-
ing the organir.ation above what it is supposedly doing is 
common in our culture and is epitomized in our allowing 
the TV commercial, the "special message," to break the 
continuity of even the most important communication. By 
way of contrast, in Spain I once counted twenty-0ne com-
mercials lumped together at the end of an hour's program. 
The polychronic Spanish quite sensibly put the commer-
cials between the major programs, not within them. 
Both systems have strengths as well as weaknesses. 
There is a limit to the speed with which jobs can be 
analyred, although once analyzed, proper reporting can en-
able a P-time administrator to handle a surprising number 
of subordinates. Nevertheless, organir.ations run on the 
polychronic model are limited in size, depend on having 
gifted men at the top, and are slow and cumbersome when 
i, 
~ 
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dealing with the business of outsiders. Without gifted 
men, a P-type bureaucracy can be a disaster, as many peo-
ple know. P-type models proliferate bureaucracies as a way 
of handling greater demands on the system. 
M-type organizations go in the opposite direction. They 
can and do grow much larger than the P-type. However, 
they combine instead of proliferating bureaucracies-e.g., 
consolidated schools, the business conglomerate, and the 
new superdepartments we are developing in government 
today. 
The particular blindness of the monochronic organi-
,, zation is to the humanness of its members. The weakness 
of the polychronic type lies in their extreme dependence 
on the head man to handle contingencies and stay on top 
of things. M-type bureaucracies, as they grow larger, tum 
inward, becoming blind to their own structure; they grow 
rigid and are even apt to lose sight of their original pur-
pose. Prime examples are the Army Corps of Engineers 
and the Bureau of Reclamation, which wreak havoc on 
our environment in their dedicated efforts to stay in busi-
ness by building dams or hurrying the flow of rivers to the 
sea. 
Monochronic and polychronic have to do with the way 
time and space are organized and how this organization 
affects the very core of existence. We can look at things in 
such a way as to transcend culture and, in so doing, gener-
alize about how culture is organized. One of these general-
izations concerns the subtle but complex relationship be-
tween meaning and context described in Chapters 6, 7, 
and 8. Another deals with man as a producer of extensions 
which in tum mold his life (Chapter 2). What the eth-
ologist calls action chains (Chapter io) and the situa-
tional frame and situational dialect (Chapter 9) are all 
structural features of unconscious culture. Possibly because 
they are so ubiquitous, man's extensions will be taken up 
next. 
2. Man as Extension 
Nineteenth.century naturalists suggested that mammals 
were divided into two groups-man and all other mam-
mals; they also thought that birds should be divided into 
two groups-bowerbirds and all other birds. These cat. 
egorizations resulted from the observation that both man 
and the bowerbird have elaborated their extensions and in 
so doing have greatly accelerated their evolution. The bow-
erbird occupies the jungles and thickets of New Guinea 
and northern Australia and, as its name implies, builds a 
bower with which to attract and woo its mate. The elabo-
rate bower, constructed of twigs and grass, is decorated 
with shells, iridescent skeletons of insects, seeds, clay balls, 
charcoal, pebbles, and brightly colored objects including 
freshly picked flowers. Actually, the bower .md its decora-
tion is not only an extension of once brilliant pinmage but 
also of courtship displays as well. As Cilliardl states, " ••• 
these object.S have in effect become extemal.iud bundles of 
secondary sexual characteristics that are psychologically 
but not physically connected with the males" (italics 
added). Behind the bower lie some radical chan.ges in so-
cial organization and behavior. The bowerbirds belong to a 
group of birds who no longer pair off (pair bonding) with 
the opposite sex to mate, nest, and raise the voung. In-
stead, males gather in clans (separate from the females) in 
which they rank themselves hierarchically. In the spring, 
the clans are formed around "arenas" in which dispby and 
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Strategies of Household Subsistence and 
Interdependency in Nicaragua 
Silvio De Franco 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to report the findings of a study 
of subsistence characteristics of producers and peasants (campesinos) in 
the coffee-growing regions of Nicaragua and to analyze the implications 
of these characteristics for the design of agrarian and rural development 
policies. The central premise is that the lack of consideration in the design 
of food production and commercialization policies given to the in-
terdependency among producers and campesinos, between production 
and commercialization systems, and between food-crop cultivation and 
labor in the production of coffee and other export crops, will result in un-
necessary social and political costs. This is illustrated by the example of 
Nicaragua since the Revolution in July 19'79. 
The first three sections of the chapter describe in some detail the 
characteristics and operational logic of coffee producers in Nicaragua, the 
determinants of labor absorption, and the survival strategies pursued by 
rural workers and peasants linked with the coffee industry. The fourth 
section attempts to evaluate the effects of policies implemented by the 
Revolutionary Government on both producers and workers by focusing 
on the impact of these policies on their strategies of survival and sub-
sistence. In the fifth section, some general conclusions and their implica-
tions for the management of social development are presented. 
CHARACfERISTICS OF COFFEE PRODUCTION 
Traditionally, coffee has represented one of the main sources of foreign 
exchange in the Nicaraguan economy (about 30 percent of total exports 
in J t de< ) . I t5 C)fta1 bas. it on its r ; fon 
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exchange earner, but also on its capacity for employment generation (22 
percent of annual agricultural employment, 33 percent of employment 
during the picking season), and on the significance of the portion of 
agricultural land under cultivation which it represents (about 21 percent). 
Nicaraguan coffee production is concentrated in the mountainous 
zones of Jinotega and Matagalpa in the north central part of the country 
and in the Cordillera that separates Lake Managua from the Pacific Ocean. 
The coffee zones are characterized by cool climates, sparse populations, 
and scarce infrastructure. 
Unlike other agro-export crops, such as cotton, the cultivation of cof-
fee is not a year-to-year decision. The creation or renovation of a coffee 
plantation requires from four to six years, which implies that the coffee 
grower is betting on making a profit in the long run. Once he has planted 
the coffee and the trees begin to produce, the only factor that the pro-
ducer can attempt to control is the va.riable cost. In other words, once 
he has made the investment, the producer becomes a price taker in the 
Jong run, in contrast to the cotton grower, who may base his cultivation 
decision on short-run price expectations. 
Coffee growing is also characterized by the variability of inputs re-
quired at different times during the year, which greatly depends on the 
cultivation practices followed. The demand for labor is concentrated dur-
.t_ ing the harvest period, from November to February. S In spite of its importance to the Nicaraguan economy, the produc-
tivity of the crop has never been high. Yields in Nicaragua average 10 
cwt. per manzana, 1 while it is possible, as proven by the experience in 
other countries, to attain average yields of 25 cwt. and more per man-
zana. Highly technological plantations in El Salvador can yield 80 and 
more cwt. per manzana. 
Behind the average yield figure of 10 cwt./mz. is a dispersion from 
under 5 cwt. to 30 cwt., according to widely varying technologies. Eighty-
five percent of the twenty-seven thousand coffee producers are considered 
to be in the "small" category, utilizing rudimentary technologies based 
on the intensive use of family labor and few modern inputs. These small 
producers account for around 30 percent of total coffee production. Their 
characteristics, as opposed to the characteristics of medium and large pro-
ducers, are shown in Table 1. 
As Table 1 illustrates, small coffee producers in Nicaragua are 
characterized by low productivity, high isolation, and low technology, 
education, and income levels. This implies that an important task in the 
improvement of agricultural conditions and in obtaining a greater amount 
of foreign exchange lies in the improvement of production methods and 
the social conditions of this small producer group. Improved production 
methods, in tum, imply the delivery of complementary inputs (fertilizers 
and pesticides) and, with it, access to credit. 








CHARACTERISTICS OF COFFEE PRODUCERS 
Small Producen; Medium Producen; 
(100 cwt of Coffee (between 100 and 
per Year, or Less) 500 cwt of Coffee 
per Year) 
Low level of edu- Higher level of educa-
cation (10% with less tion (71 % with more 
than 2 years of than 7 years of 
schooling) schooling) 
Live at the farm all Most nonresidents of 
year (90%) farms 
Some of them former 
salaried workers 
High degree of isola- G realer access: 88% 
lion and access dif- have transitable roads 
ficulties (66% between all )"!at. but 41% have 
1 and 20 kilometers only small villages as 
from small villages) nearest settlement 
and are isolated from 
provincial capital 
37% have access to Generally have year-
villages only during round access 
dry season 
Plant 2 or more crops Less cultivation of 
essentially basic basic grains 
grains (90% at least 
one more) 
Own animals (dairy G realer use for 
cattle, fowls, hogs) pastures and cattle 
Most of production Not for family use 
for consumption of 
farm 
Absence of inputs Use of fertilizers and 
other than labor more advanced 
cultural practices 
Average yield 5 Average yield 15 
cwt/manz.ana cwt/manzana 
Little relative use of 
high-yield coffee 
varieties 
Production based on Not based on family 
the family labor 
Some (33%) facilitate Permanent worken; 




(More Than 500 
cwt of Coffee per 
Year) 
48% with more than 
U years of schooling 
Most do not live at 
the farms 
90% have access all 
year. 44% have pro-
vincial capital nearby 
Generally rum, year-
round access 
Most ol the land not 
planted with roHee is 
for pastures for cattJ~ 
Not for family use 
In~ive use of fer-
tilizers, pesticides, 





caturra coffee variety 
Most (70%) provide 
land for worken; for 
the cultivation of 
basic grains 
Source: Survey of 75 producers conducted by INCAE in August-~ember 1980 as part of a study spon-




ANALYZING ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS 
The survival strategy of the small growers is broadly based upon a 
family work force for the coffee production (except during the harvest 
period), and complemented by the growing of basic grains and the rais-
ing of animals for domestic consumption and the generation of additional 
income. 
At the other hand of the scale, the strategy of large producers is to 
diversify into crops other than coffee for the strict purpose of generating 
more cash and reducing the risk of dependence on a single product. 
This diversity in size, technology, and crop diversification of the pro-
ducers implies that a rural improvement policy through the use of in-
struments such as credit, inputs, and technical assistance will clearly be 
insufficient if it does not have the flexibility to adjust to the different situa-
tions and peculiarities of the producers on an almost one-to-one basis. 
This policy should be based not on a single crop, but rather on the set 
of activities which, together, form the survival strategies of the different 
types of producers and the workers linked to them. 
In all cases, field research among seventy-five producers revealed that 
the social arrangement within the plantation is more complicated than 
a simple salaried worker-capitalist relationship. Although at first glance 
it would seem that the permanent workers2 are simply salaried employees, 
many times these workers are instead paid piece-rate during the year, com-
plementing their income with what they cultivate in parcels of land 
usufructed from the plantation. It can be argued that the fact that owners 
grant the usufruct of land to the workers for household cultivation-often 
without cost-is part of the producer's strategy to retain and flexibly use 
labor without having to fully pay for the cost of its maintenance. However, 
this argument has important implications for a policy of improved income 
distribution, one of which is that the betterment of these workers cannot 
simply be achieved through higher salaries without causing serious disrup-
tions in the existing set of social arrangements as well as in production, 
as we shall see further on. 
DETERMINANTS OF THE ABSORPTION AND 
PROCUREMENT OF LABOR 
One of the most notable characteristics of the cultivation of coffee is 
the marked seasonality of labor demand. The harvest period, which lasts 
for seventy-five days from mid-November to late January, accounts for 37.5 
percent of the total absorption of man-days in the cultivation of coffee. 
Careful and timely picking of the ripe bean from the tree is critical to the 
quality and yield of the product and thus to its price and income. 
Alternatives to hand-picking are non-existent, due to the fact that the 
mountainous terrain precludes the use of machinery and, in any case, 
there is no current technology capable of ripe bean selection. 
I 
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The absorption of labor throughout the year and during the harvest 
is largely a function of the yield per manzana of the plantation, which 
is reflected in the use of modem technologies. The range of labor demand 
per manzana of coffee is between 61 and 200 man-days, with the peak 
coming in the picking stage. Nevertheless, the use of advanced cultural 
practices, such as pruning and weeding, and the more intensive use of 
inputs, such as fertilizers, is linked to a higher demand for labor, since 
the substitution of labor by equipment and machinery is highly limited. 
The absence of modem practices and inputs not only reduces the demand 
for labor for these activities, but also, with the lower yields, reduces the 
demand during the harvest. 
Coffee producers pursue two strategies for obtaining labor. The first, 
pursued by medium and large growers, involves the use of laborers 
residing in the plantation who often have access to plots within the prop-
erty, which allows them to work throughout the year. It is common for 
the growers to pay piece-rate for coffee production tasks, which allows 
a close adjustment of salary expenses to the actual work requirements. 
The access to land permits, on the other hand, the survival of the worker's 
family, thus complementing his income in periods of low demand. This 
does not necessarily imply that this arrangement is the most adequate. 
In fact, the income and quality of life of these workers have traditionally 
been deplorable. 
fur small producers, the mechanisms for the procurement of labor 
is the use of the family labor force. During the picking season, however, 
the strategy of all producers is to incorporate the entire labor force resi-
dent on the plantation, including minors not utilized during the rest of 
the year and, in addition, to hire labor in a strictly regional market through 
mechanisms which vary according to the type of producers. (See Figure 
1.) The small producers rely upon neighbors and local farms as com-
plementary sources of labor, while the large ones have to seek them in 
a much broader geographic area. 3 
The use of family labor largely explains the differences in the measure-
ment of sub-employment between the small, and the large and medium-
sized producers. 4 The large producers show a practically insignificant sub-
employment (which does not necessarily imply adequate incomes or op-
timal location of the labor force), while among the small ones, almost one-
third (29.3%) of labor is under-utilized. In the case of the medium and 
large producers, the fact that this measure carries no great weight is due 
not only to the previously described practice of paying piece-rate, but also 
to the diversification of crops, which allows the utilization of labor in other 
types of activities which generate profits in periods of slack coffee activity. 
In the case of the small producers, the diversification runs to basic 
grains, which, in part, are for self-consumption. This combines with the 
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Figure 4-1 
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absence of advanced cultural practices in an inexorable logic: the demand 
for work fluctuates, and in spite of the fact that there is no high demand 
for labor, the small producer does not "fire" his relatives, since the family 
subsistence imperative dominates over the profit objectives. 5 
This second strategy for the use of the labor force, although varied 
according to the type of producer, is essentially based on the capacity for 
the reproduction and survival of a large part of the labor force during the 
rest of the year, when they do not receive an income as salaried harvest 
workers; and on the flexibility of their occupations during the rest of the 
year, which allows them to adjust to the great seasonality of the demand. 
How this labor force manages to subsist is touched upon later on in this 
paper. 
There are indications that the system is far from being perfectly ad-
justed and that there are chronic problems in the procurement of labor, 
as indicated in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
PROBLEMS WITH LABOR PROCUREMENT 
With chronic Type of problems 
labor problems: (Percent) 
(27.2% of total 
interviewed) In In 
cultivation harvesting In 
only only both Total 
Small producers 16.7% 80.0 20.0 100.0 
Medium producers 35.3% 33.3 66.7 100.0 
Large producers 29.0% 25.0 12.5 62.5 100.0 
As seen in Table 2, more than 25 percent of those interviewed con-
fessed to having chronic labor problems. Consistent with previous 
arguments, it is among the medium and large producers where the in-
cidence of problems is greater, since the small ones need help primarily 
only in the harvest, which, because of their low productivity, is less than 
for the other groups of producers. 
In this respect, we must point out that a substantial increase in the 
productivity of the small producers would bring about a greater accen-
tuation in the seasonal demand for labor which, together with a labor 
market that functions on a regional basis, would put an enormous stress 
on the market. This could, in turn, seriously limit any serious considera-
tion of rapid expansion of production given the socio-cultural and popula-
tion mechanisms existing in the coffee-growing zones. 
Given these characteristics of coffee production in Nicaragua, how 
successfully has the labor force been adjusting to this seasonality of de-
mand? What has been the predominant survival strategy for the rest of 
the year? These issues are discussed in the following section. 
SUR VIV AL MECHANISMS AND THE LABOR SUPPLY 
The labor market for the coffee production is primarily regional and 
self-contained. According to the evidence emerging from the INCAE 
survey, the incorporation into the labor force during the picking season 
is a family phenomenon; that is to say, several members of the same family 
are incorporated into the picking activities, consitituting an informal work 
group within the same plantation. Of an average of 6.7 members per 
family, 2.9 join in the picking tasks. If those under 10 years of age are 
not considered, average family size is reduced to 4.2 per family, mean-
ing that nearly 70 percent join in the picking. 
The decision to join the labor force during the coffee-picking season 
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is influenced by two factors: first, the opportunities available to the 
campesino for income-producing activities on his own land or land to 
which he has access; and second, the opportunities for more stable sources 
of employment elsewhere. 
The first proposition is suggested by in-depth interviews with 
campesinos, as illustrated in the results of the survey: 44.5 percent of the 
families in the sample cultivate plots of land (averaging 3.7 manzanas per 
family, mainly in basic grains) either on their own property (52.2 percent) 
or under other arrangements (478 percent). Many of these plots that are 
not owned are probably located on the plantations of the owner for whom 
they work, as suggested by the fact that 46.1 percent of the picking families 
reside on the same coffee plantations where they do the picking. 
The important point, nevertheless, is suggested by Table 3. As can be 
seen, the incorporation of family members seems to be directly related 
to the absence of available land to do their own planting. Although the 
evidence presented in the table is not conclusive, it is very probable that 
an expansion in the cultivation of basic grains would lead to a reduction 
of the labor force available for coffee picking if such expansion occurred 
during the picking season. 7 In any case, data in Table 3 are consistent with 
~1 the strategy of incorporation described above. The lesser the availability 
\) of opportunities within family production units, the greater the propen-
c sity to join the labor force during the coffee picking season. Once the 
possibilities of work within the family production unit are exhausted, a 
part of the labor force within the family incorporates itself into coffee pick-
ing, while the other part goes to work more or less permanently in other 
occupations, together with agricultural activities. Only 14.7 percent of the 
members of the family over 10 years old do not become incorporated in 
the labor force in some form or other, being mostly engaged in domestic 
tasks. 8 Of the total of the active labor force 10 years of age and older, 82.2 
percent of those surveyed joined the picking, while the other 17.8 percent 
were engaged in other activites, such as handicrafts, services, and the 
cultivation of their own plots. 
TABLE 3 
SUPPLY OF FAMILY LABOR IN RELATION 1D OWN CULTIVATION 
Proportion of pickers 
as a % of the family labor 
force, older than 10 years 
O.Dl - 0.49 
0.50 - 0.74 
0.75 - 0.99 
1.00 
With own plot 




Without own plot 
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Behind this distribution of labor-working in the coffee harvest ver-
sus other occupations, including family activities-there is another logic 
besides the availability of land: the largest number of pickers (48.8 per-
cent) are young people between 10 and 19 years of age, with little educa-
tion and few opportunities outside of coffee picking. While the average 
age of the pickers is 25 years, the average age of the family labor force 
in other occupations rises to 29. Of the latter, 45.8 percent have some for-
mal education, while among the pickers, only 'Zl.7 percent present this 
characteristic. 
Thus, it would seem that inside the family there occurs a certain selec-
tivity in the face of the opportunities in the labor market. The picking 
activity, requiring physical skills and dexterity, 9 attracts mainly the young 
people, whose productive work opportunities-given the existing socio-
economic arrangements and technological levels-are minimal or non-
existent outside the picking itself. On the other hand, those with better 
human capital endowment are engaged in more stable activities and are 
probably able to generate a higher income throughout the year. 
Once the harvest is over, the survival logic consists of adapting as well 
as possible to the opportunities existing both in salaried work (usually 
piece-rate) and in family production, usually the cultivation of basic grains 
either on plots granted by producers within the perimeters of their coffee 
plantations or on family-owned plots. 
Field research, as referred to earlier, revealed a marked annual occupa-
tion cycle of campesinos associated with coffee growing. The complemen-
tarity of the survival strategy may be clearly observed: some of the camp-
esinos remain working as salaried laborers (piece-rate), while others take 
refuge in subsistence plots, dedicating a minimal part to activities other 
than agricultural activities. Finally, some campesinos, especially the young 
people between 10 and 14 years old, remain inactive in the formal sense 
of the word, although they do contribute with minor chores to the welfare 
of their families. The arguments and the findings presented up to this 
point may be summarized as follows: On the one hand, producers try 
to obtain profits from a crop requiring large fixed investment by seeking 
to adjust their cyclical labor input needs through a series of strategies, 
such as piece-work payment, temporary hiring, and providing access to 
land to some of the workers. Given the natural growing cycle of coffee 
and the impossibility of mechanization, these strategies would appear to 
reflect a very rational pattern of choice. 
The campesinos, on the other hand, appear to follow a strategy of 
survival and the betterment of their families that includes such 
mechanisms as self-employment-often linked to subsistence plots-
during the season of scarcity of salaried jobs; the incorporation of most 
family members, including the youngest ones, into the coffee harvest to 
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maximize cash revenues; and finally, the allocation of the more able family 
members in permanent jobs either in the countryside or in the urban areas. 
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
In earlier sections we have identified the operation and subsistence 
logic of the coffee producers and the labor force associated with coffee 
production. We examined the mechanisms employed by members of the 
labor force, including their participation in coffee picking and the sub-
sistence mechanisms employed throughout the year. As stated before, it 
is my premise that the lack of careful consideration of these mechanisms 
that operate with the producers and workers, and the interdependence 
of both groups, can lead to an agricultural and rural development policy 
characterized by high social costs and minimal benefits to the rural poor. 
This may be illustrated with examples of some of the rural development 
policies implemented up to mid-1982 in Nicaragua and the effect that they 
have had in the coffee-growing regions. 
Beginning in July 1979, the Revolutionary Government initiated a series 
of measures intended to increase the levels of production and to raise the 
living standard of the rural poor. Although the decree of confiscation 
against all of the land previously owned by Somoza and his followers was 
perhaps the step which received the most international attention, a series 
of other less publicized but perhaps more significant policies were initiated 
at this time. 
'Q Beginning with the 1979-80 agricultural cycle and accentuated in the 
1980-81 cycle, the amount of agricultural credit increased dramatically in 
relation to the levels in the previous regime-an increase of 600 percent 
over the 1978-79 cycle. The financing of corn and beans alone, typically 
grown by small farmers, accounted for 14.4 percent of the country's total 
amount of rural financing. 10 
The general objectives sought by the government with its credit and 
other agricultural policies were to make the country self-sufficient in basic 
grains, to facilitate campesino access to the land by placing ceilings on 
the rent prices of land, and to support the formation of cooperatives. 
Alongside these policies, the government took a series of measures aim-
ed at replacing exisiting internal and external commercialization 
mechanisms through the nationalization of foreign trade and the regula-
tion of internal prices. The government also encouraged the formation 
of rural worker associations, 11 while at the same time demanding from 
the producers higher wages and better living conditions for their workers. 
The policies have had significant impact on producers as well as on 
campesinos, though in many instances this impact has affected the opera-
tion and subsistence mechanisms without necessarily improving the life 
of the poorest of the rural inhabitants, as shall be seen in the following 
analysis. 
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One of the immediate effects of these policies on the producers was 
the loss of their direct access to foreign currencies as the government sold 
the coffee abroad, received foreign exchange, and paid the producers in 
local currency at rates set by the government itself. This commercializa-
tion mechanism has resulted in a loss in real income for producers. 12 
Besides this loss in real income, many of the wage and price policies in-
troduced have resulted in a substantial increase in costs to the producers. 
Local experts in the coffee industry claim that total production costs have 
doubled in the last three years, and coffee harvesting costs have tripled 
due to lower productivity increases in wages. 13 
The sum of all this is a reduction in profits and the erosion of incen-
tives to reinvest in the coffee plantation. In response, many of the pro-
ducers have suspended reinvestment and some have even cut back on 
cultivation maintenance practices in order to reduce their costs. 14 This is 
the result not only of an economic logic, but also of the political uncer-
tainty arising out of what the producers perceive to be a lack of clarity 
in the "rules of the game:' 
It is well to remember that the great majority of the coffee growers 
are small producers, and that they, as well as the large producers, have 
been affected by these policies. There are no mechanisms built into the 
policies which discriminate in favor of these smaller producers. 
We may conclude, then, that large and small producers alike have 
responded to policies that have adversely affected the profitability of their 
operations by curtailing investments and inputs. How have these policies 
affected the logic of the campesinos? 
The investment and cost curtailment strategy pursued by the producers 
has had a direct effect on the campesinos that reside permanently on the 
farm. With diminished investment and maintenance, the amount in wages 
that they may earn is enormously reduced, with the resulting deteriora-
tion in their already low standard of living. In the words of a local mediurn-
sized producer: 
I feel sorry for these poor people (the campesinos), because it is they 
who have lost the most. I let them live on the farm, but cannot pay them. 
I do not plan to invest a single cent to renovate anything (of the coffee plants) 
since coffee is no longer profitable in Nicaragua. All of us here on this farm 
are living on our past investments, feeding on what was done before ... 
Demand for seasonal labor, on the other hand, remained strong, while 
a number of factors contributed to the scarcity of seasonal labor during 
the 1980 and 1981 picking seasons. The most important factor cited by 
producers was the enormous expansion in credit for basic grains, which 
caused many campesinos to leave the wage market. A second factor cited 
was the growth of the army (E.P.S., or Ejercito Popular Sandinista), which 
recruited many campesinos and their sons, further reducing the available 
supply of seasonal labor. 
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This shortage of labor during the harvest was, in part, the cause of the 
drop in productivity during these years that reinforced the cycle of lower 
income for the producers, less investment, and less demand for perma-
nent wage workers. Attempts by the government to overcome the shor-
tage with volunteers from the urban labor force were generally successful. 
Urban workers were inexperienced and thus not as productive as their rur-
al counterparts, whom they were replacing; moreover, through careless-
ness or a lack of knowledge of harvesting techniques, they often picked ber-
ries which were not yet ripe, and sometimes caused damage to the coffee 
trees. 
Although the permanent workers on coffee haciendas have not fared 
well during the revolutionary period because of the decline in reinvest-
ment, the case of the temporary workers who work only during the harvest 
months appears to be quite different, as they have been favored by the 
new policy of higher wages. Because of.the importance of the wage work 
within the subsistence cycle of the campesinos and rural workers 
associated with coffee, these salary increases and their effects should be 
studied more closely. By government decree, wages rose 20 percent each 
year between the W78-79, W/9-80, and 1980-81 harvests, while at the same 
'-')time improvements in living conditions for workers on haciendas were 
C> demanded by new government regulations. Although these welfare 
I" measures have been effective in improving the quality of the workers' lives, 
the benefits of wage increases have been completely nullified by the in-
flation rate that the Nicaraguan economy has been experiencing: between 
1978 and 1982 wages rose by 53.6 percent, while the cumulative consumer 
price index increased by 146.1 percent. 
Many of the social gains obtained in food, health, shelter, and educa-
tion are perceived by the workers as natural vindications postponed for 
decades, and not necessarily linked to their contribution to production. 
On the contrary, the response of the worker in the face of a drop in real 
wages after inflation has been to reduce his work effort, with a resulting 
lower productivity and further declines in income for the producer. 
By rnid-1981, high-level Nicaraguan public officials from the agricultu-
ral sector recognized the serious national problems resulting from low pro-
ductivity of the labor force, the lack of clear orientation in organized labor 
policies, and a decrease in the accumulation of capital. Part of the govern-
ment's reaction has been to nationalize the farms that disinvest or that 
have strong labor conflicts. Nationalization, however, does not contribute 
to solving these problems, at least in the short-run. Given the limited ad-
ministrative capacity of the public sector, productivity has not risen as 
much as expected in the farms that have been taken over. Moreover, the 
campesinos themselves complain about the bureaucratic slowness which 
characterizes the public administrative systems and which results in delay-
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If within the production of coffee we cannot find that the producers 
or the campesinos have achieved improvement, then it is logical to ex-
amine the other aspect of the survival strategy of the rural workers; that 
is, the production of basic grains. As previously mentioned, and as part 
of a plan for self-sufficiency and inducing the campesinos to unite in 
cooperatives guided by the state, credit to the small producer was increas-
ed by 600 percent. At first glance, this may seem a great push for the 
development of the small producer, who had been traditionally abandon-
ed by financial institutions. In practice, however, this policy demonstrated 
once again that in the absence of complementary inputs and improved 
technologies, effective marketing channels, and adequate administrative 
systems, credit, by itself, only produces a temporary increase in the con-
sumption of the beneficiaries, without increasing production. 
For most campesinos equipped with traditional technologies, the 
availability of credit under liberal conditions represented no more than 
the opportunity to have cash for consumption purposes. For 1981, the 
delinquency in repayment of loans was estimated at 45.3% of the bene-
ficiaries. The reasons for nonpayment are varied: 
- Excess of bank credit: In 1980, the government went so far as to 
utilize light planes or "flying banks" for the distribution of credit 
in remote areas where it was impossible to market the harvest 
because of the inexistence of roadways or waterways. Also, 
cultivation was financed in areas not suitable for the type of grains 
sown. 
- Inadequate organization of the agricultural cooperatives: There 
were cases in which the members would get together to obtain 
money and then would proceed to leave for other regions. Others 
were thrown out of the cooperative for their irresponsibility. 
- Lack of coordination among the various state institutions, such 
as PROCAMPO (inputs) and AGROMEC (machinery) over the 
technical services they should provide to their clients. 
- Attitudes among some campesinos who considered that since the 
Revolution was for them, they should not have to pay their debts. 
These attitudes were reinforced by the inexistence of an adequate 
administrative apparatus to supervise the application and recupe-
ration of credit. 
- Poor quality of the cultivated land: Most campesinos do not have 
access to fertile land; these lands are usually in the hands of the 
medium and large private producers or the state. 
- Level of existing technology: The quality of the existing traditional 
technology, as mentioned before, is poor. In some products, such 
as com, the imported seeds were not suitable for certain regions, 
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- Lack of selectivity of clients: Credit was given to anyone who re-
quested it. It is believed that in many cases the credit was diverted 
to other purposes. 
The Minister of Agricultural Development recognized these problems. 
In 1981 he said: 
We have to be more rational with the credit, give to those who can pro-
duce most effectively. A little bit romantic, in a given moment, we were 
in a helicopter with money, giving credit to campesinos who were in faraway 
places; they would receive their credit from that helicopter that would prac-
tically throw the money into their hands; nevertheless, who was going to 
bring out that production? Through roads? By what means of transport? 
And the product stayed there, the production did not get out of there 
because in many ways that money was used to buy salt, shoes, clothing 
and not for producing. 15 
As mentioned earlier, this easy credit policy resulted in a windfall 
for many campesinos, which possibly enabled them to increase their con-
sumption levels temporarily. On the other hand, the massive injection 
of credit in an open economy with serious problems in its balance of 
payments contributed to an inflation rate that, to a great degree, voided 
v;- these temporary gains. 
,~'. The cost of production inputs rose by more than the prices of some 
basic grains set by the government, with a resulting disincentive for the 
campesinos. The opinion of some experts is that the effect has been such 
that for some grains, such as corn, it is not profitable to produce for sale. 
Thus, the tendency among campesinos now is to produce just for their 
own consumption and in lands where there are no opportunities to 
develop alternative crops. 
Part of this lack of incentive comes from the inclination of ENA BAS, 
the public institute that regulates the commodity prices, to favor the con-
sumer and not the producer and from the inability of the small producer 
to influence the price decisions of ENABAS. 
In summary, although it is true that the campesinos obtained a tem-
porary benefit from liberal credit policies, the combination of the absence 
of technological improvement, inflation, and low prices has resulted in 
. disincentives and has adversely affected the survival strategy of the 
campesino. Moreover, the alternative model of state farms is at an inci-
pient stage with serious administrative problems, and it can offer no 
alternative as yet. The operation and subsistence model of the producers 
and workers has been adversely affected by the agricultural policies to 
date, yet it has not been possible to create an alternative model that is 
effective for rural poor. 
There are indications that the government is consciously pulling back 
from its extensive credit strategy and is emphasizing rather the state farms 
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and the distribution of land in cooperatives. 16 Without careful considera-
tion of the interactions of the coffee production system, of the basic grains 
system, and of the logic of their interaction, however, it is unlikely that 
any policy will accomplish the dual purpose of raising productivity as 
well as increasing rural welfare levels. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The following are some of the development policies and social 
management lessons that can be derived from our previous analysis: 
1. In the first place, I have tried to show how the existing socio-
economic structural arrangements and the subsistence logic of the 
poorest in the rural areas make up extremely complex arrange-
ments that we need to understand in depth-and not as simple 
macroeconomic aggregates-to be able to visualize and evaluate 
the results of policies that are intended to raise the living stand-
ards of the poor. This knowledge is important not only for the 
aforementioned purposes, but also to enable a greater involve-
ment of the beneficiaries in the process of change. Otherwise, one 
succumbs to the temptation of playing the role of almighty plan-
ner, manipulating figures and political-economic objectives with 
little regard for the target groups who are supposed to benefit. 
2. It is important to point out, nevertheless, that no sectoral social 
development program can isolate itself from the national context, 
since the economic and political interplay at the macro level deter-
mines their success or failure. Often, the action at the macro level 
thwarts the sectoral objectives, as we see in the case of agricultural 
wages in Nicaragua, where an expansionist credit policy con-
tributed to eliminating the nominal gains of the wage-workers. 
Also, the state policy of capturing foreign exchange in order to 
solve its balance-of-payments problem resulted in a loss of incen-
tives for the producers and a greater reduction of foreign ex-
change. Where possible, the inconsistencies among policy objec-
tives directed to other sectors and other levels must be carefully 
examined, particularly with repect to the interactions between the 
agroexport and local consumption sectors. 
3. Apart from the above, it must be recognized that the bureaucratic 
structures which implement these policies are slow to respond 
to changes and unable to absorb new objectives. In the example 
presented, it is clearly noted how the agricultural credit program 
expanded without positive results due to the absence of a cor-
responding expansion in the rest of the institutions that provide 
the complementary inputs and services. Even within the financ-
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ing system, some of its parts (e.g., the subsystem of portfolio 
recuperation) were unable to adapt to the changes. 
4. The most interesting lesson to be learned is that given a produc-
tion system and the operational and subsistence logic associated 
with it, it is impossible-without paying a high price-to affect 
a part of the system without also noticeably affecting the rest of 
it. In the case of the coffee production system in Nicaragua, the 
policies aimed at seizing profits from the producers resulted in 
a loss for the producer, in a disruption of the subsistence cycle 
of the campesinos and agricultural workers in the coffee system, 
and in a negative impact on macroeconomic objectives, since the 
reduction in productivity led to a reduction in foreign exchange 
inflow, thus affecting the economy and society as a whole. 
NOTES 
1. A "manzana" is a unit of measure equivalent to 0.7 hectares. 
2. "Permanent workers" are those who remain on the plantation after the harvest season. 
3. One-third of the large producers and approximately 6 percent of the medium-sized 
V) producers seek labor outside the regional market; none of the small producers do. Data 
\) based on INCAE Survey, 1980-81. 
-{-
4. Sub-employment is measured as a relationship between the labor available throughout 
the year and the labor technically required during the year, according to the cultural 
practices carried out. This is a very approximate measure which requires refinement. 
5. I shall not enter here into a debate as to whether there is a sui grneris "campesino" 
logic, a la Oi.ayanov, or whether the behavior of the small producers is due to an in-
sufficient development of the production and labor market mechanisms. The point is 
that family labor is a basic mechanism of the small producer's survival strategy. 
6. In some cases, the opportunities for the family are in the form of small business, han-
dicrafts, etc. 
7. Other variables should obviously be taken into account, such as access to credit, basic 
grains prices, and above all, the coincidence of the coffee harvest, if any, with the period 
of grain harvesting, and its duration. 
8. Approximately 80 percent of the families surveyed were of rural origins (farms and 
rural villages). 
9. The survey shows that men are more productive than wome.n in picking, and that the 
15- to 24-year-old group demonstrates greater producti\;ty during the picking (in cwt 
picked per day). 
10. Until 19&'.l, rural credit was extended to around 18,000 to 20,000 beneficiaries. In 1980-81 
it had expanded to 90,000 clients, 75 percent of whom were members of cooperatives 
and 25 percent individual producers. 
11. These associations, known as Asociaciones de Trabajadores de! Campo (ATC), were 
represented by delegates at departmental and national levels. 
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12. The government maintains an official exchange rate of ten cordobas to one U.S. dollar 
(C$10 = US$1) while in rnid-1982 the legal parallel rate was 24 cordobas to the dollar, 
with black market rates at better than 40 cordobas to the dollar. There is a current infla-
tion rate of 40 percent a year. 
13. A comparison between the 1979-80 harvest and the 1981-82 harvest shows an increase 
of almost three times in the total costs; for semi-technological producers the total costs 
rose from C$5,252 per manzana to C$13,536 per manz.ana, an increase of 257%. The 
harvest cost, which previously represented 35% of the total costs, now represents 51% 
of the total costs. Assuming a steady international price level since 197!W'9 (it has ac-
tually dropped), the profit per hundred-weight (quintal) would be C$117 (US$2.71 at 
an exchange rate of C$43 to US$1.CXJ) versus US$63.90 in 19'78-;'9. At the domestic price 
paid in 1981-82, the result is a loss of US$2.04 per hundredweight. 
14. This in fact constitutes disinvestment. Though the elimination of cultivation mainlenance 
practices does not seriously affect the yields in the first few years after the cutback, 
more serious consequences arise in later years, with progressively lower yields. 
15. Cmdte. Jaime Wheelock, public discourse, 1981. 
16. Beginning in 1984, credit for state farms was also curtailed, and for the first time there 
was talk of closing uneconomic operations. J. lckis, interviews with state enterprise 




The participants will: 
1. Know some of the factors that inhibit the tranfering of power 
to communities. 
2. Understand the limitations and opportunity of being an 
outsider. 
3. Consider different ways of ending a job and course. 
Activities 
1. Discussion in large group (45 min) 
a) Factors that inhibit empowerment of.others. 
b) Outsiders as empowering or disempowering. 
2. Break (15 min) 
3. Triads (40 min) 
How to end an assignment - brainstorm all the ways in which 
an assignment can end, which can be controlled and which are 
preferred. 
4. Large group evaluation (1 hour) 
What should be the appropriate ending for this course? What 
have been the issues that make this ending suitable? 
5. Discussion of final case papers and any other ends (20 min) 
discuss usefulness of readings in homework 10. 
Materials 
1. Cookies, coffee, and other yummy party things. 
2. Special certificates? 
HOMEWORK 10 
ANALYZING YOUR CASE 
1. Read: 
1. Evans, "Analysis of Case Histories." 
2. Batten, The Non-Directive Approach to Community Work. 
3. Korten, "Reflections of a Rural Development Worker." 
4. Oxfam Field Directors' Handbook. 
3. Miller, "Columbia: An Innovative Approach to Rural 
Development." 
2. The above readings will help you to finalize your case and 
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Analyses of Case Histories 
Various methods could be devised as the basis on which 
to analyze the case histories. Of course, the best method is 
to discuss them in an interactive atmosphere with other 
concerned persons, where a wide-ranging examination of 
their implications can occur. The value in analysis of com-
plex socioeconomic-technological situations is largely subjec-
tive in any event. 
Somewhat arbitrarily, a system has been developed for 
arraying these case histories according to a structure of 
interactions and effects. 
Cases can be examined in terms of three primary ele-
ments: (1) the resources, human and material, with which 
they are concerned; (2) the means by which these resources 
are developed or utilized; an~the effect that this utiliza-
tion has on the environment and peopleWITFlin it. 
Resources themselves can be classified in two ways: 
one is in terms of natural endowments such as minerals, 
energy sources, organic materials, and climatic factors. The 
other is on the basis of human attributes, particularly ana-
lytic capability, innovation and inventiveness, and the elu-
sive quality of entrepreneurship. 
The classification of "means" includes, first of all, 
technology in its multiple forms. It also includes the provi-
sion of finance for development purposes. The role of 
government as the manifestation of social and political will 
plays a pivotal role. So, also, does foreign aid in the form 
of materiel, finance, and technical assistance. 
The effects of the interaction of resources with means 
in the pursuit of some planned objective can be classified as: 
(1) econornic--with a special subset concerned with foreign 
and domestic markets; (2) social impact; and (3) the effect 
on the physical environment. Within this generalized struc-
ture it is interesting to examine the various case histories. 
It is not surprising that about half of the cases are 
concerned particularly with resource utilization. The 
Tunisian use of available, less costly butagaz as an alterna-
tive for gasoline is an example, as is the harnessing of 




in the CRUTAC community development project in Brazil and 
in the "rural university" in Colombia. In some cases it is 
the use of a waste resource, as in the coffee beneficios of 
Central America or the generation of biogas from cow manure 
in Tanzania. 
Perhaps most important of all the resources in the 
various cases is the human function of providing inventive-
ness, organization, and drive toward goal achievement; this 
element is especially prominent in fourteen of the twenty-two 
cases. Certainly nothing occurs in the development process 
without human intervention, but these qualities are partic-
ularly prominent .in such examples as the ball-point pen 
manufacturing venture in Pakistan, the Samoan Methodist 
land development program, the engineering consulting firm in 
Singapore, and in the "coffee roads" project in Haiti. In 
each instance the enthusiasm and persistence of the moti-
vated person or group played a dominant role. 
In examining the means by which these projects have 
been accomplished (and considering that technology is the 
subject of this study), it is not surprising that some specific 
aspect of technology has been at the focus of each situation. 
This is especially the case in the involvement of such rela-
tively sophisticated technologies as the explosive metal-
working applications in Brazil or the use of bioengineering 
approaches in developing cattle feed in Korea from natural 
indigenous sources. At the other end of the sophistication 
spectrum are the design of a simple, efficient cookstove in 
Central America; the traditional process of preserving fish in 
the Philippines; or the manufacture of bricks in Malaysia 
using labor-intensive, energy-conserving methods. foreign 
technology use as a stimulus to domestic inventiveness is a 
feature of the ball-point pen enterprise in Pakistan and the 
fungal conversion projects in Central America. 
Because of the complexity, pervasiveness, and scale of 
the development need, it falls to governments of both the 
developing and the industrialized countries to take a leading 
role in planning and implementing appropriate programs 
(notwithstanding the important role played by the private 
sector in technology development and transfer). 
Sometimes this government role can thwart the develop-
ment process--it certainly does not always have a positive 
effect. Government action was decisive in the case of the 
non-use of composite flour to reduce wheat imports in 
Colombia, where policy action and market intervention have 
stopped this program. Similarly, government policy in 
Indonesia resulted in large dislocations in the farm labor 
market. In Sri Lanka, the minimal support given a research 
institute by government significantly inhibited its effective-
ness. On the other hand, government support of a similar 
institution in Brazil through provision of development funds 
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has been instrumental in revitalization and growth in that 
instance. Also, government interest and support were 
responsible for initiating the regional development program 
on Che ju Island in Korea. 
The provision or, conversely, lack of finance will 
always be a fundamental factor in any endeavor. The lack 
of finance in the case of the entrepreneur in butagaz con-
versions in Tunisia was a cause of the slow development of 
that promising technology application. Government grants 
are important to the functioning of the rural university in 
Colombia and to the similar project in Brazil. The Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), as well as the 
Ceylon Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CISIR) and most other research institutions, were funded at 
least initially through government grants. Private financial 
support makes the rural development program in Samoa 
possible (along with the dedication and enthusiasm of the 
participants, of course). 
foreign assistance from the industrialized nations is a 
prominent part of many development efforts. This is sup-
plied in combinations of material products, technical assist-
ance, and finance. In Colombia, the composite flour project 
received technical and financial assistance over a period of 
years from both the Dutch government and the Organization 
of American States, as well as assistance from the United 
States through a private research institution. The coffee 
roads project in Haiti received both financial and technical 
assistance from USA ID. The Lorena cookstove project had 
technical advice from consultants provided by a private 
voluntary organization, as did the small-scale sugar proces-
sing project in Ghana and the lime kiln development effort in 
Honduras. Private sources assisted with equipment and 
technical assistance on the hydroelectric project in Papua 
New Guinea. One of the most intensive and sustained tech-
nical assistance programs was that provided by the Denver 
Research Institute in the transfer of explosive metalworking 
technology to the Institute for Technological Studies (IPT) in 
Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
Assistance of the industrialized countries to the devel-
oping world is, of course, a central theme of the develop-
ment effort, although in recent years there has been 
increasing emphasis on the attainment of greater degrees of 
technological self-sufficiency on the part of the Third World 
(note especially the precepts of the New International Econo-
mic Order). 
In over half of the cases one of the principal outcomes 
of the impact of technology has been its economic effect. 
Thailand's main export, cassava pellets, has been heavily 
influenced by technology, both foreign and domestic. Coffee 




remote rural areas that the roads open up to commerce and 
communication. The Lorena cookstove is making possible 
appreciable savings in fuel costs for users. Che ju Island's 
economy has grown significantly as a consequence of devel-
opment work based on technology application. Explosive 
metalworking in Brazil makes savings possible through import 
substitution. Sugar-processing technology in Ghana is also 
saving foreign exchange and creating domestic employment. 
Imports have been reduced by butagaz use in Tunisia and 
by ball-point pen manufacturing in Pakistan. Local profes-
sional engineers and architects are being used in Singapore 
in place of foreign experts. On the other hand, the Thai 
mint project, which had such optimistic beginnings, has not 
lived up to expectations of having a major economic effect. 
Social impact of technology is sometimes difficult to 
assess and especially to measure; only in recent years have 
there been systematized efforts at technology assessment 
from this standpoint. Nevertheless, the cases reveal some 
important social results of technology utilization as in the 
instance of community development along Haitian roads, the 
changes in community life in Papua New Guinea as a result 
of electrification, and the social development aspects of the 
extension and education projects by universities in South 
America. Rice hulling in Java had serious impact on rural 
populations, especially women. Part of the disappointment in 
the economic performance of the Thai mint program was the 
result of life-style preferences of farmers in that country. 
The absence of technological innovation in the Philippines' 
fish-drying industry permits it to continue as a family-
centered activity. 
Finally, environmental effects have resulted from tech-
nology introduction in several of the examples. Cassava-
pellet dust pollution has been a very important cause of 
technological innovation and economic impact in Thailand. 
The Lorena cookstove has not only reduced deforestation in 
Central America but has also improved the health conditions 
of housewives in that region. The biog as generators in 
Tanzania have also reduced the demand for fuel wood. And 
fungal fermentation holds promise of reducing the polluting 
effects of coffee processing wastes while creating a valuable 
feed supplement for livestock. 
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CASE HISTORIES MATRIX 
This matrix is based on the analysis method presented 
in the text. Principal elements of case histories appear in 
the left-hand column; the individual cases, identified by 
number and country of occurrence are across the top; the 
numbers and country names correspond to the list of cases. 
A mark was entered in a column if that specific element 
of the analysis format was judged to be relevant to the case. 
There is, obviously, a degree of subjectivity in deciding the 
relative importance of one of the analysis elements, but it is 
felt that this system is useful. 
It can be used as a means of selecting cases for re-
view, based either on country site or on identification of 
some particular set of characteristics. Or, it may be useful 
to compare to the reader's own assessment after reading an 
individual case. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Obtaining, Selecting, 
and Editing Cases 
TRAINERS who want to use cases need cases to use. In our ex-
perience the best providers of cases are the members of training 
groups. They can be stimulated to provide them if, when they 
have listed their problems according to the procedures outlined 
on pp. 8g-gI, the trainer asks each member of the group to 
write a brief descriptive account of what he did and with what 
result in some specific situation in which he encountered one of 
these problems and felt that he had not succeeded in coping 
satisfactorily with it. Each situation of this kind provides 
material for a case, and once the trainer has thus stimulated the 
members of the group to try to remember one or more of them, 
nearly everyone will usually be able to do so. 
The trainer will then have a stock of potentially suitable cases 
for use with the group which produced them and he can con-
tinually add to his stock by following the same procedure with 
other groups whenever he can. In this way he can accumulate 
a wide variety of cases which he can, at need, use with training 
groups whose members cannot contribute their own cases for 
discussion, either because of shortage of time, or because they 
are inexperienced, or for any other reason. 
Cases produced in this way, however, are only potentially 
suitable, even for the group which produced them, and most 
cases as originally contributed can be very much improved by 
careful editing before they are used. In fact, careful selection 
and editing of a case can greatly increase the chances that the 
members of a group will accept it when the trainer tests it 
with them for relevance and acceptability as described on 
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pp. 97-8, and that they will be able to discuss it profitably if 
they do accept it. 
Every case should satisfy certain basic requirements and cases 
which do not satisfy them should either be edited until they do, 
or if this should prove impossible, they should be scrapped. 
These requirements can be stated as follows: 
I. that it leaves TW room for doubt about the identi!J ef the person 
who encountered the problem; 
2. that the problem it presents is one that quite commonly occurs and 
one that workers find it dijficult to cope with; 
3. that it states quite specifically what the worker did and with what 
result; and 
4. that he might have succeeded if he had more skill. 
There are many other editing points too numerous to have 
specific mention here, although some of them are indicated by 
the editing of the three examples which follow. However, two 
points particularly deserve mention. The first is that even the 
slightest hint of criticism of the conduct of the worker in the 
case should be deleted. If it is left in the members of the train-
ing group will not want to accept the worker and his problem 
as typical of themselves and their problems, and this will defeat 
the purpose of the trainer in introducing the case. 
The second point is that a trainer may edit a case differently 
according to the kind of training group he has specifically in 
mind. Thus the inclusion of detail about the kind of situation 
in which a particular problem occurs will strengthen the 
presentation of a case when it is used with members of a training 
group who all work in situations of a similar kind: but the same 
amount of detail will weaken a case-and should therefore be 
omitted-when the case is used with a training group composed 
of members most of whom do not work in situations of that 
specific kind. This point occurs in the editing of Exampk Three 
below. 
The following case is in the form in which it was contributed 
for discussion by a member of the Youth Service. 
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Example One 
The 'Commando Club' which has a strong tradition for outdoor 
activities arranged a week-end camp on their usual camping site. 
'The Arabs', a mixed group from a different club, asked if they 
could share the camp with them. The 'Commandos' agreed and 
twelve members of the mixed group came to the camp accompanied 
by their leader. 
On the Saturday evening the 'Commandos', their leader, and the 
leader of the mixed group went off for a hike, while the 'Arabs', the 
mixed group, preferred to stay in camp. When the hikers returned, 
they found the 'Arabs' lounging around the fire 'necking'. The leader 
of the 'Commandos' was annoyed and said so, whereupon the 'Arabs' 
became abusive. The 'Commandos' leader then said flatly that he 
would not have them in camp again and has since refused to accept 
another visit. 
This is a poor case and if one assesses it to see how well it 
meets the requirements stated on the previous page it is easy 
to see why. There are two youth leaders and two groups of 
young people and the case is so presented that the reader is left 
to think out for himself whose problem is presented by the case 
and just what the problem is. 
This could be remedied by editing, but even if this were done 
it is more than doubtful whether it could ever become a good 
case. One would expect most training groups of youth leaders 
to reject it, partly because mo't of them would feel that they 
might never get involved in a situation of that kind, and partly 
because the outcome or problem aspect of the case might seem 
to them too insignificant to worry about. This, therefore, is the 
kind of case to scrap. 
Example Two 
A Youth Centre has been established for several years in its own 
trnnius ( 1) with a good Management Committee and also a hard-
working Members' Committee. When the Centre was established 
the canteen was staffed by a rota of lady helpers and this rota has 
worked satisfactorily for four years. 
A full-time leader is appointed and tM two previous leaders are made 
assistants. This team works well in tM club situation. (2) 
The leader suddenly decides that it should be the task of his senior 
girl members together with a few boys to staff the canteen. (3) 
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At a Management Committee he puts forward this proposal, 
pointing out that the running of a canteen is a responsible job and 
offers a training situation for his senior members. 
The representative on the Management Committee of the lady 
helpers is upset at this idea, threatens to withdraw her services from 
the club and intimates that she will be able to persuade the other 
lady members to do likewise. 
The Club Leader, however, has already committed his members to fonn a 
rota and this is due to start the following Monday. (4) He therefore tries to 
persuade the Management Committee that his idea is the right one, 
but their sympathies are with the lady helpers' representative whom 
they have known for four years and not with the leader who has 
recently been appointed. 
The Chairman of tM Management Committee sees this as a possible rift 
in tM organization of tM club and closes tM discussion by saying that he will 
discuss the problem with tM leader and tM representative of the lady Mlpers 
after the formal business of the Management Committee has been concluded. (5) 
This has the makings of a very good case. Today's trend in 
the You th Service is all for getting young people to undertake 
more responsibilities for the day-to-day conduct of affairs within 
their clubs, and one of the major difficulties of a youth leader 
who tries to do this may be the reluctance of his adult helpers 
to hand over some of their responsibilities to young people. Thus 
very many youth leaders are likely to agree that this case illus-
trates a problem that is very relevant to themselves. The case is 
also a good one because it provides quite a clear picture of what 
the leader did and of the kind of difficulty he got into as a result 
of what he did. 
This having been said, it is still true that the case can be con-
siderably improved by editing. The points at which this might 
be done are indicated in the text of the case by italics and by 
the figures in parentheses. The first two points are very minor 
ones, for the italics merely indicate information which could 
be omitted as irrelevant to the problem contained in the case. 
Point (4) is more important, for the information provided by 
the words italicized refers to something the leader did at an 
earlier stage and would be more suitably provided at (3). It is, 
however, even more important that something should be done 
about the final paragraph, for it weakens the case from the 
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point of view of leader-training by informing us that the Chair-
man of the Management Committee has taken over from the 
leader responsibility for dealing with the leader's problem. For 
use with youth leaders, therefore, the case would be much 
improved if the whole of the last paragraph were omitted. 
If the case were edited in this way it would then read as 
follows: 
A Youth Centre has been established for four years with a good 
Management Committee and also a hard-working Members' Com-
mittee. When the Centre was established the canteen was staffed by 
a rota oflady helpers, and this rota has worked satisfactorily for four 
yeani. 
Then a new full-time leader is appointed who thinks that his 
senior girl members together with a few boys should staff the can-
teen. He discusses this with his Members' Committee and other club 
members who accept the idea and organize a rota which is due to 
start the following Monday. 
He then seeks the approval of his Management Committee, ex-
plaining that the running of a canteen is a responsible job which 
provides a good training situation fur his senior members. 
The representative on the Management Committee of the lady 
helpers is upset at this idea. She threatens to withdraw her services 
from the club and intimates that she will be able to persuade the 
other lady helpers to do likewise. 
Aware that he has already committed himself with his members, 
the leader does his best to persuade the Management Committee 
that his idea is the right one, but their sympathies are with the lady 
helper on the Management Committee whom they have known for 
four years, and not with the leader who has only recently been 
appointed. So the leader now has a difficult problem on his hands. 
Could he have avoided it and still achieved his purpose, and if so, 
how? 
Example Three 
Tiu leader of a church club of some thirty members, meeting once a week, 
decUhs after fall consultation with the Management and Membm' Com-
mittus and the chUTch authorit"W to relax the rule of church mmrbmhip and 
apen the club to mere people. 
This move is resented by Richard, a member of long standing and a keen 
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communicant, and by the technical group to which he belongs which is re-
sponsible for maintaining the club electrics (record player, etc.). 
This group loo/cs on newcomers with suspicion and Richard expresses his 
resentment (I) by avoiding the payment of subscriptions whenever 
possible. When the leader tackles him on this he becomes abusive, 
and the leader feels that he can take little definite action because the 
subscriptions are administered in a slack way, and there ia no easy 
way to check up. 
The problem reaches a critical point when the Membm' CommiUee, of 
which the leader is chairman, (2) decides to tighten up the door proced-
ure and raise the subs. 
At the meeting, some of the committee who do not pay subs claim 
that they need not as they are in effect helpers. The Chairman (3) 
said that the responsibility as to whether they paid or not was theini, 
but he advised that they should pay and put forward several reasons. 
After a full discussion they voted in favour of exempting themselves 
from subs. Then the question of Richard was raised (4) as he was not 
a committee member. The committee were strongly divided and 
recommended as a compromise that the leader should cxcrcUc his 
discretion in the matter. 
Subsequently the leader tried to regularize the situation by asking 
Richard to pay up, but Richard was abusive. He left the club and tJie 
church ( 1) and took his technical group with him. 
Could the leadt:r have avoided this outcome? 
.This is also potentially a good case. It leaves one in no doubt 
about whose problem it presents, and the problem itself is one 
that any leader may encounter from time to time and have 
difficulty in dealing with. Once again, however, the case can be 
considerably improved by editing. Most of the detailed in-
formation ( x) given at the beginning of the case should be 
omitted, since it helps to distract attention from the basic fact 
that the leader thought that Richard should pay and Richard, 
for reasons best known to himself, thought otherwise. Also, if 
the club is defined as a club of one particular kind-a small 
church club open on one night a week only-the case may 
appear less relevant than it really is to leaders, for example, of 
large open clubs which meet nearly every night of the week. 
This might influence them against accepting it in spite of the 
fact that the basic problem the case presents can face the leader 
in any kind of club. 
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The case can also be improved by editing it at points (2), 
(3), and (4) to bring out more clearly what the leader actually 
did. This can be done by rewriting the words underlined at (2) 
to make it clear that it was the leader who introduced into the 
Members' Committee the idea of tightening up the door pro-
cedure and raising the subs; by substituting 'leader' for 'chair-
man' at point (3); and by substituting 'Then the leader raised 
the question of Richard .. .' for 'Then the question of Richard 
was raised' at point (4). The purpose of all three emendations 
is to help focus the attention of the members of a training group 
more directly on how the leader tried to cope with his problem. 
If the case is edited in this way it will then read as follows: 
A club leader has noticed that Richard, a senior club member who 
leads the group which looks after the club's electrics (record-player, 
etc.), has got into the habit of avoiding paying his club subscription 
whenever possible. When the leader tackles him on this he becomes 
abusive, and the leader feels that he can take little definite action 
because he is aware that the subscriptions are not well administered 
and there is no easy way to check up. 
The leader then decides to get the Members' Committee, of which 
he is the chairman, to tighten up the door procedure and raise the 
subs. 
At the meeting of this committee some of the committee members 
who are also in arrears with subs claim that they need not pay as 
they arc in effect club helpers. The leader replies that whether they 
should pay or not is for the committee to decide, but he suggests they 
ought to pay and puts forward several reasons. After a full discussion 
the members of the committee vote in favour of exempting them-
selves from subs. Then the leader raises the question of Richard who 
is not a committee member but who also helps in the club. The 
members of the committee are strongly divided and recommend as 
a compromise that the leader should exercise his own discretion in 
the matter. 
Subsequently the leader tries to regularize the situation by asking 
Richard to pay up. But Richard becomes abusive and finally leaves 
the club taking the technical group with him. 
Could the leader have avoided this outcome? 
The impact of a case can sometimes be strengthened by 
editing it so that the person who encountered the problem tells 
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his own story. If Example Three were rewritten in this way it 
might read as follows: 
I am a bit worried about the way I handled a problem that I came 
up against in the club recently. I had noticed that one of my senior 
club members, a chap called Richard, had got into the habit of 
avoiding paying his club subscription whenever he could, and since 
the system for collecting subs had got a bit slack, he had been getting 
away with it for some time. Apart from that he was quite a useful 
club member for he and a few of his friends looked after the club 
electrics (record-player, etc.) and repaired them iftheywcntwrong. 
However, that was no reason why he should not pay his subs, but 
when I tackled him on the subject he became abusive, so I let the 
matter drop for the time being until I could feel I was on really 
strong ground. 
I'm chairman of the Members' Committee in our club, and my 
next step was to get them to tighten up the door procedure so that 
no one would be able to get by without paying his subs. This wasn't 
at all popular with some of the committee members who also hap-
pened to be in arrears with their subs, and they took the line that as 
committee members they were really helpers and should not have to 
pay anything. I said that that was for the committee to decide, hut 
that in my view everyone ought to pay and I told them why. The 
committee members discussed the pros and cons of this for a long 
time, but the upshot was that they decided to exempt themselves 
from paying subs. 
I then raised the question of Richard who is not a committee 
member but who also d~ a lot to help the club. This led to still 
more discussion which ended with them telling me that I must do 
what I thought best. 
I thought it over and decided that if I exempted Richard then a 
whole lot of other members would claim exemption too, so orice 
again I asked Richard to pay up but he would have none of it. 
When I insisted, he left the club and his friends with him, and none 
of them has been back since. 
Could you have handled this problem better? 
A case can also sometimes be rewritten from the viewpoint 
of the person who, in the original case, was seen by the 'worker' 
as the cause of his problem. In Example Two, for instance, the 
youth leader's problem is with his Management Committee, 
and the case is suitable for use with a training group of youth 
leaders. But the final paragraph of the original case shows that 
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the youth leader, through what he did, had also created a 
problem for the Chairman of the Management Committee. If 
the case were rewritten to present the problem as the Chairman 
saw it, it could then be used on a training course for chairmen 
and members of Management Committees. The training appli-
cations of many cases can be extended in this way. 
But however carefully a trainer may edit a case, and however 
good a case may seem to him to be, he can never be sure that it 
really is good until he has tested and used it with a training 
group. This may reveal the need for further editing and it is 
only when this has been done and the amended case has satis-
factorily passed the test of further use that the trainer can con-
fidently add it to his permanent stock of 'good' cases. 
There is one final point. Cases vary very greatly in respect of 
the difficulty of the problems they present and in respect of the 
level of skill, or lack of it, of the 'workers' who encounter them: 
and the training value of a case is greatly enhanced if the mem-
bers of the training group are able to identify themselves with 
the way the 'worker' tries to achieve his purpose as well as with 
the problem presented in the case. The ideal case for any par-
ticular group is one which presents a 'worker' tackling a situa-
tion in much the same way as the members of the training group 
would normally have done themselves, and with much the 
same result. They then become thoroughly involved in the 
process of pooling their ideas and experience in order to 
understand just why the 'worker' failed and just how he (and 
by implication also themselves) could have done better. 
Conclusion 
IT has been our theme in this book that every 'worker' in every 
situation in which he works will necessarily use one or other of 
two approaches according to whether his intention is basically 
directive or non-directive; that each approach offers some 
advantages and incurs some disadvantages that the other lacks; 
and that in order to be consistently efficient in achieving his pur-
poses the worker needs realistically to assess which of these 
approaches is the more appropriate one for him to use in each 
of the situations in which he works. 
We have outlined the relevant factors of choice as we see them 
and have described the kinds of skill we think are needed to 
enable workers to use the non-directive approach to good effect. 
We have done this becawe we believe that many workers 
habitually use the directive approach in situations where the 
non-directive approach would suit their purposes better; and 
that many others who aim to work non-directively often defeat 
themselves: either because they sometimes try to do so when the 
situation is not right for it, or because in trying to be non-
directive they adopt too passive a role. In fact, their role should 
be negative only in the sense that they refrain from giving their 
own opinions, since this would defeat their main object of 
getting people to think things out for themselves. In every other 
respect their role is a very active one. It demands real skill to 
help people to think and decide realistically and constructively 
in the light of all the available facts about the things that really 
matter to them : and it is by thus helping people to think more 
effectively for themselves that the worker also helps them more 
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Reflections of a Village 
Development Worker1 
Apichart Thongyu 
(Translated by fames Hopkins) 
Old bumpy laterite road--
to the right, paddy fields and dikes; 
small stream on the left, water nearly dry. 
All along the road, a patchwork of grove and paddy 
just past the shabby wooden bridge 
resting on the stream ahead, 
lies the village ..... people. 
Large tamarind grove, dawn awakens: 
smoke drifts overhead in early morning light, 
cattle, buffalo and people emerge from dwellings. 
Noon passes, dusk falls: 
children herd buffalo to pens, maidens draw and fetch water, 
smoke arises once again. 
Evening comes, only sounds of householders: 
sorrow, joy, happiness, suffering. 
Silence and tranquility crawl in, covering the village. 
Arising early, 
vanishing into the fields carrying a spade, 
in my heart a question: 
this? backward, undeveloped land; 
this? problem people of the country; 
this? symbol of ignorance; 
this? symbol of malnutrition; 
this? symbol of blackness, deprivation, and poverty? 
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Large square mesh composed of farm huts and houses. 
People and their Way; one hundred and sixty years have passed, 
change creeps slowly, filled with energy, yet balance. 
Hot potent wind swoops in shouting unexpected turbulence; 
aching and cracking. 
One question drifts in on the hot wind, lingering in my thoughts: 
"What am I to do here?" 
After the season which has passed, 
yellow wildflowers cover the paddy fields, 
sunheat nearly bums crisp dried leaves. 
People passing to and fro, in their hands: 
workknives, baskets, fish nets. 
Far in the distance, ahead lies a dry mountain. 
As dusk falls, people return home carrying scrub wood, 
vegetables, grass, tadpoles, crabs, fish. 
Moonlight fills the sky, lustrous gold covers all; 
undeveloped backwardness cannot be found. 
Again the question arises: "What am I to do here?" 
Sitting, reflecting on the past, reviewing sounds spoken from the 
outside and their thoughts toward here: "stupid ... poor ... sick;" 
"backward ... undeveloped; not-growing ... inert .. .lazy;" 
"unhealthy .. .lacking education:' 
That is the force which pushed me here, together with the sound 
floating on the wind: "You are a developer:' 
The village is burning with heat, everyone works in the paddy 
fields; grandpa and son plow the fields, grandma and daughter 
care for little children and prepare food. 
Dawn till dusk, then go home. 
Hot wind blows by; outside and inside, scorching heat. 
Thought turns to the words of rice-eaters who have never farmed, 
words which echo with a striking feeling: 'Those rice farmers ... 
so lazy that they are poor:' 
Another hot blast sweeps in, leaves fall to the cracked earth; 
people herd buffaloes home. 
Hoey! Hoey! Hoey! 
Kung king ... kung king ... kung king, 
Small boys stuffs sticky rice in mouth, 
runs and jumps upon buffalo back. 
Dawn rays of silver and gold grasp the horizon, 
shortly the picture will fade. 
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On the road from the village to the paddy fields, 
no trace of '1ife" apart from "work," 
no trace of "education" apart from '1ife." 
Bamboo is split open; one, two, three, four. 
Enough for a house to live, only three walls is ample. 
Out front a ladder leans, tied to a beam; 
when leaving draw up the ladder, all villagers know ... 
gone to the paddy fields. 
No question about morality of the village people. 
No noisy sounds of confusion, 
no loud sounds of people-crowds, 
no heaps of noise from engines, 
no sound of search for freedom, 
no sound of calls for honor and rank; 
only quietude, 
life, and love. 
One hundred sixty years of this village, 
no introduction to Dharma, 
':') no ethical theories, 
~ no economic plan, 
no articles of government, 
no philosophical theory. 
Only the life of people, 
propagated in tranquil bliss. 
lat aat..iat aat, 
bamboo leaves drift down into a pile on the ground; 
Grandma sits spinning cotton. 
Under the house is a buffalo pen ... 
a shady resting place ... 
a conversation spot ... 
where the weaving loom sits ... 
tomorrow ... grandma's new sarong will be finished. 
Sitting reflecting quietly in my heart 
with the picture appearing before me, 
'1s this the meaning of laziness and backwardness?" 
While philosophers are investigating the answers of life, 
economists are thinking and searching for economic systems, 
politicians are struggling for power, 
specialists are arguing over theories, 
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barristers are drafting laws, 
social workers are speaking of freedom, 
humanitarians are speaking of human rights, 
monks are delivering sermons to the people, 
rice farmers in the village are harvesting. 
Those rice kernels 
shall feed the people. 
Rice is food; 
vegetables, fish, birds, mice, are food. 
People in the village create, make .. .find by themselves. 
Silkworms, mulberry, cotton; 
with two hands, they become clothing. 
Tree roots, grass blades; 
with brains, they become curatives for disease and illness. 
Trees, leaves; 
with labor, they are constructed into dwelling. 
Ethics, virtues; 
by telling and showing the way of life, 
establish and thoroughly transmit values of righteousness. 
What else do humans want! 
Entire Khun trees blossom in yellow flowers, 
today the village is exited. 
Some people are saying: 
"The Boss is coming today to recommend planting new crops:' 
The people fill the village temple pavillion; 
shortly, a green vehicle glides in, 
three men alight. 
They start training about planting crops after the rice season, 
together with exhortations not to be lazy. 
People nod their heads as if they understand. 
When the three men have left, 
sounds of some people arise randomly: 
''The plague! ... only good at speaking, can they do it? ... 
I've planted since my father, my grandfather! 
What do they know better than I?" 
Grandpa, seventy-six years old, 
is planting rice in the middle of the paddy field, 
from morning until afternoon; 
rushing the planting to catch the early rains, 
and hurrying back home before dusk 
because yesterday, 
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the district office ordered: 
all villagers must prepare to enter training about: 
"Conditions of Malnutrition Which Cause Ill-health and Weakness." 
Jong, a small girl in the village, is carried out, 
she is being taken to a hospital in the city. 
White-haired grandfather prevents it; 
they all take Jong to his house, 
place her on the porch. 
Before the Buddha altar, grandfather busily prepares things. 
Shortly, the exorcist arrives; 
after sitting and chanting for awhile, 
a strange language bursts out. 
White-haired grandfather translates, 
then steps down and disappears towards the garden, 
everyone sits waiting: 
grandfather returns with four or five leaves, 
binds them together, puts them in his mouth, chews them, 
it's so confusing: I don't know, are they backward or not? 
and sprays them on Jong's head. 
Jong gradually moves her eyes, awakens, and regains consciousness; 
'··"I Afterwards, Jong arises and walks back home; 
·~ in the evening, 
I see her pushing a water cart vigorously. 
Days and time change, 
people change, 
feelings and moods change. 
I, too, am the same; 
many things have changed. 
I really wonder about myself: 
who is actually being developed, 
us, or the people in the villages? 
Baskets covered and wrapped with an old sarong, 
placed on wooden shelves under the house: 
one ... two ... three ... four ... 
five ... six .. . 
Grandmother delicately pulls them out, 
unwraps the cloth carefully; 
left hand swatting flies swarming around, 
right hand scratching and flicking 
silkworms crowded in the basket, 
white and nearly full-grown. 
Reflections of a Village Droelapment Yhrker 
Not too much longer, 
and another new sarong will exist. 
Daybreak, 
another new day. 
Arising slowly, 
lonely and thinking of someone; 
turning and seeing Grandfather sitting next to the water jar, 
using an axe to cut a plow handle, 
stroking it delightedly. 
Loneliness disappears; 
the person who turns the earth is right here. 
It's nearly time to leave the village: 
Mother pulls my arm and has me sit close by; 
she describes the collective life of the village, 
history which has never poured out in print. 
Each word ... each sentence 
is full of life: 
the story of the village in the past, 
the fear of the future, 
the struggle of the present. 
Turning back to look once again, 
to be sure. 
Water in the stream is clear and clean, 
Mother with a new silk skirt, 
Father with a checkered sarong, 
people with Virtue, 
life with simplicity. 
Questions are not exhausted, even at parting: 
Undeveloped, really? 
Backward, really? 
In the time that has passed, 
only one type of development was seen: 
that of myself! 
NOTE 
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The non-governmental organisation 
In 1t11 fiold operations the NGO cannot expect to create structures parallel 
to those of the State, nor act as a substitute in the provision of services 
which are recognised as a State responsibility. However, NG Os can be 
effective in working with those groups ignored or by-passed by large 
State development schemes. The main priority should be to try to reach 
the growing numbers of people not affected by liberal reforms or 
increases in wealth. 
Perhaps the main problem for the NGO is that the scale of its 
operations is too small to effect direct structural change at a general 
level. It can, however, be effective in supporting small-scale self-help 
schemes and pilot pro1ects, and can assist in the development of ideas 
It must be recognised, though, that the self-help approach, while it 1s 
ohen the only way open to the poor in a world of shrinking resources. 
and can bring tangible benefits to those in need, is part of a trend in 
economic development that mainly benefits the wealthy. So long as the 
poor are forced to sustain their own development, without the 
assistance or even cooperation of society at large, they will remain 
marginalised both economically and politically. Therefore the NGO 
shouid encourage enlightened development education directed at the 
general populations of both Third World and industrialised nations and 
especially at governments. By exposing the problems caused by poverty 
to society at large, it is hoped to change attitudes towards the poor and 
affect policies so that those who are privileged will become more active 
in helping the poor and will direct funds and resources to that end. 
Frequently in low-income areas many of the resources necessary for 
development exist, but are either under-utilised or appropriated by 
wealthy elites. Foremost among these is the intelligence, ingenuity and 
effort of labour itself. Self-help programmes funded by the NGO may 
well not bring about structural change on a large scale, but they can at 
least help ensure that reserves of capital, labour, appropriate 
technologies etc. are used to a more constructive end - an end which 
will benefit the poor and not the upper income groups. 
Thus, the ability of the NGO to achieve its goals depends not only on 
its own resources and policies, but also on the constraints operating in 
the environment in which it works. Much of the NGO input may seem 
discouragingly fragmentary and yet the development agency must work 
within prevailing political conditions. With persistence and tact some 
solutions may be possible, even in the most intractable political 
situations. In many areas the NGO faces not so much an antipathetic 
government as a complete vacuum, where the development effort is 
circumscribed by problems other than the political. In such 
circumstances the government may well welcome the operations of the 
NGO. 
However, even in areas where the need is very great, NGOs should 
never take for granted their impact, and their work must be monitored 
and assessed regularly. One of the shortcomings of much past NGO 
work has been the way programmes have been influenced by the need 
to be financially accountable in the short-term. Development in a true 
and profound sense 1s a slow process. One cannot expect people to 
change their life-styles and life-chances in the short time-span of the 
average NGO programme In some ways funding and volunteer 
agencies can be blamed for a proiect-centred view of development 
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timetable. This pressure, which may cause considerable strain i: 
project, is compounded by the need felt b· st NGOs to bt 
structures to demonstrate a programme's succt. __ . 
This is not to say that the NGO should not support small, short-tE 
projects with limited, concrete goals, but that development should 
seen as a gradual and sometimes radical process rather than a serie~ 
projects. Often it is not the :lUtcome of a project - in terms of 
material benefits accruing, the numbers of people affected etc. - wh 
is most important. The very act of demanding a service can b1 
reflection of a people's awareness of their role in society, their needs i 
the obstacles they confront. And sometimes the development of 1 
awareness can be the main goal of a programme. (See PART FOUi 
Oxfam and development 
Oxtam's main objective is outlined in its Memorandum of Associatir 
"The relief of poverty, distress and suffering in every part of the we 
without regard to political and religious beliefs. " 
This involves, on the one hand, trying to relieve the suffering cau: 
by poverty and, on the other, reducing the total number of poor. [ 
Oxtam is trying to do something more: namely, to influence the proc• 
of development in such a way that the poorest are enabled to t; 
charge of their own lives and to mount their own initiatives in 
improvement of living standards. Thus, the main objective is to try 
end bias against the poor in the development process. 
It is hoped that the projects supported by Oxfam will be designed b' 
for: 
O the poorest to have more (particularly in terms of food and heal 
care) and to gain control of a fair share of the world's resources, ar 
O for the poor to be more, in terms of self-confidence, ability 
manage their own future, and improving their status in society 
large. 
We are not just concerned, therefore, with material improvem 
through rural or urban production schemes or health programmes. I 
also with the manner in which material change is organised; i.e., v... 
the social institutions and organisations that accompany th' 
programmes. 
It follows that the main aim of Oxfam as a funding agency is not s1m 
to improve access to resources or deliver essential services, but to as~ 
the poor to gain increasing control over resources and to remove 1 
obstacles to a more equitable distribution. To have any real impa 
development must involve a more rational distribution of ownersh 
income transfer; institutional reform; the provision of services and t 
increased participation of the poor in political life. 
Ox tam has identified three key ob1ectives 1n its work: 
a: To fund and support small-scale development programmes in cert, 
priority areas (geographic and functional) which will enable the poor 
as tar as possible - to provide for their own needs, to obtain soc 
justice and to secure their basic human rights. 
b: To fund and support humanitarian welfare work among depr1v 
people in certain priority areas. 
c: To fund, plan and, where necessary, operate an effective rel 
response to those disasters identified as requiring Oxfam's assistanc 
Each of these priorities is discussed in some detail in the followr 
'PARTS' of the Handbook. Often development. relief and welf; 
programmes will in reality be indivisible. And it is hoped that 








peoole gradually to devise their own strategies for subsistence and 
~ 31. 
.s the primary purpose of this Handbook to provide guidelines. 
grouped largely under the headings of Agriculture, Health, Social and 
Economic Development, to show how our aims may be pursued But. 
however important such guidelines and the development framework 
they imply may be, we must always remember that Oxfam exists to serve 
people, not to promote an ideology or development model 
The first essential. then. is to respond to human need out of 
compassion and a sense of natural kinship with those who suffer. The 
guidelines are necessary so that this humanitarian impulse may be 
tempered with realism, so that it does not degenerate into mere 
sentimentality. Oxfam field staff should be flexible and imaginative in 
interpreting the guidelines and should respond to human need wherever 
there is a genuine opportunity to do so. 
The main challenge for aid agencies is twofold: 
O the urgent need to save the destitute from extreme deprivation and 
premature death, and 
D the need to arrest and reverse the process of decline towards 
destitution. 
To the extent that in any given situation the former dominates. 
Oxfam's response will be in terms of gifts in cash and kind. and will be 
a short-term measure until a more substantial change in the condition of 
the victims can be effected. Thus, even though'Oxfam's main aim is to 
help people to help themselves. 'welfare' projects may 1n certain 
circumstances be necessary, especially where the people concerned are 
not in a position to benefit from a development programme. 
In situations where the main priority is to reverse the process of 
destitution, it is important to understand not only present conditions. 
but also the past and likely future dynamics of change. and to seek a 
durable solution. This will be one which results in the rehabi11tat1on of the 
poor in such a way that there is a good chance of continued 
improvement after Oxfam ceases to be involved. 
The alternative strategies available to field staff. when set against the 
limited resources at their disposal, serve to underline the dilemma they 
constantly face between 'rescue' and development aid. Whereas rescue 
aid may ensure survival but solve none of the long-term problems, 
development aid, while holding the promise of a self-sustaining pattern 
of development, entails a high degree of risk and may easily fail. 
Although the Handbook is primarily concerned with development 
strategy, it must be emphasised that the destitute who have no 
resources and little hope should receive assistance to secure their 
survival. Ideally, relief will give way to longer-term development 
programmes. 
Disasters and emergencies present a challenge which Oxfam cannot 
ignore. The plight of people made homeless or afflicted by sudden 
disaster such as earthquakes, hurricanes, epidemics or forced 
migrations evokes a response from the public which has provided much 
of the impetus for the growth of Oxfam. To do justice to the compassion 
felt by our supporters and by the public as a whole, it 1s essential that we 
continue to assist 1n times of emergency and disaster (for detailed 
gu1del1nes see PART EIGHT) 
There are many communities in the world where people live 1n a 
chronic state of destitution, degradation and illness, for which 
development can offer no solutions. Compassion demands that Oxfarn 
sho' · ;pon1 · 1ch c 3tanc 
@] Development If it is accepted that Oxfam strives to arrest · reverse the proc 
that result in deprivation, the difficulties of , Jning appropriat• 
effective programmes should not be underestimated. It takes 
patience and imagination to gain a full understanding of C'-
conditions and their causes, and to formulate and promote solu' 
This is in many ways a new field and, unfortunately, little can be le; 
from orthodox development programmes designed from the top d 
indeed, in some cases it is the unequal and unacceptable effects of 
programmes that Oxfam will have to counter. 
Disillusionment with development projects which stress n, 
economic objectives has resulted in a search for other strategies v 
stress the social dynamics of change and the nature of the distrib 
of assets within society. The dominant, 'modernisation', approa 
rural development may well have increased levels of agricu 
production but has also increased inequalities and helped to perpe 
unjust and inegalitarian forms of organisation. Modernisation 
benefited some, but the vast majority of people in the world cont in 
be marginalised and excluded from development projects. 
Oxfam tries to avoid becoming involved in development work ; 
operational agency, but to retain its integrity as a funding agr 
Whereas in the past funds were often channelled through 
international agencies, missions and other expatriate groups, nov 
emphasis is on funding directly either grass-roots groups or 
intermediate development agencies. Sometimes the opera! 
approach to aid may seem less frustrating and more dramatic in its E 
(especially if development is measured by material indices) than thr 
centralist approach. But a decentralised form of development is t 
on the view that the development initiative is more likely t• 
sustainable if there is strong support for, and a high degree of contr• 
the programme at the local level. 
It is mainly for this reason that Oxfam's policy in developmen 
moved away from the funding of large numbers of expatriate ex 
and technical advisers towards providing local people with 
opportunity to put their own initiatives, ideas and enthusiasm to 
for the benefit of their own communities. Thus, Oxfam's role ir 
development process is that of a partner. Although the organisatio1 
benefited from the experience of working in many different cour 
and contrasting circumstances, each culture and socio-political co1 
presents unique problems, and it is therefore neither possible 
desirable that the organisation should manage the process of cha 
Funding and intermediate agencies, grass-roots groups and all r 
interested parties should work together in a partnership, exchar 
ideas, sharing their effort and taking risks towards achieving their g 
Emphasis is placed on the individual and unique circumstancr 
each society. The era of 'blue-prints' for the development of the -
World, in which pre-packaged solutions are worked out in the capit< 
the industrialised countries is over. Stress is placed on small-~ 
projects rather than on comprehensive planning strategies, and 
secondary importance is given to quantitative results. Much r 
emphasis is placed on the processes by which results are achieved 
on the resultant forms: for example, it 1s much more important to er 
that the content and continuity of educational provision are appror 
than merely to construct a school. Major emphasis is placec 
increasing the opportunities of previously excluded groups to partiC' 
more fully 1n the development process. 
:ipatory 
>cracy 
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De\fempment strategies 
If Pt a are to 'be more', they must participate fully rn their own social 
and economic development: they must make therr own choices and not 
become the servants of an externally-devised grand design 
In the past ten years or so an approach has emerged whrch 
emphasises the parriciparion of the poor in determining self-re/rant 
development strategies. The paternalism of 'traditional' strategies is 
replaced by an emphasis on the provision of education and employment 
skills which will enable the poor to formulate their own programmes for 
change (see PART FOUR) Thus, an increasing number of development 
projects which Oxfam supports stress what we might term non-material 
objectives Such objectives include the raising of people's 
consciousness, increasing solrdarrty and creating organisations through 
which the impoverished and margrnalrsed groups within a society can 
build a more secure, less oppressed base from which to challenge 
established privilege. Oxfam's aim to relieve poverty, when translated 
into such terms, means supporting projects to increase awareness and 
self-determination and to remove the material barriers to self-reliant 
development. 
This approach means drrectrng support to particular groups within 
society: the poorest of the poor, those marginalised socially or politically 
and the unemployed. It rs different from the traditional social welfare 
approach, which emphasises the care of the socially disabled. Firstly, rt 
extends the meaning of this disability to include much larger sections of 
the population. Secondly, and more importantly, it sees disability as a 
product of the disabling processes of rapid social change; processes 
which encourage dependence and push more people into poverty and 
thus on to the periphery of society. Participatory democracy is identified 
as the most important mechanism for ensuring that a programme rs 
appropriate to the problems presented in a grven area Participation rs 
not merely an ideal; neither is it simply a question of consultation wrth 
project holders; nor is rt defined by the acceptance and/or use of a 
particular service provided by the development agency. Partrcrpatron rs 
crucial to the identification of the goals of a rirogramme, rts 
implementation, organisation and evaluation, and is thus a vrtal factor 
affecting its potential for success. The partrcrpatory approach places 
strong emphasis on the need for social awareness; the rdentrfication by 
people of their common problems and goals; the importance of 
rnformatron, education and training to enable the effective use of local 
resources; and the necessity that all programmes be founded on 
collaboratron between the funding agency, grass-roots organrsatrons 
and, if applicable, the rntermedrate agency 
The stress on partrcrpatory democracy rn development has certain 
practical rmplrcations 
a: The outcome will depend on the extent to which part1c1pat1on has 
occurred at the local level in all aspects of the pro1ect and on whether 
local resources have been truly mobilised 
b: The level of funding and the technological input must be appropriate 
to the local culture economy and the admrnistratrve and organ1sat1onal 
capacity of the project holders. For example, in those rural areas where 
the need for assistance rs very strong, but the population rs only 
nominally incorporated rn the market economy, rt rs all too easy to flood 
a zone with funds. In such circumstances, local 1nit1at1ve and 
partrcipatron rn, or control of, a pro1ect may easr/y be destroyed. 
c: The potential for full part1c1pat1on at the local level rs very much 
determined by the degree of sacral d1fferent1at1on and the interests of the 
local leadership Char1smat1c leaders may be very persuasive and ri-1Jy 
~ Self-Reliance 
have a strong influence on field staff and project hol~0rs alike, and yet 
they frequently inhibit the political development 1e group they 
represent and marginalise the weaker members 
d: If the emphasis is on a democratic polity and collective effort, then it 
is important to examine the tradition of collective action in any given 
area so as to avoid imposing models. For example, in Latin America, 
despite extreme social differentiation, the pre-Columbian tradition of 
collective labour organises and reinforces many present day 
development programmes in both rural and urban communities. In 
India, on the other hand, strict caste observances would make this kind 
of community involvement impossible and collective effort would more 
likely be based on different principles of unity, such as kinship. 
e: It may be that democratic participation is not simply a means of 
achieving a given end, but is seen as a goal in itself; a goal which helps 
focus social awareness and provides continuity in development. 
Where there is full participation at all levels and stages of a development 
programme, it is hoped that one result will be self-reliance in financial, 
administrative, educational and social terms. However, in many 
instances - and particularly in remote rural areas - complete 
independence is not possible. Even in industrialised countries where 
extensive infrastructures have been established, the cost and 
organisational problems involved in creating a new service may be 
enormous; but in low-income countries the obstacles to improving 
health or education provision etc. will be even greater. A people 
occupied almost full-time with survival cannot be expected to have the 
time, energy or even the interest to sustain a programme without 
support of some kind from outside. 
Perhaps in an ideal world all funding would be directed at grass-roots 
organisations - communities, cooperatives, associations etc. Even 
though this kind of work requires a high staff input from the funding 
agency, direct funding can bring considerable savings, since the 
institutional structures, staff and capital equipment of intermediate 
agencies can be extremely costly. However, it is often necessary to seek 
the support of local development institutions in the planning and 
implementation of projects or the provision of specialist services. 
Working through such organisations has- the advantage of assisting in 
the formation of local development expertise. Further, the foreign 
funding agency is not capable of providing outreach to all groups that 
need help, nor is it desirable that it should do so. Therefore, where 
appropriate, local intermediate agencies should be identified and 
encouraged 
If a local development agency rs involved in a programme, it rs 
extremely important to examine its relationship with the grass-roots 
organisations. All too often it is assumed that the credibility of local 
professionals stems automatically from the very fact that they are local 
as opposed to expatriate. The marked social stratification characteristic 
of most low-income countries means that local middle-class 
professionals frequently have very little understanding of the problems 
faced by the poor In most cases, the mandate to work in a given area, 
or with a given group of people, arises not because of a person's origins 
but because of their motives, their actions and their ability to foster a 
relationship of trust. The difference in status between the manual 
labourer and the local professional may be such that there is very little 
exchange of ideas between the two and very little chance of their 
working together on equal terms 
The achievement of self-reliance depends on a number of factors 
a: The constraints of the area: geographical, economic, social and 





undermined by forces external to the programme; income generation 
projr for example, often increase dependence and exploitation 
b: T1. ,..,roject timetable should not be planned simply to fit in with the 
requirements of the funding agency. The decision to end funding is an 
enormous responsibility. The progress of a project may be much slower 
than expected and therefore a lot of flexibility is needed in planning 
financial assistance Constant monitoring and evaluation by all 
interested parties is the best way of determining when the funding 
agency should be able to withdraw without destroying a programme. 
c: Where a project will require a permanent external input, for example. 
1n the form of technologies which cannot be produced by project 
holders, then alternative sources of finance (other than the funding 
agency) must be ident1f1ed from the outset. If there are sufficient 
reserves, the project itself may take over funding, but 1f not, 
arrangements must be made with the government or some other 
institution. It is too often the case that only when a project has already 
absorbed all the capital available from a funding agency does the search 
for an alternative source of finance begin. 
The scale of a programme can be measured by the level of funding, the 
area or population affected, the number of structures built, or the size of 
the implementing institution. Oxfam's commitment is mainly to small-
scale development programmes, not simply because of the limited 
availability of resources, but more because larger programmes are less 
likely to guarantee a high level of participation or address problems at the 
local level. 
In recent decades there has been world-wide criticism of many of the 
large-scale, 'top down', development programmes Attention has been 
focused on certain shortcomings which seem often to result: alienation 
of project management from project holders; the lack of involvement of 
project holders in implementation and administration; bureaucratisation 
and the use of inappropriate technologies and policies. The impact of 
these programmes is rarely commensurate with the resources invested. 
Thus, throughout the world we see large, unwieldy development 
projects boasting massive funding, sophisticated equipment and 
expertise and large numbers of professional staff And yet, despite 
exaggerated claims, they often prove unrealistic in their objectives, ill-
advised in their methods and ineffective in terms of results; above all, 
failing to reach those most in need. 
There are certain problems specific to funding large non-
governmental operational agencies: 
a: The institutionalisation of the agency A commitment to working 
for/with the poor may rapidly be replaced by a commitment to 
mainta1n1ng the institution and providing jobs for the staff. This trend 1s 
accentuated in countries with high unemployment among middle-class 
professionals. Projects will often be devised by staff in order to secure 
their own future, and participation in project design and implementation 
will be severely restricted 
b: Large operational agencies will be seriously affected by changes in 
funding The cost of maintaining institutional. structures with inflated 
bureaucracies and staff numbers can be exorbitant - especially where 
they are based in urban areas - and 1t is unlikely that self-financing will 
be feasible. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with large-scale 'top down' 
programmes is the tendency to create a level of dependence which 
leaves the project extremely vulnerable to changes 1n circumstance. If a 
project is beyond the control of project holders or is extremely 
expensive. then it 1s unlikely to be able to survive changes either in 
"~""rnnw~· ~- 1n fu; ~ · pol1c 
@ Development as 
an Intervention 
~ Evaluation and 
Monitoring 
However, small-scale development programmes; have a number 
of disadvantages. For example, small groups ofte ve very limited 
skills and abilities; they are frequently dominated by one or two people; 
they have difficulty in planning a programme and in assessing the results 
of their efforts. The activities of small programmes, by definition, have 
limited impact and sometimes it is hard for the funding agency to detect 
any impact at all - much depends on faith in the organisations involved. 
Finally, their size frequently makes them very vulnerable to attack by the 
vested interests they offend. 
Thus, there are no rigid rules regarding the size or scope of 
development programmes. The priority of field stall should be to 
support those programmes which with the minimum possible outlay 
reach the maximum possible numbers of people, the scale of funding or 
institutional development never undermining the feasibility of 
participation of, and control by, project holders 
It must be recognised that however little field staff may wish to interfere 
in the development process, the role of Oxfam as a funding agency will 
always imply an intervention of some kind. But Oxlam at least has the 
advantage of not being forced to work to any specific directive and can 
support either single-or multi-purpose programmes, in response to local 
priorities. Continual evaluation and monitoring of both policy and 
practice is necessary to assess the impact of the funding agency in the 
countries in which it is active. 
Perhaps the most controversial feature of intervention by the 
development agency is the way in which it may affect local cultural 
traditions. The wide range of cultural and institutional conditions in 
different parts of the world will affect radically what the funding agency 
is able to achieve in each region. Enormous tact and sensitivity are 
required when dealing with cultural attitudes which apparently obstruct 
educational or developmental activities. Yet one of the main challenges 
faced by the development agency is to try to reach those most deprived 
and marginalised: this implies that we cannot take local structures and 
attitudes at face value. 
Rigid rules regarding marriage and kinship; taboos, prohibitions and 
other cultural practices; strict class and caste observances, etc., may all 
contribute to group security, but often at the expense of individual 
freedom. While these cultural traditions may be appropriate in many 
contexts, they frequently outlive their usefulness to the individual or 
community in changing circumstances. And yet they do not disappear 
easily, nor should a pattern of development which is destructive of a 
cultural tradition be encouraged. Sometimes the most violent social and 
psychological disruptions brought about by economic change can be 
those which result from the destruction of the integrity of a local culture 
and the removal of a people's links with their past (see PART TWO, 
Section 5). 
It is recognised that all development programmes are experimental and 
entail some risk. Therefore, constant monitoring and evaluation is an 
essential component of ANY programme !see PART THREE). This kind 
of assessment not only helps to min1m1se detrimental effects but enables 
all interested parties (funding, intermediate agencies and grass-roots 
groups) to benefit more fully from the experience of development. 
Evaluation should be integral to a programme and not added as an 
afterthought or as a requirement of the funding agency anxious to 
demonstrate success in order to justify its involvement. Evaluation and 
monitoring offer all concerned a chance of redefining goals or 







P1 jCt Appraisal 
Appraisal of projects prior to making 
grants 
The idea has already been mentioned that the funding agency functions, 
not simply to underwrite material change, but more to enter into 
partnership to achieve social and economic development. The 
achievement of muwal understanding and respect between field staff 
and project holders takes great sensitivirv, understanding and 
perception, which cannot be substituted bv anv amount of paperwork 
A good relationship between field staff and project .holders is vital 
Where the rapport does not exist and project holders are unwilling to 
discuss their programme, and where there is no understanding of the 
reciprocal obligations, it will not be possible to develop a working 
relat1onsh1p 
Consultation between field staff and project holders may often start 
before the preparation of a project proposal Such preliminary 
discussions frequently help avoid mistakes If possible, when 
considering a new project the following should be incorporated: 
a: Adequate baseline data The information available should be 
sufficient to en-able errors to be avoided in the decision-making process 
Projects often collapse because the information on which certain 
assumptions have been based is either inadequate or false. It is difficult 
to assess a project 1f there 1s no baseline data against which to judge 
progress. Even in cases where it is hard to obtain information, the 
question should be asked: what 1s the minimum one needs to know 
before work can be initiated? 
b: Tangible, and preferably quantifiable, objectives Some 
projects may have ob1ectives that do not lend themselves to assessment 
by statistical methods for example, those concerned with social 
education. In these cases, 1t is vital to ensure that the ob1ectives of the 
prowct are well defined and understood by all. Many programmes fail 
because project objectives are vague, ill-defined or over-ambitious. The 
ob1ectives should also specify the group to benefit from the programme, 
its numbers and location. 
c: Control groups. Where feasible, 1t is useful to identify a control 
group against which progress can be measured. Sometimes projects 
have resulted in apparently remarkable improvements, but further 
1nvest1gat1on has shown that the circumstances of neighbouring 
communities not exposed to the pro1ect have improved to the same 
degree. The use of a control group, therefore, can give a more modest 
and realistic impression of a pro1ect It is unlikely that sufficient 
resources will be available for detailed mon1tonng of a control group; 
however, relatively informal comparisons with such a group may suffice 
d: Reporting and monitoring procedures should be discussed at the 
earliest possible moment: what information is to be included, by whom, 
how often and how to implement any changes indicated by the reports/ 
e: Provision for self-evaluation and for external evaluation 
studies, if appropriate, should also be discussed (see Section 41. A 
useful approach is to incorporate plans for a mid-term review in the life 
of a pro1ect, in which pro1ect staff and beneficiaries, field staff and 
outside consultants etc. meet to discuss the project and to measure 
achievements against goals and ob1ect1ves. This should be done with a 
view to changing ob1ect1ves and programmes in the second period of the 
pro1ect 1f necessary. Future funding should also be discussed at this 
~ Background 
If the above procedures are followed, the funding< ;y will be able 
to meet its obligations to donors and to recipients tu 0otain publicity 
material and assist in its own resource allocation and policy formulation. 
More importantly, these procedures provide a means whereby the 
project can stimulate and improve its own management. There is no 
doubt that good management is one of the critical elements affecting 
the outcome of prowcts. 
Similarly, at this early stage it should be made clear to what extent 
grants will be subject to the receipt of satisfactory reports, and any other 
conditions should be specified. 
It is essential that in the appraisal of all projects due regard is paid to the 
national, regional and local socio-economic context. Even the most 
effectively designed programme will collapse if insufficient attention has 
been paid to the background against which it 1s working. National 
policies may easily run counter to the objectives of the programme. For 
example, a rural community may seek to improve agricultural production 
only to discover that the government has decided to cut the price paid 
to producers, thus rendering production unprofitable. Many political 
variables have a bearing on development initiatives and must be 
analysed before decisions are made. Field sraff mav feel that the general 
political and economic circumstances of a counrry are bevond the 
immediare frame of reference, ro ignore them, however, is to risk projecr 
failure. It is rare for Oxfam to support surveys of national and regional 
soci.al trends, because frequently there will be existing studies or 
specialists will be available who can advise on the context of a proposed 
project. (See Appendix Ill SOCIAL SURVEYS! 
Many factors may affect the life of a development project, and it is 
impossible to predict all of these. There are, however, certain factors 
which should always be taken into account· 
a: Government policies are of obvious relevance to any project; food 
prices, education policies and political outlook are some of the aspects 
of government which need to be assessed. 
b: Development programmes. Before funding a project, field staff 
should find out about other development programmes in the area and 
programmes mounted in the past. It is not unknown for different 
development programmes to be antagonistic in their goals. For example, 
plans to settle jungle areas in South America are harmful to attempts to 
establish the rights of indigenous peoples inhabiting the zone. In other 
cases, development agencies have been found to be duplicating their 
efforts This problem is particularly unfortunate given the limited 
resources available for development. A preliminary survey is especially 
important with service projects (e.g., health and education) where an 
NGO might duplicate work planned by the State or even give the State 
an excuse to withdraw from its programme, thereby depriving a 
population of a long-term service. Similarly, investigations should be 
made into the previous development experience of those groups 
intending to mount a project. Often the impact of previous aid 
programmes can be such that the potential for future success is severely 
restricted. For example, communities that have at some stage received 
large sums from official sources may well become dependent on 
external funding and in such circumstances small-scale, self-help 
schemes will probably fail. Investigation may reveal a poor use of funds 
1n previous programmes. Or it may be found that a funding application 
has been made primarily to enable a group to pay off debts incurred 
through earlier programmes. 
c: Local social and political hierarchies and structures have 
1mmed1ate relevance to a small development programme: care should be 







Largr iowners fearful of competition, for instance, may well seek to 
unde, .e rural cooperatives or marketing groups. The first defence is 
to be aware of the possible dangers and to avoid a development plan 
that leaves gaps which could be exploited by outsiders. Many small 
marketing schemes, for example, fail because insufficient attention 1s 
paid to obtaining appropriate legal recognition or status for the group, 
thus leaving it open to harassment from local authorities. Similarly, there 
is little point in building a health post or digging a well if it is not clear who 
has legal title to the land on which the construction is to be sited. 
d: Cultural norms and practices may impede a development project. 
Field staff must be sensitive to those practices and beliefs which could 
have an adverse effect on a project or isolate certain groups. 
Unfortunately, expatriate development workers have often been 
particularly remiss in this respect, not taking full account of local 
conditions. In some areas differences between classes, sexes, castes 
and tribes may be quite evident. In other areas social and cultural factors 
may not appear to be decisive; but it is all too easy to assume that all 
people engaged in the same kind of activity, dressed alike and speaking 
the same dialect have the same interests. 
e: Long-term trends. Long-term climatic and social trends affecting a 
population are not always clear. Further, people's perceptions of these 
trends can sometimes be misleading. It is therefore vital to examine the 
history of the area in which the project is located. Extreme drought can 
be treated - mistakenly - as if it were an emergency which could be 
alleviated with short-term relief measures. However, if it is found that 
drought is becoming an annual event, then it might be more appropriate 
to think in terms of funding measures designed to have a long-term 
impact. 
a: Reid staff should assess projects mainly on the basis of 
O whether the people have a genuine need; 
O whether the project is desired by the intended beneficiaries, both 
men and women; 
O whether the objectives of the pro1ect fall within the scope of Oxfam's 
policies and terms of reference; 
O whether the project is likely to achieve its ob1ectives; 
O whether the project is technically appropriate and economically 
viable; 
O whether the project will survive the test of time (or, in other words, 
what likelihood there is that the benefits will continue once the 
project ends), and 
O whether the constraints can be overcome. 
b: Defining the objectives of a project is perhaps the single most 
important stage in project preparation. There will obviously be a 
hierarchy of objectives, and these should be listed in order of 
importance, always taking care not to confuse ends and means 
Frequently neither project holders nor field staff distinguish between the 
purpose of a grant (e.g., to build a health post) and the objective of the 
project (to improve the general level of health or eradicate infectious 
disease, etc ) Once the principal objective has been defined, the 
secondary objectives should be established. Thus the main aim of an 
agricultural programme may be to increase production and incomes; 
and once this primary objective 1s clear, then the secondary ob1ectives 
will indicate more immediate goals (such as the introduction of a new 
cropping system, reclaiming of land or building of an irrigation system) 
The next stage is to decide on the appropriate means to achieve these 
ends (e.g., to build an irrigation ditch, carry out educational and 
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[I] Leadership 
c: There are certain guidelines which can assist in pla1 objectives: 
0 An objective should be realistic in terms of time, quu• 1tity, quality 
and cost. The beneficiaries should be clearly identified in number 
and location. If the objectives are not defined precisely, what 
remains is simply a vague statement of intent 
O The planning process must involve people, and objectives should be 
defined with people and not for them. Involvement of project 
holders in planning a programme generally results in their greater 
commitment to implementation. 
O In some cases the main objective of a programme might result from 
an outsider's perception of a given community's needs, and might 
differ from those perceived by the community itself. However, the 
participants in the project must be able to see some objectives in the 
project which relate to their own experience; there will otherwise be 
no reason for them to continue working with the programme. 
d: The following sequence can be used in planning projects in relation to 
their objectives: 
O define objectives (both primary and secondary!; 
O consider the alternative ways of achieving these objectives; 
O choose the best, or least costly, alternative, given the resources 
required and available; 
O plan expenditure (see notes on project budgets); 
O plan implementation of the project, and 
O plan regular assessment of progress against objectives, allowing for 
the adjustment of objectives, methods and resources in the light of 
experience. (See Section 3, Monitoring.) 
Specific elements in project appraisal 
The following notes draw attention to some of the problems likely to be 
encountered in pro1ect appraisal. Above all it must be remembered that 
its development is about people, and so is project appraisal. However 
rechnicallv feasible a projecr, it is the participarion of people which will 
determine whether it is a success or not. The general atmosphere 
prevalent in a programme will indicate a great deal about the relations 
between the people involved in it. Are the people relaxed in their work? 
Are relationships within the group cordial? When entering a community 
in the company of project workers, do local people wave as you pass by? 
Do they even recognise the project workers? Do people stop and talk in 
the streets, or are they in awe of the proiect staff? Alternatively, are the 
staff respectful of local people? Do they keep them waiting for long 
periods? Do they treat locals as social inferiors, or as a hindrance to their 
work? On consecutive visits is the same small number of people always 
present, or is there evidence of a large number of people involved in the 
project? The appraiser should try to make sure that their visit is not 
treated as a special event since it is extremely important to establish, as 
far as possible, what a normal working day is like 
People with qualities of leadership play an important role in all 
organisations. Many communities are fortunate enough to have a strong 
person to represent them, to lead the community in development and 
other initiatives. Inertia can be overcome by dynamic leadership. 
However, people may frequently agree with a leader, or be persuaded to 
take action during the excitement of a public meeting, but once away 
from the direct influence of the person's charisma may question the 
decision, and be unenthusiastic about implementing it. For example, 
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n '•arismatic leader may make appraisal of a project difficult, for 
his c r presence overshadows others, making it hard to assess with 
accuracy their attitudes and opinions. The leader may apparently know 
all the answers, communicate well with the appraisers, and always 
appear to speak on behalf of colleagues and neighbours. It is important 
to find out what the remainder of the group really thinks, or whether 
they even understand the project in question. 
Many leaders work for long hours and put an enormous amount of 
effort into their work on behalf of other people. However, by taking so 
much onto themselves they do not allow others to participate fully in the 
project or to learn from their own experience. If leaders concentrate 
information, management and decision-making into their hands, others 
may fail to understand what is happening in a project. 
It can be very d1ff1cult to explain to a hard working and committed 
person that their very immersion in their work may be detrimental to the 
people on whose behalf they are working. But for a group to be totally 
dependent upon one person is risky; leaders may obstruct new ideas or 
impede the participation of others, and their absence or removal can 
lead to the total collapse of the pro1ect. 
There are people who will exploit power for their own ends. It is often 
all too easy for such persons to undermine morale by financial 
dishonesty or by encouraging a s1tuat1on of permanent conflict in order 
to maintain their own dominant position. 
People's motives for becoming involved in development vary greatly, 
although there is little evidence that the nature of individual motivation 
has any direct relationship to a project. However, it is important to be 
aware of the possible problems that can be caused by particular sorts of 
motivation. 
a: Religious conviction. Involvement in development work is 
sometimes seen as a path to individual salvation rather than a process of 
participation with a group in a common activity. The improvement of the 
individual ego becomes a major Objective of daily work. Religion can also 
be used to exaggerate the righteousness of the adherents, and this can 
make them unreceptive to outside ideas. Finally, development and 
humanitarian work can be seen merely as a vehicle for proselytising 
b: Political. The same factors can also affect the work of those people 
with strong political motivations. Sometimes outsiders will attempt to 
use poor people for their own political ends. Thus, different factions may 
compete for the allegiance of a group of people by offering development 
programmes as an enticement. Any pro1ect risks coming into conflict 
with power elites, but certain political factions may have the expressed 
aim of inciting conflict, or using the poor as political 'cannon fodder'. 
c: Professional. The field of development is increasingly becoming an 
independent profession and offers to many an interesting and 
challenging career. Greater professional1sm in development can bring 
many advantages, but the danger is that projects will be written 
specifically with the aim of professional advancement in mind 
Intermediate agencies for example may look more towards the survival 
of their own institution than to the interests of those for whom they 
supposedly work. 
d: Expatriates. There are many committed, experienced and well 
qualified expatriates working in development programmes throughout 
the Third World. They often provide scarce skills and work in 
inhospitable areas neglected or abandoned by others. Furthermore, 
some expatriates make long-term commitments to their adopted 
country and cease to be regarded or to regard themselves as foreigners. 
However, the relationship between expatriates and local people is 
complex and should be taken into ilccoiint when assess1nn a nrrwwr 
~ Funding 
The advantages and disadvantages should be weigher ·efully. Some 
of the more obvious advantages are that expat1 ,: may have 
professional experience and technical skills, and can train local people; 
have experience beyond national boundaries; are often highly motivated 
and committed and willing to work in d1ff1cult areas; often have greater 
ob1ect1vity and are able to identify more clearly local needs; can provide 
some protection against abuses of human rights by channelling 
information to the international press; can expose local prejudices and 
cross social boundaries, for example by working with women, low 
castes, tribal groups, minorities, refugees etc. The disadvantages are 
that: 1f expatriates are unfamiliar with local conditions and languages, a 
lot of time may be lost in training; they may be replacing local people in 
the 1ob market; their participation continues the dependence on foreign 
knowledge; volunteers can be used as cheap labour, or if paid, 
expatriate labour can be very expensive; they may stay for a very short 
period and therefore destroy continuity; the project may collapse when 
they leave; they may push the programme too fast for local people in 
order to complete work before their contract ends; their lack of 
understanding of local society can lead to inappropriate responses; local 
agencies may seek to use expatriate assistance as a way of obtaining 
access to funds controlled by foreign agencies. 
In an ideal world there would be little need for expatriate personnel. In 
certain areas, however, they are still required to assist in development 
and humanitarian work whether as paid staff or as volunteers. It is 
important to establish whether there 1s a real need to employ expatriate 
personnel or whether there are local people available with the necessary 
skills. Will the expatriate be teaching a counterpart or replacement? 
What will the role of the expatriate be? If it is as leader or project director, 
is someone being prepared to take over or will the project collapse on his 
or her departure? Are the expatriates encouraging a level of activity and 
funding which will be difficult to maintain in the future? 
a: Support for individuals. In the absence of development agencies, 
individuals without any institutional backing sometimes become 
involved in development or humanitarian work. Some of the points 
raised above will be relevant in the assessment of such initiatives. For 
example, what will happen when the individual withdraws? Is 
management too centralised or is there allowance for community 
participation, etc.? What length of time is the person likely to continue 
their work? 
It 1s highly inappropriate for agencies like Oxfam to provide funds 1n 
response to individual cases of hardship whether they be refugees, 
destitute people, the sick or anyone else. Not only is it an inefficient use 
of funds, but it entails many risks. It is not possible for the NGO to make 
a true assessment of individual cases. Individuals should be referred to 
an agency competent to undertake case-work. Other agencies specialise 
in providing grants for individual study. Where possible this is usually 
best carried out 1n the country of origin. 
b: Overfunding. NGOs and governments alike constantly request an 
increase in resources available for development, but it must be 
remembered that the over-funding of projects can be very harmful. In 
part 1t is the uneven spread of assistance, which results in some groups 
rece1v1ng funds from many different sources whilst others are hardly 
touched by development activities. This imbalance is largely due to the 
def1c1enc1es of funding agencies, which tend to concentrate their efforts 
in the same geographic areas, 1n those areas with good communications 
and with those people who are most articulate and able to present 
applications for funding. Unfortunately, many small groups have been 





com1 urate with a group's capacity to grow, and to cope with the 
management, administrative and personnel problems incurred in such 
growth. As a group grows, informal mechanisms of coping with 
decision-making and coordination between the participants begin to 
break down. The result may be inefficiency, an erosion of trust, and 
emergence of conflicts and tensions. Alternatively, some activities are 
possible on a small scale, but become more difficult if expanded; for 
example, handicraft production at the basic level requires little 
administration, but with many people involved may encounter problems 
of obtaining supplies and markets, and incur fiscal and legal obligations. 
A project should be allowed to grow at its own pace. New initiatives, 
good ideas and successful schemes deserve support but not at the risk 
of flooding them with funds. 
c.- Competition. Beware of the possibility of duplication of effort 
between agencies in the same area and, worse still, competition 
between them. Certain circumstances may exacerbate this problem. For 
example, political, religious or personality differences can cause 
communities or agencies to break up into smaller groups which continue 
their work in competition with each other. 
d: Continuity and self-funding All funding agencies are, or should 
be, preoccupied with the long-term management and financial 
arrangements of projects. Most recurrent costs are met by external 
funding agencies for only short periods, and therefore it is essential that 
before commencement some thought be given to possible sources of 
funding at the end of the initial grant. 
Certain types of project should become self-sufficient as soon as 
possible. If, for example, an income-generating pro1ect is feasible, well-
managed and well-planned, there should be no need to provide 
subsidies for running costs. Production should never be subsidised, 
although it might be acceptable to subsidise initial capital costs (or 
related social costs such as training). On the other hand, even though 
local people should make some kind of contribution to the costs of their 
services, it is unrealistic to expect all services to become self-funding, 
One common problem is that many proposals for service projects are 
over-optimistic about the likelihood of a contribution from local sources, 
whether private or governmental For example, the ideal health 
programme would allow for referral to a hospital and for laboratory 
services. However, the system of referral in many countries is very 
inefficient and in some areas 1s completely absent. Governments 
sometimes use the involvement of NGO funding agencies in health 
programmes as a pretext for neglecting the service. Allowance must be 
made for these possibilities. 
If a service provided is more lavish than is the norm for the country or 
area, then the government is unlikely to be able or willing to maintain 1t. 
Many mission facilities transferred to state control have subsequently 
fallen into decay because they were more expensive to run than the 
average for the country. It may therefore be advisable to fund and plan 
for a programme which is less than the ideal, but which stands a better 
chance of obtaining finance for the future. 
By not taking into account the longer-term future of a programme it 
1s possible that services will be created and will disappear according to 
the availability of funds. It is important to plan for the longer term, to 
ensure follow-up, continuity and a lesser degree of dependence on 
external funds. It is unfortunately the case that many programmes only 
survive financially by being passed from one funding agency to another 
a: Technical feasibilitv. Once the basic aue~t1ons relating to a pro1ect 
1posc " be< ;were becc lece; to ar the 
the technical details of agricultural, health. social economic 
development, educational and disaster programmes. It .nportant to 
measure the obiectives of the programme against its technical 
feasibility; people tend to be over-opt1m1st1c about the expected results 
of small pro1ects and hence are disappointed when goals are not 
achieved. it is also important to ensure that the management and 
technical capacity of the project team 1s sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the programme. 
b: Concentration on theory. The development process is highly 
complex, and in the attempt to understand often contradictory factors 
there is a tendency to formulate all-encompassing models. These may 
not only over-simplify reality but also restrict the implementation and 
achievement of goals. Any group which claims to have discovered the 
only true road to development must be treated with some 
circumspection, as it is unlikely to learn from its mistakes. 
Project proposals which are over-theoretical in approach may obscure 
the empirical problems likely to be encountered in the project's 
implementation. Care should also be taken with plans for immediate 
replicability of a successful programme, as conditions may vary so much 
as to prohibit duplication of the model. 
It 1s one thing to write a well thought-out proposal and provide all the 
necessary background information and analysis, but it is something else 
actually to implement the ideas. Excessive concentration on the theory 
of development can be as unproductive as extreme pragmatism. 
c: Regional concentration. It is important to ascertain whether the 
proposed project is too concentrated geographically or, alternatively, 
too dispersed. Excessive concentration will lead to a reduction in the 
number of beneficiaries, and may increase costs per person as against 
benefits. Furthermore, neighbouring communities may become hostile 
if they are excluded from a programme: on the other hand, a programme 
taking in a larger area may become too thinly stretched and therefore 
lack impact. In dispersed programmes travel expenses may be high and 
a great deal of time can be wasted in travelling. There may be too little 
time available to spend in each locality for good relationships to develop. 
Rather than concentrating on one locality, and rather than attempting 
to tackle many different problems in an integrated fashion, a programme 
may choose one single aspect of development. There have been some 
remarkable projects which have developed one type of expertise or pilot 
activity, sometimes as a complement to the development work of other 
agencies. However, such specialisation may lose the many advantages 
of integration. 
d: Legal identity. This element of an organisation should not be taken 
for granted when assessing a project proposal. It is important to ensure 
that the legal identity of the pro1ect is appropriate to the nature of the 
activity proposed (e.g., if a production cooperative is envisaged, then in 
most countries the organisation should not be legally registered as a 
charitable bodyl. Legal recognition may be essential for a programme to 
operate. For instance, an export licence may be a requisite for a 
handicraft group. Obviously the legal requirements will vary from 
country to country. Once legal status has been established, it is 
important to see how the control and ownership of assets are organised. 
Field staff must be cautious of projects which register ownership in the 
name of individuals. There is always a possibility that an institution may 
have only a short life-span; it should be clear how assets will be disposed 
of if the organisation dissolves (assets should preferably be given to a 
similar group to be used for the purposes for which they were originally 
acquired). The disposal of capital items will be of particular importance 
if e: ve b1 ·"-':~1s arf 'n""lved . 







mar' impact on its operational success A very small group with 
cen ,ed management may 1n time run into trouble, since a highly 
centralised structure can become inadequate as the group grows. It is 
probably impossible to achieve a perfect balance between a hierarchy 
and democracy. While a hierarchical structure inhibits participation, 
total democracy impedes decision-making But it is important to 
establish that an organisation does have a clear system of management, 
decision-making, procedures for reconciling conflicts etc. Is there, for 
example, a governing body to which staff and beneficiaries can appeal 
in case of conflict within the group? 
However well a proposal is written, if the project holders are not 
sufficiently prepared technically, or committed personally to the project, 
then it cannot progress. Some people are excellent at preparing project 
proposals but lack the capacity for implementation. It is important to 
look at the project members as a team and not simply as a collection of 
1nd1viduals: a project director may be impressive in many ways but not 
work well with the team. The appraisal should include a study of group 
dynamics, leadership and, where funding is not aimed directly at grass 
roots groups, the relationship between the project team and 
beneficiaries. 
f: Finance. There are two aspects of the project finance which need to 
be examined: firstly, the economic feasibility of the project - where this 
1s appropriate - and secondly, the details of the operational budget It 
must be ascertained whether the budget 1s realistic 1n terms of salaries, 
running costs and capital equipment; whether it takes due account of 
inflation and possible unforeseen costs. and whether it details additional 
contributions from the community and/or from other sources. It may 
also be important to examine plans for the attainment of self-financing 
or alternative funding at the end of the grant period. 
Specialised appraisal techniques 
A project which has admirable objectives may still be refused a grant if 
it appears to have a poor chance of reaching those objectives. However, 
1n cases of urgent need, Oxfam may be willing to take much greater risks 
than would normally be acceptable, a willingness to take risks being one 
of the strengths of non-governmental organ1sat1ons Assessment of the 
degree of risk may depend mainly on intuition based on experience 
However, certain questions may help in making this assessment: 
O To what extent 1s the project likely to be interfered wnh by the 
government, local authorities, or by other power elites? 
O How confident are you of the managerial ability of the pro1ect staff, 
and their ability to work together? 
O In the long-term, what permanent improvements should the project 
bring about? Will the project have any adverse environmental 
effects? To what extent will the pro1ect be replicable? 
A key part of the design of pro1ects 1s the preparation of budgets 
covering anticipated expenditure and revenue. The failure to analyse 
budgets properly has often hidden from view potential risks or pitfalls 
Field staff should pay close attention to budgets and income estimates 
and check especially economic forecasting and assumptions. Detailed 
advice on budgets is included in Section 6, Budgeting and Accountancy 
and in PART FIVE, Economic Development Guidelines. 
One simple measure for appraising a project is to estimate the cosr per 
person that is, divide the cost of the pro1ect by the number of people to 
benefit fit 1s important to define the exact number of benef1c1aries, not 
the total population 1n the areil) WhPre two alternative merhnrl~ nf 




reaching the same objective are presented, a decisir ·tween them 
may be made on the basis of cost effectiveness or co~ ,,cir person. 
This is a fairly crude measure, however, applicable only to clear-cut 
objectives where there are only 'direct' beneficiaries, all of whom stand 
to benefit equally; for example, with the provision of clean water to a 
village or construction of a health post. It is difficult to make any 
ob1ect1ve estimate in situations where the benefits resulting from a 
programme are indirect and unquantifiable 
The greatest per capita expenditures are probably 1ustified in projects 
which train individuals to help others, for example extension workers or 
nutritionists, as these projects have a muluplier effect. In general, 
projects which invest in buildings or capital equipment have a low 
multiplier effect as compared with pro1ects which train or educate 
people. In particular, investment in buildings is hard to justify because of 
the long period of use required to merit the high levels of capital 
investment entailed. 
The evaluation techniques of Cost Benefit Analysis (CSA) are now 
widely used in appraising development pro1ects, and field staff should be 
aware of the principles involved in applying such techniques, the 
limitations and difficulties involved, and their relevance to the types of 
project likely to be supported by NGOs 
CSA is a pro1ect appraisal technique that helps decide whether or not 
a particular project is economically acceptable, or which out of a number 
of alternative pro1ects is the most acceptable. 
a: Concepts involved. It is important to see how the perspective of 
'social CSA' differs from a purely financial analysis of a project. Both try 
to predict the profitability of a project by comparing the project's 
expected costs with its expected return If the project's return exceeds 
its costs, then the project is acceptable 
In contrast to purely financial appraisals, social C BA takes a wide view 
of a project, and considers all the costs and benefits that may result. A 
businessman may not take into account the environmental 
consequences of a project, for example. The pollution of rivers or the 
preservation of wild life may be irrelevant to the economics of a project. 
Social CBA, however, views such effects as costs that may have a very 
important effect on a particular society, and they must therefore be 
considered if a project's wider implications are to be adequately 
assessed. 
b: The three stages of social CBA. 
O Estimaring future costs and benefits. The procedure is first to 
identify all costs and benefits of a pro1ect, and then to put a value on 
them. All relevant costs and benefits should be included, whether 
direct or indirect. For example, an indirect cost of new industry 
might be the possible adverse effect on local artisans. Another 
important difference between financial appraisal and social CBA 
arises in estimating the monetary value of costs and benefits. A 
financial appraisal will assess the cost of materials, labour and 
equipment at just the market prices paid for them. Social CBA will 
assess these costs using the economic concept of the opportunirv 
cost. For example, an industrial project decides to recruit a worker. 
He or she is at present earning a living in agriculture. The project 
offers a wage that is higher than the total value of his or her 
agricultural production. The cost to the economy is not the new 
wage that will be paid, but the cost of the agricultural production lost 
as a result of the worker's transferring from agriculture to the 
project. This is therefore the opportunity cosr to the economy as a 
whole of the labour input of the new worker in the project; it is also 
known as the shadow wage rare, or the accounting wage rate. 
j 
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O 'Discounting' furure cosrs and benefirs. Since the benefits of costs 
not appear until airer the initial outlay, a technique known as 
.. :>counting is used to take this into account. 
Discounting occurs when the immediate prospect of receiving,sa1·. 
£100 is more attractive than receiving the same sum, or even a greater 
amount, at some point 1n the future: £100 received now may be 
equivalent to £120 received next year (because of inflation, pressing 
needs etc.). Next year's £120 is discounted to this year's £100 The 
discount rate 1n this case 1s 20%, 1.e. the difference expressed as a 
percentage of £100. 
Typically, over the lifespan of a proiect the ma1or cost will be 
incurred in the early stages and the benefits will accrue later. In an 
agricultural project, the cost of land improvement and irrigation 
demands an immediate outlay_ The increase in agricultural output 
may not appear until a year or more later. So costs and benefits have 
to be identified and calculated year by year. 
Once the future costs and benefits have been estimated over the 
life-span of the project. a second major step is therefore to reduce 
these costs and benefit flows to what are called presenr day values 
This 1s done by the use of discount tables, after choosing a suitable 
discount rate over the time period. 
In order to establish the suitable discount rate, the investor must 
decide upon a standard reqUJred rare of return. This is the lowest 
acceptable return on an investment, and is calculated in one of two 
ways: with an organisation like Oxfam, experience would suggest the 
lowest rate of return that makes a pro1ect a realistic proposition; 
alternatively, the required rate of return could be established by 
taking current interest rates into account. 
Having discounted all future costs and benefits to obtain present 
day values, these can then be added to give rota/ discounred future 
costs and total discounted furure benefits. Appendix I includes 
project examples which illustrate the kind of calculations required to 
undertake a CBA 
D Acceptance or rejection of a project. Criteria need to be established 
with which to decide upon a project's economic acceptability. One 
or more of three decision rules may be used· 
Net Presenr Value (NPVJ: this 1s the discounted total benefits less the 
discounted total costs. If this difference 1s positive, i.e. 1f the 
monetary value of benefits outweighs the monetary value of costs, 
the pro1ect is deemed acceptable. 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (8/CJ: this 1s the ratio of the discounted benefits 
to the discounted costs. If this ratio 1s greater than one, the pro1ect 
1s acceptable. 
lnrerna/ Rare of Return (/RRJ. this 1s the most commonly used 
decision rule. It is rather like quoting a rate of return on investment: 
a project with an IRR of 30% is better than one with an IRR of 20%. 
The computation of the I RR is rather more d1ff1cult to understand and 
explain, and will not be attempted here. In practice, a project will be 
acceptable if its IRR 1s higher than the required rate of return (see 
'Discounting' future costs, above). The required rate of return 
therefore becomes the cut-off rate for acceptance or re1ection of the 
pro1ect 
c: Practical problems. The three main steps in conducting social CBA 
outlined above include a great number of theoretical and operational 
problems. Some of these are touched upon here: 
D Predicting future benefits 1s clearly difficult or impossible in many 
projects. For example, 1n an agricultural project, the adoption of 
1nnovat1ons by farmers depends upon a whole range of technical, 















of these are difficult to predict; e.g, unexpr ·.-,d weather 
conditions, recession, crop failure . 
D Estimating benefits of 'social development' projects (such as 
training schemes or social education) 1n money terms is highly 
controversial. In the case of an industrial or agricultural project, the 
main direct benefits will be the increased output attributable to the 
project, e.g., bags of fertiliser or tons of rice. However, in the case 
of a nutrition or rural health project. the benefits are not normally 
expressed in such terms. These can be estimated by considering the 
costs these pro1ects will avert if they are implemented. For example, 
a malnourished population will impose costs on an economy 
because people do not work as well as they would if they were 
adequately fed. Needless to say, valuing benefits in such a way is a 
difficult and controversial matter, as it involves putting a quantitative 
value on the quality of life. 
D The impact of inflation can only be ignored if all relevant resources 
will be subject to the same rate of inflation. For example, if labour 
rates are expected to be subject to a rate of inflation different from 
the general inflation rate, then the different rate for labour must be 
brought into the calculation. 
D The treatment of risk and uncertainty can be done by carrying out a 
sensitivity analysis. This is to undertake a series of CBA calculations 
by modifying the original assumptions of costs and benefits (e.g., 
price of inputs, cost of labour, price and quantities of project output) 
by, say, plus or minus 10% or plus or minus 20%. This will produce 
a range of inrernal rates of return, each reflecting the assumptions or 
estimates made during the CBA calculation. 
D The final internal rate of return of the pro1ect will have made use of 
a whole range of assumptions about opportunity costs, future prices 
and quantities of output, an appropriate discount rate, the life-span 
of the proiect, and so on. Many of the assumptions are likely to be 
based on subjective judgement alone. It is therefore advisable to test 
the more important assumptions by using sensitivity analysis as 
described above, particularly since the final rate of return may turn 
out to be disproportionately affected by a particular assumption or 
group of assumptions. 
The many difficulties involved in valuing benefits has led to a growth 
of interest in developing alternative appraisal procedures, such as Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis. It is possible that CBA, by emphasising 
monetary values, could distort the project's potential; however, this 
would not happen if the results were weighed against and compared 
with the results of other appraisal techniques. In other words, these 
techniques should not be used in isolation. 
A simple list of all the relevant costs and benefits, and some indication 
of their magnitude, would aid the formulation of a suitably objective 
judgement of a particular project. Where CBA is considered appropriate, 
but where the project holders are unable to carry out a full CBA, this list 
could then be included in the project's proposal so that field staff can 
make these calculations. (See Appendix I for examples.) 
Field staff are unlikely to have to participate directly in surveys, although 
there are times when it will be necessary both to initiate a survey and to 
interpret its results. (A special note on nutrition surveys can be found in 
PART SEVEN, Section 1). All too often too much data is collected 
because the use of random sampling techniques has not been fully 
understood (see random sampling in Appendix Ill); excessive data 





There is always room for testing assumptions and hypotheses through 
. 1e use of unstructured interviews and casual discussions; the more 
obvious information can often be overlooked by the use of complex 
questionnaires However much thought goes into a questionnaire, the 
questions posed still determine to an extent the answers received. 
Important information may not be forthcoming because the 
questionnaire does not ask the appropriate question. Less structured 
questioning might well provide the information. 
In planning any survey it is important to know: 
O the types of situations in which a survey 1s/1s not needed; 
O where/how a group can get advice before it wastes time on the 
wrong kind of survey. What information is already available? 
O the different approaches to surveys: participant observation, 
structured questionnaires, random sampling, participatory 'action'-
styled investigation, etc.; 
O the main types of sampling and statistical analysis available 
(ensuring that these are appropriate to the task in terms of 
sophistication, accuracy, and costs); and 
O whether the survey will produce the sort of material necessary for 
future decision-making 
Further details are available in Appendix Ill. 





1 Does the project fall within the gu1del1nes and prior1t1es for the area? 
2. Is the pro1ect known to you7 If not, then have you allowed suff1c1ent 
time to get to know the group, and for a relationship of trust and 
confidence to be developed between you and the group7 
3. The size of the project will have some bearing on the visit, whether 1t 
will be possible to talk of past work, and on aspects such as evaluation, 
planning and management. Small grass-roots groups will be more 
concerned with the immediate project 1n hand than with more general 
discussions about development and its mechanics Discretion will 
always be required when v1s1ting projects and the people involved 1n 
them. 
Specific points 
It should be remembered that every project 1s to an extent unique, and 
that the relevance of particular questions will vary from project to 
project 
1 Objectives: 
Are the short-term aims and goals of the project compatible with its 
longer and medium-term objectives? 
D Are they clear? Are they reasonable and practical? 
D Are they based on reality as illustrated through experience and 
discussion, and on the results of study! 
2. Design· 
D Is the project feasible/ 
D Does the design take into account local traditions and customs/ 
D Is the project over-ambitious! Are the resources adequate to the 
requirements? 
D Does the project design cater for suff1c1ent feedback/ 
D Is the timing realistic! 
D Would a short pilot project be advisable to gain experience before 
commencing the project/ 
3. Financial involvement· 
D Do all the people aided by the project have a stake in it7 Are they 
contributing in some way (in cash, 1n kind or in labour)/ ls the project 
simply a source of income or career advancement for the 
professionals and other development workers involved? 
D Could those involved be asked to contribute morel 
4. Education· 
D Are the people involved going through a process of 'critical 
appraisal' 7 Does the pro1ect enable them to assume greater control 
over their own lives7 
D Have they reached a stage at which they are able to articulate their 
problems, aspirations and prior1t1es7 
O Is it felt necessary to mount a programme of 'self-awareness'? How 
is this to be achieved, and how does 1t relate to the rest of the 
programme! 
5. Practical effects 
O Wtll the pro1ect improve people's lives by bringing them material 
benefits? Wtll they have more cash, food, animals etc. 7 Will they 
have better access to services such as health? 
O Compare this with the answers on the educational process. Material 
ar cat1c :nef1t 1ld bl ;:ilem Sor es th 
expansion of the economic process helps to build up· -,,pie's critical 
awareness, but the reverse is not nec2ssanly true. 
6. Staff of project team and/or promoters 
D Are they reliable, realistic, capable and motivated? 
D Have they sufficient experience! In what fields are they 
experrenced7 Is thrs experience appropriate to the task in hand? 
D Are they well qualified or do they need more training? 
D Are the leaders strong? Do they respect and/or reflect the opinions 
of others? What do other local groups and 1nd1v1duals say about the 
project leaders? 
D Do the staff/promoters work well together/ What relationship do 
they have with the poor/ What do the local people say about them? 
D How open to new ideas and suggestions are the staff/promoters! 
7. Partic1pat1on: 
D How was the application drawn up7 Who was involved in this 
process? 
D To what extent are the people supposedly being helped able to 
influence the course of the project? What mechanisms are there for 
this? Have they already participated in the planning of the project? 
D Is the feedback of information being properly heeded by the project 
managers! Is there a mechanism to allow participants to voice 
complaints or make suggestions to amend the proj8ct? 
8 Organ1sat1on 
D What is the nature of the organi::;at1on? Does it have legal status? In 
practical terms what effect does the legal status have/ 
D Are there clearly set rules for running meetings, taking minutes, 
following up decisions, changing leadership, etc? 
O How democratic is the organisation and how difficult is it for the 
membership to overturn decisions of the executive body? 
O If things go wrong with the project, what allowance has been made 
for either resolving internal conflict, or disposing of donated assets? 
O Is there an education programme for members of the organisation7 
This is especially important for cooperatives and similar institutions. 
O What safeguards are there to ensure that the organisation is not 
taken over by an elite group? 
9. Monitoring· 
O Is there a system for regular self-evaluation7 If so, how is this carried 
out and who participates? 
D Are the conclusions of the monitoring process used to change 
objectives or plans? Does the project design allow for the 
incorporation of new ideas? 
O Are any outside agencies or ind1v1duals invited to assist in the 
planning, monitoring or evaluation process7 
10. Budgets and cost effectiveness: 
D To what extent is the project, as planned, the cheapest way to 
achieve the objectives defined/ 
D Is the budget reasonable I How do staff /promoter salaries, for 
example, relate to those of the benef1c1aries of the project? Are 
salaries compatible with local norms7 Are equipment costs 
appropriate to local conditions 7 
O What previous aid has the project rece1ved7 What were the results of 
this aid 7 
O Is there a danger that further aid wtll do more harm than good? 
11. Measurab1l1ty· 
O Will it be possible to measure the progress of the project? If so, how7 
O Is a form of measurement built in to the project design? 
O How often will this monitoring be carried out? At regular intervals/ 




the multiplier effect likely to be7 Could the programme be expanded 
o neighbouring areas? 
Continuity· 
O When outside aid ceases, rs 1t likely that the project would be able tc 
continue on its own 7 
O What plans are there for cont1nuat1on at the end of the pro1ect 
period? 
O Is it likely that government and local authorities will encourage or 
oppose the project? 
O Is the project so designed as to allow it to survive rnto future 
generations, i.e. are new techniques being passed on, and is there a 
teaching element/ 
14. Other institutions· 
O Is the project linked to other similar institutions? Is it able to learn 
from other groups? 
O Does an appropriate intermediate or representative group exist to 
which the pro1ect holders should belong, e.g. a federation of 
cooperatives 7 
O Is the agency responsive to requests for assistance from similar 
groups7 
15. Risk assessment I see Section 2): 
O Compared with other appl1cat1ons for funds, how much risk rs 
involved in helping this particular project? 
O Which applications are the most viable, with the greatest poss1brlrty 
of achieving results, of being able to expand and of having a 
multiplier effect/ 
Other considerations 
1 When considering the funding of intermediate agencies rt is essential 
to talk not only to the staff of the project but also to the people who are 
to be helped by the project, e.g. peasant groups, community 
committees, indigenous groups, women or handicapped people. It 1s 
also important to talk to other agencies and prominent local figures such 
as priests, development officers etc. 
2. Even before a project has begun to receive funding, 1t can be useful 
to arrange for prospective project members to visit other srmriar 
programmes. 
3. It can also be helpful to organise simple surveys and/or baseline data 
collecting. This should be done by an experienced agency. If at all 









4. Sometimes after visiting a group that rs seeking funds, field staff will 
be forced to consider whether, in spite of its def1cienc1es, the group ! 
shows sufficient potential to merit receiving limited support, in the hope 
that - in time - the good points will outweigh the faults. This requires 
much thought, tact and a good relationship with the group. 
5. In certain cases, where the needs of the community are great and 
where the prospect of a successful proiect seems minimal, 1t mrght be 
possible to give a small donation, on condition that an evaluation 
(internal or external} should be undertaken at once. If all goes well, a 
further application can be 1nv1ted after this process has been completed. 
6. Freid staff should never try to impose forcibly their own, or the 
funding agency's, ideas or rules. Ultimately, both the applicants and the 
funding agency must feel that they are convinced about what they are 
undertaking. An imbalance in this respect 1s not only lrkely to result in 
disaster but is also an insult to the applicant's integrity Hence the 
insistence that field staff should spend as much time as possible getting 
to know and ur,derstand the group concerned. 
7. Funding agencies must be consistent in their work y cannot say 
one thing and do another. Consistency is also impc it in the way 
agencies raise their money, deal with applications in their home office, 
alert their own nationals to the problems of the Third World, criticise 
th err own government's policies towards development, and stand up for 
human rights rssues, etc Always try to explain to those seeking help 
how the funding agency is run, where the money comes from, what the 
organisation stands for, what it does at home in the way of educating 
the public on Third World issues, etc. 
--lllllilllilliiiiiiiiiiii .... iiiiiiiiiiiiliimaa-1111111ma---· 
Appropriate Technology 
ll for Development: 
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An Innovative Approach to 
Rural Development 
James M. Miller 
BACKGROUND 
The Foundation for the Application and Teaching of the 
Sciences (FUNDAEC) is a private, nonprofit organization that 
was granted legal status by Resolution #4747 of the govern-
ment of Cauca Valley, Colombia, on 25 October 1974. 
FUNDAEC actually had begun several years earlier at 
the University of Valle (funded by the Rockefeller Founda-
tion), where questions had been asked about the role of 
higher education in the field of development. Many years of 
involvement in community projects, primarily in the area of 
health, had led several of the professors to question the 
very concepts of development. It was clear that traditional 
indicators such as Gross National Product and exportation 
indices were not applicable in terms of describing the condi-
tions of the poor. In spite of economic growth, health 
conditions, nutrition, living conditions, and educational 
opportunities for the majority of the people had not improved 
and, in many cases, had actually worsened. This is attrib-
utable to the large gap that exists between the established 
institutions--governmental or private, national or multi-
national--that have know-how, human and financial re-
sources, and infrastructure, and the small farmers, who 
each year abandon their villages in large numbers to migrate 
to the slums of urban areas. 
One of the often-mentioned solutions to needed improve-
ments in development projects is to formulate interdisciplinary 
groups and multi-institutional programs. One such group 
consisting of professors at the university met regularly for 
almost one year and began to consider models for social 
development. However, problems related to the integration 
of their efforts at the level of community action arose. An 
element seemed to be missing: someone or a group of 
persons who could coordinate actions or needs at the family 
and community levels. Since no one with this type of skill 
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could be found from among the group of university experts, 
issues were raised about the effectiveness of the various 
academic disciplines themselves. 
To begin with a specific problem, that of rural develop-
ment, a new approach was taken by asking the question, 
"What would a person need to know in order to help the 
small farmers improve their living conditions?" Many fields 
of knowledge were seen ·as indispensable, especially agricul-
ture, health and nutrition, sanitary engineering, civil engi-
neering, formal education, and elements of the social 
sciences. 
THE SMALL FARMER JN COLOMBIA 
The size of landholdings in itself is a somewhat variable 
parameter since in regions such as the western plains of 
Colombia, twenty hectares is a small expanse, while in the 
fertile land near Bogota, one to three hectares cultivated in 
flowers or vegetables are sufficient for a good income. 
Traditionally, in Colombia a .small farmer is defined by the 
government as one who possesses less than ten hectares of 
land, who consumes most of what he produces, and who 
utilizes primarily his own manual labor. However, the major-
ity of the small farmers have plots much smaller than ten 
hectares, consume little of what they produce, and are dedi-
cating an increasing portion of their time to working in 
larger enterprises. These farmers, who do not have access 
to the services offered by the Colombian Social Security 
Institute, the Agriculture and Livestock Financial Fund, or 
other public institutions, grow approximately 60 percent of 
the food commodities produced in Colombia. This same rural 
population, according to data from the Survey of Human 
Resources for Health and Medical Education, has the least 
access to income, heal th care, sanitation facilities, and 
education of any group in the country. 
The amount of land dedicated to agriculture in Colombia 
during 1970 was 31.3 million hectares, of which 76 percent 
was owned by 7 percent of the landowners in individual 
holdings generally far in excess of 50 hectares. In the 
decade of 196()._-1970, the number of holdings with less than 
ten hectares decreased by approximately 5. 5 percent due to 
abandonment or sale of the property. Of these, the farms 
most affected were those consisting of less than five hec-
tares. This represents a total loss of land for more than 
90 ,000 small farmers and their families, or an equivalent of 
540, 000 persons. 
Twenty percent of persons employed in the rural sector 
work only six months of the year; 30 percent work up to 














national average income is $162 1 , small landowners receive 
only between 21 percent and 60 percent of this figure, or 
from $34 to $97. Therefore, in most instances, only a 
farmer with holdings between ten and fifty hectares can 
begin to have the possibility of an acceptable standard of 
living. As of April 1979, only 22 percent of the farmers are 
in this category. 
Consequently, the rural population has the worst condi-
tions in housing and sanitation and the lowest levels of 
literacy and primary education in the country. Nutritional 
levels are lower than those found in urban areas. The 
number of malnutrition cases, which in urban areas is 
around 30 percent, reaches levels of almost 90 percent in 
some rural regions. 
A particular example of these conditions is present in 
northern Cauca Department. This region comprises various 
rural communities that are characterized by an unequal 
distribution and inadequate utilization of the land. With a 
population of 65,000, of which 25,000 live in the small town 
of Puerto Tejada, the region is inhabited primarily by small 
farmers who have partially abandoned their own agricultural 
labors in order to work for the nearby large sugar indus-
tries. Data show that 60 percent of the rural population are 
involved in this type of labor. Some 80 percent of the rural 
population have plots smaller than three hectares, of which 
27 percent have only one-half hectare. Fifty-six percent of 
the houses lack sanitary facilities and, in some places, 
malnutrition reaches levels of between 65 and 70 percent. 
The principal causes of these problems in the rural 
sector traditionally have been identified as the scarcity of 
credit, the poor quality of technical assistance, and diffi-
culties in marketing. As mentioned previously, while 
accepting the indisputable importance of these factors, it 
seems in general that other aspects of possibly equal impor-
tance are not fully considered in the life of the small farmer. 
These include the need for new and adequate systems of 
agricultural production and animal husbandry and new tech-
nology that would permit the small farmer to live with a 
certain degree of independence. 
The majority of development agencies have investigated 
and promoted solutions that have been successful for the 
larger agricultural industries. Such solutions have then 
been reduced in scale to be applicable to the small farmer. 
Much experience indicates, however, that a mere reduction 
in scale is not always effective and may not produce im-






In the Cauca Valley the credit guide published by the 
Regional Corporation of Cauca Valley (CVC) shows an 
average profit of be~een $30 to $40 per hectare per month 
for commonly cultivated crops such as corn, soybeans, 
cassava, and red beans--a sum that represents an appre-
ciable income for the owner of fifty or more hectares. These 
figures assume optimal conditions in the accessibility of 
modern machinery, credit, and marketing. In other words, 
assuming the perfection of existing national agencies and the 
accessibility of these services to the small farmer, the owner 
of two hectares (which is considerably more than the average 
in northern Cauca) would have a monthly income of sixty 
dollars. Considering that the prices of basic foodstuffs are 
relatively high ( $1. 25 per pound of meat, $. 60 per pound of 
red beans, and $. 30 per pound of rice), it would be 
extremely difficult to feed a family. 
Confronted with this situation, the majority of those 
who have not already sold their lands to the large agricul-
tural industries maintain their traditional farms with perma-
nent cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, plantain, or fruit 
trees. Although the lack of techniques such as crop rota-
tion and the use of fertilizer has diminished the productivity 
of these landholdings, the crops nevertheless contribute to 
the low, but fixed, income of the rural family. The other 
part of the income derives from occasional low salaries from 
the agricultural industries. 
Historically, and even today in many parts of the 
world, small farming is not as bad an occupation as the 
foregoing discussions show. Where, then, lies the contra-
diction between the actual situation of the farmers in 
northern Cauca (and in many similar parts of the world) and 
the potential for small farming? The quality of land in the 
Cauca Valley is so good that one hectare could produce 
abundant food for a large family. Why, once working within 
the economic system of a society that even in its most inef-
ficient form is designed to render at least some benefits to 
its members and is seemingly preferable to a system in which 
individual families work their own farms in isolation from 
society, do the small farmer and his family suffer from 
severe malnutrition? 
Part of the answer is found by examining modern agri-
cultural production and animal husbandry, which, because of 
their mechanized and technical nature, have high require-
ments for investments of capital, energy, and natural 
resources. The question arises, then, whether science, 
which has permitted the development of a system applicable 
to a certain life-style, could not also improve the life of the 
small farmer. Wouldn't this contribute to the solution of the 
worldwide food problem given that, for example, in many 
countries in Latin America more than 60 percent of all food 
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already is produced by the small farmer under present 
adverse conditions? 
Other questions examined are: (1) what experiences 
are there concerning making science and appropriate tech-
nology available to the small farmer? (2) what are the 
proper channels? (3) what methods are showing promising 
results? (4) where is the manpower for such a vast program 
of community education? (5) how is this manpower in itself 
to be trained? (6) what portion of the existing knowledge of 
appropriate agricultural practice actually needs to be propa-
gated and to what extent? (7) how should the recipients of 
these services be organized? (8) what are the methods to 
bring about community participation? (9) what is really 
meant by it? (10) who should make the decisions about 
priorities? (11) are these organizational models at the 
village level? (12) what is the role of the economically 
advantaged section of the community? (13) how should the 
private sector participate in rural development and through 
what institutions?2 
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
Farzam Arbab, who received his Ph. D. in elementary 
particle physics from the University of California, Berkeley, 
and currently is a professor of physics at Valle University 
in Cali, concluded that solutions extended beyond traditional 
academic disciplines and indeed beyond the traditional 
educator. A concept of supplying a person with knowledge 
about his/her environment was required. Arbab gathered a 
small group of professionals from the natural sciences, social 
sciences, humanities, medicine, agriculture, and engineering 
fields. He set up what is now known as the Rural Univer-
sity ( FUNDAEC), but which is not accredited in the usual 
academic manner. 
The staff of FUNDAEC totals twenty-three full- and 
part-time professionals in the following fields: agricultural 
systems, mechanical and civil engineering, sociology, physi-
ology, education, biology, medicine and public health, 
physics, anthropology, and veterinary medicine. 
With the objectives of educating rural candidates in 
their own environment and having them remain in the rural 
scene rather than migrating to urban areas, selection teams 
went into rural areas discarding aptitude testing and concen-
trating instead on ability to learn. They gave courses to 
volunteers, then tested the volunteers for potential achieve-
ment in an accelerated program. 
2~tne foregoing was extracted from papers by Dr. 






The first group of candidates, twenty-six in number 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three, started in 
May 1975. The lowest level of schooling was through the 
fourth grade. in grammar school (three in this group remain), 
and the highest level of schooling was the third year in high 
school. Six were young women. After the first two years, 
the group had dropped to sixteen, three being young women. 
The class then stayed this size for the remaining four years. 
Training is for six years and, for lack of a better name, is 
called "Engineering for Rural Welfare." 
The second class began two years later with twenty-two 
students. Four were women. The class still retains four-
teen, four of whom are women. 
All classes are held in FUNDAEC facilities built in the 
community of Arrobleda, forty-five minutes from Cali. The 
students are completely subsidized, and they stay in dormi-
tories for the three-month periods, some returning home for 
a one-month vacation following each trimester. 
Textbooks are all originals written by FUNDAEC staff. 
The Colombian Ministry of Education has approved the cur-
riculum as experimental for· Arrobleda, in the Cauca Valley, 
making two years of FUNDAEC equivalent to four years of 
the Colombian high school program. 
The objective of the "engineering" program has been to 
educate a new professional who can work within the rural 
milieu and look for answers to problems concerning. health 
and nutrition, sanitation, housing, agricultural production, 
income, and community organization. The six-year training 
program has been designed in three stages, each consisting 
of two years. The curriculum fits into the following scheme: 
Preparatory 
Stage 
(First two years) 
Language 













(Third two years) 
Integral Courses 
Community Service 
The five general areas of the first two-year phase are 
designed to develop within the student scientific and investi-
gative abilities. They do not follow the usual system dedi-
cated almost totally to information delivery. Development of 
these fundamental capacities enables the students to learn in 




learn to study texts, extract information, express them-
selves, and communicate with others. They are given the 
opportunity to utilize their creativity and become familiar 
with the concepts of appropriate technology for translation 
into community service. 
Looking at the first of three "text" examples--language 
--the objective is to regain and even strengthen the stu-
dent's ability to communicate in terms of his rural language. 
Tapes and lecture material are built around this concept of 
retaining idiomatic usage as well as proceeding with devel-
oping language ability to cope with university-level educa-
tion. The text begins with concepts like forms, size, 
geometry, substances and their properties, and color and 
expands into more complex concepts such as systems, 
changes in the state of a system, and interactions. True 
and False tests are given every five days. 
In the area of mathematics, although abilities are taught 
systematically, immediate applications to real situations or to 
other areas of knowledge contribute to the process of inte-
gration. For example, in the first text, after a review of 
the concepts related to sets, a few lessons are dedicated to 
the classification of the plant and animal kingdoms. The 
text on geometry includes a number of activities in simple 
topography that are applied immediately by the students to 
their work in the community. The text on fractions includes 
many pages of material on epidemiology, a subject that 
generally is introduced in advanced university courses. The 
first concepts of the topic, however, only use rates and 
ratios, which are applications of the mathematical concepts 
well within the grasp of the students. The student uses 
these tools immediately to examine the health indicators for 
the Cauca Valley, the rates of mortality, and the prevalence 
and incidence of the most important diseases. This reorgan-
ization of knowledge is an important task for educators, and 
what FUNDAEC has done is indeed a very small step toward 
a far more ambitious program of changing the content of the 
text for primary and secondary education. 4 
During the first deliberation about possible methods and 
content in the areas of natural sciences, the educational team 
of FUNDAEC became aware of the inherent limitation of 
teaching the sciences as distinct disciplines. According to 
Arbab, the student, when introduced to the field for the 
first time through highly structured disciplines, with their 
definitions and formulas, never learns the fundamental task 
of observing, discovering, and describing that which 
surrounds him. The student mentally divorces science from 






It therefore was decided to teach the sciences of systems 
and natural processes related to the future work of the 
students. A list was made of the themes that are covered in 
pre-university science courses. These themes were sepa-
rated concept by concept and reorganized into units that 
examine systems and processes such as the cultivation of 
beans and corn, the biosphere, the digestive system and 
nutrition, and the betterment of varieties of crops and 
animal breeds. In addition to developing the basic scientific 
capacities of the student, this approach has led to increased 
motivation and greater clarity of the material presented. 5 
The second phase of science courses (third and fourth 
years) is designed around University of Valle courses but 
with special texts. Professors from the university conduct 
many of these courses. Throughout all six years, emphasis 
remains on community services. This emphasis involves 
observation and description of the environment and its 
needs, which is carried out in cycles through specific 
packages developed by the facility of the Rural University 
around "research-action-learning." The fifth and sixth 
years of professional integration are almost entirely devoted 
to community services and are organized around these 
packages. 
Currently, packages under development are child devel-
opment, production in small farms, appropriate technology, 
environmental sanitation, and community organization. The 
following sample details one of the packages selected at 
random. 
Concepts of Sanitation: A Three-year Program. 6 
The first year includes lessons in diagnosis: 
General sanitation 
Problems of intestinal parasites relating to gastro-
intestinal systems 
Taking fecal samples 
Taking data on incidence of diarrhea 
Laboratory diagnosis at the University of Valle of 
intestinal parasites 
Diagnosis of water supply and disposal systems 
Diagnosis of nutritional systems 
5Dr. Farzam Arbab. 
60ne of the 
Carrasquillas, 
health. 
authors of this program is Dr. Gabriel 
M. D., who also holds an M.A. in public 
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The second year includes action/interventions based on 
diagnoses of the first year: 
Water supply and disposal systems 
Continue measuring indicators 
Deeper theory and practice 
The third year: 
Analyze what has been accomplished. 
As the training activities progressed, it became in-
creasingly evident that more was required than placing new 
professionals as agents for rural change. The need for 
activities in the field of appropriate technology led to the 
establishment of a new department within FUNDAEC called 
"Technology for Rural Welfare." This effort seeks to adapt 
technology that is more suited to the economic capacities of 
the small farmer. 
Two full-time engineers are dedicated to research in the 
field, supported by additional staff when necessary. They 
are seeking viable alternatives for production systems for 
the small farm. Work is underway in minimal irrigation, 
fertilizers, land preparation, credit, and availability of 
seeds. 
This work on appropriate technology opens the oppor-
tunity of educating technicians and para-professionals in 
shorter training programs within the six-year training of 
Engineers for Rural Welfare. This program has two levels: 
(1) the practitioner for rural welfare, who undergoes one 
year of study; and (2) the technician for rural welfare, who 
has a three-year period of study and is classified as a 
middle-level professional. These two programs will become 
available during the coming year. 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
A large number of people (on staff and otherwise) plus 
organizations and industry have continuously contributed 
services and materials to this program. No donated value 





Appropriations: (all in U.S. dollars) 
1974 $32, 000 Rockefeller Foundation 
(design programs and curricula) 
4 ,000 Colombian Foundation for Higher Education 
--- (Arrobleda land) 







































Carvajal Foundation of Colombia 
Rockefeller Foundation 
UNICEF 
Colombian National Plan/Foods & Nu tri ti on 
Fundo Nacional para el Desarrollo (FONADE) 
Eder Foundation of Colombia 
U.S. Inter-American Foundation 
Rockefeller Foundation 
PACT of the U.S.A. 
United Nations University 
Inter-American Foundation 
Eder Foundation of Colombia 
Colombian CIID (estimates pending) 
Ford Foundation 
PAN of Colombia 
* Divided into 1978 and 1979. 
**To cover two years. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The community services "packages" vary in length 
throughout the six years. The sanitation package, for 
example, is three years. They then are to be repeated in 
subsequent classes, which will provide the basis for longer-




At present, each of the students in the first class 
(1974) has done about eighty family case descriptions that 
have led to assessments of need, e.g., water supply, animal 
feed, waste utilization, agricultural needs, and social/ 
economic associations between families. The latter, for 
example, has resulted in separate cooperative systems for 
chicken production, processing, and marketing as individual 
small business enterprises. 
The success of the program, according to Arbab, can 
only be measured by the welfare of the families and commu-
nities in which the rural engineer works. Evaluation plans 
are drawn up to yield the educational program's improvement. 
Immediate conclusions are premature, but the small projects 
now being implemented show excellent relationships between 
students and communities. 
An obvious indicator of success is the fact that all 
sixteen students in the first class have been offered posi-
tions in various Colombian government agencies, even two 
years prior to graduation. They are to remain in the rural 
environment. Another strong indication of acceptance is the 
funding growth from $36 ,000 in 1974 by two agencies to 
$293, 500 by eight agencies, national and international. 
In terms of potential social impact, all aspects of health, 
education, nutrition, housing, social and community develop-
ment, public utilities, recreation, and retention of profes-
sional leadership in the rural scene are areas of great 
promise for the future. Arbab advised that the best student 
with the most potential is one who finished only the fourth 
grade. According to Arbab, it is inspiring to see intellects 
saved for productive use for their communities. 
Favorable economic impact, increased agricultural pro-
duction and utilization, higher income levels, strengthened 
family relationships, and local and regional development with 
reduced urban migration all appear to be quite possible. 
RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL GOALS 
The Colombian PAN Food and Nutrition program plus 
the Integrated Rural Development program call for increased 
food production, better nutrition, improved sanitation, and 
improved rural infrastructure. The National Health System 
is extended to small towns and inaccessible areas. The 
National Education System aims at the application of knowl-
edge to local conditions. FUNDAEC, with its engineers and 
technology for rural welfare through its university and 






Dr. Farzam Arbab 
President of the Board of Trustees, FUN DA EC 
Apartado Aereo 6555 
Cali, Colombia 
Dr. Gabriel Carrasquillas, staff member, FUN DA EC 
Ms. Christine Tucker, staff member, FUNDAEC 
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER 
1. The more direct application of academic education to the 
problems of the rural areas is a sought-after objective. 
Do the students in this program have sufficient oppor-
tunity to learn the basics of their fields of interest, or 
are they too dispersed across their rural activities to 
develop a real specialty? If not, should there be an 
institution to accomplish these sorts of development 
activities, in addition to the more traditional forms that 
concentrate on academic preparation of students? 
2. The minimum land area necessary for self-sufficiency in 
this region of Colombia appears to be below that which 
is typically owned. ls there a clear need for land 
redistribution policies in this instance? If so, how 
might they be accomplished? 
3. ls the assistance program introduced by the university 
faculty likely to be perpetuated, or is it a phenomenon 
that depends on the motivation of a few individuals for 
its success? ls this concept replicable in other situa-
tions? 
4. Other than the limited testimony of a few interviewees, 
is there any evidence that the program was having a 
material impact on the rural economy? ln view of the 
land tenure situation and the economics of agricultural 
self-sufficiency, is there any real prospect for the 
long-term viability of the small farmer system? 
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